RJ policy transfer: the case of Jamaica by Levers, Leanne Alexis
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications   
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/130951 
 
 
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
RJ Policy Transfer: The Case of Jamaica  
       
By  
Leanne Alexis Levers  
A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 in Politics and International Studies  
University of Warwick  
 Department of Politics and International Studies  
December 2017  

     Table of Contents 
 
Lists of Charts Figures and Tables            9 
Acknowledgements            11 
Declaration             12 
Abstract            13 
 Abbreviations            15 
Introduction:            20 
 What is RJ?             24 
 What is Policy Transfer?          28 
 Governance             30 
Research Questions            37 
Contributions             37 
 Chapter Summaries            41 
Chapter 1: Literature Review         44 
 Dolowitz & Marsh Framework          52 
 Who is involved in Policy Transfer?        52 
 What is the motivation to engage in policy transfer?      53 
 What is being transferred?          54 
 From where is the information transferred?       55 
What is the degree of transfer?          55 
What enables or constrains policy transfer?       56 
How do these factors affect the success or failure of policy transfer?     57 
Page !3
Justice Policy Transfer Literature          59 
Justice Policy Transfer Literature in the Caribbean       62 
 RJ Literature            66 
Restorative Practices          69 
Victim-Offender Mediation          69 
Restorative Circles           70 
Overlapping Features          71 
Stakeholder Involvement          71 
Honesty            72 
Consensual Outcome            72 
Chapter 2: Methodology          81 
Introduction to Research Methods         81 
Case Study Approach          82 
Data Collection           90 
Interviews            91 
Questionnaires           96 
Focus Groups            97 
Documents and Observations          99 
Triangulation                     102 
 Data Analysis                    103 
Limitations of the Study                   104 
Ethical Considerations                    110 
Protections of Participants and Researcher                  111 
Page !4
 Consent                    112 
Privacy                    113 
Researcher Effect                   117 
Chapter 3: Crime, Politics and Justice in Jamaica               120 
Jamaican Class Structure                  122 
Jamaican Politics                   129  
Political Structure                   129  
Political Party Competitiveness, Clientelism and Violence             133 
Garrisons                    139 
Dons                     142 
 Homogenous Voting                  144 
The Rise of the Don and Organized Crime              145 
Clientelism Continued: Appeasing the Elite               149 
 Clientelism Continued: International Stakeholders and the State            153 
Donor Countries                  154 
IFIs                            157 
Chapter 4: A Historical Shift and its Effect on Justice Policy            161 
Jamaican Justice Policy                 161 
Consequences of Semi-Coercive Policy Transfer               163 
A Shift towards Opportunistic Policy Transfer              166 
The Lack of Collaborative Governance in Jamaica               174 
Public Opinion                  176 
Page !5
Civil Society                   179 
      
Chapter 5: Legal Pluralism and Human Rights             189 
Legal Pluralism                 190 
The Formal Jamaican Justice System                192 
Informal Systems                  193 
Human Rights                  197 
 Human Rights and Legal Pluralism               201 
Human Rights Assessment of Formal Systems              203 
Access to Justice                 205  
Bias and Corruption                 208  
Lack of Contextual Legislation               210 
Inhumane Treatment of Prisoners                          211 
Dissatisfaction with the Justice System              212 
Assessment of Informal Systems              212 
Strengths of the Jungle Justice System             212 
Strengths of the Maroon Justice System             214 
Failures of the Informal System              218 
 Jungle Justice System               218 
Maroon Justice System               221 
Chapter 6: Exploring RJ as an approach to crime in Jamaica         225 
Does RJ Work?              227 
Page !6
Retributive Aspects of RJ            227 
Benefits of RJ             232 
Will RJ work in Jamaica?                       235 
Collaborative Approach           238 
Civil Society              240 
Other Non-State Actors            241 
Best Practice             248 
Chapter 7: RJ in Jamaica            253 
History of RJ in Jamaica                      253 
 RJ National Policy            254 
Chapter 8: Examining the Transfer of RJ Policy in Jamaica      283 
Dolowitz & Marsh Policy Framework         283 
Who is involved in Policy Transfer?         285 
 What is the motivation to engage in policy transfer?       295 
What is being transferred?           299 
From where is the information transferred?        300 
What is the degree of transfer?         303 
What enables or constrains policy transfer?       304 
How do these factors affect the success or failure of policy transfer?    308 
Conclusion            309 
References            314 
Appendices            356 
Page !7
Page !8
Lists of Charts, Figures and Tables  
Charts  
Chart 2.0  Distribution of Murder by Parish in Jamaica in 2013              89 
Chart 5.0  Court Structure in Jamaica                193 
Chart 7.0  IIRP RJ Continuums                  269 
Chart 8.1  MOJ RJ Referral Process                 275 
Chart 8.0  DRF RJ Referral Process                 301 
Chart 8.2  CCRJC Referral Process                 302 
Figures  
Figure 1.0  Four Components of Policy Transfer       47 
Figure 1.1  Dolowitz & Marsh Framework       52 
Figure 1.2  Dolowitz & Marsh Policy Transfer Framework Continuum    54 
Figure 1.3  Degrees of Policy Transfer        55 
Figure 2.0  Population Map of Jamaica        84 
Figure 2.1  Map of Kingston Metropolitan Region, showing the population    84 
    density of the Kingston Metropolitan Area  
Figure 2.2  Map of Kingston Metropolitan Area showing uptown/downtown divide   86 
Figure 2.3  Map of RJ location centres in Jamaica      89 
Figure 2.4  Map of Law Court locations in Jamaica      89 
Figure 3.0  Stone’s Class Structure in Jamaica                122 
Figure 3.1  Gordon’s Class Structure in Jamaica                125 
Figure 3.2  Map of Kingston and St. Andrew Constituencies              133 
Figure 3.3  Map of violent hotspots in Kingston KMR               137 
Figure 3.4  Map of Socio-Economic Background in 1991              140 
Page !9
Figure 4.0  Flow of Narcotics throughout the Caribbean             146 
Figure 4.1  Jamaica Rape Rates 2006- 2015                176 
Figure 5.0  Typology of Relationships between the Formal And Informal Systems          191 
 
Figure 5.1  Map of Cockpit Country (Maroon Territory)               194 
Figure 7.1  Social Discipline Windows                 271 
Tables 
Table 1.0  Focus of literature on RJ according to Region     75 
Table 2.0   List of Interviewees         90 
Appendices  
Appendix One  Arnstein’s Ladder of Collaboration & Moloney’s Continuum of           359 
   Collaboration 
Appendix Two  Methodology Tools                 360 
Appendix Three  Document Analysis                 367 
Appendix Four  List of Garrisons and Their Political Affiliations              369 
Appendix Five  Timeline of Milestone RJ moments in Jamaica             371 
Appendix Six   Photographs of RJ centres               378 
Appendix Seven  Population of Pilot RJ Communities in Jamaica             379 
Page !10
     Acknowledgments  
I am grateful to my supervisors, Professor Tom Sorell and Professor Ann Stewart for their steadfast 
dedication to supporting me throughout this time. Their guidance has been integral to the 
development of this thesis.  
My gratitude goes to the Independent Jamaican Council for Human Rights (IJCHR), WMW 
Jamaica and Providence Methodist Church for accommodating my focus groups and supporting my 
fieldwork research. I would also like to thank all those who participated in the research.  
My Loved ones – Daniella, Akin, Aunty Lornas, Aunty Maggie, Aunty Jackie, Kathryn, Kareen, 
Daniel, Shane, Kemi, Lisa, Alexis, Chung, Steven, Chantal, Roshell, Andrew, Gillian, Zoe, Simone, 
Kristina, Norville, Tian – Thank you for feeding, housing, proofreading for and believing in me 
when I didn’t believe in myself. I love you all.  
To my siblings, Dhara and Christopher- thank you for all your emotional and financial support 
throughout the years and your unwavering belief in me. I could not have accomplished this without 
you.  
To my Parents –There is a sadness that will never leave me because you are not here. I love you.  
      
Page !11
     Declaration  
I hereby declare that the research presented in this thesis is my own work, which entails empirical 
knowledge derived from primary and secondary data collated through fieldwork in Jamaica from 
September 2014 and March 2015. All the information acquired through elite interviews and focus 
groups was used with the written permission of the participants. Anonymity has been maintained as 
and when requested. I confirm that the research presented in this thesis has not been submitted for a 
degree at another university.  
Page !12
            Abstract 
 This thesis is a critical examination of the national Restorative Justice policy in Jamaica 
developed between 2001 and 2015. Restorative justice was considered as part of a larger on-going 
attempt of penal reform. Within this thesis, I adopted this definition from Tony Marshall thesis : 1
 “RJ is the process whereby all parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to  
 resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of an offence and its implications for the  
 future (Marshall, 1999). 
 Essentially, as a process that brings all those with a stake in a particular offence to 
collectively resolve the aftermath of the offence and its future implications, Restorative justice aims 
to do three things: (i) address the victim’s needs (ii) hold the offender accountable in a way that 
reintegrates them into society with reduced likelihood of reoffending and (iii) empower the 
community by involving them in providing justice to victims. I propose that RJ is consistent with an 
international human rights perspective on justice. This viewpoint understands punishment as an 
opportunity for addressing the direct cause of offending through an individualised approach to 
accountability. I argue that restorative justice can be an effective penal policy. However I argue that 
it is most beneficial when it is community driven, whilst having the financial support and  
supervision of the state.  
 The restorative justice policy process might have been an opportunity for the Jamaican 
government to implement effective penal policy. However, I argue that the Jamaican government 
engaged in a type of inappropriate policy transfer, where there was a failure to consider the cultural, 
political context of the country throughout development and implementation of policy. In particular, 
the government, as a result of the historically skewed donor relations in Jamaica, engaged in 
 As part of the formal justice system, RJ is typically embraced as an approach for juvenile 1
offenders initially. While I mention that this would have been a beneficial approach for the 
Jamaican government to make in Chapter 6, there is limited scope to move beyond this position, 
since its recognised use is limited to that of adults. 
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opportunistic policy transfer, where they gave primacy, without coercion, to the perceived interests 
of  international donors.  This is clear from the lack of even collaboration among stakeholders. This 
failure to be collaborative meant the neglect of such local facts of life as the lack of resources, 
political corruption and public mistrust of the state, the long-standing community loyalties to ‘dons’ 
or local leaders of organised crime and most importantly, the presence of informal mechanisms for 
dispute resolution already operating within the Jamaican context that might have provided a 
foundation for a context-specific effective ‘Jamaicanised’ form of restorative justice. 
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     Introduction  
 This thesis is a critical examination of the policymaking process of the national restorative 
justice (RJ) policy in Jamaica between 2001 and 2015, a policy that was created as part of a larger 
on-going penal reform process of the Jamaican justice system.  
 In common with many other former British colonies, Jamaica has experienced high levels of 
violent crime (Lange & Dawson, 2009). This violence is often associated with a history of political 
patronage of criminal gangs, who use violence and exploitation of Jamaican citizens for political 
ends (Stone, 1976; Harriott, 1999; Charles, 2002; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Sives, 2012; Jaffe, 
2015). Past efforts to reduce violent crime have had limited success for a number of reasons 
(Headley, 2002; Harriott, 2009; Charles & Beckford, 2012). For example, there is a history of 
politicians depending on criminal gangs in inner-city communities to deliver votes: a crackdown on 
crime would in effect be a crackdown on any ruling party’s political partners or limit the potential 
for the opposing political party to become the dominant party. This dependence of politicians on 
criminals has weakened the legitimacy of the state.  
 This has led to a diminished capacity of the state to enforce the rule of law . In order to 2
avoid accountability for their direct role in criminal activity, the state avoids punishing crimes 
committed by political gangs and does not apply the law evenly. In turn, many Jamaicans, 
particularly those in the inner cities, are less inclined to depend on relevant institutions of the state, 
namely the justice system and law enforcement. The collusion between political officials and 
criminals and the correlative failure of the state to uphold the rule of law has prompted the creation 
of informal governance actors who take on these state responsibilities for many Jamaicans. Informal 
 Within this thesis, the rule of law refers to the idea that citizens and government about bound by 22
law. It assumes the existence of legal rules and citizens’ awareness of the requirements that those 
rules impose (Tamanaha, 2011). 
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actors are often accepted and even defended vociferously because of a lack of alternatives (Harriott, 
2000; 2009, Headley, 2002; Acosta, 2005).  
 Historically, there have been few attempts to implement justice reform policy, due to the 
lack of political will to address crimes that benefit political parties. There has been a consistent 
failure of the Jamaican government to develop and implement even formal policy (Edie, 1984; 
Acosta, 2005; Harriott, 2009). Efforts at reform have focused on crimes, such as drug-trafficking 
and gang crime that affect developed states, in particular the USA, United Kingdom and Canada 
(Sives, 2007; 2012, Leslie, 2010; Figueroa & Sives, 2012; Levy, 2012). However these efforts have 
been half-hearted as political officials benefit directly from the crimes that donor countries seek to 
curb. The collusion between politicians and criminals, the country’s lack of financial independence 
and the subsequent failure to address crime in a way that benefits local victims has resulted in 
victims having limited access to justice and, in some cases being at risk of further victimization by 
other Jamaicans and the state itself. 
  In this thesis I propose that this historical dependence on funders and the resulting pressure 
to implement certain policies have created a political culture that consistently implements policies 
consistent with an international agenda, regardless of funding requirements or its benefit to the 
Jamaican context or the . Increasingly, the Jamaican government engages in what I will refer to as 
opportunistic policy transfer, where governments adopt policies because they see it as an occasion 
to engender or maintain funding relationships with donors. While there is a historic trend of semi-
coercive policy transfer in Jamaica, recent justice reform efforts demonstrate opportunistic policy 
transfer; where the government voluntarily adopts policy in order to gain financial donor support 
and give the appearance of being responsive to crime to the public from whom they seek electoral 
support. This is consistent with the limited political will to genuinely respond to the prevalence of 
crime seen. The superficial nature of justice policymaking in Jamaica is highlighted by a 
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willingness to adopt policy from other jurisdictions entirely un-adapted to the political, social and 
economic context of Jamaica.  
 The adoption of RJ policy in Jamaica is an example of opportunistic policy transfer. I 
propose that restorative practices, which are grounded in ideals such as accountability, collaboration 
and transparency, might have benefited Jamaica. A different kind of RJ has the potential to improve 
the public perception of the state and the justice system by strengthening its capacity to address 
crimes in Jamaica that are not related to political patronage. Unlike other programmes, which carry 
a certain level of uncertainty in terms of their capacity to reduce crime, RJ has demonstrated 
success in a range of other countries, including ones with similar historical background to Jamaica. 
This suggests a greater potential for addressing crime in Jamaica. Moreover, in Jamaica, there is a 
long-standing history of successfully using restorative-oriented practices as well as indigenous 
informal justice systems that reduce crime by embracing a community-driven approach to justice.  
 The stated Jamaican government rationale for developing a RJ policy was to re-establish 
Jamaicans’ faith in the state by improving the efficiency of the justice system, reducing the costs of 
crime and empowering communities through a structured collaboration with the state (Ministry of 
Justice, 2012). In addition, the choice to develop a national policy on RJ, a form of justice 
apparently inconsistent with a more established retributive approach in Jamaica, appeared to 
indicate policy innovation.  
 However, my research indicates that in spite of avowed positive intentions and support for 
RJ from both the main political parties in Jamaica, the policy was not home-grown or motivated by 
a local justice deficit suffered by ordinary Jamaicans. Instead, the motivation to adopt RJ policy 
from Nova Scotia is actually based on the Jamaican government’s pre-existing funding relationships 
with Canada as a donor country. What is more, the RJ policy was imported wholesale from Nova 
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Scotia. That is, the Jamaican government chose to copy a penal policy from a developed jurisdiction 
with traditions quite different from Jamaica’s, a policy they hoped Jamaicans would support as a 
watershed change in justice policy. My research indicates that both political parties sought to claim 
ownership of RJ policy, whilst forgoing opportunities to fuse RJ with well-established, indigenous 
community-driven approaches to justice.  
 In other words, the national RJ policy stands as an example of inappropriate transfer of RJ 
policy, as it failed to take account of the political, social and economic differences between the 
donor jurisdiction of Canada and Jamaica, such as the lack of resources, the prevailing culture of 
informerphobia and public mistrust of the state. The inappropriateness of the policy transfer, which 3
stemmed in large part from its opportunistic character, diminished the potential of RJ to reduce non-
political crime, is evidenced by the difficulties with the implementation of the policy and limited 
willingness of the public to engage with the programme.  
 In this thesis I argue that the lack of collaborative governance in Jamaica contributed 
significantly to inappropriate policy transfer. Had the Jamaican government considered local 
context, where we see competition between political parties, a lack of political will to effect change 
(due to the cultivation of organised criminals as funders and enforcers of justice), a politicised civil 
society and public mistrust of the government, a more contextualised RJ programme might have 
been created. Instead, the Jamaican government created divides between stakeholders in the 
policymaking process; namely the government and civil society. This unwillingness to collaborate 
resulted in a fight among political parties for ownership of the policy, a disjointed approach to 
developing and implementing RJ in Jamaica and an overall neglect of local ingredients of penal 
 2 This term refers to the culturally embedded fear of and consequences attached to being seen as an 
‘informer’ by going against the community and reporting information to the police or other state 
officials (Henry-Lee, 2005; Jaffe, 2012).  
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policy reform. I suggest that all of these factors help to explain the limited uptake of the RJ 
programme: only 46 cases have been completed since 2014. I argue that if the Jamaican government 
had taken a collaborative approach to governance that incorporated a range of stakeholders, the 
programme would have benefitted from a single, unified approach to policymaking that would have 
taken in to account the context- specific issues noted above.  
 In the next two sections, I introduce both RJ and policy transfer, as underpinning ideas of 
the thesis, before going on to identify the research questions and detail how answering these 
questions makes a contribution to Caribbean studies, political science and criminal justice. I will 
then provide an outline of the rest of the thesis.  
What is RJ?  
 RJ is practiced in a number of jurisdictions for various purposes ranging from conflict 
resolution in schools to transition out of foster care to rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders, 
to reconciliation of system-wide offences during a post-civil war/ political conflict (Braithwaite, 4
2002; Daly, 2015; Van Ness & Strong, 2014). However, there is no single accepted definition of RJ, 
or a unique theory from which it has arisen (Van Ness & Strong, 2014; Daly 2015).  
 For instance, there is a wealth of literature on the use truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) 4
in countries such as South Africa Guatemala, Canada and Chile to address gross human rights 
violations of the country’s past (Llewellyn & Howse, 1999; Van Ness & Strong, 2014; Richards & 
Wilson, 2017). However, Daly (2015) notes that this is ‘transitional justice’, not RJ. First, TRCs are 
truth-seeking mechanisms, which investigate and document these abuses. A TRC is a state 
empowered system that investigates past events that have affected the wider population over a 
period of time (Richards & Wilson, 2017). TRCs document these violations in the form of a final 
report, which very rarely requires enforcement of recommendations or restitution for victims. As 
Daly (2015) points out, justice and reparations are separate ideals within TRCs. Unlike transitional 
justice, RJ in the criminal justice system starts off from with an acknowledgement of the convict’s 
guilt and seeks to produce some form of personal reconciliation between the convict and victim 
based on the willingness of the offender to acknowledge guilt. 
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 One of the most influential definitions, and the one adopted in this thesis  is from Tony 5
Marshall: 
 “RJ is the process whereby all parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to  
 resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of an offence and its implications for the  
 future (Marshall, 1999). 
 Despite the fact that RJ is an old concept , governmental interest in this approach to justice 6
has re-emerged within the last few decades. This resurgence is motivated by the consistent failures 
of formal justice systems to ensure access to justice and equality before the law (Achilles & Zehr, 
2000; Morris, 2002; Wenzel et al. 2008; Van Wormer, 2009). The literature on RJ suggests that 
westernized justice systems view crime as a violation of state laws and citizen obligations to the 
state (Achilles & Zehr, 2000; Wenzel et al, 2008; Barton, 2000). In doing so, many justice systems 
limit the role of victims and neglects the impact that crime has on  wider community. In addition, 
the formal system provides a pre-determined response to the question of how to address crime, 
namely, hard treatment in the form of incarceration, or some other burden imposed upon the 
wrongdoer that is meant to be proportionate to what he deserves (Barton, 2000; Sullivan & Tifft, 
2008; Wallace, Wylie and Gordon, 2013). However, the idea of using isolation or some harm in 
order to address harm caused is counter-intuitive, as it provides little benefit to the victim, 
wrongdoer or community. Within many post-colonial developing countries that have failing justice 
 As part of the formal justice system, RJ is typically embraced as an approach for juvenile 5
offenders initially. While I mention that this would have been a beneficial approach for the 
Jamaican government to make in Chapter 6, there is limited scope to move beyond this position, 
since its recognised use is limited to that of adults. 
 RJ is not new (Carey, 2000; Van Ness, 2005). Practices of restitution and reconciliation after 6
offences can be found throughout history in both Western and Non-Western traditions and religions 
(Umbreit, 1994; Weitekemp, 1999; Winfree, 2004). Principles of restitution for property offences 
can be found in the Code of Hammurabi, dating back to 1700 BC (Azdorf-Schubbe, 2000; Richards, 
2009). Similar principles can be found in Old Testament and Hebrew scriptures (Carey, 2000). 
Some argue that RJ is anticipated in the tradition of Native Americans, New Zealand natives, as 
well as Mennonites in Canada and Indiana (Winfree, 2004; Wormer, 2008).  
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systems, this means the neglect of victims, and limited or passive punishment of offenders via 
incarceration that does not require them to face the effects of these crimes (Achilles & Zehr, 2015; 
Wallace, Wylie & Gordon, 2013). Ultimately the state fails to protect by the community because 
victims do not walk away with a sense of justice being achieved
 
and it does not hold the offender 7
accountable in a way that lessens the likelihood of reoffending upon his return to society. Thus there 
is a failure to protect the community effectively, beyond that of the temporary physical removal of 
the wrongdoer.  
 As in the formal justice system, RJ requires that when an offence is committed, something 
should be done about it (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Zehr, 1990; Gavrieldies, 2007). However, RJ 
states that crime is not simply a violation of state law (Ashworth, 2002; Braithwaite, 2002; 
Liebmann, 2007; Hamlin & Hokamura, 2012). Proponents of RJ argue that crime violates the 
relationship between the wrongdoer, the victim and the immediate community (Morris, 2002; 
Sullivan & Tifft, 2008; Wenzel et al, 2008; Wallace, Wylie & Gordon, 2013). In order to repair the 
damage, blanket punishment is not sufficient. As a violation that has affected all three parties, the 
response should demonstrate respect for all involved and raise awareness in the wrongdoer of the 
harm done in order to restore the relationships (Zehr, 1990; Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Gavrieldies, 
2007). In restoring these relationships, RJ aims to ensure that no one’s dignity is violated further. 
This is achieved by restoring the victim’s sense of security and respect via some sort of apology or 
compensation from the wrongdoer, increased participation in the justice process and support from 
 This literature indicates that lengthy periods of incarceration are not effective tools in reducing 7
recidivism (Rydberg & Clark, 2016; Wermink, Nieuwbeerta, & Ramakers, 2017). This failure to 
engender reform is compounded by the poor treatment of offenders, which as will be discussed later 
on, increases the likelihood of recidivism. Although there is limited research on the effect of 
incarceration and prison conditions in Jamaica, one might infer its ineffectiveness in reforming 
prisoners from the consistently high reoffending rates. The DCS reported consistently high 
reoffending rates across prisoners during the 1990s, ranging from 25% to 48% (Taylor, Chauhan & 
Fondacaro, 2012). In particular, in 1993 there was a spike of 54% in offender recidivism (Taylor, 
Chauhan &. Fondacaro, 2012). 
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the community. In addition, the wrongdoer is held accountable for his offending behaviour. RJ has 
the wrongdoer demonstrate accountability by apologising directly to his victim and community and 
making efforts to address the damage caused by the crime. RJ ensures that offenders are confronted 
with the negative effects of their actions and work actively to repair the damage. For restorativists, 
impersonal retribution via incarceration allows the wrongdoer merely to suffer harsh treatment 
without facing up to what he has done or its effects on victims. It therefore allows the wrongdoer to 
avoid discharging the duty to manage, learn and grow from their conflicts (Wenzel et al. 2008) . By 8
contrast, restorative practices provide the wrongdoer with the opportunities to take responsibility by 
facing those who have been affected by the offence directly (Hudson, 2002). Finally, increased 
participation from the community is an important step in increasing the commitment of the 
community to crime prevention and reconciling the harm directly caused by the offence. 
 RJ does not seek to restore the status quo, which may have contributed to committing the 
offence to begin with. Instead, it encourages (but is not mandated to ensure) a transformation of the 
offender into a better person who is capable of forming better relationships within his community. 
In RJ, a wrongdoer is expected to recognise his wrongdoing, repent publicly and undertake agreed 
actions to compensate the victim and wider community (Wenzel et al, 2008). The punishment, 
which is agreed to by the wrongdoer as well as the victim and community, is tailored to encourage 
his return to society as a law-abiding citizen; offenders are required to engage in a number of 
activities that respond to individualised risks for re-offending (specific to the wrongdoer), such as 
regular drug and alcohol testing and rehabilitative courses (Wormer, 2008). Thus, he is punished in 
a way that reduces the likelihood of reoffending. In restoring relationships, RJ has the potential to 
reintegrate victims and perpetrators into society and can facilitate a better understanding of why 
 The literature suggests that severe curtailment of liberties may create a sense of bitterness towards 8
society, which strengthens the likelihood of reoffending (Dhami, 2005; Orr, 1998). This loss of 
rights may alienate offenders and give them a reason to reoffend.  
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crimes have been committed amongst the community. In this way, all parties may become aware of 
how they might guard against further crimes being committed.  
What is Policy Transfer?  
 This thesis is concerned with the importation of RJ policy from a Canadian provincial 
jurisdiction –Nova Scotia – to Jamaica. This is an example of policy transfer. Dolowitz & Marsh 
(1996; 2003) are responsible for coining the term ‘policy transfer’ and setting out the framework to 
examine its use (Benson & Jordan, 2011; Jones & Newburn, 2014). Policy transfer is defined as the 
process whereby knowledge regarding policies or political practices of one political system is used 
in the development of policies and practices in another political system (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2003; 
Patterson & Sloam, 2005; Hoyt, 2006; Marsh & Sharman, 2009).  
 Within the policy literature, there is a substantial discussion of the transfer of elements of 
policies within and across jurisdictions (Bennett, 1991; Rose 1993; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; James 
& Lodge, 2003; Jones & Newburn, 2007; Monahagn, 2015; Ogg, 2015). A number of factors have 
been proposed to account for policy transfer, such as the spread of information between states that 
are geographically close and the proliferation of national networks that share information (Stone, 
2012). While the transfer of policies has been a common practice throughout history, the literature 
identifies globalisation
 
as the driving force behind the recent increased spread of policies 9
(Fruhling, Tulchin & Golding, 2003;; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Evans, 2009; Jones, 2013; 
Barrows, 2014). Globalisation has not only increased the overlap in societal issues across countries, 
but has allowed for increased transmission of policy ideas and concepts to address these problems. 
Although there is no single definition of globalisation, Cerny (1994) notes that it is a term that is 9
used widely across disciplines. Within the realm of politics, globalisation is defined as an 
interaction of people and governments from different jurisdictions that is driven by economic, 
political and technological advancements (Drezner, 2001; Evans, 2009).  
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Common societal issues across jurisdictions lend themselves to the use of similar policy 
approaches, particularly in societies with uncertain or developing political environments (Stone, 
2000; Jones, 2003; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Muncie, 2005; Jones & Newburn, 2007; Crawford, 
2011). Technological advances such as the Internet have facilitated this increased communication 
between policymakers (Bissessar, 2002; Benson, 2009; Evans, 2009; Barrows, 2014).  
 Some have argued that the study of policy transfer is pointless. McCann & Ward (2010) 
propose that the entire concept of policy transfer should be abandoned altogether. However, the 
discussion of policy transfer can be seen across a range of disciplines, ranging from political science 
to public health and economics (Page, 2000; Evans, 2009; Benson & Jordan, 2012; Evans & Marsh, 
2012). Practically, the study of policy transfer can only help jurisdictions to improve their 
policymaking efforts by identifying when policy transfer is an ideal approach, how it should be 
done and the factors that influence process and outcome (Stone, 1999; Evans & Marsh, 2012; 
Dolowitz & Marsh, 2012).  
 From an academic standpoint, the discussion of policy transfer makes a number of 
contributions to policymaking literature. It explores the factors that motivate policy change and 
identifies the mechanisms that drive the spread of policies (Marsh & Sharman, 2009; Evans, 2009). 
In addition, policy transfer advances our understanding of how decision-makers learn (Haas, 1997; 
Evans, 2009; Marsh & Sharman, 2009). Much of the policy transfer literature discusses how 
policymakers learn of policies, whether through the identification of policy entrepreneurs, experts 
and networks, the influence of globalisation or the increased use of study tours by states to identify 
a suitable policy in response to a particular problem (Haas, 1997; Stone, 1999; Evans, 2009; Marsh 
& Sharman, 2009; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2012). Evans (2009) points out how policy transfer 
contributes to the discussion of incrementalism, by providing an explanation of how outside 
influences inform policy learning. Toen & Landwher’s discussion of cross-national policy learning 
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compares the impact of the different strategies of policy learning, indicating that the way in which 
policymakers learn about policies has an influence on the outcome of the policymaking process (as 
seen in Evans, 2009). McAllister, McCrea & Lubell (2014) discuss how the agendas of members of 
these networks influence policymaking outcomes. In the case of climate policy in Australia, they 
found that the prioritization of advocacy of local government issues limited policy choices and 
resulted in biased use of information (McAllister, McCrea & Lubell, 2014).  
 This thesis identifies policymaking styles embraced in Jamaica and whether or not national 
RJ policy is consistent with Jamaica’s policymaking history. In addition, the examination of the RJ 
policy will discuss how effective this consistency with or departure from the norm has been for 
justice policy transfer, which is under examined in the literature. The examination of the various 
factors that affect the process and outcome of justice policy transfer in a space where there have 
been limited attempts at justice reform, is important for understanding how to best implement 
justice policy within Jamaica.  
Governance  
 Another criticism of policy transfer literature is that it fails to advance a specific theory of 
policy development (Evans, 2009; Benson & Jordan, 2012). Many academic commentators agree 
that policy transfer is weak as a theory of policy change. However, they propose that it is 
strengthened when combined with other theories, particularly within the discipline of political 
science. Rhodes & Mazey (1995) refer to methodological pluralism, where a number of 
complementary policy development theories are combined to develop a theory that accounts for a 
number of topics related to policy change, such as the role of certain agents (Shlonsky & Mildon, 
2014).  
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 One of the most  complementary combinations is that of policy transfer and governance 
(Ewalt & Jennings, 2004; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Evans, 2009; Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011; 
Evans & Marsh, 2012; Stone, 2012; Moloney, 2013; Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017). Essentially, 
governance theory discusses shifting patterns of how people are governed; the process of ruling 
(Stoker, 2002; Hill, 2004; Ewalt & Jennings, 2004). Governance refers to  
 “The sound exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority to manage a   
 country’s resources for development. It involves the institutionalisation of a system through  
 which citizens, institutions, organisations, and groups in a society articulate their interests, e 
 exercise their rights, and mediate their differences in pursuit of the collective good” (Jabes,  
 2004, p646).  
 Policy transfer acts as a lens through which the evolution of state institutions and emergence 
of new state actors can be brought into focus (Evans, 2009). It provides a guide for understanding 
how and why changes in governance occur (Stoker, 2002). The literature makes a distinction 
between the concept of governance and government. Government refers strictly to the rule of 
formal state institutions working to maintain order and enable collective action, while governance 
advocates the sharing of responsibility beyond the state to the private and voluntary sector and 
ordinary citizens to solve societal issues (Stoker, 2002; Hill, 2004; Ewalt & Jennings, 2004; 
Holston, 2009; O’Brien, 2012; Zurba, 2014).  
 Policy transfer complements governance theory because of its shared emphasis on the 
complex relationship between the state and international policy agendas as filtered through 
interactions with the state as well as non-state, transnational and international actors (Evans & 
Marsh, 2002; Marsh & Evans, 2012; Challies et al, 2017). In fact, practitioners often adopt modes 
of governance from other countries as part of their policymaking efforts, as seen in the European 
Union and their development of environmental policy (Challies et al, 2017). In this way, policy 
transfer analysis can be understood as making sense of how knowledge at one level of governance 
influences the development at another level (Evans, 2009; Challies et al, 2017).  
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 There has been a widespread shift away from discussions of ‘government’ to governance 
(Hill, 2004; Ewalt & Jennings, 2004; O’Brien, 2012) . Marsh & Evans (2012) identify three modes 10
of governance: hierarchy, network and market. Hierarchy governance has an organisational 
structure where one entity is superior to all other organisations involved (Evans & Marsh, 2012). 
Market governance mechanisms employ principles of competition or game theory as a means of 
encouraging sustainable development (Evans & Marsh, 2012). Finally, network governance is 
defined as  
 “Coordination that is characterised by organic or informal social systems, in contrast to   
 bureaucratic structures within firms and formal contractual relationships between    
 them.” (Jones, Hesterly &Borgatti, 1997, p 913).  
 They go on to discuss how policy transfer manifests under different modes of governance. 
Under a hierarchical mode of governance, policy transfer is more likely to be a top-down process, 
which takes a rationalist approach to policymaking. Network governance is more likely to make it a 
negotiated or collaborative process (Huxham, 2000; Hill, 2004; Ewalt & Jennings, 2004; O’Brien, 
2012; Moloney, 2013; Fung 2015). It is characterised by creation of networks of all stakeholders 
that have comparable consideration in decision-making (Evans & Marsh, 2012). It  
 Within this thesis, I focus on collaborative governance, as a form of network governance. 
Collaborative governance is defined as,  
 “The processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that   
 engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of    
 government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public   
 purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011,   
 p2).  
The literature highlights the increased value placed on the outsourcing of former state 10
responsibilities to voluntary sector and civil society, as well as a shift in the role of government 
from origination to regulation, steering, collaboration and integration.  
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 As the term suggests, collaborative governance is rooted in the notion of collaboration 
(Schoburgh, 2007; Bowen, 2009; Jones, 2010; Minto-Coy, 2011; Brown, Langridge & Rudestam, 
2016). Collaborative governance requires administrative capacity and strong leadership to 
coordinate the diverse roles and functions amongst all stakeholders. Having a strong organizational 
model ensures a level of structure and order. This model should be adaptable and sustainable (Jones, 
2010; Schoburgh, 2007; Mahmood, 2010; Minto-Coy, 2011). This strengthens the capacity building 
of the network and organizational capabilities.  
 Collaboration requires a clear consensus on the goals being pursued jointly and the roles that 
each stakeholder plays in order to achieve that goal (Schoburgh, 2007; Bowen, 2009; Minto-Coy, 
2011; Moloney, 2013). This clear understanding of the collaborative process and the policy being 
undertaken helps to reduce competition between stakeholders for ownership, ensures that there is no 
single perspective that takes precedence and most importantly prevents misunderstandings (Bowen, 
2009; Jones, 2010; Minto-Coy, 2011). In addition, the outlined sharing of responsibilities increases 
the efficiency of the collaboration and allows for fair and equal distribution of work.  
 A shared consensus requires transparency. Stakeholders must have on-going and clear 
communication, again, as a way of minimising any misunderstanding and engendering trust 
between stakeholders (Bowen, 2009; Jones, 2010; Minto-Coy, 2011). Finally, it is essential that 
there is consideration of context. In other words, there should be investigation into the type of 
available resources and a solid understanding of the cultural, political and economic structure of the 
country in which a policy is applied (Bowen, 2009; Jones, 2010; Minto-Coy, 2011). In this way, the 
group can ensure that they are setting achievable goals and their strategy is suitable to the relevant 
conditions. This approach may result in increased commitment and motivation as the group of 
stakeholders meets each target. These requirements tend to improve the potential for successful 
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collaboration, increased resource production and achievement of pre-determined goals (Jones, 2010; 
Minto-Coy, 2011).  
 Both policy transfer and collaborative governance literatures indicate how essential the 
collaboration of stakeholders is to the success of policy (Grant, 2003; Bowen, 2009; Innes & 
Booher, 2010; Exadaktylos & Zahariadis, 2012; Moloney 2013). Understanding policy transfer as a 
type of collaborative governance process enables one to examine how different types of governance 
bear on a variety of societal issues (Evans, 2004). Other factors also affect the influence of 
governance as well. The number and type of stakeholders included in what should be a 
collaborative process, their motivation for involvement and their level of interaction are key 
determinants of policy success (Evans, 2004). Shafer (2014) notes the value of government 
collaborating with academics in policymaking due to their capacity to legitimise policy through 
developing an evidence-based policymaking approach. However, the involvement of academics is 
oftentimes limited to providing research, which can be used selectively in order to support state 
interests, thereby affecting the effectiveness of policy (Shafer, 2014).  
 This influence of different modes of governance on policy transfer is often discussed 
(Crawford & Newburn, 2002; Bissessar, 2002; Stoker, 2004; Evans, 2009; O’Brien, 2012; Goldin, 
2013; Morales & Harris, 2014). Collaborative governance has many proposed benefits. Where 
stakeholders who are actively involved in decision-making, are more likely to be successful than 
others in both developing policy for stakeholders and implementing it through pooling of resources 
(Huxham, 2000; Newburn & Crawford, 2002; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Evans, 2009; Sirianni, 2009; 
Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011; Moloney, 2012; Brown, Langridge & Rudestam, 2016). By 
involving a range of actors with varying backgrounds, collaborative governance enables 
governments to find innovative ways of responding to societal issues. Academics, CSOs and 
business sector stakeholders bring unique benefits to the network through collaborative governance. 
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CSOs bring their approach of volunteerism, advocacy and cost-effective benefits of service 
provision, while academics contribute to effective programme creation through evidence-based 
solutions (Jones, 2010; Moloney, 2013; Macaulay, 2013). This involvement of multiple voices 
increases the likelihood of success by contributing to the resolution of a problem. State stakeholders 
are likely to be disconnected from non-state perspectives. By acquiring the input of non-state 
stakeholders, members of the public and CSOs that are more likely to be affected by the issue being 
faced, one ensures that the policy addresses it directly. The literature states that this approach to 
policymaking is likely to lead to overall improvement of capacity, state accountability, civic 
engagement, production of resources and ensures the delivery of an effective programme or policy 
(Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bowen, 2009; Innes & Booher, 2010; Jones, 2010; Minto-Coy, 2011; 
Moloney, 2013; Brown, Langridge & Rudestam, 2016) . 11
 This thesis embraces Moloney’s (2013) ladder of participation. This model is based on a 
Caribbean context (also a modified version of Arnstein’s ladder of participation), to identify the 
type of collaboration taking place throughout the policymaking process . Moloney (2014) uses a 12
ladder where the lower end is referred to as ‘informing’ and the upper end is full collaboration 
For instance, Johnson (2015) discusses the collaboration that took place to develop legislation 11
regarding adult prostitution in Vancouver. The collaboration of academics, legal professionals and 
most importantly sex workers contributed to this legislative reform. While academics and legal 
professionals provided evidence to challenge the incumbent prostitution laws, the inclusion of sex 
workers created a campaign that acknowledged how these laws impacted the lives of sex workers 
negatively and assembled recommendations that would improve their situation (Johnson, 2015). As 
a result, there have been reports of improved interaction between the police and sex workers, 
continued concern and support for sex workers by the state, on-going public awareness efforts and 
overall increased neighbourhood safety (Johnson, 2015). 
Arnstein proposes that there are gradations of involvement in a collaborative process. She (1969) 12
developed a continuum that is used widely within literature on participation called the ‘ladder of 
participation’. She (1969) argued that the use of a ladder highlights the various degrees of 
participation in citizenship (as seen in Bishop & Davis, 2002). Some academics have used this idea 
that is commonly used for citizens, in order to assess the level of inclusion of CSOs (Donohue, 
2004; Bowen, 2005; Jones, 2010; Moloney, 2013). 
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(partnership) . In between these two extremes are various forms of involvement: (i) consultation, 13
(ii) placation, (iii) cooperation and (iv) coordination (See Appendix One). The first three on the 
ladder (consultation, placation and cooperation) are considered to be tokenistic in nature. Tokenistic 
states denote a lack of interest in stakeholder participation by the state. These are highlighted by 
short-term and informal interaction and a failure to incorporate the views of non-state stakeholders 
into the policy outcome (Bowen, 2009, p 74; Moloney, 2013). States might inform citizens of policy 
choices via citizen meetings or consult them through the administration of surveys. However there 
is an effort made to limit participation in governance activities that have a direct influence on policy 
development (Moloney, 2013).  
 Coordination and collaboration involve meaningful participation. Coordination is 
characterised by an on-going relationship between actors that involves shared goals and 
responsibility in achieving tasks. Collaboration involves closer connections and overlapping of 
connections, resources and boundaries (Moloney, 2013). I argue that the Jamaican government had 
meaningful coordination with its donor countries, while all other stakeholders made at most, minor 
contributions to the development of RJ policy. This is evidenced by the lack of awareness of the 
policy by identified civil society partners, the fight for ownership of policies between political 
parties, the poor public consultation efforts and the intentional exclusion of other non-state 
stakeholders, such as the leaders of informal justice systems.  
 As I will discuss, the Jamaican government failed to embrace collaborative governance 
throughout the development of the national RJ policy. In keeping with the literature on policy 
transfer failure, the Jamaican government was guilty of poor administration, lack of consensus on 
roles of stakeholders and failure to consider context. I propose that there has been an exclusion of 
 It is understood that the Jamaican State does not engage in full participation nor does it 13
completely exclude all stakeholders, that is, non-participation. 
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civil society and the Jamaican public from RJ policy-making. Given the contextual issues examined 
in this thesis, such as political competitiveness and corruption, politicisation of the voluntary sector 
and public mistrust and the corresponding dependence on informal justice systems, this thesis 
works to advance the discussion of the benefits of collaborative policymaking approaches and 
identification of what conditions affect its success.  
Research Questions  
 Policy transfer analysis seeks to strengthen the understanding of the cross-cultural transfer 
of knowledge about policies from one sector to another in a different country (Evans, 2009). As the 
first in-depth assessment of justice policy conducted in Jamaica, this thesis seeks to describe how 
policy transfer took place to explain why policy transfer occurred and to prescribe 
recommendations that would have allowed the policy transfer to achieve a greater level of success. I 
focus on answering two central research questions:  
(i)  What factors influenced the process of penal policy transfer within the post-colonial, 
pluralist jurisdiction of Jamaica? 
(ii)   How did these factors affect the capacity of RJ to address crime in Jamaica? 
Contributions  
 The discussion of RJ in what follows lies at the intersection of political science, Caribbean 
studies, and criminal justice studies. In answering (i) and (ii) and by providing the first case study of 
penal policy transfer in Jamaica, I seek to make a series of contributions to the regional justice and 
political science literatures as well as the wider political science literature in a number of respects.  
 First, this thesis contributes to academic discussion of penal policy transfer in developing 
jurisdictions (Jones, 2003; Jones & Newburn, 2007; Steinberg, 2011; Macaulay, 2013; Macfarlane 
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& Canton, 2014; Silva, 2015; Carrington, 2016). By providing an in-depth examination of how 
political, cultural, legal and economic contexts of Jamaica affect policy transfer and policymaking 
in general, this thesis will illuminate the policy process in developing states while highlighting 
distinctions between its impact on developing and developed jurisdictions. In doing so, this thesis 
makes a significant contribution to the development of the Dolowitz & Marsh framework by 
identifying an additional motivation for policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2002; Stone, 2004; 
Blumer & Padgett, 2004). As will be discussed the motivation for transfer is a continuum, ranging 
from voluntary to coercive transfer. However, I propose that the RJ policymaking process in 
Jamaica is an example of opportunistic policy transfer. I posit that a jurisdiction engages in 
opportunistic policy transfer, where voluntary adoption of policy takes place irrespective of its exact 
content or its appropriateness at a time to a jurisdiction, but because adopting the policy is rewarded 
by the country it is adopted from financially or successfully engenders political support from the 
public by appearing to be responsive to an issue. Notwithstanding the lack of political will to 
embrace policy that is beneficial to the context of the jurisdiction, opportunistic policy transfer 
(which is disconnected from a genuine need to respond to an issue) is not likely to single out 
effective policy or even policy that applies at all outside the originating jurisdiction. This concept of 
opportunistic policy transfer expands the Dolowitz & Marsh framework and its understanding of 
‘voluntary’ transfer and has practical use for policymakers across jurisdictions in identifying 
correlations between motivation for policy transfer and its subsequent success or failure.  
 From a methodological standpoint, this thesis also adds value to the Dolowitz & Marsh 
framework by being applied to penal policy transfer. Currently, the Dolowitz and Marsh framework 
is not applied to case studies of justice policy. Also, there are limited examples of its use to assess 
policy within developing or newly democratic jurisdictions (Bissessar, 2002; Randma-Liiv & 
Kruusenberg, 2012; Nethery & Gordyn, 2013). As will be discussed, the Dolowitz & Marsh 
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framework is a heuristic device: it provides a framework for identifying and learning various factors 
that affect policy transfer, rather than assuming a set of pre-determined factors (Dolowitz & Marsh, 
200; McFarlane & Canton, 2014; Ogg 2015). Therefore, the Dolowitz & Marsh framework has a 
particular value in its application to developing countries with policymakers, who are yet to identify 
policymaking trends in their jurisdictions and are not rigid in their institutional approaches to 
policymaking.  
 Second, there is relatively limited discussion of policy transfer within the Caribbean, 
particularly in the area of justice
 
(Bissessar, 2000; 2002; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Hoyt, 2006; 14
Ramdathsingh, 2014; Meikle & Jaffe, 2015; Harriott & Jones, 2016). There are two types of policy 
transfer literature; one that explicitly mentions policy transfer, and another that implies the spread of 
policies across jurisdictions, without labelling it as policy transfer (Evans, 2009). Much of the 
literature that discusses policy transfer in Jamaica is of the latter kind (Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; 
Harriott, 2009; Harriott, Lewis & Zechmeister, 2015; Harriott & Jones, 2016). This explicit 
identification of policy transfer and its causal factors is important in underlining the distinction 
between the conscious process of policy transfer and other forms of transfer, such as lesson-drawing 
and convergence. In turn, this advances the wider policy transfer literature, which calls for case 
studies to make these distinctions, in order to contribute to the evolving nature of policy transfer as 
a concept (Evans, 2009; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2012; Benson & Jordan, 2012; Oliver, Lorenc & 
Innvaer, 2014; Bender, Keller & Willing, 2014).  
 My in-depth assessment of justice policy transfer in Jamaica responds to the call for case 
studies on justice policy within the regional literature (Acosta, 2002; Harriott, 2009; Harriott & 
Jones, 2016). This thesis makes an empirical contribution to the limited discussion of penal policy 
Much of the discussion surrounding policy transfer in the Caribbean focuses on economic, health 14
and environmental policy. 
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in Jamaica as the first case study that details the policymaking process of justice policy. Previous 
literature tends to focus on identifying the approach to justice and discussing the outcomes of these 
approaches, without considering how the process affects that outcome. The emphasis on Jamaica 
does not prevent uptake by the wider Caribbean literature as a means of comparing the 
policymaking process in other Caribbean jurisdictions and former British colonies.  
 While there is extensive literature on RJ, RJ within Jamaica and the Caribbean is restricted 
to a few papers (Williams, 2009; Taylor, Chauhan, Fondacaro, 2012; Wallace, Wylie & Gordon, 
2013; Ali 2014). This thesis expands the literature on Caribbean RJ and will be of use to Caribbean  
countries that are, or will be, considering the implementation of RJ programmes. Not only will I 
highlight the mistakes of the Jamaican government in terms of its poor approach to governance and 
inappropriate policy transfer of RJ policy, but I will also propose an ideal form of Jamaican RJ that 
is specially well suited to the Jamaican political, social and economic context. In this way, my 
discussion on the effect of transfer of RJ policy from a region of a developed country (Canada) to 
the post-colonial, developing and legally pluralistic Jamaican context will break new ground. This 
discussion of RJ policy will also prove beneficial to guiding practitioners and policymakers to 
develop and implement RJ that is fit-for-purpose within similar regions.  
 Finally, I contribute to governance literature by expanding on the limited discussion on the 
role of non-state actors in governance processes such as policymaking. The concept of collaborative 
governance has been applied to a range of policy contexts, particularly environmental and health 
policy (Nicholson-Crotty & O’Toole, 2004; Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011; Moloney, 2013; 
Brown, Langridge & Rudestam, 2016; Zurba, 2014; Fliervoet, et al, 2015; Hutter, 2016). However, 
much of the discussion of governance and policymaking tends to exclude jurisdictions where 
collaboration is not popular, such as the developing states of the South, including the Caribbean, 
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South Africa, Tanzania and Mexico
 
(Minto-Coy, 2011; Moloney, 2013). There are only a few 15
examples of case studies that provide evidence of the positive influence of collaborative governance 
on policy transfer in developing states, despite the fact that it is often proposed as a solution to 
failed instances of policymaking, including the Caribbean (Hill, 2004; Ewalt & Jennings, 2004; 
Benson, 2009; Moloney, 2012; Levy, 2012; Blake, 2012; Jaffe, 2015). Also, while there is 
substantial literature that speaks to the role of non-state criminal actors in governance, the 
discussion is limited to their capacity to govern at the community level, rather than their 
involvement in policymaking (Arias, 2006; Koonings and Kruijt, 2007; Jones and Rodgers, 2009; 
Meikle & Jaffe, 2015). This thesis can spearhead the discussion of possible roles for non- state 
violent actors in penal policymaking in Jamaica, as the government moves towards collaborative 
governance (Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Bowen, 2009; Jones, 2010; Minto-Coy, 2011; Moloney, 
2013; Lue, 2015; Anglin, 2015; Miller, 2017; Schoburgh & Ryan, 2017).  
 I propose that, as part of a collaborative approach, the inclusion of leaders of informal 
justice systems that operate within the Jamaica would have been beneficial to the policymaking 
process: namely certain criminal gang leaders and leaders of the Maroon community. As leaders of 
systems that contribute to the administration of justice within Jamaica, they have the potential to 
provide lessons on the needs of Jamaican citizens and on the operation of an informal system that 
can interact with the formal justice system. In addition, their consultation might have had a positive 
effect of improving public trust of the state by demonstrating the approval of trusted community 
leaders.  
Chapter Summaries  
Instead, much of the scholarship based on collaborative governance is rooted in evidence from the 15
US, Europe and Australia (Moloney, 2013). There is a correlation made between poor governance 
and failing economies, corruption and lack of political legitimacy (Rose-Ackerman, 2005). 
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 This thesis is organised into 8 chapters. The next provides a comprehensive review of the 
relevant literature on policy transfer with a focus on justice policy transfer within the Caribbean. 
This will demonstrate how the current literature supports the main claims of the thesis and identifies 
the gaps that it aims to fill. In addition, I provide an overview of RJ literature and show that it lacks 
discussion on RJ policymaking, particularly within a Caribbean context. Chapter 2 discusses the 
methodological frameworks that frame this discussion of policy transfer. I explain the 
methodological approach to data collection, as I used a range of methods to collect qualitative 
information. I will also highlight some of the limitations faced during the collection of this data. 
Chapter 3 and 4 provide relevant background on the Jamaican context. Chapter 3 discusses how the 
political structure and history of political violence have affected policymaking in Jamaica. In 
addition to providing background on the political structure, it provides an overview of the societal 
class structure and the various local and international interests that the Jamaican government must 
attend to in order to maintain that structure. I identify the history of policy in Jamaica as largely 
motivated by semi-coercive and coercive policy transfer, which has led to ineffective justice policy 
and a relatively unchanged crime situation. However, I note the shift in policymaking away from a 
historically semi-coercive policy transfer due to changes between donor- recipient country 
relationships. Chapter 4 continues this discussion by suggesting that, despite the fact that some 
donors have increasingly facilitated the development and implementation of contextualised policy 
as well as the expansion of justice-focused CSOs who coordinate efforts with the state, the approach 
to policy making continues to give primacy to international interests when it opens up financial 
opportunities, has become embedded the political fabric of Jamaican culture. As a result, this 
opportunistic form of inappropriate policy transfer  has emerged, where policymakers voluntarily 
engage in inappropriate policy transfer, in order to be perceived as being consistent with 
international agendas and interests. In Chapter 5, I discuss the concept of legal pluralism as well as 
the HR perspective on the presence of informal and formal justice systems operating within the 
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same jurisdiction. I propose, in keeping with this HR approach that informal systems can prove 
beneficial to the administration of justice, once they demonstrate respect for HR standards and work 
alongside the state. Finally, I highlight the legal pluralist nature of Jamaica, where there are 
informal justice systems operating alongside the formal justice system. This background 
demonstrates the need for justice reform by highlighting the failure of the justice system and the 
subsequent dependence of Jamaicans on informal justice systems. I go on to assess both informal 
and formal systems through the lens of a HR approach to legal pluralism, which advocates a 
collaborative approach under the supervision of the state. I suggest that the Jamaican government 
might have benefitted from considering the HR approach to legal pluralism in implementing RJ and 
that engaging in endogenous policy transfer would have been consistent with the aim of developing 
a contextualised national RJ policy that addressed the reality of Jamaican citizens. In Chapter 6, 
after discussing the effectiveness of RJ generally, I demonstrate the potential that RJ has to effect 
change in Jamaica and discuss how RJ might look, when developed collaboratively with 
consideration of context. Chapter 6 goes on to provide an overview of the history of RJ in Jamaica 
prior to its formal introduction by the state in the implementation of the national RJ policy, which 
has had limited success thus far. Chapter 7 details the development and implementation of the 
national RJ policy in Jamaica. Chapter 8 examines the RJ policy through the lens of policy transfer. 
It highlights how a lack of collaborative governance created a national policy that failed to consider 
the differences in the political, economic and cultural context of Jamaica and Nova Scotia, the 
exporter jurisdiction of the policy. This inappropriate policy transfer was compounded by poor 
implementation efforts, which explains the limited uptake of the RJ programme.  
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    Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 There are many concepts in the literature that seek to explain or categorise the transfer of 
knowledge about policies across jurisdictions (Bennett, 1991; Rose 1993; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; 
James & Lodge, 2003; Jones & Newburn, 2007; Evans, 2009; Benson & Jordan, 2012; Stone, 2012; 
Monahagn, 2015; Ogg, 2015). I will review some explanations of policy transfer, in order  
to justify the concept of policy transfer that the thesis embraces; policy transfer as developed by 
Dolowitz & Marsh, which structures its discussion of policy without pre-determined assumptions 
and highlights other concepts that are key to policymaking, such as collaboration. I will then go on 
to discuss the relatively limited literature of justice policy transfer literature internationally as well 
as the same type of policy transfer literature that is specific to the Caribbean region.  
 Originally, policy transfer literature grew from studies involving the federal system of the 
US (Stone, 2004; Benson & Jordan, 2011). Increasingly, the concept of policy transfer now focuses 
on policy exchange that takes place between transnational communities, rather than domestic 
transfer only (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Stone, 2004; Jones & Newburn, 2007; Crawford, 2011; 
Canton & McFarlane, 2014; Ogg, 2015).  
 Policy transfer analysis should seek to identify: (i) pre-decision making processes, (ii) the 
key actors involved, (iii) how the transfer of the programme was managed, (iv) how the policy was 
implemented, as well as (v) the causes for policy outcome (Evans, 2009). However, much of the 
literature only focuses on certain aspects of the policy transfer process. Many academics are 
interested in explaining how policies are transferred. For instance, policy convergence (Bennett 
1991) is described as the tendency for societies to become similar in terms of structure, processes 
and performances (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Drezner, 2001; Jones & Newburn, 2007). The 
literature does not always attribute this to interaction between states. Instead it simply notes without 
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explanation the increasing tendency of governments and policy-makers in different countries to 
arrive at similar resolutions to issues (Stone, 2000; Jones & Newburn, 2007; Marsh & Sharman, 
2009). However, Bennett (1991), who focuses on the patterns created by the spread of policies 
across jurisdictions identifies a number of ways in which the spread of policies can occur including: 
(i) a deliberate emulation of policy from another place, (ii) elite networking, where expertise and 
information about policies in response to a common problem are shared, (iii) harmonisation of 
policies in order to be in line with international communities and, (iv) penetration, where states are 
forced to conform to certain policies.  
 As a concept, convergence has a number of limitations. Bennett (1991) limits his discussion 
to the similarities and differences between policies across jurisdictions without real consideration 
for how or why they occur. By focusing on the various routes through which convergence can take 
place, Bennett (1991) assumes it to be either an unconscious process or one that is rational and 
voluntary, with little consideration for unintended events and cultural context. Policy convergence 
places little emphasis on a range of factors that might influence the spread of policies, such as the 
role of policy actors as politicians, financial institutions and the international community as a whole 
(Stone, 2001). By neglecting the various factors that can affect the spread of policies, it assumes 
policymaking to be a rational process (Stone, 2004; Jones & Newburn, 2007; Ogg, 2015). Rose 
(1991) and Jones & Newburn (2007) argue that, as a result, convergence takes a ‘deterministic’ 
perspective, suggesting that policy development has a likely outcome, regardless of contextual 
factors. Convergence assumes the adoption of ideas and policies. However, the spread of ideas does 
not necessarily result in the adoption of any specific policy. In general, the outcomes of spread are 
not sufficiently considered. In addition, Jones & Newburn (2007) discuss the fact that convergence 
assumes similarity between policies, fails to consider the contextual differences that make 
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apparently similar policies dissimilar, once transferred. Though a certain policy may apparently 
spread across jurisdictions, the way in which it is implemented varies (Muncie, 2005).  
 On the other hand, Rose (1991; 1993) discusses the concept of lesson-drawing. Lesson-
drawing is the process by which policy-makers look to policies and programmes in other places that 
might resolve their dissatisfaction with the status quo in their own environment (James & Lodge, 
2003; Benson 2009). A lesson is defined as a description of a series of actions that a state can 
borrow as a result of experience in another space (James & Lodge, 2003). Lesson-drawing literature 
focuses on understanding the conditions under which policies operate and how they might be 
created elsewhere to make them effective in the importing jurisdiction (Page, 2000; Benson, 2009). 
In other words, states can make policy travel by learning from practices and policies that have been 
used in other spaces. Stone (2004) argues that this process engenders the adoption of coherent ideas 
and policies, otherwise referred to as consensual knowledge, which are accepted by the state and 
society. At the regional and international level, lesson-drawing informs the development of an 
international policy culture, which all states might be encouraged to take part in (James & Lodge, 
2003; Stone, 2004; Ogg, 2015).  
 In an updated version of his concept of lesson-drawing, Rose (2005) has described a process 
that practitioners can use to assess the potential effectiveness of lesson-drawing. (i) learning the key 
concepts of the programme and determining the lessons that should be drawn, (ii) getting the 
attention of the policymakers, (iii) scanning alternatives and deciding where to look, (iv) studying 
by going abroad, (v) developing a generalised model of how the programme works in the foreign 
jurisdiction, (vi) domesticating that lesson for your own context, (vii) deciding whether the model 
should be adopted, (viii) deciding whether the lesson can be applied, (ix) simplifying the means and 
ends of the lesson, (x) evaluating the outcome of the lesson (James & Lodge, 2003; Stone, 2004; 
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Benson 2009; Ogg, 2015). From this outlined process, Rose (2005) notes that policy transfer 
involves a balance of supply and demand (as seen in Figure 1.0) (Page, 2000; Benson 2009).  
Figure 1.0 Four Components of Policy Transfer (Rose, 2003) 
! Accessed 
Benson, 2009. 
 Essentially, policymakers represent the demand side or the ‘satisfiers’, where there is limited 
enthusiasm for transfer, as they work to maintain status quo as much as possible. Typically, 
policymakers suffer from the constraints of focusing on path dependency and embedded interests. 
The supply side focuses on practitioners identifying and applying policies for transfer (Benson, 
2009), including policies that might be imported from an external jurisdiction. As a result, their 
constraints relate to understanding the context of both the exporting and recipient jurisdictions as 
well as detailed understanding of the policy itself and the types of adjustments that will be required 
adopt the policy effectively. Policy should be adopted in a way that fits the social, political, legal 
and economic profile of the recipient country, while still achieving the intended goals of the policy 
itself (Benson, 2009). 
 In understanding these competing interests, Bennett recognises that there may be some 
variation in policy adoption, specifically degrees of borrowing. Borrowing may take the form of (i) 
copying, (ii) adaptation, (iii) hybridisation, (iv) synthesis or (v) inspiration (James & Lodge, 2003). 
As the term suggests, copying takes place when a programme or policy is adopted without any 
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changes. Adaptation does not involve direct copying but instead consider the contextual differences 
between the donor and recipient jurisdictions. Hybridisation and synthesis are indicated by a 
combination of elements that may be found in more than one place. Finally inspiration is where the 
donor countries inspire ideas and innovation within another jurisdiction, without direct replication 
of the original policy or programme. Rose (1993) argues that lesson-drawing is both positive and 
negative, as it indicates what should be done and avoided.  
 The application of the concept of lesson-drawing needs to be more nuanced in its 
explanation of transfer. The main critiques of Rose’s work call attention to his omissions. First, he 
fails to relate the concept of lesson-drawing to the wider literature on policy transfer and to other 
forms of policy-making, particularly ones that take a rational approach (Evans & Davies, 1999; 
Evans, 2009). His notion of lesson-drawing does not consider fully the various issues that can affect 
the transfer of ideas, such as the varied motivation of actors to engage in the transfer of policies and 
resource availability (James & Lodge, 2003; Stone, 2004). Rose assumes that the adoption of 
policies from other countries is voluntary and unhurried (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; James & Lodge, 
2003; Stone, 2004; Ogg, 2015). Rose (2001) states that policymakers adopt policies from other 
countries because they do not have time to develop policies independently. In addition, he argues 
that lesson-drawing and adoption of policy are motivated by some genuine need on the part of 
political actors to resolve an issue. Rose (1991; 1993) does not consider that countries might be 
coerced into adopting policies, as seen in many developing states. For instance, the US arguably 
coerced many countries to adopt certain penal policies by offering funding to address infrastructural 
needs, which also enabled them to expand their war on drugs (Macauley, 2013). USAID funded the 
expansion of maximum-security prisons in Colombia and Bolivia and encouraged the use of 
extended sentences for drug-related crimes (Macauley, 2013). Similarly, IFIs promised the South 
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African government assistance with the economic stability of the country, if South Africa adopted 
certain crime prevention policies
 
(Steinberg, 2011).  16
 Instead of exploring why policies might be adopted, Rose (1993) limits his discussion by 
providing a set of conditions in which lesson-drawing is likely to occur, such as the popularity of a 
programme in the donor country and the similarity in resources between governments. Yet such 
constraints are downplayed in his 2005 arguments. De Jong (2009) criticises Rose’s ‘10-step plan’, 
by noting that he downplays significantly the contextual constraints that can affect policy transfer 
and questions ‘his apparent dislike of historical background’ and selective ‘unwillingness’ to accept 
its effect on transfer. While he provides a model to assess the potential for learning lessons, he does 
not provide an overarching theorisation of policy change that can account for all variations of 
learning. His account focuses almost exclusively on the network, the agents operating within them 
and the policy outcome. As a result he negates the potential influence of the surrounding 
environment on the network and policy transfer in general. In this way, the lesson-drawing literature 
fails to account for the often, uneven nature of learning and other influential factors (Dolowitz & 
Marsh, 2000; James & Lodge, 2003; Stone, 2004; Stone, 2004; Ogg, 2015). While a more 
exhaustive identification of possible constraints to successful lesson-drawing would have been 
ideal, Rose does not provide any recommendations for how to overcome the ones that have been 
identified (Evans & Davies, 1999; Evans, 2009).  
 Finally, Rose has been accused of not providing the necessary tools for identifying whether 
or not lesson-drawing has indeed taken place (Evans & Davies, 1999; Evans, 2009). The concept of 
lesson-drawing, like that of convergence, assumes that policymaking is a voluntary process that 
follows a logical order (James & Lodge, 2003; Stone, 2004; Ogg, 2015). While these stages provide 
 I propose in this thesis that consistent criticism and pressure from the international community 16
led to the adoption of justice policy from developed states in Jamaica. 
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an ideal for policy-makers to follow, it is difficult to use Rose’s concept of lesson-drawing to 
evaluate whether or not a lesson has been adopted (James & Lodge, 2003; Stone, 2004; Evans, 
2009). These stages, particularly the development of a domestic version of the borrowed policy, do 
not consider if the process actually results in successful policy adoption (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; 
James & Lodge, 2003; Stone, 2004; Ogg, 2015).  
 Dolowitz & Marsh (1996; 2003; 2012) are responsible for coining the term ‘policy transfer’. 
Policy transfer is defined similarly to other concepts mentioned,  
 “It is the process whereby knowledge regarding policies or political practices of one   
 political system is used in the development of policies and practices in another political   
 system (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2003; 2012, Patterson & Sloam, 2005; Hoyt, 2006; Marsh &   
 Sharman, 2009) .  17
 Policy transfer incorporates many of the ideas proposed by Rose (2005) and Bennett (1991). 
Also it responds to the criticisms of convergence and lesson-drawing (Stone, 1999; Benson, 2009). 
It extends the work of Rose (1993) and Bennett (1991) and introduces new ways of examining 
policy transfer. First, policy transfer expands on the discussion of how the transfer of policy 
happens by exploring transfer as both dependent and independent variables (Dolowitz & Marsh, 
2000; Jones & Newburn, 2007; Evans, 2010; Benson & Jordan, 2011). That is, Dolowitz & Marsh 
explore policy transfer as a way of explaining policy innovation and subsequent success/failure, and 
they discuss the circumstances under which policy transfer occurs. This framework thus provides a 
more comprehensive discussion of policy transfer in policymaking than formulations that precede it 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2010; Benson & Jordan, 2011; Bender, Kelling & Willing, 2014).  
 Policy transfer is considered to be one of the causal factors of policy convergence. The more 17
knowledge is exchanged between states, the more likely convergence will take place. However, not 
all types of policy convergence occur as a result of policy transfer (James & Lodge, 2003; Stone, 
2004; Ogg, 2015). 
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 Second, Dolowitz & Marsh (2012) provide a comprehensive framework, which acts as a 
heuristic. One of the main critiques of policy transfer is that it does not provide rigorous tools to 
examine the policymaking process (Evans, 2009). As will be discussed the Dolowitz & Marsh 
framework suggests a comprehensive series of questions that explore how and why transfer takes 
place. Through these questions, they are able to consider a range of possibilities, rather than 
assuming pre-determined contributing factors (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1994; 2000; James & Lodge, 
2003; Smith, 2005; Benson & Jordan, 2011).  
 Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) use questions as a means of exploring the various dynamics of 
policy transfer . Dolowitz & Marsh (1994; 2000) do not assume the rationality of policy transfer. 18
As mentioned, both convergence and lesson-drawing are concerned with rational intentional 
transfer. By contrast, Dolowitz & Marsh discuss both purposive and involuntary forms of policy 
adoption (Jones & Newburn, 2007; Monahagn, 2015; Ogg, 2015). Also, Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) 
consider the fact that policies and ideas can be exchanged horizontally and vertically (Dolowitz & 
Marsh, 2000; Stone, 2004; McFarlane & Canton, 2014; Monahagn, 2015). Essentially, they 
recognise the ‘messy’ nature of policymaking and its susceptibility to coercion and a range of 
contextual factors, unlike lesson-drawing, which undermines the extent of their influence (Dolowitz 
& Marsh, 1996; 2000; Jones & Newburn, 2007; Ogg, 2015). Also, the framework does not assume 
the success of policy transfer. Rather, the Dolowitz & Marsh framework identifies whether or not 
policy transfer has occurred and where it has not been successful and the reasons for its failure. I 
will now enlarge on the framework.  
While engaging in policy transfer, policymakers should consider how the policy works in the 18
originating country, so that it can be modified for implementation within the borrowing jurisdiction. 
In this way, policy transfer can become a more efficient process that has the potential to be more 
successful in addressing these issues (Stone, 2001; 2004; James & Lodge, 2003; Paterson & Sloam, 
2005).  
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Dolowitz & Marsh Framework  
 The Dolowitz & Marsh framework (2000) attempts to contextualise the discussion of policy 
transfer by asking a series of questions: (i) who is involved in policy transfer?, (ii) What is the 
motivation to engage in policy transfer?, (iii) What is being transferred?, (iv) What is the degree of 
transfer taking place?, (v) From where are lessons drawn?, (vi) What factors enable or constrain 
transfer?, (vii) What is the effect of policy transfer on the success or failure of policymaking 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 2003; Jones & Newburn, 2014) (See Figure 1.1) ? 
Figure 1.1 Dolowitz and Marsh Framework 
 
 
(Accessed from Dolowitz & Marsh, 2012). 
Who is involved in policy transfer?  
 The literature on policy transfer identifies it as a pluralistic social process that involves a 
range of actors in policymaking. Dolowitz & Marsh (1996; 2003) have identified 9 categories of 
state and non-state actors that are typically involved in policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 
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Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Stone, 2001; Abrams, 2002; Benson & Jordan, 2003; Acosta, 2005; 
Benson & Jordan, 2011; Cahn, 2013). These include (a) elected officials, (b) political parties, (c) 
civil servants, (d) pressure groups, (e) policy entrepreneurs and experts, (f) transnational 
corporations, (g) think tanks, (h) supra-national governmental, and (i) non-governmental 
institutions/ consultants (academics) .  19
 The literature indicates how essential the collaboration of stakeholders is to the success of 
transfer (Grant, 2003; Bowen, 2009; Innes & Booher, 2010; Exadaktylos & Zahariadis, 2015; 
Moloney 2013). There is particular emphasis within the literature on involving non-state 
stakeholders in decision-making activities that affect the well-being of society (Bishop & Davis, 
2002; Burnstein, 2003; Schoburgh, 2007; Moloney, 2013). As will be highlighted in my discussion 
of Jamaican justice reform, there is a tendency of states to draw lessons from a small pool of actors 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Benson & Jordan, 2003). Oftentimes this can result in reinforcing the 
status quo, instead of achieving the intended reform (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996).  
What is the motivation to engage in policy transfer?  
 Different agents in the list given will have different motives for engaging with policy 
transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Benson & Jordan, 2003). Dolowitz & Marsh (1996; 2003; Jones 
& Newburn, 2014) state that policy transfer should be seen as part of a continuum, where voluntary 
transfer (lesson-drawing) and coercive transfer (direct imposition) are the two extremes (See Figure 
1.2).  
 Stone (2004) identifies an emerging group, referred to as policy networks. The networks consist 19
of policy organisations that work alongside academics, civil society and other non-state actors to 
develop and implement policies under the charge of governments and international organisations 
(Stone, 2004; Prince, 2012). Often they are seen to be more flexible, self-organising and have a 
greater range of freedom in searching for ideas and have some relationship with non-state actors, 
indicating that the context of the implementing country is more likely to be considered (Prince, 
2014). 
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Figure 1.2. Dolowitz and Marsh Policy Transfer Framework Continuum  
Voluntary----|----Semi-V oluntary-----Obligated---------Semi-Coercive------- Coerced  
 Opportunistic 
 Coercive transfer occurs when a state is forced to implement certain policies. On the other 
hand, voluntary transfer is a genuine response to an issue with the status quo, where full information 
about the range of options is used to determine which policy choice might provide the best outcome 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 2003). Typically, policy transfer falls somewhere in between these two 
boundaries and can involve more than one type of motivation (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; James & 
Lodge, 2003). Indirect coercive transfer takes place when there is pressure to adopt similar policies 
in order to be in line with the international community (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; James & Lodge, 
2003). As discussed, IFIs are responsible for imposing these pressures on developing nations that 
are dependent on international funding for economic sustainability, while political parties are 
pressured to adopt policies as a way of legitimising their own agendas and accessing funding from 
IFIs (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 2003; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004). I seek to contribute to the on-
going development of this framework by introducing the concept of opportunistic policy transfer 
(See Figure 1.2), which is based on the perceived need to gain political and financial favour with 
the public and international donors respectively, but without any direct pressure or obligation from 
the donors themselves. By discussing opportunistic policy transfer, I provide an example of how 
voluntary transfer does not necessarily correlate with a genuine will to resolve an issue.  
What is being transferred?  
 The Dolowitz & Marsh framework identifies seven things that can be transferred (Dolowitz 
& Marsh, 1996; 2000; Benson & Jordan, 2011). These are: (i) policy goals, (ii) structure and 
content, (iii) policy instruments or administrative techniques, (iv) institutions, (v) ideology, (vi) 
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ideas, attitudes and concepts and, (vii) negative lessons (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 2000; Benson & 
Jordan, 2011) .  20
From where is information transferred?  
 Policy transfers can be exogenous or endogenous (Benson & Jordan, 2011). More 
specifically, information can be transferred from 3 areas, the international community as well as the 
national and local communities. Actors can draw lessons from the history of political systems and 
other institutions within their own country. In addition, the national government can learn or adopt 
information from lower levels of governance. Dolowitz & Marsh (2003) note that endogenous 
transfer is ideal to start a policy search because it is a time and resource-saving approach. An 
endogenous approach ensures that there is a basis for comparison in terms of context. Actors can 
learn about what has been attempted and why these attempts succeeded or failed within a similar 
setting.  
What is the degree of transfer?  
 There are a number of different ways in which policy transfer can take place (Dolowitz & 
Marsh, 1996; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Benson & Jordan, 2011). Dolowitz expands on the original 
continuum created by Rose (1993) (See Figure 1.3).  
Figure 1.3 Degrees of Policy Transfer 
Direct copy-----Emulation----Hybridisation & Synthesis----Inspiration  
 These categories are drawn almost directly from the categorisation created by Rose (1993). 
Policy transfer can involve any number of these degrees within a particular case (Dolowitz & 
 In modifying the original framework, Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) have added an 8
th 
element; 20
programmes. They propose that this should be a separate category from policies, which imply a 
transfer of theories as opposed to the action of implementing a programme (Dolowitz & Marsh, 
2000). 
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Marsh, 2003). It is likely that motivation will play a role in the degree of transfer taking place. A 
state that is interested in responding to an issue quickly might copy or emulate a policy (Dolowitz & 
Marsh, 1994; 2004). However, it may be ideal to combine elements from different sources in order 
to respond to an issue.  
What enables or constrains policy transfer?  
 Drawing from Rose (1993), Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) have identified a number of factors 
that can either enable or constrain policy transfer . Demand constraints deal with convincing 21
policymakers of the need for change and the demand for transfer (Benson, 2009). Timing or the 
‘issue attention cycle’ can affect these constraints as they shape how the need for change is 
perceived (Downs, 1972; Stone, 1999). For instance, a pandemic or outbreak may motivate the need 
for policy transfer, since there is a quick response required to an issue. Thus uncertainty is likely to 
increase the motivation to transfer policy (Benson, 2009). Programmatic constraints relate to the 
limitations of the programme itself, such as the complexity of the programme or the unpredictability 
of the programme (Benson, 2009). Of course, this constraint is exacerbated by the distinction 
between political and social contexts as well as the objective of transferring the policy. For instance, 
Benson (2009) discusses the failure of transfer of the Child Support Agency programme from the 
USA to the UK to the UK’s neglect of the influence of federal institutions on the distribution of 
child welfare in the donor country, which is absent in their own jurisdiction. Contextual constraints 
include issues related to the effect of past policies, political ideology, resources and political context 
(Benson, 2009). Policies that are transferred are implemented within pre-existing contexts, such as 
existing commitments to international organisations or the current approach to punishment within 
the justice system. Policy transfer is more likely to be successful where both jurisdictions have 
These issues are more likely to arise with hard copying of policies and programmes, rather than 21
softer forms of transfer, such as inspiration, where constraints can be considered and negotiated 
accordingly. 
Page !56
similar political ideologies (Benson, 2009). Finally, application constraints consider the types of 
changes needed to implement the transfer, such as how information on new policy options are 
evaluated by policymakers, in-depth knowledge of both jurisdictions, as well as adjustments that 
need to be considered in adopting a certain policy or lesson, such as institutional capacity and 
transaction costs (Benson, 20009). For instance, some difficulty was noted in transferring HIV 
programmes to a number of developing states because they did not acknowledge the differences in 
institutional capacity. More specifically, some countries did not have the capacity to collect 
epidemiological data (Benson, 2009).  
How do these factors affect the success or failure of policy transfer?  
 Regardless of the arena, policy transfer from developed to developing countries does not 
often result in the development of effective policy (Duke, et al. 2016; Schmidt & Huenteler, 2016; 
Evans, 2017). The literature identifies 3 different types of policy transfer failure. These are: (i) 
inappropriate, (ii) uninformed and (iii) incomplete policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2003; Stone, 
2017; Giest, 2017). Uninformed policy transfer takes place when the borrowing country has 
insufficient information about the policy or practice being transferred. Incomplete policy transfer 
takes place when integral aspects of the policy in the original country have not been transferred to 
the borrowing country (Stone, 2001; 2003; 2017; James & Lodge, 2003). Inappropriate policy 
transfer fails to acknowledge the cultural, political, social and economic distinctions between the 
country that is borrowing and the country that policy and practices are being borrowed from 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Stone, 2017).  
 Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) demonstrate how the voluntary/coercive nature of policy transfers 
affects policymaking. The literature on inappropriate policy transfer indicates that a lack of genuine 
motivation to improve the well-being of the society can contribute to the failure to consider the 
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differences in context and conduct a thorough search for policy that would fit the needs of the 
borrowing country (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2003; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Stone, 2017; Giest, 2017). 
Ultimately this can result in a disconnect between the policy and its implementation because the 
policy is not related to the needs on the ground in the borrowing country.  
 I shall argue that policy transfer, as discussed by Dolowitz & Marsh (1994; 2000), is the 
most suitable approach to discussing the adoption of penal policy in Jamaica. The level of flexibility 
that is provided by its structure and use of questions makes the framework ideal for understanding 
of policymaking through case studies (Jones & Newburn, 2007; Ogg, 2015). This is particularly 
true for the case of Jamaica, where there has not been many justice reform efforts available to 
examine. While the limited discussion of penal policymaking within the region and across justice 
policy literature in general may force researchers to make assumptions, the concept of policy 
transfer as understood by Dolowitz & Marsh allows for a comprehensive examination of how and 
why policy transfer takes place and the identification of contextual factors that should be 
considered. My expansion of the Dolowitz & Marsh framework to include opportunistic policy 
transfer will add to the comprehensive nature of the framework and highlights the nuanced nature of 
policymaking and the effect of context on the process. In particular, it speaks to how a voluntary 
form of policy transfer can still result in ineffective policy transfer.  
 Having discussed the general policy transfer literature, I will now go on to more relevant 
literature on justice policy transfer internationally as well as in the Caribbean. This discussion will 
highlight such commonly emphasised factors as the influence of the IFIs on implementation of 
justice policy, the failure to contextualise or ‘domesticate’ justice policy, as well as the lack of 
collaboration in policymaking. It will note the lack of case studies on justice policy in developing 
jurisdictions and more specifically, the Caribbean as well as the limited examination of RJ policy.  
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Justice Policy Transfer Literature  
 Within the policy literature, there is a substantive discussion of the transfer of elements of 
policies within and across jurisdictions (Jones & Newburn, 2007; Monahagn, 2015; Meikle & Jaffe, 
2015; Ogg, 2015; Marier, 2016; Evans, 2017; Stone, 2017). There is substantial discussion of 
justice policy in developed countries within policy literature, but less on developing states (Jones & 
Newburn, 2007; McFarlane & Canton, 2014; Ogg, 2015; Welsh & Harris, 2016; Boushey, 2016). 
There is relatively limited use of frameworks in policy analysis, since discussions centre on the 
outcome instead of the effect of the policymaking process. Nevertheless, given the increase in crime 
and incarceration rates across a number of developed and developing jurisdictions, the types of 
discussions on justice policy are expanding (Jones & Newburn, 2007; Sharman, 2008; McFarlane & 
Canton, 2014; Ogg, 2015; Monahagn, 2015; Jaffe, 2015; Welsh & Harris, 2016).  
 Academic examination of penal policy transfer has been prompted by the noticeable 
similarities in policies across jurisdictions (Jones & Newburn, 2007; Ogg, 2015). As noted, the 
existing literature identifies globalisation as creating an internationalisation of crime (Jones, 2003; 
Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Barrows, 2014). In response, the international community has engaged 
in what is referred to as global governance. Global governance is the idea that certain public policy 
problems that affect more than one state or region can be handled by a ‘global’ unified response 
(Duffield & Donini, 2014; Haas, 2015). Muncie (2005) and Jones & Newburn (2007) focus on the 
similarities of a range of justice policies between the UK and the US in response to shared issues of 
drug trafficking and sexual violence. In addition, Dolowitz & Marsh (2012) note the adoption of 
American and British welfare-to-work policies across Europe. They note that globalisation has 
contributed to the homogenisation of justice policies. In particular, a zero-tolerance approach that 
imposes harsh sentences on juvenile and adult offenders for minor offences is used across 
jurisdictions (Muncie, 2005; Jones & Newburn, 2007).  
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 The literature highlights multilateral organisations, such as World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), as the main proponents of global governance. 
Funding is also provided by the European Union (EU) in exchange for implementation of 
approaches that are in keeping with their policies (McFarlane & Canton, 2014). For instance, the 
EU assisted the Turkish government in the development and implementation of policies for the 
Turkish Probation Service by sending a team of policy consultants, trainers and probation officers to 
work alongside the Turkish probation team. In addition, Molina & Aberola, (2003) discuss the 
impact of globalisation on juvenile justice in Spain. They note the influence of international HR 
organisations as well as the EU in the shift towards a restorative approach to juvenile justice in 
Spain (Molina & Alberola, 2003).  
 Stone (2013; 2015) discusses the creation of policy networks and entrepreneurs as a result of 
globalisation. Policy networks consist of policy organisations that work alongside academics, civil 
society and other non-state actors to develop and implement policies under the charge of 
governments and international organisations (Stone, 2013; 2015; Prince, 2012) . McFarlane & 22
Canton (2014) discuss the partnership between the UK, Croatia and Turkey. They refer to the 
process of ‘twinning’, which is essentially, the development of a partnership between EU states and 
other states hoping to gain membership that allows for the transfer of expertise and assistance with 
capacity building across public sectors.  
 Justice policy literature indicates that global governance literature has neglected the 
importance of differences in the political, economic and social contexts between the importing 
jurisdiction and the donor country or developed countries that have inspired a particular standard 
(Newburn & Crawford, 2002; Bissessar, 2002; Jones & Newburn, 2007; McFarlane & Canton, 
 Often they are seen to be more flexible, self-organising and have a greater range of freedom in 22
searching for ideas and have some relationship with non-state actors, indicating that the context of 
the implementing country is more likely to be considered (Prince, 2012). 
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2014; Ogg, 2015; Unwin et al. 2017). Understanding the changes that might occur to policy as it 
moves through space and time, justice policy literature notes that policies will manifest differently 
as a result of the variation in contexts. For instance, states within the US have made use of a number 
of zero-tolerance policies such as curfews, a 3 strike rule
 
and electronic monitoring of young 23
offenders (Newburn, 2002). However, within the US, different states have implemented the use of 
the 3-strike rule differently. The consequences of 3 strikes vary across states. In Montana, being 
‘out’ carries a consequence of life imprisonment, unlike the potential sentence of up to 25 years in 
Pennsylvania. Also, Steinberg (2011) points out that many South African crime prevention policies 
were adopted from Britain as a result of the pressure felt to be in keeping with best practice dictated 
by developed jurisdictions. In doing so, the South African government failed to address their 
context-specific issues as a developing post-colonial state.  
 The literature suffers from a dearth of empirical work that examines specific instances of 
penal policy transfer (McFarlane & Canton, 2014; Jones & Newburn, 2007; Silva, 2015). Where 
there is empirical research on justice policy transfer, it focuses on transfer between the UK and the 
US and European countries (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; James & Lodge, 2003; Jones & Newburn, 
2007; Steinberg, 2011; McFarlane & Canton, 2014). This is due, in part, to the limited focus on the 
policymaking processes and the unwillingness of officials to provide information across 
jurisdictions (Jones & Newburn, 2007; Ogg, 2015). In its limited way, this thesis corrects this 
tendency, by examining policy transfer of justice policy between developed and developing states.  
 Again, many articles focus on outcome rather than process. They use transfer as an 
independent variable and do not discuss the issues that might have affected the process of transfer, 
such as the motivation of policymakers or the current value of the justice system in place. This 
 The 3-strike rule is legislation that is intended to deter repeat offending, by increasing the 23
severity of punishment for each offence (Newburn, 2002). 
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thesis expands on this limited discussion by confirming that policy transfer has taken place (rather 
than assuming that transfer has taken place) and examining how the management of the policy 
transfer process affected the success of the policy and more specifically, the impact of RJ on crime 
in Jamaica.  
Justice Policy Transfer Literature in the Caribbean  
 I now discuss the limited literature on justice policy on developing states and in particular 
on Jamaica and the Caribbean. Many of the policy transfer case studies fail to go beyond interaction 
between developed countries (Jones & Newburn, 2007; Steinberg, 2011; McFarlane & Canton, 
2014; Monahagn, 2015; Ogg, 2015). As a consequence, the literature calls for case studies of policy 
transfer in Caribbean countries
 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Sharman, 2008; Ogg, 2015).  24
 This lack of emphasis on the Caribbean is surprising. Historically, coercive policy transfer 
can be seen within post-colonial states, including Jamaica, where legislation and institutions from 
colonising states was transferred forcibly to colonies (Bissessar, 2002; La Guerre, 2002; Molina & 
Alberola, 2003). As a post-colonial region, the Caribbean is an important site of policy transfer, as 
the imposition of policy by developed states on developing jurisdictions has continued. However, 
only a few papers mention policy transfer in this area (Bissessar, 2002; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; 
 This case study of justice policy transfer is of particular important to the diverse context of the 24
Caribbean. The wider literature notes the varying outcomes of policy transfer, even within 
developing countries that share certain characteristics such as a lack of resources and dependence 
on international funding (Bissessar, 2002; Page, 2002; LaGuerre, 2002; Sharman, 2008). While 
policy transfer is a universal practice, outcomes manifest differently across jurisdictions. For 
instance, despite their similar context in terms of limited financial resources and political 
corruption, the introduction of policies that seek to moderate relationships between ethnicities in 
French-speaking Caribbean countries has been more successful than in British colonies like 
Jamaica, due to the presence of ethnically and racially diverse populations of the former (La Guerre, 
2002). This case study is essential to understanding the nuances of justice policy transfer in Jamaica 
specifically, but can also be useful in comparing this context within a region that shares issues, 
within a diverse range of contexts. 
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Hoyt, 2006; Schoburgh, 2007; Tennant & Clayton, 2010; Harriott, 2009; Harriott & Jones, 2016; 
Gereffi, Bamber & Fernandez-Stark, 2016; Scobie, 2016). Where it is mentioned, much of the 
discussion focuses on economic, environmental and health policy. In Policy Transfer, New Public 
Management and Globalization (2002), Bissessar’s discussion of policy transfer throughout the 
Caribbean places an overwhelming emphasis on New Public Management (NPM) and the 
imposition of neoliberal economic policies (Bissessar, 2002).  
 In addition, there is limited scholarly discussion of justice policy in Jamaica, despite the 
well-documented severity and widespread distribution of crime (Harriott, 2000; 2002; 2003; 2008; 
2009; Williams, 2009; Tennant & Clayton, 2010; Meeks, 2008; 2011; Harriott et al. 2013; Harriott 
& Katz, 2015; Harriott & Jones, 2016; Maguire & Johnson, 2016). The discussion on justice policy 
in Jamaica is limited mostly to identifying approaches used to address crime rather than evaluating 
the process that led to the creation of the policy itself (Harriott, 1999, 2009; Headley, 2002; Jones, 
2003; Acosta, 2005; ECLAC, 2008). This might be due to the limited efforts of the Jamaican 
government to develop and implement justice policy altogether (Jones, 2003; Acosta, 2005; 
Harriott, 2009). Many of the sporadic efforts to improve the penal system have focused on 
maintaining the status quo of selective severe punishment and occasionally improved infrastructure 
and increased law enforcement training of police forces (Spiller et al, 2003; Jones & Schoburgh, 
2004) . However, emerging discussions speak to the importance of collaboration in public policy 25
development. For instance, Harriott, Lewis & Zechmeister (2015) consider a community-driven 
approach to crime. As part of this approach, they recommend the involvement of the public and 
civil society in policy development. In addition Harriott & Katz (2015) note the importance of 
considering contextual differences when adopting policy from America and European states in the 
 For instance, much of the financial resources allocated towards the JCF and correctional services 25
have been used for training and equipment (Acosta, 2005). 
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Caribbean. In particular he states that governments should ensure that programmes being adopted 
address the fundamental contextual factors.  
 Also, recent politics literature has noted the overwhelming influence that international 
funding agencies have on justice policy prescription in the Caribbean specifically (Bissessar, 2002; 
James & Lodge, 2003; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Marsh & Sharman, 2009; Harriott, 2009; Meikle 
& Jaffe, 2015; Harriott & Jones, 2016). Dominant forces within the global community use weaker 
states as ‘guinea pigs’ to test the effectiveness of policies . For instance, the WB has noted that 26
their development of ‘best practice’ policies has been hindered by its ad hoc nature and constrained 
by a lack of research (Ferguson, 2002). There is some discussion of the influence of financial 
institutions on penal policy in Jamaica. Some literature highlights the semi coercive nature of penal 
policy transfer by noting the pressure felt by developing states to adopt policies endorsed by IFIs 
(Harriott, 1999; 2003; 2009; James & Lodge, 2003; Robotham, 2003; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; 
Evans, 2009; Marsh & Sharman, 2009; Leslie, 2010; Moloney, 2012; Daley, 2013; Harriott & 
Jones, 2016). International approaches are adopted readily within the Caribbean due to the wish to 
be perceived as ‘keeping up’ with developed counterparts (Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Schoburgh, 
2007; Ricketts, 2010; Levy, 2012; Daley, 2014). By adopting these ‘best practice’ policies and 
approaches, the Jamaican state attempts to improve its credibility and maintain positive 
relationships with their funding donors for on-going support (Spiller et al, 2003; Jones & 
Schoburgh, 2004; Schoburgh, 2007; Tennant & Clayton, 2010; Steinberg, 2011). For instance, there 
was some pressure from the US and the UK to address drug trafficking in Jamaica, due to the effect 
that it had on crime rates within their own jurisdiction (Levy, 2009; 2012; Leslie, 2010). As a result, 
the Jamaican government has emulated policies from developed states such as the US, Canada and 
 In this thesis, I propose that RJ stands as a unique example of policy, which does not carry the 26
same level of uncertainty, due to its widespread success in addressing crime across a range of 
jurisdictions and its successful use on a grassroots level in Jamaica. 
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the UK in an effort to be seen as co-operating with those jurisdictions. Some of these efforts 
resulted in the extradition of one of Jamaica’s biggest drug lords  Accordingly, the U.S government 27
has praised the cooperation of the Jamaican government with its Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
and has signalled a willingness to continue to support Jamaica’s efforts (Leslie, 2010; Levy, 2012). 
As will be discussed, the failure to consider context has resulted in the implementation of 
ineffective policies in many developing countries that borrow policies from developed states such 
as the adoption of sex registers in Jamaica (Common, 1999; Spiller et al. 2003; Jones & Schoburgh, 
2004; Schoburgh, 2007).  
 There are different policymaking styles within the Caribbean as well. La Guerre (2002) 
notes the varying manifestations of the same policies across Caribbean countries such as Trinidad 
and Jamaica, due to their differences in resources, despite their shared colonial history. Similarly, 
Daniel (2002) points out that French colonies are more likely to copy directly from their colonisers 
than British colonies, who prefer to adopt aspects of policies of the colonising power. This thesis 
will advance this discussion by examining whether or not this style of adopting policy is consistent 
with the approach to justice policymaking in Jamaica generally.  
 However there is a call for research that provides a more detailed evaluation of the 
development and implementation of various justice programmes and policies (Harriott, 2003; 
Robotham, 2003; Acosta, 2005; ECLAC, 2008; Harriott, 2009). I am unaware of any in-depth 
examination of the policymaking process for any particular policing, sentencing or correctional 
 In particular USAID has spearheaded the development of the Community Empowerment and 27
Transformation Project (COMET), a project that is directed towards the dismantling of gangs. In 
addition, the report from the Joint Select Committee, which considered the 2014 SOCA, affirmed 
the importance of the legislation being in line with that of international best practice, by referring to 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and examples of legislation from the 
US, such as legislation from California. Furthermore, some of the recommendations made from 
non-politically affiliated local organisations such as INDECOM were disregarded (Government of 
Jamaica, http://www.japarliament.gov.jm/attachments/1187_Anti-gang_report.pdf, accessed 
October 17, 2016).
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policy in Jamaica. Therefore, this overview of Jamaican justice policy and the in-depth examination 
of the national RJ policy act as a significant contribution to the expansion of the discussion of 
national and regional policy literature on justice. This is particularly important since other British 
colonies in the Caribbean and commonwealth, and other developing states in general that might 
share similar issues to those examined within this thesis.  
RJ Literature  
 As noted, there is a wealth of literature on RJ across jurisdictions. Much of the literature 
works to define RJ and identify its associated practices. I will now discuss who is involved in a 
restorative practices, introduce some of these practices identified in the literature (as I will reference 
them throughout the thesis) and go on to discuss the common themes across these practices.  
Restorative Participants  
 RJ involves all participants affected by an offence—all stakeholders— in the restorative 
process (Morris, 2002; Von Hirsch et al. 2003; Llewellyn & Howse; Plaatjies, 2008; Sullivan & 
Tifft, 2008). In keeping with the relevant literature, the stakeholders are identified as: the victim, 
wrongdoer and the community.  
 It is generally understood that victims are the persons who suffer harm as a result of a 
particular crime. One can identify the victim by determining the source and their proximity to the 
harm. In restorative practices, the victim is identified as the person that has suffered harm directly 
as a result of the actions of the wrongdoer (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Braithwaite, 2002; Wenzel et 
al. 2008).  
 The wrongdoer is the person who directly causes harm to the victim. In RJ, an offender is 
expected to recognise his wrongdoing, repent publicly and undertake agreed actions to address the 
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harm (Wenzel et al. 2008). However, there is literature that highlights the overlapping 
characteristics of victims and offenders, in that offenders often suffer some harm, which contributes 
to their offending behaviour. Although offenders represent a diverse group of individuals, many 
have a number of social disadvantages (Delgado, 1985; Smit, 2007). The significant relationship 
between poverty and crime across jurisdictions has been well documented (Delgado, 1985; Raphael, 
2004; Acosta, 2005; UNDP, 2012). A correlation between poverty, lack of education and crime is 
clear within the Jamaican context as well (Acosta, 2005; Witter, 2004; UNDP, 2012). For instance, a 
study carried out by Hooghe et al. (2010) looked at the relationship between inequality, poverty, and 
unemployment on crime in Belgium. Researchers collected crime data for 589 offenders in Belgium 
from 2001through 2006 (Hooghe et al, 2010). It was noted that crime rates tended to increase in 
urban areas of Belgium, which supported the conclusion that poverty and increase in population 
density have an impact on the prevalence of both property and violent crime (Hooghe et al. 2010, p 
13). Moreover, income level, unemployment and income inequality were related to crime rate 
(Hooghe et al. 2010).  
 The literature notes that, for many offenders, serving longer terms of imprisonment, these 
social disadvantages are exacerbated by the loss of liberty (UNODC, 2006; Holtfreter, 2004; Claire 
& Dixon, 2016; Hagan et al. 2017). Where prisoners are under restrictions for extended periods of 
time, offenders become less familiar with the community they wish to return to. In addition, 
offenders can suffer a range of psychological problems, including the impairment of social skills 
and social withdrawal (UNODC, 2006). Even if offenders did not have these social disadvantages 
before entering prison, their period of incarceration can lead to problems that increase the likelihood 
of reoffending, if remained unaddressed. Hagan et al. (2017) found a strong positive correlation 
between solitary confinement and post-traumatic stress disorder. Within a sample of 119 
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participants, 43% experienced solitary confinement and 28% screened positively for PTSD . RJ 28
holds the offender accountable in a way that addresses the specific harm caused to the victim, but 
also facilitates modulating the impact of stated social disadvantages by provision of community 
support and retaining of rights and responsibilities associated with that of a law-abiding citizen.  
 There is some ambiguity regarding the definition of the third stakeholder, namely, the 
community (Ashworth, 2002; Wright, 2005; Plaatjies; 2008; Wenzel et al. 2008; Sullivan & Tifft, 
2008; Zehr, 2015; Rossner & Bruce, 2016). In the case of RJ, community members are understood 
to be part of the wider social or legal grouping defined by the local jurisdiction, of which both the 
wrongdoer and victim are citizens. The role of the community is to censure the wrongdoer and hold 
him accountable for his wrongdoing . Participants of this wider group are often determined by the 29
relationship with other stakeholders, their connection to the crime and the ways that they can  
contribute to the restoration process (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Ashworth, 2002; Rosenblatt, 
2015). For instance, restorative programmes will often ask the ‘micro-community’ of family 
members and friends to participate in a restorative process in support of the victim and wrongdoer 
as they have direct ties to the parties (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Ashworth, 2002; Plaatjies, 2008). 
Gender equality advocates might participate in restorative process handling a sex offence as they 
have a direct stake in the issue of gender-based violence. In the case of a burglary, it may be useful 
to have members of the local community present to speak to the impact of the crime on their locale. 
Many VOM and RJ conferences invite volunteers to participate since they represent the interests of 
 Across the sample, there were other issues that offenders faced prior to imprisonment, such as 28
lifetime substance abuse and inadequate housing (Hagan et al. 2017).
 As stated later on in this chapter, the literature indicates that censuring the offender is more 29
effective when those who are responsible for reproaching their actions are closer to the offender 
(Ashworth, 2002). In addition, it is likely that they will be more motivated to re-connect with 
communities that they feel close to. 
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the ‘macro-community’, who have been affected by the wrongdoing as well. Thus they have a 
responsibility to address the offending behaviour.  
Restorative Practices  
 There are a number of practices that fall under the umbrella of RJ , including: (i) victim-30
wrongdoer mediation, (ii) community and family group conferencing, (iii) sentencing circles, (iv) 
peace-making circles, (v) reparative probation and community board and panels.  
Victim-Offender Mediation  
 Victim-Offender mediation (VOM) is a practice that allows the wrongdoer and victim to 
meet under the supervision of a mediator and discuss a crime for which the wrongdoer has been 
convicted (Van Ness, 2005; Sullivan & Tifft, 2008; Plaatjies, 2008). Together, the parties agree on 
the terms of the meeting (RJ Council, 2010). This process results in a contract, where an offender 
agrees to undertake certain actions to make amends. VOM is said to be most effective when all 
parties are able to meet face-to-face, regardless of at what point in the justice process it takes place 
(United Nations, 2006). During these face-to-face meetings, victims are given the opportunity to 
express their feelings about the wrongdoer and the crime. In turn offenders are expected to agree to 
make reparation to their victims (Marshall, 1999). However, participants can opt for non face-to-
face meetings as well (Marshall, 1999). In these cases, there may be someone asked to read a victim 
impact statement, which will convey the feelings of the victim. VOM is driven by the aim of 
achieving settlement, rather than focusing on reconciliation between parties (McCold, 2008). All 
parties agree upon the form that reparation takes, which should result in compensation to the victim 
and holding the wrongdoer accountable.  
Restorative Circles  
 I will discuss in detail only the most popular practices that have been acknowledged by the UN 30
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 Circle meetings are considered to be the most inclusive of all restorative practices, since, 
depending on the purpose of the circle, a wider range of community members can be incorporated 
into the process (Van Ness, 2005). Sentencing circles, which are used to inform the sentencing of 
offenders, will incorporate family members and other supporters. They can include traditional 
criminal justice stakeholders (such as the judges, attorneys and police officers) to assist in 
determining how all parties can best move forward after the crime (United Nations, 2006). On the 
other hand, Circles of Support and Accountability (COSA), which focus on supporting the 
reintegration of high-risk offenders after their release, will encompass a wider range of community 
members, giving the wrongdoer an opportunity to interact with and be accountable to a wider cross-
section of society (Hoing, Bogaerts & Vogelvang, 2013; Farrington, 2015; Bohmert, Duwe & 
Hipple, 2016). The wrongdoer (referred to as the Core member) voluntarily requests to participate 
in the programme, where he receives support and advice from the volunteers (also called Circle 
members) on reintegration into the community as a law-abiding citizen. By providing the Core 
member with a group of ‘friends’, they are less likely to experience feelings of rejection and social 
isolation (Hoing, Bogaerts & Vogelvang, 2013; Farrington, 2015; Bohmert, Duwe & Hipple, 2016). 
The victim is not required to participate, although Circles can facilitate a meeting with the 
wrongdoer if requested (Hoing, Bogaerts & Vogelvang, 2013; Farrington, 2015; Bohmert, Duwe & 
Hipple, 2016).  
Regardless of the purpose, participants sit in a circle, symbolising the equal respect for each 
participant . As in all other restorative practices, offenders must admit guilt and all parties enter 31
into circle meeting voluntarily (United Nations, 2006). Circle meetings consider the needs of the 
victim, the community and the welfare of the wrongdoer (United Nations, 2006). In addition, there 
is follow-up to ensure that offenders fulfil the terms of the agreement formed (United Nations 
 In COSA, the victim is not part of the regular meetings with the offender and community. 31
However a face-to-face encounter can be arranged during the offender’s reintegration process. 
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2006). Since stakeholders in the process can include criminal punishment authorities and much 
emphasis is placed on successful wrongdoer reintegration, circle meetings are more likely to take 
place during and after the court process (United Nations, 2006).  
Overlapping Features  
 The processes described so far are not an exhaustive listing of all restorative practices. As a 
flexible process that is often shaped by the cultural and legal contexts it is operating in, there is no 
one format for developing restorative practices (Ashworth, 2002; Shapland, 2003; Holtermann, 
2008). There is some concern that the lack of guidelines can make it difficult to identify restorative 
processes (Ashworth, 2002; Shapland, 2003; Sullivan & Tifft, 2008; Holtermann, 2008). While 
there is no single restorative process, there are shared characteristics of restorative practices that 
aim to achieve restoration of victim and community’s dignity and respect and wrongdoer 
accountability (Ashworth, 2002; Morris, 2002; Shapland, 2003; Van Ness, 2005; Wenzel et al, 
2008). These are: (i) stakeholder involvement, (ii) honesty and (iii) consensual outcome. In this 
way, context-specific practices can be created while maintaining its fundamental features.  
Stakeholder Involvement  
 Restorative practices must involve an encounter that is inclusive of victim, wrongdoer and 
the community (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Van Ness, 2000; Shenk, 2001; Carson, 2009; Zehr, 
2014). The dialogical process is the driving force of RJ, and the dialogue has to be open to all the 
offence has affected (Strang et al. 2006; Pranis, 2000; Wenzel et al. 2008). Including all 
stakeholders in the restorative process demonstrates equal respect for all perspectives. Participants 
are able to gain an understanding of and demonstrate respect for each other’s perspectives about the 
offence (Daly, 2008). The encounter provides a safe space for all persons to tell their stories and 
establish connections with other community members that are mutually beneficial. For the victim, 
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the encounter empowers them by creating the opportunity to gain resolution by having their 
questions answered and their needs met (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Pranis, 2000; Barton, 2000; 
Shenk, 2001; Achilles & Zehr, 2015; Braithwaite, 2002; Wenzel et al. 2008). For the wrongdoer, 
bringing all parties together increases his level of accountability (Llewellyn & Howse,  
1997; Van Ness, 2000; Tyler, 2006; Carson, 2009). Typically, community members are invited to 
speak on how the crime has affected the wider community and participate in holding the wrongdoer 
accountable (Latimer et al. 2005; Umbreit, Coates & Vos, 2007; Rodriguez, 2007).  
Honesty  
 It is essential that all parties enter into all restorative processes voluntarily and with the 
intention of being honest (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Latimer, Dowden & Muise, 2001). The 
voluntary nature of restorative practices expresses a willingness on the part of the wrongdoer to be 
accountable (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Ashworth, 2002; National Commission on RJ, 2009; Zehr, 
2014). If participants are not coerced into being part of a process, they are more likely to be honest 
throughout it.  
Offenders must acknowledge their guilt in order to participate in the process (Llewellyn & Howse, 
1997; Carson, 2009; Zehr, 2014). This opportunity typically comes by way of a public apology and 
disclosure to persons affected by the wrongdoing (Van Ness, 2005). A sincere apology symbolises 
that the wrongdoer has understood the wrongdoing of his behaviour based on the moral values of 
the society. Often absent in criminal justice systems, this type of apology is typical in restorative 
proceedings (Strang 2002; Zehr, 2015). Acknowledging his guilt reduces the inclination for the 
wrongdoer to become defensive of his actions (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Barton, 2000; Zehr, 
2014). Also, when an offender volunteers to participate in a process that requires acknowledgement 
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of guilt and facing unknown consequences, it indicates a sincere willingness to change (Wenzel et 
al. 2008).  
 This emphasis on honesty contributes to the empowerment of all participants. The voluntary 
nature of RJ allows victims to choose how they would like to resolve the offence (Barton, 2000). 
This is unlike the court system, where there is relatively little choice in how the proceedings play 
out or their level of involvement.  
Consensual Outcome  
 All restorative processes are expected to have an outcome that is agreed upon by all parties 
and monitored to ensure compliance (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Shenk, 2001; Braithwaite, 2004; 
Umbreit, Coates & Vos, 2007). The outcome describes the ways in which the wrongdoer will make 
amends for his actions. This form of restitution makes considerable demands on the wrongdoer. Not 
only is he required to admit publicly that he was wrong, but is obligated to ensure that the victim is 
compensated (Van Ness, 2005; Zehr, 2015). This compensation can take the form of financial 
restitution, replacement of property or some other arrangement that is mutually agreed upon. For 
instance, in New Zealand, the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act of 1989 requires 
offenders to make apologies, pay restitution and engage in community service. In Vermont, 
reparative boards are charged with ensuring that all low-risk offenders undergo drug and alcohol 
treatment in addition to making financial payments to the victim. All parties must work together. 
Community members are typically mandated to work with probation officers to the responsibility of 
working with the wrongdoer or monitoring his fulfilment of the agreement. In Circles of Support 
and Accountability, volunteers from the community work with probation officers to regularly update 
them on any changes to the wrongdoer’s behaviour.  
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 The inclusion of the all stakeholders is supposed to produce a just and balanced outcome. 
The victim should not use the process for revenge, since the outcome, will enable the return of the 
wrongdoer to society. Therefore, these outcomes would exclude corporal punishment or other 
treatment that would violate the fundamental rights of any participant. Similarly, it is unlikely that 
the offender would use the restorative process to avoid being accountable since a restorative 
outcome ensures that he takes an active role in deciding how to make amends to the victim and the 
wider community. In addition, pre-meetings should filter out those who wish to manipulate this 
more informal approach and refer them to the formal court system.  
 Once the agreement resulting from the restorative process is in place, due process requires 
some sort of mechanism to guarantee that it is upheld. As mentioned, community members can 
become responsible for monitoring these agreements (Braithwaite, 2004; Umbreit, Coates & Vos, 
2007). This type of supervision is likely to bring about increased compliance, since the supervisor 
of the agreement is connected to the wrongdoer and invested in seeing the outcome come to 
fruition. A study by Schneider (2000) found that offenders who completed restitution and 
community service felt an increased level of commitment and feelings of citizenship (as cited in 
Braithwaite, 2002). Therefore the restorative process may reduce feelings of alienation or bitterness 
toward the community, thereby reducing the potential for reoffending. Currently, over 100 countries 
use some form of restorative practice to address crime (Van Ness, 2005; http://restorativejustice.org/
world- map/#sthash.KHiyNYBc.dpbs, accessed May 30, 2018). All forms of RJ, ranging from 
conferences to circles can be seen across jurisdictions to address a variety of crimes, including petty 
theft to sexual assault and rape (See Table 1.0).  
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Table 1.0 Focus of literature on RJ according to Region  32
Region Purpose of RJ
Main types of RJ 
discussed
Africa
1. Response to genocide/HR violations 
2. Overcrowding/Case backlog
Truth 
Reconciliation 
Commission, 
Conferencing
South Africa, 
Rwanda,
1.Peacemaking and reconciliation 
between divided communities  
2.Justice Reform
1.Juvenile Justice  
2.Justice Reform
Belgium, 
England, Ireland
1.Conflict Resolution  
2.Juvenile Justice
Latin America
1.Improving State legitimacy  
2.Crime reduction  
3.Justice reform
Conferencing, 
VOM
North America & 
the Caribbean
1.Justice Reform  
2.Juvenile Justice
Conferencing, 
Circles, VOM
United States, 
Canada
    
!  
Asia
!  
Europe
!  
Middle East  
!
 
Conferencing, 
Circles,
 
Conferencing, 
VOM
    
Sample 
Countries 
    
 
Conferencing, 
VOM 
 
 This table is compiled based on information from a range of sources; http://restorativejustice.org/32
world-map/#sthash.cHeJWTjV1fL4T3C7.dpbs; Gavrieldies, 2007; National Commission on RJ, 
2008; Vroomen, 2014; Hunter, 2015; Bolitho & Freeman, 2016). However it is not considered by 
exhaustive and is intended to the show the main focus of the literature regarding the range of 
practices used to respond to a variety of justice-related needs across jurisdictions. 
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 Most countries implement restorative processes for juvenile offences (United Nations, 2002; 
Hunter, 2007; Barnes et al. 2013) , ranging from theft and vandalism to sexual assault and 33
homicide. However the type of crime addressed by RJ varies across countries (Liebmann, 2007). 
For instance, Finland uses RJ for a range of minor juvenile offences such as vandalism and theft as 
well as violent crimes such as assault. They exclude offences related to child sexual abuse and on-
going violence, while Canadian provinces, such as British Columbia, embrace RJ as a means of 
handling adolescent sexual offences and family violence (Bolivar, 2009; Barnes et al. 2013). In 
addition, many countries expand their application of RJ to adult offences, including less serious 
crimes from drunken driving and drug offences to more serious offences including rape, 
manslaughter and murder (Liebmann, 2007; Hunter, 2007; Barnes, 2013). In general, there seems to 
be a preference for the use of processes that allow for face-to-face encounters and some indication 
that RJ can be effective for a range of crimes, including serious violent ones such as murder, assault 
and rape (Hudson, 2002; Von Hirsch et al. 2003; Edwards & Sharpe, 2004; Sullivan & Tifft, 2008; 
Koss, 2012; Brooks, 2015) . However, conferences seem to be a more popular option for violent 34
crimes, research indicates that recidivism results are greatest for VOM   35
Pacific Justice Reform
Family 
Conferencing,
New Zealand, 
Australia
 In the following chapter, where I discuss the policymaking process of RJ in Jamaica, I will 33
highlight the failure of the Jamaican government to follow best practice by implementing RJ for 
adult offences, before attempting to assess its success through its application to juvenile offences. 
 Maxwell, Morris & Hayes (2008) state that research has shown a consistent preference for 34
restorative conferences because they provide an increased level of involvement for victims. In 
addition, conferencing has a reputation for careful planning, stakeholder consultation and careful 
selection of community participants (Edwards & Sharpe, 2004). For instance, studies from Australia 
and New Zealand, where victims are allowed to be present, demonstrate high attendance rates 
(Maxwell, Morris & Hayes, 2008). 
 Participants of VOM tend to recidivate less, and when they do, it is for less serious offences 35
(Umbreit, Coates & Vos, 2007).
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 Typically, restorative practices are adapted to meet the needs and context of the jurisdiction 
in which it operates. The literature highlights the wide range of practices that are used across 
jurisdictions to respond to a number of justice-related issues. New Zealand and Australia 
incorporated RJ processes into their formal justice system as a way of responding to the 
disproportionate imprisonment of aboriginal youth (Gavrieldies, 2007; Vroomen, 2014). For these 
countries, juvenile justice family group conferencing was preferred; it allows the family to play an 
integral role in the reform of the wrongdoer. On the other hand, Northern Ireland has expanded 
restorative conferences to an array of juvenile and adult offences (Hunter, 2015). Similarly, many 
countries from Europe, such as Belgium, Scotland and the UK began to utilise VOM and 
conferencing to reform their youth justice system (some later expanded to adult justice) (Vroomen, 
2014; National Commission on RJ, 2008). On the other hand, the United States And Canada began 
using grassroots organisations to deliver a range of RJ practices (VOM, Conferencing, Circles, 
COSA) for a number of crimes, including sexual violence (Bolitho & Freeman, 2016).  
 Many of these countries adapt RJ practices to fit the contextual needs of the country (Daly, 
2002; Van Ness, 2005; Wenzel et al. 2008; Wallace, Wylie & Gordon, 2013). In Canada, RJ has 
developed largely from the culture of indigenous communities. Where applicable, circle 
conferencing is introduced, which combines the more structured aspects of conferencing, while 
arranging the participants in a circle; one of the First Nation’s cultural practices (Barnes, 2013). 
Similarly, New Zealand has developed the ‘Wagga Wagga’ conferencing model, which is inspired 
by restorative-oriented indigenous practices (Barnes, 2013). In Ireland, due to the grave nature of 
some of the crimes such as attempted murder, rape and grievous bodily harm, as well as offenders 
that suffer from mental illness, the Probation Board allows restorative conferences that do not 
require face-to-face meetings between victim and wrongdoer. In addition, many conferences take 
place post incarceration for prisoners that have a sentence that exceeds 6 months (Hunter, 2007). In 
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New Zealand, where the focus is on achieving justice for aboriginal youth, it is not surprising that 
their RJ practices are rooted in Maori traditions (Gavrieldies, 2007).  
 Also, the level and type of state involvement in RJ  affects the way in which RJ is used in 36
different jurisdictions. Where states do recognise RJ, restorative processes is typically used at 
various stages in the justice process (Van Ness, 2005). There are 4 main points in the criminal 
prosecution process at which restorative practices are used. These are: (i) pre-charge, (ii) 
prosecution level, (iii) sentencing, and (iv) corrections (as an alternative to, during or after prison) 
(Daly, 2002; United Nations, 2006). Some justice systems that have integrated RJ completely use 
restorative processes at all four stages. Countries such as New Zealand and Canada have formally 
recognised and incorporated RJ into their justice systems. In Australia, RJ is incorporated into all 
stages of the criminal system, where restorative processes run alongside formal justice processes 
(Larsen, 2014). These states are likely to use RJ to reduce the burden on the courts, but also because 
of their belief in RJ to reduce recidivism and create a shift in the approach to justice as a whole. The 
Canadian Dispute Resolution Unit, run by the Correctional Services have a range of RJ 
programmes, allows RJ pre-charge, post-charge, pre-sentencing and post-sentencing (Canadian 
Resource Centre for Victims, 2011). Similarly, Wagga Wagga (Australia) uses RJ to divert offenders 
from the court by offering it post-charge. They also offer it pre and post-sentencing and post-release 
as a means of reducing the likelihood of reoffending (Larsen, 2014). On the other hand in the UK, 
where the state has not incorporated RJ completely, offenders are only eligible to participate in RJ 
post-sentencing, signalling loyalty to the view of harsh punishment as a deterrent (Gavrieldies & 
Loseby, 2014). In Thailand, RJ is run as an adjunct to the formal system and is only employed pre-
sentencing (Boriboonthana & Sangbuangalum, 2013).  
 Later on in this thesis, I will elaborate on the relationship between RJ and the state within the 36
framework of legal pluralism. I propose that RJ is most effective when it is driven by the 
community, but supported and supervised by the state. 
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 Some states do not recognise RJ, have not incorporated it formally or see it as an alternative 
to the justice system. In these cases, organisations are free to use RJ for a range of crimes at 
different points in the justice process. In the UK, community organisations run a vast majority of RJ 
programmes under the supervision of state entities (Gavrieldies & Loseby, 2014). In Thailand, the 
state runs RJ programmes through probation services only (Boriboonthana & Sangbuangalum, 
2013). Also, the Sycamore Tree programme is run independently across 27 countries. States such as 
Costa Rica, Fiji and Cayman Islands (where RJ is not a formal part of the justice system) contract 
this programme to be run during an wrongdoer’s imprisonment (Liebmann, 2010; World Map, 
2018; Restorative Justice, 2018). On the other hand, the RESTORE programme began in Ohio 
through a faith-based agency, works in adult male prisons pre-release in order to increase empathy 
for victims (Liebmann, 2010) . The literature has also identified a number of countries across 37
Africa, North America and the Pacific that utilise indigenous restorative practices without the 
support of the state (World Map, 2018).  
 Certainly, there is a wealth of discussion of RJ policy within developing jurisdictions 
(Lemley, 2001; Skelton, 2002; Muncie, 2005; Liebmann, 2007; Menkel-Meadow, 2007; Skelton & 
Batley, 2008; Clark, 2012; Clamp, 2013; Johnstone, 2013). However, the literature does not give 
significant attention to the connections between the policymaking process and the effectiveness of 
RJ itself (Newburn & Crawford, 2002; Skelton, 2002; Frederikson, 2005; Molina & Alberola, 2005; 
Brooks, 2012; 2013; Silva, 2015). There is limited examination of the policymaking process of RJ 
within the developing contexts (Earle, Newburn & Crawford, 2002; Muncie, 2005; Wemmers, 
2005; Molina & Aberola, 2005; Oduro & Nagy, 2014; MacFarlane & Canton, 2014; McAlinden & 
As will be discussed, the Dispute Resolution Foundation (DRF) in Jamaica uses a variety of 37
practices to handle a range of crimes without involvement from the justice system altogether, while 
the MOJ employs restorative conferences pre-charge, post-charge and post-sentencing in order to 
meet their aims of reducing the burden on the court as well as reducing recidivism mostly non-
violent crimes. 
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Dwyer, 2015; Clamp, 2016). Any focus on specific aspects of RJ or mention general restorative 
ideals. For instance, Earle, Newburn & Crawford (2002) focus on the implementation of referral 
orders , which is a restorative-oriented practice. In this thesis, I argue that the failure to consider 38
local context and lack of collaboration throughout the policymaking process resulted in the 
implementation of a RJ policy that did not meet its objectives or make use of resources effectively.  
 Also, there is limited discussion of RJ in Jamaica and other Caribbean countries. The 
regional literature focuses on RJ in North American focuses on the United States and Canada 
(particular given the long standing history of RJ in Canada and its roots in Aboriginal community 
practices). The limited literature on RJ in the Caribbean focuses on the potential of RJ to reform the 
justice system and reduce crime (Wachtel, 2005; Llewellyn, 2008; Williams, 2009; Taylor, 
Chauhan, Fondacaro, 2012; Wallace, Wylie & Gordon, 2013; Ali 2015). There is no literature that 
assesses the effectiveness of RJ policy or policy transfer of RJ in the Caribbean. This thesis seeks to 
introduce this discussion of RJ policymaking to the region.  
Conclusion 
 I have provided an overview of the various discussions taking place within policy transfer, 
justice policy and RJ literature across a range of jurisdictions as well as in Jamaica and the 
Caribbean. In doing so, I have noted the gaps that this thesis aims to fill. I will now go on to discuss 
the methodology that this research employed.  
 A referral order is a formal request to participate in a youth offender panel. It is part of restorative 38
practices for juvenile offenders that aim to bring the offender, community and victim together to 
resolve the crime collectively. 
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    Chapter 2: Methodology  
 This research concerns the transfer of RJ policy in Kingston, Jamaica between 2002 and 
2015. It seeks to respond to questions regarding the reality of policy transfer within a post-colonial, 
pluralist, developing jurisdiction that has limited experience in justice reform and how this can be 
improved upon. In accordance with the Dolowitz and Marsh framework, this research covers the 
origins of policy transfer, what was transferred, the factors that influence the policy transfer, and the 
effect that all of these considerations have on the success of the RJ programme.  
 The first section of this chapter discusses the value of qualitative research. The second 
section will provide rationale for the case study as part of this qualitative approach to data 
collection; and an in-depth description of the research strategy, which involves triangulation of the 
various data and key elements identified throughout. The final section will reflect on issues of 
validity and transferability, ethical concerns as well as the limitations of the research generally.  
Introduction to Research Methods  
 I utilised a qualitative research design with the aim of providing a context-specific, detailed, 
thick description of the process of transferring RJ policy in Jamaica. As a result, I was able to 
highlight the factors that affected this policymaking process and decipher which of them are 
consistent with or vary from those identified within the regional and international literature. Also, 
by identifying these influencing factors and its effect on policy success in Jamaica, I was able to 
discuss how this process might be improved upon.  
 Through qualitative information, researchers can provide an in-depth assessment of real-
world events and the effect that context or setting has on those events and persons involved 
(Silverman, 2000; Sallee & Flood, 2012). Qualitative research on RJ policy is similarly beneficial in 
that it can provide information on choices made throughout the policy-making process and describe 
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how this process affects the success of the programme. A quantitative analysis of the relevant 
statistics on crime prior to and after the implementation of RJ would not reveal such details. This is 
important given the lack of pre-existing information on policy transfer and the various factors that 
policymakers must contend with in Jamaica.  
 My work here relies on a range of qualitative data collection methods, including interviews, 
focus groups, questionnaires and observations. Conducting interviews allowed me to discriminate 
between goals stated in the RJ policy documents and what was being achieved in practice. I used 
interviews to demonstrate the lack of awareness of key stakeholders of the policymaking process. 
My interviews with civil society leaders and members of the judiciary demonstrated the lack of 
awareness of RJ, despite their stated inclusion in the programme. In addition, it demonstrated the 
importance of sensitisation. The failure of the Jamaican government to provide information on the 
contributing factors of crime, such as poverty meant that the key stakeholders, who held uninformed 
stereotypes of offenders and certain crimes, influenced their perception of RJ negatively. Some 
open-ended questions were used to obtain detailed information such as how would they want RJ to 
look like in practice in order to fit the needs of the Jamaican society, and how RJ applies to more 
heinous crimes, such as sexual violence.  
Case Study Approach  
 Case studies are used widely across the social sciences (Kohlbacher, 2006). A case study can 
be defined as ‘an intensive description and analysis of a phenomenon or social unit’ (Merriam, 
2002), and is usually bound by time and place (Creswell, 1998). It has also been shown that case 
studies often situate the case in its natural setting (Creswell, 1998), and can allow researchers to 
maintain the relevant characteristics of real-life events (Yin, 2014; Kohlbacher, 2006). Using the 
case study approach allowed for the close examination of the political, economic and social 
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conditions present in Jamaica that affect policymaking. In addition, I examined these factors during 
a specific period; where the Jamaican government was making its first attempt to reform the entire 
justice system; another context-specific issue that might have affected the policymaking process. By 
focusing on RJ, I was able to garner information about the influence of these conditions on penal 
policymaking specifically. This level of specificity has wider implications in determining the 
similarities and differences in penal policymaking versus other forms of policy as well as making 
inferences about other pluralist, British post-colonial jurisdictions that engage in policy transfer that 
may have similarities. A country that has limited experience in justice reform, suffers from a paucity 
of resources and public distrust of the state might learn valuable lessons from the Jamaican context.  
The choice of a case study enables researchers to engage with a wide variety of data, including 
interviews, documents and observations (Kohlbacher, 2006). The variety of empirical data and 
perspectives also adds depth to the analysis (Glowka, 2011; Denzin, 2012). My case study focuses 
on the events that occurred during the effort to develop and implement a national RJ policy in 
Jamaica between 2002 and 2015, more specifically in the city of Kingston, which I chose as the 
main research site because it enabled access to persons that were directly involved with the RJ 
programme (Marshall and Rossman, 2016).  
 Jamaica has a population of around 3 million (http://statinja.gov.jm/Demo_SocialStats/
population.aspx, Accessed, October 12, 2017) and the island is made up of 14 parishes (see Figure 
2.0). Much of the population (666,041) resides in the capital, Kingston that is located on the south-
eastern end of the island (http://statinja.gov.jm/Demo_SocialStats/populationbyparish.aspx, 
accessed October, 2017). Within Kingston and St. Andrew, many residential areas are separated in 
accordance with the class stratification of the population. A large portion of  the population of 
Page !83
Kingston and St. Andrew reside in the downtown area, also referred to as the Kingston Metropolitan 
Area (KMA)
 
(See Figure 2.1). 39
Figure 2.0 Population Map of Jamaica
 
Accessed: Retrieved from http://www.zonu.com/jamaica_maps/Jamaica_Population_Map_2.htm, 
accessed, March 1, 2016.  
 KMA is one part of the KMR, which includes Spanish Town and Portmore 39
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Figure 2.1. Map of Kingston Metropolitan Region, showing the population density of the Kingston 
Metropolitan Area 
 
Retrieved from the National Environment and Planning Agency, http://www. nepa.gov.jm/ecentre/
maps.asp. Accessed May 22, 2016  
 According to the 2011 census by the Statistical Institute of Jamaica, KMA represents 88% of 
the population of the parish of Kingston & St. Andrew (Clarke, 2006; http://statinja.gov.jm/
pressreleases/pressreleasecensus.aspx, accessed May, 2016). As will be discussed, much of the 
population within the southern and western parts of KMA (referred to as downtown) suffers from 
poverty, unemployment and subsequently crime (Headley, 1996; Henry-Lee, 2005; Clarke, 2006). 
This is in contrast to the eastern and northern sections of Kingston and St. Andrew (referred to as 
uptown), where the wealthier classes live in relatively crime free areas
 
(Robotham; 2003; Jaffe, 40
2012; Carnegie, 2014) (See Figure 2.2).  
 Over time, some small segments of the low-income population have infiltrated ‘uptown’ areas of 40
Kingston by occupying less desirable spaces such as gullies and water courses (Carnegie, 2014, 
p65). 
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Figure 2.2 Map of Kingston Metropolitan Area showing uptown/downtown divide  
 
(Accessed from Jaffe, 2012)  
 Within the KMA, there are a large number of inner-city communities, referred to as 
“garrisons,” where crime and violence are concentrated (see Figure 2.3). Harriott (as cited in Lewis, 
2012) states that 20% of all constituencies
 
and approximately 60% of all urban constituencies are 41
 A constituency refers to a group of voters within a certain geographical area that elect a political 41
representative.
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‘garrisoned’. Within these garrisons, politicians from the two major political parties develop 
relationships community leaders, referred to as ‘dons.’ Dons deliver the votes of citizens in 
garrisons by the threat or actual use of violence against community members. The political 
allegiance coordinated by ‘dons’ and politicians has contributed to the increasing murder rates in 
Kingston (Gray, 2007; Bourne et al. 2012). By using violence to garner political support, political 
parties have created a culture within these garrisons where violence and murder were legitimised for 
the purposes of maintaining political power. Groups from opposing parties and hence communities, 
engage in violence in order to diminish the stronghold that the opposition may have over a 
particular community. Between 2001 and 2005, politics was cited as the one of 3 main sources of 
motivation for over 40% of murders in Kingston (Gray, 2007) .  42
 All national government administration takes place in the capital Kingston. The House of 
Parliament, where policy is considered for legislation, is situated in downtown Kingston; and 11 of 
the 24 courts in Jamaica can be found in the city (see Figure 2.4). The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
and its sub-organizations responsible for the RJ programme and policy are also located in Kingston, 
as is the head of the National RJ Unit at the Justice Training Institute (JTI). However, only 1 of the 
7 RJ centres, Tower Hill, is located in Kingston
 
(see Figure 2.4). Upon discussion with personnel 43
from Tower Hill centre, I was informed that they accepted the most referrals for restorative 
practices due to the political tensions between garrisons in Kingston.  
The other two sources of motivation were rape and reprisals, which may be related indirectly to 42
political issues (Gray, 2007). 
 The RJ centre located in Montego Bay is currently not operational. It is located in a shopping 43
centre. 
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Chart 2.0 Distribution of Murder by Parish in Jamaica in 2013  
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Figure 2.3 Map of RJ Centre locations in Jamaica  
 
Figure 2.4: Map of Law Court locations in Jamaica  
 
Data Collection  
 I utilised a number of research tools to collect data during September 2014 and March 2015. 
I now discuss these tools and the value of triangulating the data collected. Then, I will review the 
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quality of the research in terms of validity and generalisability as well as the limitations of the 
research and ethical considerations that was accounted for so as to minimise any potential risk to the 
participants and myself in the final section.  
Interviews  
 I conducted 29 in-depth semi-structured elite interviews with a range of individuals (See 
Table 2.0) . These individuals were predominantly from the following groups: (i) CSOs who utilise 44
RJ or work with inner-city communities, (ii) members of the legal fraternity and judiciary, (iii) 
political representatives from the MOJ, (iv) academics, and (v) those mandated with the 
development of the National RJ policy.  
Table 2.0 List of interviewees 
Name Position Date Location
1 Michael Gordon Asst. Lecturer at University 
of the West Indies: RJ 
facilitator
11/27/2014 Eastwood Park 
Road Kingston, 
2 Dr. Bernard 
Headley
Professor at University of 
the West Indies: 
criminology; RJ facilitator
11/27/2014 Eastwood Park 
Road, Kingston
3 Mark Golding Attorney; Minister of Justice 11/18/2014 MOJ Offices, 
Oxford Road, 
Kingston
4 Justice Patrick 
Brookes
Court of Appeal Judge; 
former attorney
11/10/2014 Personal 
Residence, 
Hope Pastures, 
Kingston
5 Dr. Lloyd 
Barnett, Q.C
Attorney; Director of 
IJCHR; Expertise in 
constitutional reform and 
HR law
11/12/2014 In Chambers, 
Duke Street, 
Kingston
 George* asked to remain anonymous at the beginning of the interview. He was the only 44
interviewee that requested anonymity. 
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6 Justice Marva 
McIntosh
Retired Supreme Court 
Judge; Specialist Legal 
Consultant for Department 
of Public Prosecutions
11/28/2014 Office of the 
Department of 
Public 
Prosecution, 
Downtown 
Kingston
7 Judith 
Wedderburn
Director of Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (FES)- women’s 
rights
10/10/2014 FES Offices, 
Merrick 
Avenue, 
Kingston 10
8 Paul Hines CEO of Dispute Resolution 
Foundation (DRF)
07/11/2014 DRF Offices, 5 
Camp Road, 
Kingston
9 Nancy Anderson Attorney; Secretary of 
IJCHR 
1/12/2014 Norman 
Manley Law 
School, 
University of 
the West Indies, 
Kingston
10 Dorothy 
Lightbourne
Former Attorney General 
and Minister of Justice; 
Attorney
20/02/2015 In Chambers, 
Downtown 
Kingston
11 Dr. Clayton 
Sewell
Head of Ward 21 (Mental 
Health Facility at the 
University of West Indies 
Hospital); Only forensic 
Psychiatrist in Jamaica 
contracted by Department of 
Corrections
01/09/2014 Mental Health 
Facility, 
University of 
the West Indies, 
Kingston
12 Mr. Roydon Hall Acting Director, RJ Unit at 
the National Justice Training 
Institute; Centre Manager at 
Tower Hill Restorative 
Centre; panellist at RJ 
international conference
28/11/2014 RJU Offices, 
Camp Road, 
Kingston
13 Dr. Oo CEO of Bellevue Mental 
Hospital; Clinical 
Psychiatrist contracted by 
Department of Corrections
01/08/2015 Bellevue 
Mental 
Hospital, 
Windward 
Road, Kingston
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14 Carla Maria 
Gulotta
Director of Stand Up for 
Jamaica (Offender’s Rights 
Group), Panellist at RJ 
International Conference
20/1/2015 Stand up for 
Jamaica 
Offices, Tower 
Street, 
Downtown 
Kingston
15 Rachel Morrison HIV programme manager, 
UNDP
21/12/2014 UNDP Offices
16 Dr. Ramona 
Biholar
Lecturer at Faculty of Law 
at UWI; dissertation on the 
efforts of Jamaica to change 
cultural and social norms to 
fit with the mandate of 
CEDAW, with a particular 
focus on Article 5.
22/1/2015 Norman 
Manley Law 
School, 
University of 
the West Indies, 
Kingston
17 Donna 
Parchment-
Brown
Director of Justice Reform 
Implementation Unit 
(JRIU); former CEO of 
Dispute Resolution 
Foundation (DRF) and 
Peace Management 
Initiative (PMI); former 
Political Ombudsman; 
former Custos of St. 
Andrew; former Legal 
Representative of the 
Maroons.
3/02/2015 MOJ, Oxford 
Street, 
Kingston
18 Ruth Carey Former Policy Consultant to 
the MOJ on the RJ 
Programme; CEO of 
independent RJ centre
N/A Declined
19 Dr. Jermaine 
McCalpin
Associate Director of the 
Centre for Caribbean 
Thought and lecturer of 
Transitional Justice, 
University of the West 
Indies; Lecturer; Panellist at 
RJ International Conference 
03/03/2015 Telephone 
Meeting (UK & 
United States)
20 Hermoine 
McKenzie
Director of AWOJA; 
Professor at University of 
the West Indies
16/02/2015 AWOJA 
offices, 
Ellesmere Road
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 Interviews are a useful research tool because they provide insight into events that we would 
ordinarily know little about and they provide more detail about the nuances of political processes 
and the manoeuvrings between influential actors (Lilleker, 2003). These chosen interviewees 
21 Audrey Barrett National Technical Advisor  
(NTA) of RJ programme
10/01/2015 Skype Meeting 
(Jamaica and 
Canada)
22 Jennifer 
Llewellyn
Consultant of RJ 
programme; Lecturer at 
Dalhousie University
10/02/2015 Skype Meeting 
(Jamaica and 
Canada)
23 Damian 
Hutchinson
Director, Peace 
Management Initiative
26/02/2015 PMI Offices, 
Melmac 
Avenue, 
Kingston
24 Lisa Palmer-
Hamilton
Deputy of Director of Public 
Prosecutions; attorney 
25/02/2015 Office of the 
DPP, 
Downtown 
Kingston
25 Carol Palmer Permanent Secretary of 
MOJ
10/01/2015 Ministry of 
National 
Justice, Oxford 
Street, 
Kingston
26 Leon Dundas Senior Trainer/Mediator at 
Dispute Resolution 
Foundation; Consultant at 
MOJ
20/04/2015 Café, Leicester, 
United 
Kingdom
27 Dr. Barbara 
Toews
Consultant of DRF; Mentee 
of Professor Howard Zehr
06/11/2014 Skype Meeting 
(Jamaica and 
Canada)
28 George Standup for Jamaica 
Director; RJ facilitator
20/1/2015 Stand up for 
Jamaica offices, 
Tower Street 
Kingston
29 Dr Damion Blake Assistant Professor of 
Political Science and Policy 
Studies, Elon University; 
Consultant at MNS
05/04/2016 Skype (UK and 
Jamaica)
30 Vuraldo Barnett RJ Centre Manager, Trench 
Town RJ centre
Declined Declined
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represent the ‘gatekeepers’ of knowledge, since they are either directly involved or have had some 
interaction with the policy transfer of RJ in Jamaica (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). As a result, they 
were able to provide detailed information regarding the development and implementation of the RJ 
policy and the advantages gained from and obstacles faced. Two forms of sampling were used to 
select participants. Initially, I used purposeful sampling which involved selecting particular cases 
based on a specific purpose instead of at random (Teddie & Yu, 2007). Of the 29 interviewees, 19 
were chosen because of their role in the development of the policy or their association with justice-
related issues, such as my request for an interview with the Minister of Justice, Mark Golding, 
because of his consistent support for RJ in Jamaica. I was able to interview 10 other persons 
through snowball sampling , which occurs when an interviewee recommends other individuals 45
who may shed further details on the issues being discussed. During my interview with Minister 
Golding, (MOJ Offices, 18/11/14) he recommended Permanent Secretary (PS) Carol Palmer (MOJ 
Offices, 10/1/15) to be interviewed, who had a vested interest in RJ and was heavily involved in the 
development and implementation of the policy.  
 I sought access to all interviewees by sending out formal interview requests via email and 
post. I followed up these formal requests with telephone calls. Most participants welcomed the 
opportunity to participate in the interviews. Only 3 persons declined interviews. With the consent of 
the participants, the interviews were audio-recorded and ranged in duration between 40 minutes and 
2 hours and 30 minutes. All but 3 interviews took place in person in Jamaica, since these persons 
were no longer based in Jamaica. These three interviews were done via Skype and telephone. While 
all interviews were conducted in English, t patois (Jamaican dialect) was also used extensively.  
Also, I embraced both internal and external sampling. External sampling is understood as 45
interviewees chosen who are outside of the focal point of research, but still has a wealth of 
knowledge of it (Mickez, 2012). For instance, I interviewed Hermoine McKenzie, Director of 
AWOJA because of her work in civil society, but also because, as a professor, she had supervised a 
number of dissertations on RJ. Despite her lack of direct involvement in the development of policy, 
she was able to provide an informed outside perspective on the potential of RJ in Jamaica. 
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Questionnaires  
 A questionnaire is defined as a list of questions that are sent out to individuals to gather 
information about their opinions (Williams, 2003; Grix, 2004), and is a quick, cost-effective way of 
collecting large amounts of data (Harpham et al, 2003; Wright, 2006). For this research, 206 online 
questionnaires were randomly distributed to Jamaican citizens over 18 years of age residing in 
Kingston using Google Docs, which allowed me to monitor responses more effectively.  
 These questionnaires did not seek to ascertain public opinion on RJ. Rather it sought to 
demonstrate the type of detailed, contextual information that the Jamaican government could have 
garnered had they engaged with the public in a collaborative manner. Later on in the thesis, I 
describe the tokenistic nature of public consultation as part of the policymaking process. Both the 
questionnaire and the focus groups in this research (which the government used in their own public 
consultations) sought to exhibit the potential effectiveness of the tools that were used in the 
consultation process. For instance I asked participants about the use of RJ for sexual offences .   46
 The answers are not representative of a cross-section of the Jamaican public. Rather the 
responses are representative of the type of information that could have been collected and the 
usefulness of those responses in developing a context-specific form of RJ.  
 In demonstrating the most effective use of a questionnaire and its capacity to capture how 
Jamaicans envisage RJ, many of the questions provided a range of answers to choose from or were 
open-ended to allow participants to express themselves in detail. In addition, a short written 
 I focus on sexual offences as crimes that have been increasing, but left largely unaddressed by the 46
justice system. Since 2009, there has been a decrease in violent crimes, but a consistent increase in 
sexual offences (20.5%) (Harriott & Jones, 2016). Of the 347 rapes reported to the Centre for the 
Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse (CISOCA) in 2013, only 137 resulted in arrests 
(Harriott & Jones, 2016). While RJ is largely accepted as a ‘soft approach to crime’ that can handle 
minor disputes, I propose that RJ is actually punitive in nature and should be able to address a range 
of crimes in terms of severity. 
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description was provided that explained the content of the questionnaire and its purpose due to the 
sensitive nature of topics being discussed. This was accompanied by a video link, which depicted a 
restorative conference and factual information about sexual offences—potential topics of RJ 
conferences   47
 This video engaged misinformed beliefs about RJ as a soft response to crime and sexual 
offenders as innate predators so that participants could respond to questions having been given 
factual information about RJ and the underlying factors that contribute to persons committing 
heinous crimes such as sexual offences
 
(Tsui, 2014; NCIS, 2007; Thomas, 2004; Sanghara, 2006; 48
Johnstone, 2013; Bohart & Plumm, 2015). This video was used across data collection methods to 
maintain consistency (Olsen, 2004; Bryman, 2011). 
Focus Groups  
 A focus group interview allows for communication between research participants to create 
data (Kitzinger, 1995). Focus groups are also most suitable for the collection of in-depth 
information on topics that are not well understood or under-studied by researchers, particularly 
those who have some shared experience that makes their perspective valuable to the research 
 Wright (2006) notes that online questionnaires can be beneficial in garnering information from 47
persons who may be hesitant to speak in person. Anecdotal evidence from the interviews indicated 
that there is an unwillingness of Jamaican women of a higher socio-economic status to participate 
in-group conversations about sexual violence. Many of the studies that examine sexual violence in 
Jamaica focus on the connection between low socio-economic backgrounds and sexual violence 
(Eggleston et al. 1999; Arscott-Mills, 2001; Amnesty International, 2006; Baumgartner et al. 2009; 
Jones, 2010; Ishida, Stupp & Mcdonald, 2011; Sukhu, 2012; Lansford et al. 2014). However a 
number of studies that attempt to garner information from a range of social classes use self-
administered questionnaires (Griffith, Negy & Chadee, 2006; Jones & Jemmott, 2009; Jones, 2011; 
Pasura et al. 2013). Therefore, a questionnaire seemed an appropriate and timesaving method to 
obtain information from individuals of a wider demographic. 
 This aspect of the research is in keeping with the concerns discussed within the study by Taylor et 48
al.2012). In this study, researchers noted that one of its flaws was the fact that it did not examine 
what the participants knew about RJ at the beginning of the research.
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(Kitzinger, 1995; Vaughn, Schumm & Sinagub, 1996; Balch & Mertens, 1999; Seymour, 2004; 
Holcomb et al. 2006; Jones et al. 2009).  
 By means of stratified sampling, I recruited participants between the ages of 18 and 40 for 
two focus groups. Stratified sampling is ideal for researchers interested in exploring the views of 
individuals who have some shared characteristic or interest (Teddie & Yu, 2007). Focus groups 
were divided into sets of participants that represented potential stakeholders in an RJ process: 1) A 
group of eight female victim-survivors and 2) A group of seven community members . The focus 49
groups were further split into two sessions of 2; (4 hours in total) where participants gathered in a 
private room and were seated in a circle. During the first session, participants were able to discuss 
their awareness of RJ and the justice system. Prior to the second session, the video provided in the 
questionnaire was shown to give participants a basic understanding of the topics being discussed 
and dispel any prior misinformation. After the video presentation, the second session focused on 
gaining in-depth information about how Jamaicans, particularly those who had been victims of 
crime, viewed the restorative process and how they would adapt it to suit their needs and the 
Jamaican political, cultural and economic context. All participants from the female victim survivor 
focus group were recruited from inner-city communities with the assistance of a local women’s 
  In keeping with the feminist methodology literature, it was important for the group to be 49
homogenous across experiences, age, race and class in order to make participants feel comfortable 
and reduce any possible harm. Kitzinger (1995) states that most researchers recommend some form 
of homogeneity within the focus group setting in order to gain as much information about the 
perspective of the collective (Ginsburg et al. 2002; Hollander, 2004; Weist et al. 2007; Jones et al. 
2009; Jacobson, Phillips & Edgar, 2010). Focus groups are also less intrusive because of the 
reduced role of the facilitator, which means that participants can control their level of involvement 
(Barkhuizen, 2011). The homogenous group setting can also create a space of empathy and support 
for individuals who have been through similar experiences (Barkhuizen, 2011). In this way, focus 
groups may be beneficial to the researcher and the participants.  
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rights group and the community members were recruited from a local church. As the primary 
researcher I acted as a facilitator for both focus groups, alongside a clinical psychologist .  50
 According to Seymour et al. (2004) focus groups are able to: (i) identify participants’ most 
salient needs, (ii) seek input from a variety of stakeholders about rights and services, and (iii) 
identify strengths and gaps in public policy. As noted previously, the Jamaican government carried 
out public consultations as a way of ascertaining public opinion during the development of the 
national RJ policy. As will be discussed , these consultations failed to collect relevant information 51
to develop a RJ programme that addressed the realities of the Jamaican public. My focus groups 
aimed to highlight the failure of the public consultations by demonstrating the wealth of information 
that could have benefitted the development of a more contextually relevant national RJ policy by 
considering issues such as the distrust of the government, the presence of dons and their informal 
justice systems and more specifically the value of the perspectives of potential stakeholders, that is, 
victims, offenders and participating community members.  
Documents and Observations  
 The use of documents is essential in social sciences and in political science (Wesley, as cited 
in Kaal, Maks & Elfrinkhof, 2014). I used an intensity sampling strategy to select a range of 
documents that had detailed, relevant content on: (i) crime rates in Jamaica, (ii) the current state of 
the justice system and its reform, (iii) policymaking in Jamaica, and (iv) the RJ national policy and 
its implementation. These documents-which are identified in Appendix Three- -provided valuable 
  A female psychologist co-facilitated the session to assist should there be any discomfort for the 50
victim-survivors. In the community focus group, a male clinical psychologist was used to provide a 
balanced representation of gender within a mixed group. 
 For instance, the Jamaican government had focus groups with large numbers of participants and 51
failed to categorise groups in accordance with types of stakeholders that would utilize restorative 
practices. 
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information regarding the intended actions of the Jamaican government to reduce crime as well as 
their success or failure to achieve these goals. They provided a wealth of background knowledge on 
the history of the Jamaican justice system, the plan for its reform as well as the outlined process for 
the development and implementation of the RJ policy and programme, including identification of 
key stakeholders, organisational and financial capacity and reasons for the successes and failures . 52
I was able to cross-reference and triangulate this data with the rest of the data collected.  
 I also used observations to collect data for this study. An observation is defined as “the 
systematic description of events, behaviours and artefacts in the social setting chosen for 
study” (Marshall & Rossman (1989) and is particularly useful in collating qualitative research as it 
allows researchers to examine intricate interactions within a natural environment (Rossman, 2010). 
I used participant observation, which refers to an observational approach that allows the researcher 
to immerse himself or herself in the research setting (Mason, 2016), and share first-hand the 
experience of participants and connect with those experiences, giving an indication of how and why 
persons behave (Mason, 2016; Kawulich, 2005).  
 Traditionally, researchers find participant observation useful during the exploratory aspects 
of research due to the wealth of information that could be collected (Guest, Namey & Mitchell, 
2013). Participant observation contributes to the rich multi-dimensional description of the 
phenomena being examined (Mason, 2014; Kawulich, 2005), and is considered applicable to 
situations where there is little known about the event or if there is no other way to obtain the data 
(Jorgensen, 1989; Mason, 2014; Grix, 2004). I used participant observation for its capacity to 
provide insight, to access information otherwise unavailable, and to confirm information collected 
through other methods. As mentioned previously, there is very little documented information on the 
implementation of national RJ policy, particularly information Public Relations and sensitisation 
 Many of these documents were accessed through the Access to Information Act.52
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efforts of the Jamaican government. I was able to gain first hand experience on how RJ functions in 
Jamaica, the effect of the spaces in which they operate as well as how RJ is presented to and 
perceived by the public respectively. This is information was not available from other forms of data 
collection, since none of the focus groups participants had attended an RJ event and many of the 
elite interviews could not recall details of sensitisation events attended.  
 I observed events that were related directly to the implementation of the RJ policy; a RJ pre-
meeting at the Tower Hill RJ centre
 
(See Appendix Six), a site visit to the Spanish Town RJ centre 53
as well as the 2015 International RJ Conference and the Launch Exhibition of RJ weeks at the 
National Tom Redcam Library. Mr Roydon Hall (Acting RJ director) and Donna Parchment-Brown 
(Head of JRIU) invited me to these events.  
 Jorgensen (1989) states that a researcher’s involvement may be overt, (that is having the 
insiders aware of the researcher’s presence) or covert (without the knowledge of the insiders). 
However the literature discusses the fact that these positions can overlap within any study (Mulhall, 
2003; Guest, Namey & Mitchell, 2013). For the most part, I maintained an overt presence at all of 
the observations. For instance, at the pre-meetings for the restorative conference, the facilitators 
knew that I was researching RJ for my thesis . At the conference and library exhibition, many 54
persons whom I had interviewed were in attendance and aware of my status as a research student. 
For attendees who did not know me, I introduced myself as a research student with an interest in RJ 
without indicating that I was there to observe the events taking place and the people involved. There 
 Due to government restrictions, I was unable to observe a conference in my official capacity as a 53
researcher. However, I was granted access to participate in a restorative conference as a community 
member. Unfortunately, the actual conference did not take place, due to a failure to find a mutually 
convenient time for all parties to meet. 
 The acting director of the RJ Unit was one of the facilitators. He informed his co-facilitator that I 54
was a research student. 
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were other students present, which allowed me to fit in as a regular attendee. I had no formal role in 
the activities . 55
Triangulation  
 As part of analysing the data, I cross-matched and triangulated the information garnered 
from documents and newspaper articles with all other data collected. Triangulation is defined as, 
‘the mixing of data or methods so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon a 
topic’ (Olsen, 2004; Bryman et al. 2011). Researchers use triangulation to approach a study from 
‘different angles by using different methods’ (Grix, 2004). Sale et al. (2002) acknowledge that this 
approach is useful particularly in complex studies, such as the current one, where the real world 
phenomena being examined require information from multiple perspectives. These varying 
perspectives strengthen the validity of the research because the information obtained from one data 
collection method can be confirmed through data collected from other approaches (Olsen, 2004; 
Bryman 2011; Denzin, 2012). Within the current research, the theme of community distrust of the 
government is consistent across both semi-structured interviews and focus groups conducted which 
shows that one form of data collection may shed light on initial information gained from another. 
Document analysis indicated noticeable time gaps between the provision of funding, the 
establishment of the RJ unit, the drafting of the policy and its publication. The official government 
documentation did not explain the reason/s for these time lapses. By conducting semi-structured 
elite interviews with a range of political officials, I was able to attribute these gaps to changes in 
political leadership within parties and at the national level. Triangulating data from interviews and 
participant observation also confirmed information attained from each method. During my 
observations at the International RJ Conference, I noted a lack of awareness amongst the legal 
fraternity and funders about the restorative conference as a practice. I was able to compare this with 
 At the site visit to Spanish Town, the centre was empty and there was no one to interact with. 55
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the level of awareness of interviewees from the Department of Public Prosecutions and members of 
the judiciary as a way of reaffirming the lack of awareness amongst key stakeholders.  
Data Analysis  
 While there are a variety of ways in which qualitative data can be analysed, there are a few 
common factors that proponents of qualitative data analysis agree upon as essential to the process. 
One such method is immersion in the data, which involves a systematic approach to organising, and 
coding data and the creation of categories/thematic frameworks (Kohlbacher, 2006; Marshall & 
Rossman, 2006; Srivastava, 2009).  
 For this research, I chose to use framework analysis (Ritchie & Spencer, 1999; Srivastava, 
2009; Gale et al. 2013). Framework analysis is used widely in policy research and it embraces a 
variety of data collection methods and overlaps with other approaches in terms of the immersion in 
the data, the creation of categories and the importance of coding the data systematically. Srivastava 
(2009) describes the process as follows: (i) familiarisation, (ii) identifying a thematic framework, 
(iii) indexing, (iv) charting, and (v) mapping and interpretation.  
 The defining feature of framework analysis is the sorting of the data into matrix outputs. 
These matrix outputs allow data to be compared across cases and within cases (Gale et al, 2013), 
facilitating the revision of ideas. As a result, I transcribed all interviews, focus groups and notes 
from observations into Microsoft Word documents and input the data from the questionnaire into an 
excel spread sheet. I placed these into separate files. In order to immerse or familiarise myself with 
the data I read these transcriptions, the initial notations from the observations and listened to the 
audio recordings several times. From this familiarisation, I organised and coded the relevant data 
under categories of recurring ideas, such as involvement of civil society, political competitiveness 
and sustainability with the use of NVIVO. From these groupings, I identified main overarching 
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themes; (i) type of collaboration with/level of involvement of non-state stakeholders (Public, civil 
society, dons, Maroons), (ii) collaboration between political parties (iii) consideration/neglect of 
Jamaican social, legal, cultural and economic context and (iv) policy development versus 
implementation.  
 Another strength of this approach is that it works within a pre-determined framework as 
dictated by the research questions but is open to the incorporation of emerging themes that are 
discovered within the data (Ritchie & Spence, 1999; Srivastava, 2009). Concepts first suggested by 
the research questions may come to seem less relevant than expected. Initially, sexual violence was 
identified as a theme. In fact, it is highlighted as one of the main problems to be addressed by 
justice reform efforts (Harriott & Jones, 2016). While it was determined that the application of RJ to 
sexual violence was an important part of the discussion, there was not sufficient evidence to make it 
central to the thesis. This was due to the lack of local research on sexual violence in Jamaica and the 
decision of the Jamaican government to exclude sexual offences from the list of crimes that could 
be addressed by RJ under the national RJ policy.  
Limitations of the Study  
 This research suffered from some limitations, particularly in the collection and interpretation 
of data. The questionnaire suffered from selection bias, which is caused by a preferential choice of 
participants that is not independent of the outcome (Elwert & Winship, 2014). In this study, 
participation was restricted to persons with internet access, which may have limited the 
generalisability of the results to individuals of a certain socio-economic status, as according to the 
WB, only 40.5% of Jamaicans have access to the internet (The WB, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2, accessed, August 6, 2015). Anecdotal evidence from the interviews 
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indicated that there was an unwillingness of Jamaicans of a higher socio-economic status to 
participate As conversations about crime .  56
 As stated previously, the questionnaire and the focus group were not utilised in order to gain 
public consensus on RJ. Instead they were used to demonstrate the detailed, rich information that 
the Jamaican government might have garnered had they embraced a collaborative approach to 
policymaking. As will be discussed in greater detail, the Jamaican government distributed 
questionnaires to the same cohort that participated in their ‘talking circles’ in order to bolster the 
validity of their data collection. However, I demonstrate that the questionnaires could have been 
used to garner a perspective that is less widely found in public consultation. Unlike, the focus 
groups, which garnered the opinions of persons from a lower socio-economic status only, the 
distribution of an online questionnaire data might have provided insight into the attitudes of 
individuals who are often not part of these studies but contribute to public opinion and can provide 
support to the RJ programme as volunteers and financial donors. A number of studies that attempt to 
obtain information from a range of social classes use self-administered questionnaires (Griffith, 
Negy & Chadee, 2006; Jones & Jemmott, 2009; Jones, 2011; Pasura et al. 2013). Therefore, the 
issue of selection bias is not applicable, since my intention was not to capture public opinion, but 
rather to demonstrate how it might have been captured more effectively. A questionnaire was the 
most suitable complement to focus groups in order to obtain information from a wider cross-section 
of Jamaican society.  
 This may be true of other developing countries as well. In a study that looked at the relationship 56
between women’s socioeconomic status and DV experiences, only 7%of respondents had a 
secondary education. In addition, only 40% of respondents were part of the ‘rich’ or ‘richer’ 
categories (Pambe, Gnoumou & Kabore, 2013).  
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 The definition of validity is not fixed within the literature on qualitative methodology 
(Golafshani, 2003; Rolfe, 2006) . Essentially, qualitative researchers are concerned with accuracy. 57
In order to maximize the accuracy of the research, I engaged in a number of processes that are 
highlighted within the methodology literature. Triangulation was important for ensuring validity 
and credibility of the research. I utilised a range of qualitative data collection methods to compare 
the consistency of results across methods. One problem identified with this research is that readers 
of the research would be dependent on the ‘interpretation’ of the researcher, making the validity and 
reliability of the research dubious (Bowen, 2009; Kaal, Maks & Elfrinkhof, 2014). I attempted to 
minimise these issues through the use of data triangulation. In addition, I engaged in member 
checking by interviewing some of the authors of the research papers, those involved with writing 
policy, as well as representatives of both political parties.  
 The literature on participant observation across disciplines identifies researcher bias as one 
of the main drawbacks of participant observation (Jorgensen, 1989; Johnson & Sackett, 1998; Drury 
& Scott, 2001; Kawulich, 2005; Iacono et al. 2009; DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010). Researcher bias 
occurs when the researcher filters the collected information based on personal interests, rather than 
presenting a complete picture of events (Kawulich, 2005). I implemented certain measures to 
minimise this effect by collecting as much information as possible. Maxwell (2002) recommends 
the use of ‘rich data’ to increase the validity of the research. By providing as much detail as 
possible, there is less reliance on the author’s interpretation. 
Consistent with this idea, I personally transcribed the focus group and interview recordings. Oliver 
et al. (2005) discuss how transcription can be practiced; a continuum between naturalised and de-
naturalised transcription. Naturalised transcription includes as much detail of the audio as possible, 
 While there is some consensus on the criteria for quantitative, this is not the case for qualitative 57
(Rolfe, 2006; Denzin, 2009; Bryman 2011). 
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including speech patterns, accents, pauses and non-verbal activity (Oliver et al. 2005). On the other 
hand, de-naturalised transcription is focused on the content rather than the delivery of that content, 
in particular the meanings and perceptions voiced during the conversation. I embraced a form of 
transcription that is closer to denaturalised transcription on the continuum. My focus was on the 
informational content of the interviews. However, I transcribed verbatim the use of patois in the 
transcriptions to ensure that the cultural understanding of the information was retained and 
indicated intonation of voices to highlight the views and feelings of participants. A note-taker was 
also present at both focus groups. This was beneficial in case of any malfunctions of the tape 
recorder and for added assurance that all information was collected accurately (Kitzinger & 
Barbour, 1997; Powell & Single, 1996). In keeping with the work of Jogensen (1989) I recorded the 
information during the event. Most researchers find it useful to write field notes as close to the time 
that the events were observed as possible (Mulhall, 2003). During and after each event, I made 
notes of my observations. Where possible, I took pictures and collected any PR material available.  
 Qualitative research is also concerned with the generalisability of the research. Sometimes 
referred to as transferability or portability, researchers value case study research that can provide 
value beyond the cases being examined (Maxwell, 2002; Kawulich, 2005). However, as noted 
earlier, the information garnered from the focus groups and questionnaires was not intended to 
prove generalisability. The focus groups and the questionnaires demonstrate an ideal collaborative 
approach to policymaking that would have enabled the Jamaican government to create a fit-for-
purpose RJ programme that considered the realities of the Jamaican society .  58
 However, it is important to note that the understanding of justice of the victim-survivors, their 58
issues with the justice system and their perception of RJ as a way of validating their experience and 
regaining power is consistent with related literature on women’s experience with justice systems 
and RJ in particular (Frederick & Lizdas, 2010; Rubin, 2010; Pennell & Kim, 2010; Ptacek, 2010; 
Miller & Iovanni, 2013; Koss, 2014). I will discuss these similarities later on in the thesis.
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 Finally, there were a number of difficulties that affected my capacity to collect data 
altogether. According to the literature, there are often challenges faced in conducting elite 
interviews (Welch et al. 2002; Lilleker, 2003; Kaiser, 2009; Lancaster, 2017). The most prominent 
of these is access. Lancaster (2017) notes that political elites often occupy roles, which have the 
capacity to create barriers to the research. This problem is definitely reflected in my research. 
Similar to Lancaster (2017) and others, I found that my interviews with policymakers and other 
politically connected officials became limiting in my capacity to access key information, as these 
gatekeepers were tied to organisational policies and bound to the protection of the reputation of 
those policies and their affiliated organisations (Welch et al. 2002; Mickez, 2012). Many of my 
interviewees were very open and frank about the pitfalls of the development of the RJ policy in 
Jamaica. However, some of the interviewees, particularly those who were not senior staff, were 
more hesitant to speak for fear of losing their jobs or becoming embroiled in the political 
competitiveness between the PNP and JLP. For instance, as part of my research, I hoped to observe 
a RJ conference. Two of my prospective interviewees declined participation as a result of fear of the 
repercussions on their professional reputation. Vuraldo Barnett, an RJ Centre Manager, indicated 
that he would not be able to participate due to ‘some recent developments in the unit’ and ‘internal 
dynamics’. In addition Ruth Carey, former RJ director declined to participate due to the potential 
impact that her commentary might have on her prospects of starting her own RJ firm. Audrey 
Barrett, Technical Advisor to the MOJ on the RJ policy (Skype. 10/1/15), reaffirmed this in her 
interview. She stated,  
 “It doesn’t surprise me that Ruth wouldn’t speak to you. I wont speak on her behalf, but   
 Ruth went through a lot at MOJ. Being a political entity, it had a lot of politics going on in  
 it. I watched those who were Jamaican and worked within the system and it can be very   
 tough. Please don’t take it personally, but there were a number of things she had to endure”.  
 This is consistent with the available literature, where research has shown that junior staff are 
often more reserved in their comments, when compared with senior participants (Welch et al. 2002).  
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 This issue of access also prevented me from participating in certain activities. Some of the 
participants were keen to help, but unable due to restrictions imposed by organisational policies and 
their loyalty to the organisation itself. As noted, the function of the focus groups was to demonstrate 
the type of useful information that could be garnered from public consultation. In particular I 
propose that the focus groups could have been used to obtain key information about how 
prospective stakeholders viewed RJ and how it might best function in Jamaica. As a result I set out 
to conduct 3 focus groups with different cohorts: victim-survivors, community members and 
offenders. In particular, I chose incarcerated male sex offenders who had committed offences 
against adults in order to demonstrate the different possible ways in which RJ could be adapted to 
address a more severe crime that had been largely unaddressed or mishandled by the Jamaican 
government. In order to access offenders, I made an application to The Department of Corrections. 
However, I found that there were a number of blocks that were in place to prevent such access. 
After several months of speaking with the head of research at the department and making plans to 
conduct the focus group, I received a letter from the Commissioner of Corrections, which asked me 
to make a number of changes to my thesis and methodology. In this letter, it asked for documents I 
had already provided, such as an official letter from the University of Warwick. In addition, I was 
told that my thesis would have to be reviewed by the Department before submission, where they 
reserved the right to make changes to the final draft and publish the document themselves. 
Compounded by the consistent delays in getting a response from the department, I was unable to 
obtain access to a group of offenders. This problem was affirmed during my interview with Dr. 
Clayton Sewell, head of Ward 21 at the UWI (UWI Offices, 9/1/14). He indicated that he faced 
similar issues in trying to conduct research on the correlation between mental health and sexual 
offences in Jamaica. He had been told that his research could not be allowed for fear of 
‘embarrassment to the Jamaican government’. This reduced the validity of the focus groups in terms 
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of their ability to demonstrate how the Jamaican government might have used it effectively to 
garner the input of prospective RJ stakeholders.  
 Also, there were practical issues that affected my access to information. For instance, much 
of the statistical information I requested from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) was 
unavailable. I requested information regarding statistics on the arrest, acquittals and convictions of 
various types of sexual offences. However this information was only available for a certain period 
of time, since prior to the implementation of the 2009 Sexual Offences Act, many sexual offences 
such as rape and sexual assault were all identified as Carnal Abuse. As a result, disaggregated 
statistics were unavailable prior to 2011. As a result my contribution to the discussion of addressing 
sexual violence in Jamaica became a less significant aspect of the thesis. In addition, I was not 
granted access to depersonalised transcripts or individual review of RJ cases due to protocols 
regarding confidentiality. I also requested the MOJ annual summary report on RJ that is provided to 
funders. However I was told that this was not yet available for public dissemination. This 
information limited the capacity of my research to speak to the reception of the public to RJ and the 
way in which the process took place in Jamaica.  
 In order to respond to this gap, I attempted to observe a RJ conference. I was granted 
permission by Roydon Hall, the acting director of the RJ unit, to participate in a RJ conference as a 
community member for a community dispute between landlord and tenant. However after 
participating in the pre-meetings, I was told that the conference would no longer take place due to a 
failure to coordinate a mutually convenient time for all stakeholders to come together. While I was 
able to receive a detailed account of what would take place in a RJ conference through my 
interview with Roydon Hall and my participation in the pre-meeting, I was unable to triangulate this 
information with a first hand account of the process.  
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 Despite these limitations, the discussion of the development and implementation of RJ 
policy within this study adds value. Jamaica is the first country in the Caribbean to develop a 
national RJ policy. Examining this policy can provide lessons for other British post-colonial 
developing countries, particularly those within the Caribbean, due to overlapping contexts in terms 
of hierarchical political systems, high crime rates and public mistrust of the state. Methodologically, 
the research demonstrates the usefulness of the Dolowitz & Marsh framework to penal policy 
transfer, particularly in developing and post-conflict jurisdictions where there is a lack of 
experience with reform or policy implementation generally.  
Ethical Considerations  
 Ethics refers to what should or should not be done in order to minimise the potential of harm 
for all involved in the research, both participants and researchers (Grix, 2004). It is a duty of 
standards pertaining to behaviour and morality (Shanmuganathan, 2005), which will vary across 
disciplines. For the purposes of this research, I was guided by the ethical statement and guidelines 
provided by the University of Warwick. The following section will identify those guidelines that 
were pertinent to the research and how I considered them.  
Protection of Participants and Researcher  
 In order to ensure the safety of participants, deception was avoided throughout the research. 
All participants were told about the nature of the project and what the information collected would 
be used for at the beginning of the focus groups and interviews. A clinical psychologist was present 
at both focus groups. The facilitators vetted the questions and video presentation in terms of their 
potential to cause distress to vulnerable participants. In addition, a pilot study was conducted where 
feedback was given on the phrasing of the questions as well as the video. In a continued effort to 
protect participants, all participants were given debriefing packs, which provided them with 
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information in case they wished to seek advice/help after participating in the study. The physical 
safety of focus group participants and interviewees was ensured by holding these sessions in private 
and familiar spaces that were not located in areas that are associated with crime, such as private 
offices, a church and a women’s community centre. All focus groups were given aliases in order to 
ensure anonymity. 
 To the best of my knowledge, none of my actions as an observer posed a threat to attendees. 
I did not collect any data that might have been incriminating or dangerous and I did not compromise 
anyone’s privacy by using audio or video recording. During the observation process, my interaction 
with attendees of the events was minimal. Guest, Namey & Mitchell (2013) note that the level of 
interaction with those being observed is important when considering whether or not to gain consent. 
In the case of this study, I did not interview any attendees or speak to any one individual for an 
extended period. Most of my conversations were limited to general conversations where attendees 
and I discussed our interests in RJ.  
Consent  
 There are 3 main factors that the literature suggests should be considered for consent and 
deception: (i) the setting, (ii) self-presentation, and (iii) the effect on participants (Mulhall 2003; 
Namey, Guest & Mitchell, 2013). For focus groups and interviewees, all persons provided both 
written and verbal consent. Focus group participants were asked to sign consent forms and agree 
orally to participate. In cases where literacy was a concern, a facilitator was on hand to explain the 
content of the consent form to participants and where they were unable to sign, they were asked to 
make a mark in the consent box. A facilitator witnessed both types of signatures. In addition, 
participants of both focus groups and interviews were told that they were free to leave the study 
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without consequence at any point in time. There was no deception involved in any of the research 
and all participants agreed to partake in the study willingly. No form of coercion was used.  
 For observations, complete consent in public settings is not usually required. The literature 
on participant observation acknowledges that gaining consent in public settings is particularly 
difficult and in many cases, impossible (Mulhall, 2003; Guest, Namey & Mitchell, 2013). 
Researchers are free to collect information in public spaces, provided that the actions or 
conversations being observed are not considered to be private (Mulhall, 2003; Namey, Guest, & 
Mitchell, 2013). Although I had gained consent from the ‘gatekeepers’, it was difficult to gain 
consent from those I interacted with, as well as gain consent from all of the attendees observed. 
However, the way I presented myself limited the need for consent and negated the need for 
deception. Mulhall (2003) and others note that in identifying myself as a research student, and 
providing an identity that is in keeping with the goals and objectives of the study, consent is implied 
and deception is considered negligible (Guest, Namey & Mitchell, 2013). In addition to gaining 
consent from the individuals who invited me to these events, I gave attendees whom I interacted 
with truthful information regarding my position as a research student and my interest in RJ. 
Although I did not indicate that my aim was to observe the events, I did not deceive anyone in terms 
of my role and my interest in attending the events.  
Privacy  
 One of the main issues surrounding privacy and confidentiality is that of naming the 
participants of the study. Anonymity is one form of confidentiality, which was an important 
consideration within this research. Within the literature, there is some discussion about the difficulty 
of deciding whether to identify participants (Welch, 2002; Kaiser, 2009; Mickez, 2012; Kitzinger, 
2014; Lancaster, 2017). The academic literature on social research highlights the importance of 
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confidentiality, even when they conflict with the aims of the research (Siedman, 1998; Yin, 2009; 
Bailey, 2007).  
 Complete anonymity is often impossible as persons involved in data collection often know 
and meet participants. However, there are two forms of confidentiality discussed within the 
literature. The dominant/default approach requires that researchers maintain anonymity of 
respondents through the collection, analysis and report of data collected (Kaiser, 2009; Kitzinger, 
2014). This can be done in a number of ways, including the use of aliases, depersonalised data sets 
and any other wishes that the participant requests. This is the approach that I took for the focus 
groups. While none of the participants expressed any concern as to how the information they 
provided would be used, efforts were made to ensure the privacy of all. At the beginning of each 
focus group, participants were asked to choose aliases to ensure anonymity and to use those aliases 
in addressing each other throughout the focus group to ensure recognition of voices during 
transcription later on . A note taker was present for both focus groups. This was beneficial in case 59
of any malfunctions of the tape recorder and for added assurance that all information was collected 
accurately (Powell & Single, 1996; Kitzinger & Barbour, 1997).  
 However, in the case of interviewees, the dominant approach would not have provided the 
same quality of confidentiality. As it relates to interviewing political elites, default anonymity has a 
number of disadvantages (Kitzinger, 2014). First, keeping places and names hidden forces the 
research to lose the rich, detailed nature of the data and limits scope for analysis, which can run 
counter to the aim of the research (Kitzinger, 2014). Within the thesis, the context is integral to the 
discussion of the policymaking process as it seeks to contribute to the development of justice 
policymaking within Jamaican and the English-Speaking Caribbean during a specific time frame.  
 It was not necessary to anonymise the meeting places as none of the participants were frequent 59
visitors or associated with the spaces where focus groups were held. 
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 As will emerge, the situating of the RJ centres in impoverished areas with high instances of 
crime, the political loyalties of actors and the change in roles and political administrations are all 
contextual aspects that have a direct effect on the policymaking process. To decouple these factors 
from the discussion of events would ultimately limit the transformative goals of this research to 
guide policymakers in identifying the various factors that can affect justice policymaking within 
this context, learning from the mistakes made and ultimately improving the effectiveness of justice 
policymaking and reducing crime in the region. History and context is certainly not static. Within 
this thesis, I provide insight into the historical relationship between donors and the Jamaican 
government. I go on to explain that, despite changes to this relationship, there has been a failure of 
the Jamaican government to embrace a more collaborative approach to policymaking that gives 
primacy to the needs of Jamaicans rather than donor agendas. This shift in context is time-specific 
and directly affects the outcome of the RJ policy, which is largely adapted from the province of 
Nova Scotia in Canada, would not be brought to light without identifying the international 
consultants, the sites of study tours conducted by the Jamaican government and the distinction in 
relationships between PNP, JLP and Canadian actors involved.  
 In addition, default anonymity often does not altogether prevent participants’ identification 
altogether. Anonymyzing elite interviews provides confidentiality outside of the context in which 
the study takes place (Kaiser, 2009; Kitzinger, 2014). However, it often fails to provide within the 
environment. Where studies examine ‘small world’ environments, elite interviewees and their 
political affiliations can be easily identified through the information they provide, timescales of 
involvement in the policymaking exercise and job titles, even when vaguely described. For instance, 
Kaiser (2009) provides an example of a researcher who studied teachers within a school district; 
one could easily identify individual teachers by simply indicating their age, gender and the number 
of years spent at the school. Similarly Elias (1986) conducted a health study within a remote 
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community. Despite anonymising data, participants were able to themselves and others, which 
caused relationships within the community to become strained.  
 When conducting interviews, I attempted to address these issues by embracing the 
‘alternative approach’. This approach, commonly utilised by anthropologists, interprets 
confidentiality with the wishes of the participants. It is part of a dialogue with research participants, 
where they have the choice to be identified within the research. Ultimately, this gives respondents 
greater control of how their participation is embedded in the research. In addition, it minimises loss 
of integrity to the research.  
 The relevant literature notes that it is essential to consider the intended audience of the 
research (Kaiser, 2009; Kitzinger, 2014). Researchers note that anonymity cannot be applied 
without consideration for context. There must be a balance between protecting participants and 
maintaining the integrity and purpose of the data and the research itself, as anonymising data can be 
a time-consuming process (Kaiser, 2009; Kitzinger, 2014). As noted, one of the intended audiences 
of this thesis is Caribbean policymakers and other actors involved in policymaking. These persons 
are likely to identify participants based on the very information that informs the thesis directly; 
information they provide about the policymaking exercise, the opinions held regarding Jamaican 
politics and RJ generally, the role that they played in the policymaking process and the timeline of 
that involvement. Because of the ‘small world’ environment that is the Jamaican political sphere, 
anonymising names and location would not have prevented participants from being identified by 
policymakers, other political figures and the Jamaican public. For instance, Permanent Secretary, 
Carol Palmer is the only PS that has served across political administrations. Her departure from the 
programme had a significant effect on delivering the policy and the involvement of one of the key 
stakeholders - International Institute of Restorative Practices (IIRP). In addition to her own 
interview which highlights her level of awareness about the RJ programme, her role is described in 
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details by several other interviewees in terms of her integral involvement in the programme, her 
position within the MOJ and her poor working relationships with other actors in the development of 
the RJ policy, such as Ruth Carey, former RJU director and lead writer of the RJ policy. 
Anonymising her would not have afforded her any increased confidentiality, but it might have 
diminished the utility of the data obtained from other interviews. In embracing the alternative 
approach, I allowed participants to decide if they wanted to be identified. All participants were 
asked whether they wanted anonymity. Only one person (George*, Stand up for Jamaica and RJ 
facilitator) requested anonymity.  
Researcher Effect  
 'Researcher effect’ refers to the effect that the presence of the researcher has on the 
participants of the study. It is argued that any behaviour that takes place in response to the presence 
of the researcher should be rejected (Monahan & Fisher, 2010). Having influenced the participant, 
the researcher is no longer able to gain a true sense of the participants being studied. Researcher 
effect ‘contaminates the pure social environment being studied’ (Monahan & Fisher, 2010).  
 As a researcher I was constantly aware of the potential effect that my presence could have 
on participants. Some of the debates surrounding researcher effect focus on how researchers interact 
with participants as ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders and how those positions affect the research outcomes 
(Natour, 2011). Bryman et al (2011) states that shared cultural membership is advantageous to 
conducting research. Throughout the research, most interviewees and participants were forthcoming 
with information and did not decline or hesitate to answer any questions. This level of comfort may 
have been due to my status as a fellow Jamaican and my connection with trusted individuals and 
organisations that aided in sampling of interviews and my recruitment of focus groups participants.  
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 Some researchers who discuss researcher effect state that the longer the researcher interacts 
with participants, the more at ease they should feel being themselves and dismissing any suspicions 
(Spano, 2006; Monahan & Fisher, 2010). Although I did not have several months to interact with 
participants, many of the interviews began with recognition of the fact that the participant and I 
knew each other through mutual contacts.  
 Natour (2011) states that we are never all-out insiders or all-out outsiders. Despite the 
cultural similarities, there were still instances where I was viewed differently. In the focus groups, 
there were persons who viewed me as an ‘outsider’ in terms of class. Being aware of my ‘outsider’ 
status as a professional from a different socio-economic background, I maintained an informal 
demeanour to minimise any mistrust of the participants. To counter this, Fox (2004) notes the 
benefits of being aware of the cultural similarities and differences between the researcher and 
participants in planning and carrying out research. For instance, we chose to start the focus groups 
with an icebreaker. The icebreaker helped participants to be comfortable with me as a facilitator and 
minimised their view of me as a researcher. During the debriefing sessions, we had an opportunity 
to discuss any ways in which we could have improved the focus group. In addition, conducting a 
pilot focus group
 
was beneficial in terms of ensuring that our approach as facilitators was not 60
intimidating and that the atmosphere was as comfortable as possible. For example, during the pilot 
focus group, some of the participants suggested that my language be less formal in order to make 
the conversation more casual and free-flowing. In the focus groups and interviews I was able to 
speak patois with participants, which emphasised my position as a fellow Jamaican. These activities 
helped me to ensure that I reduced as much influence as possible.  
 This pilot focus group was conducted on the 08/11/2014 at 17:46. 60
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 McDonald (2005) suggests that it may be beneficial to discuss the researcher effect with the 
participants directly. One of the participants from the victim-survivor focus group, who had been 
particularly quiet during the first half of the focus group, spoke with me at the end of the first 
session and said that she thought I would be ‘stuck up’. By discussing the participant’s concerns 
directly, she could see my genuine passion for the topic and became much more engaged during the 
second session and even asked to recite a poem about her experiences.  
 In cases where I did not know participants well, I attempted to build trust by spending time 
with the participant prior to the interview where possible. Prior to my interview with the director of 
the RJ unit, we had an initial meeting where we discussed in a casual setting my aims for the 
research and my dedication to Jamaica. This approach made participants more willing to share 
information with me.  
 It may be impossible to remove researcher effect completely. Researchers may influence 
participants to pretend or hide the truth, whether due to anxiety, mistrust or general uncertainty. 
However, Monahan & Fisher (2010) state that changes in behaviour caused by the researcher, 
otherwise referred to as ‘staged performances,’ can be viewed as a strength of the research rather 
than a setback (Monahan & Fisher, 2010). A staged performance represents some truth about 
participants in terms of their perception, values, cultural background and what they consider as 
important to the researcher. Staged performances highlight how individuals wish to be viewed and 
what information they value most (Monahan & Fisher, 2010). For instance, PS Carol Palmer (MOJ 
Offices, 10/1/15) was the only interviewee who was hesitant to answer questions. However, her 
emphasis on Jamaica as following in the footsteps of developed jurisdictions, indicated the value 
she placed on ‘being consistent with international best practice.  
Conclusion 
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 Conducting this fieldwork with elite interviewees on sensitive issues within Jamaican 
society required an immense amount of planning prior to data collection process. This chapter 
highlights the careful approach taken to collecting this qualitative information, which I will discuss 
in greater detail in Chapter 7. In the next few chapters, I will provide information on the Jamaican 
political, economic and social context. This background is essential to this discussion since it 
demonstrates the limiting effect of political patronage and Jamaica’s dependence on the global 
economy on the capacity of the Jamaican government to address crime effectively.  
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   Chapter 3: Crime, Politics and Justice in Jamaica  
 In this chapter, I discuss the historical exploitation of organised crime and violence for 
electoral advantage by political officials. This collusion of politicians and criminals in order to gain 
patronage has resulted in the hesitation of the state to curb instances of political violence and 
organised crime. The failure to address these crimes is compounded by a lack of economic 
independence of the state, which has resulted in the Jamaican government being unable to fulfil 
many of its responsibilities to Jamaican society, including the overall administration of justice. 
Consequently, the Jamaican community has developed a mistrust of the Jamaican government.  
 Many Jamaicans outside the political parties have pledged their support to criminal leaders, 
otherwise known as ‘dons’, whose political associations enable their immunity from punishment 
and ability to take on responsibilities akin to those of state actors. Policy has become a political tool 
for regaining public trust; during election periods, politicians seek to demonstrate their commitment 
to change by presenting policy ideas. The literature notes that these efforts are often superficial, as 
many policies are rarely implemented effectively, due to ties with the dons. In addition, the lack of 
political will and competition between political parties for power means that opposition parties 
often abandon policies once they come into power.  
 The literature on politics and policymaking identifies a number of factors that affect 
policymaking, such as the nature of the political system, political ideology, the lack of financial 
independence as well as political conflict (Stone, 1976; Biddle & Stephans, 1989; Jones & 
Schoburgh, 2004; Levy, 2009; Edie, 2011; Lewis, 2012). Many of these factors are present in 
Jamaica and affect the development of the national RJ policy. I will now go on to describe the 
Jamaican context, which will enable me to highlight how RJ is particularly suited to this context 
later on in the thesis.  
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 Over the next few chapters I will highlight the social, political and economic context of 
Jamaica. I will discuss how this context led to the antagonistic relationship between parties in 
Jamaica, public mistrust of the state, the rise of criminal non-state leaders and the politicisation of 
civil society. I will explore how these factors have affected policymaking historically. In this 
chapter, I focus on how political parties competed to successfully manage multiple and conflicting 
class interests in order to maintain power despite a lack of economic independence. I go on to 
highlight the shift in some of these areas, such as the de-segmentation of Jamaican class structure 
through upward social mobility post-1970s, the less coercive approach of donors, and the increased 
engagement between civil society and the Jamaican government in terms of justice policy. I propose 
that RJ was particularly ideal to the Jamaican context in light of the reduction in political violence, 
the shift away from the historically semi-coercive relationship with donors and the de-politicisation 
of civil society to implement a contextualised as well as the long-standing history of RJ in Jamaica.  
Jamaican Class Structure  
 In Chapter 2, I provided a geographic breakdown of Kingston, which indicates that a 
majority of crime took place within the KMR region. The KMR region demonstrates the 
segregation of the wealthy and poor as part of the larger class structure in Jamaica. Stone (1976), 
views class as a ‘dominant system in which economic, ideological and institutional components 
combine to constitute an integrated power structure’ . 61
 Initially, the class system maintains boundaries through their control over distribution, 61
management of resources and their influence over the state in accordance with similar ideological 
tendencies (Stone, 1976). This type of class-system is a product of colonialism, where distinctions 
were based on ethnicity and race (Stone, 1986; Jaffe, 2012; Harriott et al. 2012; Carnegie, 2014). 
During the colonial period, the white elite minority had ownership over black slaves. A paternalist 
competitive class structure emerged during the transition from the abolition of slavery to 
independence (1838-1962), which sought to maintain the wealth and power of white elites and 
continued subjugation of blacks, who threatened the status quo by mobilising under the leadership 
of Marcus Garvey.  This shift allowed for further inclusion of other light-skinned groups such as the 
Chinese and Lebanese into the elite (Stone, 1972).Under a competitive class structure, it was 
perceived that economic power would be the determining factor of class identity. 
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 Carl Stone (1978) developed a class categorisation specific to the Jamaican context, which 
considered the intermingling of class and race, similarity of ideology across classes and most 
importantly their relationship to distribution of wealth
 
(See Figure 3.0) (Stone, 1978; Edie, 1997).  62
Figure 3.0 Stone’s Class Structure of Jamaica 
Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 11:03 10 September 2015. 
 Stone, who looked at class structure leading up to the 1970s, reduces these 7 classes into 3 
main groups; (i) upper and upper-middle, (ii) lower-middle and (iii) lower. These social divisions 
 This is in contrast to other classifications that are based on European values and bias associated 62
with whiteness and power 
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were based largely on distribution of wealth and race (Stone, 1976; Edie, 1997; Clarke, 2006). 
Upper and upper-middle classes are largely made up of minorities such as whites, Lebanese, 
Chinese, Indians and light-skinned mixed-race citizens. Statistics indicate that until the 1970s, there 
was a positive correlation between lighter skin tone, higher levels of education and greater personal 
income. The vast majority of the wealthy elite population were less likely to experience crime 
(Harriott et al. 2012). Also, they were more likely to hold key leadership positions (Stone, 1972; 
1976; Edie, 1984). The middle class constitutes 18.5% of the population range (Stone, 1972; 1978; 
Edie, 1984; Carnegie, 2011).On the other hand, lower-middle and lower classes, who represented 
more than 75% of the population were predominantly black (Stone, 1976; Edie, 1984; Henry-Lee, 
2005).  
 There are three main components of the class bound system; ideological, economic and 
institutional. Political parties manage these components in order to prevent class conflict from 
arising. The main areas of conflict are: (i) over distribution of wealth, (ii) over ownership of wealth 
assets, (iii) rights and social worth of classes, and (iv) access to and control over public sector and 
state institutions (Stone, 1976).  
 The economic components of this system are the most common . Stability in this class-63
bound domination system rests on a concentration of wealth within a privileged minority of the 
upper class (also referred to as the minority class) (Stone, 1976; Edie, 1997). All classes are 
capitalist in nature; they all seek to improve their economic situation through their influence on the 
state. While the minority class maintains this position as a consistent benefactor for the state, the 
middle class preserves its status by ensuring political patronage and the lower class negotiates with 
the state for material resources through its capacity to determine the appointment of political power. 
 Generally, the other issues stated only arise during periods of internal contradictions within 63
classes. 
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Even though they compete to improve their economic situation in different ways, their shared 
overall goal means that alliances can be made across classes.  
 At the time, the stability of the system was also dependent on the consciousness (ideologies) 
of subordinate classes (also referred to as the majority class), which aligned their interests with that 
of the minority classes (Stone, 1976). As will be discussed, the state was forced to contend with 
these opposing interests in order to maintain legitimacy and support. As a result, the state’s capacity 
to steer policy prescription and its approach to crime has been historically compromised.  
 While Stone (1976) provides a foundation for understanding the post-independence 
development of class structure in Jamaica, his structure does not consider the changes that took 
place after the 1970s. Stone’s picture of the class structure is based on the post-colonial period, 
which is largely rooted in the exploitation of the agricultural labour force and the black majority. In 
‘Class, Status and Social Mobility in Jamaica’, Gordon (1987) examines the changes to this class 
structure: its becoming more heterogeneous and rooted in a capitalist order, with the declining 
emphasis on race, allowing economic access and education to become determining factors of status.  
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Figure 3.1 Gordon’s Post-1970 Class Structure 
 
(Accessed Gordon, 1987)  
 As can be seen from Figure 3.1, changes took place to class structure; in particular there was 
an emergence of new status groups between upper and upper middle class groups, the traditional 
agricultural and labour poor as well as a number of internal changes within the composition of 
groups previously established by Stone (1976) such as the lower middle class group. These changes 
occurred as a result of period of industrialisation, shift of foreign capital interests from Britain to the 
United States and Canada, a shift in focus from agricultural exports to manufacturing, bauxite, 
tourism and finance (examples of these changes are noted throughout this chapter). This period 
resulted in an expansion of the economy and job creation.  
 With this expansion of job opportunities and industry, new social classes emerged; including 
a working class of skilled workers, a widening middle class of managerial, professional and clerical 
roles within the private sectors and the state as well as the emergence of a local industrial 
bourgeoisie and an expanding capitalist sector. That is, there was some upward social mobility seen 
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within and across classes  Unlike Stone’s classification, which is based largely on race, Gordon’s 64
classification is largely based on occupational status and its relationship with capitalist exploitation. 
For instance, the middle stratum consists of wage labourers, who do not necessarily own capital and 
the petit bourgeoisie (which sits below the middle strata) is composed of small self-earning self-
proprietors (Gordon, 1987). Similarly, the top of the lower working class consists of foremen, 
firemen and policemen who wield a greater level of authority (Gordon, 1987). Although education 
became a determining factor, it was no longer aligned with the race, income and occupational status 
of citizens. For instance, the foremen and high-grade service workers earned significantly more than 
clerical workers, despite occupying a lower class position. Thus, public sector employment is more 
likely to be a part of the middle strata, regardless of the educational level of economic status.  
 These changes were significant for the middle and upper classes, who found an opportunity 
for upward social mobility. For instance, there was a notable shift in the composition of these 
classes in terms of race, making them more heterogeneous in nature. Between 1943 and 1984, there 
was significant transition from the middle to upper classes. As a result, black representation 
amongst managerial and professionals of the (upper) middle strata increased from 20% to 42%. The 
shift highlighted the emphasis given to occupation and education. Much of the recruitment of the 
middle strata came from the small propertied class, such as small farmers. 1 of 8 of the middle strata 
had lower strata of working class origins (unskilled, domesticated and agricultural labourers) 
(Gordon, 1987). The upper middle strata of professionals also recruited from the lower sections of 
their own strata (37% of men). Similarly, artisans, traders and employers were more likely to be 
recruited from small proprietors, including farmers.  
 This meant that the determinants of class were not limited to race. Instead economic status and 64
access to education became more independent determining factors of social status. 
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 However, widening inequalities between minority and majority classes also mark the period. 
As noted above, much of the upward mobility took place within and between the middle strata and 
the petit bourgeoisie. On the other hand, there was a clear disadvantage for the working class 
(particularly the lower strata of the working class) in terms of the opportunities to advance their 
social status. While a vast majority of the upper middle strata were recruited from within the middle 
strata itself, only 1 in 5 men were recruited from the working class . Only the upper strata of the 65
working class (foremen, policemen) were eligible for recruitment to the middle strata (Gordon, 
1987). Gordon (1987) notes that those with backgrounds of agricultural, domestic and manual 
labour, had almost no chance of entering the upper middle strata. While 37.7% of persons within 
middle strata inherited the same status, only 4/1000 males with agricultural labour backgrounds 
entered into the upper middle strata. Although less severe, there were also limited opportunities for 
entry into the broad middle strata. Only 6 and 7% of males with agricultural and small farming 
backgrounds respectively rose to the level of the lower middle strata (Gordon, 1987). None of the 
occupational or small proprietors had any chance of entering the middle strata.  
 These contrasting outcomes of upward mobility and maintenance of status for certain 
sections of middle and upper class and the lack thereof for the poor speaks to a number of factors; 
the limited size of the local elite, the continued clash of interests between the majority and minority 
classes and the subsequent alignment of local elite interests with that of international funding 
community. It also provides additional context to the on-going conflict and struggle for access to 
resources within the majority class. As will be discussed the introduction of neoliberal policies and 
focus on foreign investment exacerbated this divide between classes. The middle and upper classes 
that benefitted from these political changes aligned their efforts to exert pressure on political parties 
1% of males in the middle strata stay within their class, while only 13% and 8% of the working 65
class and 8% of proprietors were upwardly mobile in status. 
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to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, the poor, unable to rise in social status, became tools 
of political parties in exchange for access to resources and power.  
Jamaican Politics  
Political Structure  
 Jamaica is a parliamentary democracy. Reflecting Jamaica’s status as a former British 
colony, Jamaica operates a counterpart of the Westminster parliamentary system (Figueroa & Sives, 
2010; Morris & Graycar, 2011; Sives, 2012) . The Westminster model has a number of defining 66
characteristics, such as a concentration of executive power in one party and a bare-majority cabinet, 
cabinet dominance, two-party system; constitutionalism, a neutral civil society, majoritarian system 
of elections and a centralised government. Many of these characteristics are present in Jamaica.  
 In culturally homogenous societies, class relationships tend to have the most impact on 
politics (Stone, 1976). This is exacerbated by the party system. A party system is understood as 
class-oriented, where political parties put forth effort to appeal to and represent class interests. In 
Jamaica, both political parties attempt to represent multiple, cross-class interests, while managing 
any conflicts that exist between them (Stone, 1972; 1976; 1977; Edie, 1997). In order to do this, 
political parties must develop ideologies that are rooted in class, but that can also attract multiple 
classes and create alliances between them.  
 As in Westminster, two main political parties, the People’s National Party (PNP) and the 
Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), dominate Jamaican politics. Both parties were created during the 
nationalist movement in the 1930s and 1940s, prior to independence in 1962 (Lewis, 2012). They 
 The Westminster mode is itself an example of policy transfer, as the English exported it to their 66
Caribbean colonies during the post-war period (Griffith, 2001). Where they ensured accountability 
amongst politics in England, it is argued that the Westminster model has hindered progress in 
Jamaica, with particular emphasis on its effect on policymaking (Sutton 1999; Ryan, 1999). 
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represent competing ideologies that are rooted in the four main class issues noted earlier. The PNP 
is characterised as a ‘radical reformist’ party that embraces democratic socialism and state 
ownership of the economy under the leadership of ‘upper-middle class intelligentsia’ (Stone, 1976; 
1980; Sullivan, 2010; Lewis, 2012, Blake, 2012). Starting as a nationalist movement that sought to 
empower the working class by taking control of state institutions from the coloniser, the PNP 
advocated for radical and long-term changes consistent with egalitarianism and social justice. 
Essentially the PNP sought to minimise the dependence of the state on external funding and 
distribute resources more evenly across the society, thereby encouraging a positive relationship with 
the state (Edie, 1984;1986; Sives, 2002; Brown, 2013). Instead of focusing on partnership with the 
developed world, the PNP sought to develop its own independence by creating partnerships with 
other post-colonial states that shared their vision of financial independence. During the 1970s, 
Manley, Prime Minister of the PNP (elected in 1972) tried to develop diplomatic relations with 
Cuba, Zimbabwe, and Grenada. They developed trading relationships and training programmes that 
were mutually beneficial, such as sending unemployed Jamaican youth to brigade programmes in 
Cuba, and young Cuban doctors being given work experience into Jamaica (Edie, 1989; Sives, 
2002; Brown, 2013). On the other hand, Manley limited the allowances that had been given to 
North America such as imposing a levy on the US-owned national bauxite companies; this was later 
extended to all bauxite that was exported or processed in Jamaica (Edie, 1984; 1989; Sives, 2002; 
Brown, 2013). Simultaneously, Jamaica began negotiations that would allow them to become 
majority shareholders of mining operations of major bauxite companies (Edie, 1989; Sives, 2002; 
Brown, 2013).  
 The JLP, which began under the leadership of lower-middle class figures, took more of a 
‘conservative reformist’ approach, promoting ideals such as economic liberalisation and 
privatisation (Stone, 1976; 1980, Sullivan, 2010, Lewis, 2012; Blake, 2012). JLP began as an 
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alliance of individuals who supported Alexander Bustamante and the Bustamante Industrial Union 
(BITU). Upon claiming status as a party in 1944, it took on the anti-socialist and demagogic 
populist agenda of its leader. Over time JLP focused on acceptance of a capitalist free enterprise 
basis of the economy. They focused on making parochial, short-term and incrementalist decisions 
by taking action consistent with Western interests; hesitant to alter the consciousness of Jamaicans 
or class structure as a whole (Sives, 2002; Edie, 2011). After the 1962 election, in which JLP was 
victorious, Edward Seaga, the new Minister of Finance (and later Prime Minister) cut ties that had 
developed during the Manley administration. Seaga established a Jamaican-American Business 
Investment Committee that facilitated more than 1 billion Jamaican dollars of private investment 
from foreigners and entered into negotiations with the IMF, WB, Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) and Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) (Brown, 2013) .  67
 Over time, both parties have garnered support across classes. The JLP, which started as a 
workers’ movement, began with support predominantly from the trade union base. Their 
incrementalist, non-intellectual approach was consistent with the interests of the majority classes 
who had limited aspirations for state power, but sought better distribution of income and improved 
trade union representation. At the time, the JLP garnered the support of middle and upper classes 
through their anti-socialist tendencies and big capitalist backing.  
 The PNP began as a nationalist movement, which represented the ideologies and interests of 
the educated middle class, who sought increased access to and control of state institutions. Over, 
time, their support came to incorporate the more radical sections across classes, such as its own 
working class trade union movement through its rhetoric of democratic socialism as well as the 
 Also He extradited the Cuban ambassador and revoked plans that were in place for partnerships 67
with other Caribbean countries and even supported the U.S invasion of Grenada (Brown, 2013). 
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working class radicals and the militant unemployed youth who identified themselves as victims of 
economic stagnation by capitalists and colonialism (Stone, 1976).  
 Within class-based politics, parties attempt to articulate the interests of these groups. The 
more these opposing interests are articulated, the more likely conflict will occur between the 
classes. In order to find the balance between the two, political systems do the following: (i) multiple 
agencies articulate interests, but with some common stake in politics of institutional life, (ii) cross-
class alliances based on some unifying principle (iii) weakening of threatening classes by political 
appeals that split political loyalties within classes (iv) building of a minimum system-supportive 
alignment with a plurality of classes (v) cyclical patterns of change where symbolic articulation of 
interests of hostile classes for short periods, followed by longer periods of stability of or conflict 
containment (vi) coalition politics, which allows smaller classes to play a central role in power-
balancing between competing classes (vii) avoiding the more divisive issues in partisan or public 
debate (Stone, 1976;1977).  
 A number of these approaches are seen in Jamaican policymaking. During the Manley-
Seaga era, the literature notes the cyclical change in support for political parties, where parties 
would articulate conflicting interests of the classes. The policies were clearly driven by their 
respective ideologies. Under the Manley administration, a number of social programmes were 
implemented to improve the overall well being of inner-city communities, such as equal pay for 
women and adult literacy programmes (Edie, 1989; Sives, 2002; Brown, 2013). Under the 
Minimum Wage law, many of the lower socio-economic status (SES) saw a significant increase in 
wages. This law and the 1974 Employment Act ensured equal pay for women, many of who were 
breadwinners of their households (Edie, 1989; Sives, 2002; Brown, 2013).  
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 Under the leadership of Seaga, the JLP administration embraced a neoliberal agenda . 68
Seaga endorsed pro-US policies in order to repair US-Jamaica groups from distorting state 
involvement (Harvey, 2005; Thorsen & Lie, 2007). Across, jurisdictions, neoliberalism has had 
negative effects on the provision of relations (Edie, 1984; 1989; Sives, 2002; Brown, 2013). He 
signed an IMF agreement that imposed a series of structural adjustment policies (SAPs), which 
were intended to diversify the economy and make Jamaica a legitimate competitor in the world of 
international trade (Fearon & Laitin, 2006; Galvin, 2011; Jaffe, 2012). These included policies that 
reduced government spending and deficits, imposed controls on salaries and prices, as well as 
currency devaluation (Edie, 1989; Sives, 2002; Brown, 2013) .  69
 I will now go on to explain how this political competitiveness between parties led to their 
involvement in crime and violence and subsequent dependence on criminal actors, which resulted in 
a failure to address crime effectively. This failure to address crime contributed to the public’s loss of 
faith in government and weakened the legitimacy of the state.  
Political Party Competitiveness, Clientelism & Violence  
 The Westminster model encourages the existence of political strongholds for the two 
political parties. Within the Kingston and St. Andrew parish, there are fifteen constituencies (See 
Figure 3.2). Seven of the constituencies, the majority of which are located in the southern part of the 
region, have long standing political allegiance to one of the two parties (Clarke, 2006). Due to the 
 Neo-liberalism is a mode of governance that promotes free market capitalism and limited state 68
involvement. Neo-liberal policies underscore the idea that well-being can be achieved by enabling 
individual freedoms. In order to do this, the state should not seek to interfere in markets so as to 
prevent powerful health and security services, subsequently lowering the overall well-being of 
individuals particularly those from marginalised communities.
 In Chapter 4, I highlight the continued use of policymaking as a political tool within the justice 69
sector through the consistent adoption of policies that are consistent with donor interests, instead of 
Jamaican context. 
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large population of the lower class, many of whom reside in this region (which includes the KMA), 
political support from these constituencies is of great value.  
Figure 3.2 Map of Kingston and St. Andrew Constituencies. 
 
(Accessed from Clarke, 2006)  
  
 Leading up to independence, both political parties attempted to gain favour with all classes 
of the Jamaican society. Until 2010, both political parties alternated in forming governments; each 
party ruled for 33 years (Figueroa & Sives, 2010; Lewis, 2012; Sives, 2012) . A wealth of literature 70
discusses the fight for political hegemony between these two parties in Jamaica (Harriott, 2002; 
 In 2006, a study conducted by Boxhill found that 50.5% of Jamaicans identified as PNP 70
supporters. In the 2010 election, there was an unexpected shift in power to the PNP, after only one 
term of JLP at the helm. Later on in the thesis, I will argue that this change in government caused 
practical delays in the development of the Jamaican national RJ policy and exacerbated the 
problems regarding collaboration within the government and between the state and a politicised 
civil society community. 
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Lemard & Hemenway, 2006; Smith, 2010; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Lewis, 2012). Until the mid 
90’s, PNP and JLP engaged in intense and often violent competition for a majority of 60 
constituency seats (Morris & Graycar, 2011).  
 Within politics literature, patronage is the provision of resources or support by organisations 
to individuals (Edie, 1997; Yagboyaju, 2015). As will be discussed, the widespread use of patronage 
in Jamaica has created clientelistic relationships that enable political parties to gain political support 
from citizens and secure economic security for the state (Edie, 1989; Stone, 1980; Sives, 2002; 
Harriott, 2003; Figueroa & Sives, 2010).  
 Parties engage in clientelistic relationships to retain the support of the Jamaican public 
(Edie, 1986; Sives, 2002; Roniger et al. 2004). Following Flynn (1974, p 134), I shall define 
clientelism as,  
 ‘more or less personalised relationship between actors or sets of actors, commanding   
 unequal wealth, status or influence, based on conditional loyalties and involving mutually  
 beneficial transactions’.  
 Within a political context, clientelism involves access to resources for individuals or a group 
of individuals in exchange for unwavering support (Roniger et al. 2004). According to Stone 
(1980), patrons (politicians) determine the distribution of resources in a typical clientelist political 
structure. In turn, the clients who are receiving theses resources are obligated to return the favour by 
providing political support (Stone, 1980; Kurer, 1993; Charles, 2002; Figueroa & Sives, 2010). 
Within a Jamaican context and other post-colonial states, where social divisions are created through 
implementation of a class-based system, some propose that clientelism has become an 
institutionalised mechanism of class control
 
(Flynn, 1974; Edie, 1984; Sives, 2002).  71
 This is unsurprising, given the long-standing history of clientelism during colonialism (Edie, 71
1984). Edie (1983) discusses ‘old clientelism’ as a feature of the plantocracy system, where the 
white planter (patron) would provide economic support to a black ex-slave (client) in exchange for 
his labour as well as political loyalty. 
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 There are at least two types of state patronage in Jamaica, which seek to balance competing 
interests. The first, which takes place between the political parties (rather than the state) and the 
lower classes, are based on the need for material resources or some other economic good (Stone, 
1980; Edie, 1984; Edie, 1989; Sives, 2002). This patronage is rooted in the need for political parties 
to maintain their position of power by gaining support and limiting challenges from the majority 
classes who aspire to be on equal standing with their patron.  
 It is achieved by the minimal distribution of resources to clients in a way that does not 
permit significant growth, but provides them with a sense of belonging and identity (Sives, 2002). 
This ability to provide an identity is one of the most essential features of successful clientelism 
within developing states (Sives, 2002). While the state focuses on satisfying the interests of the 
elite, the majority classes are largely denied equal access to these state institutions. As a result, the 
majority classes have little faith in the state and support political leaders and their parties instead. In 
turn, they provide support to the leaders of the political parties through the electoral process, 
particularly those who demonstrate dedication to the wide distribution of scarce resources (Edie, 
1997).  
 This form of clientelism minimises class conflict in two ways. First, the shared support of 
political parties across classes, that is multiple class coalitions, weakens class solidarity and 
minimise race and class tensions between the rich and the poor (Edie, 1997). Second, it weakens the 
horizontal links with the lower class group, who are constantly fighting amongst each other for 
scarce resources and increased status. This form of patronage gives members of majority classes a 
political identity  by feeling associated with a leader and party that has access to power, status and 72
resources that they can depend on (and in some ways trumps the need to resolve their financial 
problems) (Edie, 1984; 1997; Sives, 2002). The voting behaviour as well as the long-standing rule 
PNP supporters identify themselves as ‘Comrades’, while JLP refer to themselves as ‘Labourites’.72
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of party leaders highlights this unwavering support for political parties and their leaders. Edie 
(1997) notes that the majority of voters vote according to party loyalties, regardless of ideologies, 
policy choices or the state of the country . As a result, members of the majority classes are pitted 73
against each other, by demonstrating unwavering support for their parties in exchange for resources. 
Thus, the elite maintain the status quo by containing or suppressing resistance from the underclass.  
 These identities come with the capacity to engage in illegal activities with impunity once 
they contribute to the success of the party (Edie, 1997; Figueroa & Sives, 2002). Having identified 
as a Comrade or Labourite, both parties have granted impunity from the use of political violence. 
Much of the literature on Jamaican politics highlights the link between political parties and violence 
(Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Morris & Graycar, 2009; Sives, 2012; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Blake, 
2013). Typically, clientelistic violence is controlled by elites (Edie, 1984; 1989; Sives, 2002). This 
control allows political parties to fight for political patronage without posing a threat to the status 
quo. This use of violence was initiated within the context of pre-existing group identities.  
 Both political parties garnered support through their involvement with Jamaica’s two major 
trade unions, the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) 
(Lewis, 21012). Once the union leaders became the leaders of newly formed political parties, its 
members became willing to engage in violence to ensure that ‘their’ leader remained in power so 
that their welfare was secured (Fearon & Laitin, 2006). As early as 1944, both PNP and JLP 
members engaged in street conflicts with the use of stones and knives against each other (Stone, 
1978; Headley, 2002; Figueroa & Sives, 2010). Manual workers from the JLP and skilled workers 
from the PNP in Kingston and St. Andrew engaged in violent street attacks against each other to 
ensure political loyalty for their party (Sives, 2002).  
Over time, a trend has developed which signifies the popularity of the PNP with the majority class 73
population and the loyalty of the minority classes to the JLP (Stone, 1978. However, the PNP has 
had the longest reign in office between 1989 and 2007 (18 years) (Lewis, 2012). 
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 Turf politics is defined as, ‘the process by which political parties seek geographic or 
positional control over given areas as part of their electoral strategy (Figueroa & Sives, 2010). 
Political parties manipulated gang conflict for political gain; politically opposing gangs engaged in 
violence leading up to the 1
st 
post independence (1967) election, (Fearon & Laitin, 2006; Luffman, 
2007). As a result, Jamaica has had consistently high rates of political violence throughout the 
1960s to the 1990s (Morris & Graycar, 2009). Much of this violence took place within the KMR, 
where, as a part of turf politics, gangs enforce political allegiance (See Figure 3.3).  
Figure 3.3 Map of Violent hotspots in Kingston (KMR)  
 
(Accessed from Clarke, 2006)  
 During the 1970s there was an increase in violent crime, which was attributed to increased 
political warfare between garrisons. The 2007 National Security Policy for Jamaica states that, 
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between 1970 and 2005, more than 22,300 cases of homicide were attributed to ‘political tribalism, 
gang related conflicts and reprisals’ (Government of Jamaica, 2007, p10). Harriott (2000) argues 
that there is an electoral effect on the prevalence of murder and shootings. That is, during election 
years, there is a sharp increase in these types of crimes (Harriott 1996; 2000) The 1980 election was 
considered to be one of the most violent elections: 889 Jamaicans were killed (153.33% more than 
the previous year) (Gray, 2007; Morris & Graycar, 2009; Bourne, 2012). Participation in violence 
allowed individuals to maintain their association with a leader and a party that gave the promise of 
financial security. That is, this political association gave them an identity that, unlike race and class 
distinctions, did not exclude low status persons further .  74
Garrisons  
 During the 1967 election, many of these inner city areas were turned into politically 
homogenous areas called garrisons as an extension of this ‘turf politics’ approach. This is reflected 
in the development of garrisons . Essentially, garrisons are inner-city housing schemes, most of 75
which are located within Kingston and St. Andrew that were built by political parties and allocated 
to party supporters (See table 1.0) in exchange for political support (Headley, 2002; Sullivan, 2010; 
 Although it has declined significantly, there is still some political violence. Between 2001 and 74
2005, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) stated that over 40% of the murders committed were 
motivated, in part, by political interests and reprisals (Gray, 2007). In 2016, there were reports of 
political violence during the weeks leading up to general elections. 2 men were shot and killed at a 
JLP rally, while 4 others were seriously injured. On the eve of elections, 38 people (including 2 
children) were admitted to hospitals with gunshot and stab wounds after attending a PNP rally 
(CaribFlame, http://www.caribflame.com/2016/02/violence-escalates-on-eve-of-elections-in- 
Jamaica/, accessed November 10, 2017). 
Garrisons help to demonstrate the linkages between political parties and their involvement in 75
violence and corruption, which, as will emerge, make the state hesitant and unable to enforce the 
rule of law and administer justice fairly.
Page !138
Figueroa & Sives, 2010; Thomas, 2013) . Carl Stone was the first to describe a ‘garrison’ as a 76
“veritable fortress where the dominant party and its local agents are able to exercise control over 
significant political, economic and community related social activities” (as cited in Figueroa & 
Sives, 2010) (See Appendix Four for list of garrisons). Since this population constitutes a large 
portion of potential votes, gaining their loyalty was essential for both political parties .  77
 There are now 40 garrisons within the Kingston and St. Andrew area, the majority (22) of 
which pledge allegiance to the PNP (Henry-Lee, 2005) (See Appendix). There is limited literature 
that provides a typology of garrisons (Harriott, 1996; Henry-Lee, 2005; Levy, 2009; Jaffe, 2012; 
Blake, 2013). Levy (2009) identifies two types of garrisons: centralised and less organised. 
Focusing on centralised garrisons, they are more likely to be under the firm control of the JLP, and 
demonstrate strong inner-city leadership (Levy, 2009). Citizens are responsive to their leader’s call 
for order, less susceptible to changes in political allegiance and have lower levels of crime 
(homicide in particular) (Levy, 2009) . They are self-governed for the most part, meaning that they 78
are less prone to law enforcement and state intervention and attacks from rival garrisons. Police and 
 However, it is important to note that this provision of housing did not change the financial status 76
of residents. For instance, Tivoli is built in one of the most deprived areas of Kingston; a majority 
of residents did not own their accommodation and people were either unemployed or had some type 
of informal employment. Party patrons were able to exploit citizens by giving them some sense of 
identity that symbolised the hope of change, but actually strengthened the financial disparity 
between themselves and inner-city citizens (Sives, 2002; Clarke, 2006; Levy, 2009). Tivoli 
exacerbated the lack of unity amongst the majority classes by causing feelings of resentment from 
PNP supporters, as their original homes were being taken away and they were denied any 
employment in its re-development. 
 As can be seen from Figure 1.1, these constituencies have a high population density. One of the 77
main garrisons, Tivoli has 16,031 of the total West Kingston population of 39,332 (Tivoli Report, 
ECLAC, 2010). In addition, the 2012 JNCVS report indicates that those of a lower socio-economic 
status are more likely to vote than their elite counterparts. 
 Evidence indicates that, under the leadership of Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke (an inner-city crime 78
boss, otherwise known as a don) the murder rate in Tivoli was close to zero (Henry-Lee, 2005; 
Meeks, 2011).
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politicians often refrain from interfering in issues within or between these garrisons (Sullivan, 2010; 
Figueroa & Sives, 2010; Sives, 2012; Charles & Beckford, 2012).  
 All garrisons suffer from a lack of basic resources including sufficient food, access to 
education, security and employment (Harriott, 1996; Henry-lee, 2005; Jaffe, 2012; Blake, 2013) 
(See Figure 3.4) .  79
Figure 3.4 Map of Socio-Economic Status in KMR in 1991  
 
Accessed from Clarke (2006, p425) 
 
 Within garrisons, political parties reinforce the political identity of poor Jamaicans through 
their gross misuse of resources for political gain. Unlike members of the upper class and upper-
 The decentralised garrison is less organised (Henry-Lee, 2005; Levy, 2012). It is more likely to 79
experience periods of violence and state interventions to control these intermittent violent episodes 
(Levy, 2009). Decentralised garrisons are more likely to be associated with the PNP, which 
historically, suffers from internal tensions and does not follow a centralised approach to leadership. 
Consequently, they are more prone to changes in political affiliation or likely to contain smaller 
areas that are not loyal to the same party (Henry- Lee, 2005; Levy, 2009; Levy, 2012). For instance, 
August town is considered to be a PNP stronghold (Levy, 2009). However, there are sections within 
the garrison area that are loyal to the JLP. 
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middle class communities who are benefactors of individual clientelism, poorer Jamaicans often 
receive communal ‘pork-barrel’ benefits from their allegiance, whether it be infrastructural 
improvements such as access to running water and paved roads, having the option of not paying 
utility bills or access to employment (Kurer, 1993; Charles, 2002; Lemard & Hemenway, 2006; 
Figueroa & Sives, 2010; Thomas 2013). This type of patron-client exchange is referred to as 
‘communal clientelism’, where communities exchange their votes for material resources (Figueroa 
& Sives, 2010) .  80
 Within this patron-client relationship, MPs are responsible for ensuring that communal 
benefits are dispensed through the administration of relief programmes at the Parish Council level 
(Edie, 1984). These programmes provide employment for construction, gully development and 
holiday work, among other opportunities. Of course, preference is given to known supporters of the 
political party that the MP is associated with . In this way, government officials continue the 81
clientelistic approach by manipulating resources to ensure that constituents maintain their status at 
local elections as well as that of their political party during national elections.  
Dons  
 Political parties strengthened these clientelistic relationships with garrison community 
members through their ties with dons (Kurer, 1993; Figueroa & Sives, 2010; Stone, 1980). Within 
Communal clientelism is a small departure from traditional political clientelism, which is defined 80
as a one-on-one relationship between patrons and clients, where there is a trade of material favours 
for votes (Charles, 2002; Figueroa & Sives, 2010)
 It is through local government officials that political parties were able to maintain the loyalty of 81
its constituents. Regardless of whether they were in power or the opposition, local government 
officials ensured that the distribution of resources was associated with their political party (Edie, 
1984; 1989; Sives, 2002). Anecdotal evidence indicates that when Seaga was Minister of Finance, 
his constituency of Tivoli did not suffer from a lack of resources (Edie, 1989). He had relatively 
unlimited access to resources because of his powerful position within the government. Once the MP 
has demonstrated his ability to ensure that he can access funds, he is likely to be re-elected. In order 
for an MP and a councillor to receive grants consistently, he must be well connected within his 
party (Edie, 1989; Edie, 1984). 
Page !141
garrisons, dons are leaders of the political gangs
 
(Clarke, 2006; Sullivan, 2010; Meeks, 2011; 82
Sives, 2012; Jaffe, 2012; 2013; Blake, 2013) . It is not uncommon for local government officials to 83
have informal ‘brokers’ who encourage communities to vote for a particular political party (Edie, 
1984; Galvin, 2011). Typically, dons are male professional criminals who come from the garrison 
communities that they gain control over (Price, 2004; Meeks, 2011; Jaffe, 2012; Charles & 
Beckford, 2012; Blake, 2013). In the 2012 Jamaican National Crime Victimisation Survey 
(JNCVS), 4.5% of respondents indicated the presence of a don in their community (JNCVS, 2012, p 
82).  
 In the 1970s, while politicians were developing garrisons, criminals within garrisons began 
to foster relationships with influential politicians, thereby building reputations for themselves as 
leaders within the garrisons (Meeks, 2011; Jaffe, 2012; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Blake, 2013). 
The don would consult with MPs, who would then delegate the responsibility of distributing 
employment and contracts for construction work. Typically, dons are successful criminal bosses 
who are known for having strong political ties . In exchange for ensuring political support within 84
the garrisons, dons receive personal benefits (Headley, 2002; Smith, 2013; Thomas, 2013; Jaffe, 
2013). Dons, such as Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, developed legitimate businesses to work with the 
government and private sector (Blake, 2013). Often, politicians provide construction and security 
contracts to dons through their ‘legitimate’ businesses and their associates without going through 
 This characterises a majority of gangs in Kingston, but some gangs do not answer to a don and 82
are without political ties, as will be discussed later on in the chapter.
 Not only do dons play a vital role in Jamaica in the proliferation of political corruption and the 83
development of organised crime, but also in the relative success of the informal system of justice 
that operates within the garrisons. I return to this in the Chapters 5 and 6. In this chapter, I will 
highlight how their relationship with political parties prevented the state from upholding the rule of 
law and reduced the legitimacy of the state 
 Not all dons are the same. I will focus on the Mega don, as the figure is of particular importance 84
to this thesis.
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the tender process. In 2001 when the local city council for Kingston and St. Andrew (KSAC) began 
the renovations for the downtown market area, they provided 3.1 million Jamaican dollars to the 
don of ‘Brick Town’ to provide the equipment, material and labour (Charles, 2003; Johnson & 
Soeters, 2008). The council arranged for dons to be responsible for security within the markets and 
the relocation of vendors at a monthly cost of 1 million dollars (Charles, 2003; Johnson & Soeters, 
2008). Also, dons operate with impunity in the drug trade, trafficking of guns and extortion of local 
businesses within the KMR (Charles, 2002, Sives, 2012; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Blake, 2013). 
A mega don uses these businesses, including construction, sports and transportation, as a cover for 
the additional income from his criminal activities (Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Blake, 2013). As a 
result of the wealth acquired through criminal involvement and political ties, they are able to pay or 
coerce the community to vote for a particular party
 
(Figueroa & Sives, 2010).  85
Homogenous Voting  
 Dons pick a handful of individuals, otherwise known as ‘shottas’ , to support their activities 86
and carry out orders (Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Blake, 2012). As early as the 1970s dons would 
send out their shottas to carry out door-to-door ‘campaigning’ for votes. According to Blake (2012), 
dons and their gangs ensured that people stuck to their ‘right party’ (Blake, 2012) . This use of 87
political intimidation, violence and exploitation of Jamaicans in impoverished localities resulted in 
‘homogeneous voting’ and other forms of electoral fraud (Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Figueroa & 
 Ultimately, this involvement of political parties with dons has, until recently, disabled its capacity 85
to uphold the rule of law by dictating the types of offences that are punished. That is, politically 
motivated crime and drug-related crimes carried out by dons were not typically addressed. 
 Shottas are small-time criminals who carry out small non-violent crimes such as pick pocketing.86
 During the 1993 election, ‘party loyalists’ came to polling stations where, conveniently, non-87
partisan volunteers had not shown up (Figueroa & Sives, 2003; Clarke, 2006). At that time, the 
Director of Elections noted blatant intimidation of staff, stuffing and stealing of ballot boxes and 
early closure of some polling stations to ensure that one party retained as many votes as possible
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Sives, 2010; Charles & Beckford, 2010; Sives, 2012; Blake, 2013). Homogeneous voting is the 
process by which one party receives all the votes in a ballot box or all but ten or less votes 
(Figueroa & Sives, 2010). In 1993, during the local Kingston elections, 48% of the boxes returned 
no votes for the losing candidate (Figueroa & Sives, 2010). In 2002, the PNP representative, Omar 
Davies won a seat in the St. Andrew South Eastern community with 95% of the votes. Henry-Lee 
(2005) notes that within three garrisons in the KMA, representatives have been selected with 76% 
or more of the votes for 14 years.  
The Rise of the Don and Organised Crime  
 The literature on Jamaican garrisons discusses the effect that neoliberal reforms had on the 
role of the don (Sives, 2002; Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Jaffe, 2012; Blake, 2013; Habers, Jaffe & 
Cummings, 2016). I will now discuss how this loss of economic stability facilitated the transition of 
the don from a ‘broker’ of governance to a ‘partner-in-governance’ (Blake, 2013), where dons 
became responsible for state-like responsibilities within garrisons, including welfare assistance. 
Later on, I will consider the extension of those responsibilities to the provision of protection and 
administration of justice (Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Jaffe, 2012; Blake, 2013; Habers, Jaffe & 
Cummings, 2016).  
 When large portions of the population withdraw their support from state institutions, it 
weakens the legitimacy of the state and limits the capacity to govern. The Manley-Seaga era caused 
a period of economic downturn in Jamaica, which left the government unable to carry out state 
responsibilities and destabilised the inner-city communities. A breakdown in the internal 
clientelistic relationship between the government and the majority classes often occurs when the 
resources being distributed declines or when the state can no longer afford to provide the resources 
altogether (Sives, 2002). Under the Manley administration, there was a withdrawal of foreign 
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investment, particularly from the US. Multinational corporations pulled out from the Jamaican 
economy (Edie, 1984; 1989; Sives, 2002; Brown, 2013). U.S capital sources cut their investments 
by over 30% (Edie, 1989). Bauxite companies filed a suit with the WB International Centre, 
contesting the legal validity of the levy (Edie, 1989). This withdrawal of investment had a 
devastating effect on the economy. Exacerbated by the international oil crisis of the 1970s, the 
withdrawal of investment meant that there was a failure of the state to provide resources to the 
majority classes, including garrison residents (Edie, 1989; Sives, 2002; Brown, 2013). The 
Jamaican government was forced to take a loan from the IMF to address this severe economic 
downturn, which came with conditionalities including an increase in interest rates as well as 
devaluation in order to improve the export sector (Brown, 1981; Johnston & Montecino, 2011; 
Johnston, 2015).  
 Although the continuation of the neoliberal policies by the JLP gained great favour with the 
local elite and financial institutions, SAPs had a negative effect on poor young men and women 
(Headley, 1996; Harriott, 1996; 2000) . Gordon (1987) notes that during periods of economic 88
stagnation, people are less likely to experience upward mobility through conventional routes. It 
follows that during these periods, when the Jamaican government was unable to provide resources, 
both the working class sought alternative means of accessing them. Case studies from other 
jurisdictions indicate that informal governance actors, such as paramilitaries and criminal gangs 
often take on state-like responsibilities in response to the unequal access to resources and protection 
(Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Habers, Jaffe & Cummings, 2013). In the case of Jamaica, the poor who 
 Young men between the ages of 15 and 29 suffered from unemployment and lack of access to 88
legal pathways to self-sustainability. Male participation in the labour force fell from 84% in 1985 to 
74.6% in 1993 (Harriott, 1996; 2000). Between, 1970s and the 1980s, only one-fifth of all new job 
seekers were able to find employment (Headley, 1996). Wages were amongst the lowest in the 
region, and with high male unemployment rates, many females became the breadwinners of their 
households. With a disproportionate number of all inner-city households being headed up by single 
mothers, many Jamaican women were forced to migrate in order to be able to earn enough to 
provide for their families (Jaffe, 2012). 
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suffered from violence, a lack of resources and inaccessibility of justice to poor found recourse 
through the dons.  
 Dons — who had amassed significant wealth from their ability to participate in these illegal 
activities with impunity, took over these welfare and security responsibilities from the state within 
their garrisons (Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Jaffe, 2012; Blake, 2013; Habers, Jaffe & Cummings, 
21016).  
Figure 4.0 Flows of Narcotics through the Caribbean 
 
Accessed from Griffith, 2001. 
 As a result, the state became dependent on dons and their associates to continue the patron-
client relationship within the garrisons. Because of their strong political ties, dons became involved 
with marijuana trafficking and gun trade without fear of prosecution (Headley, 1996; Headley, 
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2002; Albuquerque & McElroy, 2007; Scott, 2007; Blake, 2012) . This allowed dons to become 89
independent of their political ties (Blake, 2013; Jaffe, 2012). With the assistance of their political 
associates, dons, such as Lester Coke and Claude Massop, had increased their wealth exponentially. 
They had begun travelling across the U.S and Europe to set up drug networks; developing 
operations for the shipment and sale of cocaine and marijuana in major cities such as Miami and 
New York (See Figure 4.0) (Gunst, 1995; Headley, 1996). In this way, dons became both recipients 
and agents of clientelism (Harriott, 2002; Charles, 2002; Lewis, 2012). Many dons took on state 
responsibilities for their garrisons, such as providing schoolbooks, payment of utilities and 
employment for young adults (Henry-Lee, 2005; Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Leslie, 2010; Lewis, 
2012; Blake, 2013). Garrison residents began to view dons as a relatively reliable source of support 
and protection (Charles, 2002; Leslie, 2010; Sives, 2012; Jaffe, 2012) .  90
 This rise of the don had an effect on the capacity of the government to address crime. 
Garrison residents viewed dons as a reliable source of support and protection (Charles, 2002; Leslie, 
2010; Sives, 2012; Jaffe, 2012). Dons such as Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke were popular for the 
amount of assistance they provided to garrison community members and for making their garrisons 
more structured, organised and impenetrable to police and rivals from other garrisons (Johnson & 
 By the late 1970s, dons expanded their wealth by participating in the transnational narcotics and 89
gun trade (Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Blake, 2013; Jaffe, 2013; Jaffe, 2015). At the time, the illegal 
drug trade was one of the few stable sectors that provided a regular income in contrast to the failing 
economy (Harriott, 1996; 2003; Sives, 2002; Clarke, 2006). By 1990, it was estimated that 
Jamaican professional criminals had earned 8% of the 8.8 billion dollar U.S cannabis trade and 
profited substantially from the 18 billion dollar cocaine trade (Harriott, 1996; 2003).
 Throughout the 1980s, dons continued to deliver these state responsibilities because of their new 90
lucrative careers in narcotics, organised crime, extortion and partisan mobilisation. Subsequently, 
the literature notes an increase in gang welfare, where children were becoming part of gang culture; 
as political enforcers or gun ‘couriers’ (Harriott, 1996; Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Jaffe, 2012; Sives, 
2012). In 2000, youth under the age of 25 were responsible for 51% of the murders and 56% of all 
major crime in Jamaica respectively (WB, 2007). In 2002, the same group was responsible for 80% 
of all violent crimes, 75% of all murders, the rate of juvenile cases and 98% of all crimes committed 
in Jamaica (Smith & Green, 2007).
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Soeters, 2008; Figueroa & Sives, 2010). The JNCVS report (2012) found that 43% of respondents 
within garrison communities found that the dons were doing positive things for the community 
(Leslie, 2010; JNCVS, 2012). Thus the state became dependent on the dons to control garrisons. 
However, because of the threat they pose to democratic stability, dons are able to take part in 
governance by dictating the types of crime the state can punish and essentially ruling over the 
garrisons. This increased involvement of dons in governance has, in some ways deepened the 
overlap between the political parties and criminal activity.  
 Dons remain reliant on their political connections for impunity from their involvement with 
narcotics and other related crimes (Charles, 2002, Charles & Beckford, 2012; Sives, 2012; Jaffe, 
2012; Blake, 2013). Even though there has been a decrease in political violence since the 1980s, the 
state is still dependent on dons and gangs for political patronage and supports their ability to 
provide welfare assistance to the garrisons (Sives, 2002; Clarke, 2006; Johnson & Soeters, 2008; 
Charles & Beckford, 2010; Levy, 2012). At the request of the dons, MPs continue to provide 
contracts for the gang members and other individuals within the garrisons (Levy, 2009). Political 
parties and other elites have solicited many gangs to provide extortion or bribery services within 
and outside of the garrisons (Harrison, 2002). Even state agencies hire gang enforcers to provide 
security (Harriott, 2007).  
Clientelism Continued: Appeasing the Elite  
 I described the first type of patronage as an exchange of resources for electoral support 
between the lower classes and political parties. The second is a relationship between parties and the 
local elite, where they are given access to state machinery, law enforcement, nepotism as well as the 
reprieve from rules and regulations that hamper economic progress. In turn, they lend their financial 
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support to state institutions. Political parties that are in power will ensure that they support the 
elite’s interest in maintaining a majority of wealth in the country.  
 There is limited literature on the elite population in Jamaica as it relates to their political 
economy and the consequences of that power (Holzberg, 1980; Edie, 1989; Jaffe, 2012;  Carnegie, 
2014). As mentioned previously, the elite population of Jamaica can be identified in accordance 
with wealth, occupational status, education and race (Edie, 1984; Sives, 2002; Edie, 1989; 2011; 
Harriott et al. 2012; Carnegie, 2014). The elite are central to this discussion of clientelism, since, in 
many ways they are the ‘oil’ that keeps the political machine running. Historically, economic elites 
in Jamaica began as a few families (estimated 21 families) that occupied influential and lucrative 
positions in successful commercial, financial and industrial businesses that contribute to the 
Jamaican corporate economy
 
(Holzberg, 1980; Edie, 1984). However, the period of economic 91
expansion during the 1970s and the subsequent heterogeneous nature of social classes mean that 
black middle-class individuals now fill most positions within the government. However much of the 
control remains within economic elite community who dominate leadership positions. In 1977, the 
Jamaican economic elite filled 125 (of a total of 219) of all existing corporate directorships and 
70% chairmanships (Edie,1984). For instance, two of the wealthiest families in Jamaica, the 
Hendricksons and Matalons, have occupied positions in the private sector and government agencies 
under both party administrations (Edie, 1984; 1989). Members of the Matalon family are 
represented in the hotel industry, the National Development Agency and the Jamaica Bauxite 
Institute (JBI) (Edie, 1984).  
 In the clientelistic relationship with elites, the state is both the client and the patron at 
different times (Edie, 1984;1989; 2011; Sives, 2002). The state acts as the patron by making 
 It is only since the 1990s that the upper and middle class groups have come to include a number 91
of black wealthy individuals or families (Stone, 1978; Carnegie, 2014).
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political decisions that support and promote the interests of the economic elites (Edie, 1984;1989; 
Sives, 2002). The state has access to public resources that contribute to the success of the economic 
elite (Edie, 1984; 2011). The state supports these interests by placing members of the economic elite 
into influential positions within government corporations and state bureaucracies, where they have 
access to state power .  92
 In turn, elites give support to political parties through generous financial contributions. They 
fund election campaigns and the distribution of resources to appease the majority classes (Edie, 
1984;1989; Sives, 2002). Without their contribution, the economy would have destabilised and the 
potential for class conflict increased. In exchange for being given a stake in the Bauxite industry by 
Manley, some resources were used to appease the majority classes that were gaining directly from 
the levees imposed through the creation of social programmes such as the Project Land Lease
 
and 93
Special Employment programme
 
(Edie, 1989).  94
 By holding these influential positions the local elite is able to influence policy choices that 
protect their interests in business, agriculture and tourism on a national scale (Edie, 1984; 1989; 
 For instance, Joseph Matalon is the chairman of the main Jamaica investment holding company, 92
the British Caribbean Insurance Company, the Development Bank of Jamaica, President of the 
Private Sector Organization of Jamaica. Matalon was appointed as director of the JBI and ensured 
that other elites aligned with the PNP were given leadership positions within the (PSOJ) and a 
director of the Gleaner Company (national newspaper) and Bank of Nova Scotia in Jamaica. Also, 
he sits on a number of government committees to advise the state on financial and economic matters 
(Persaud, 2001; https://www.panamericanworld.com/en/article/8-wealthiest-and-most- influential-
people-jamaica, accessed November 13, 2017). 
 The Project Land Lease programme leased small plots and gave credit to small farmers, which 93
contributed towards reducing their costs. However this programme also became a political tool as a 
majority of these opportunities were given to PNP party supporters (Edie, 1989). 
 The Special Employment Programme sought to address unemployment by giving jobs; mostly in 94
labour, such as road construction, cutting trees and street cleaning (Edie, 1989). Typically the grants 
for this programme were given to party supporters and the local government level who in turn, gave 
jobs to PNP loyalists (Edie, 1989). 
Page !150
2011; Daley, 2014). The socialist agenda of Manley did not benefit the local elite. Initially, his 
attempt to impose bauxite levys on North America was supported by the private sector. Claiming a 
share of a sector that was completely foreign owned benefitted their business interests. Meyer 
Matalon was appointed as director of the JBI and ensured that other elites aligned with the PNP 
were given leadership positions within the organisation (Edie, 1989). However, once Manley’s 
agenda shifted to a redistribution of wealth and a refusal of foreign income, a majority of local 
capitalists and businessmen opposed Manley and the PNP government (Stone, 1977; Stephans & 
Stephans, 1983). In an effort to create a mixed economy that was no longer dominated by the 
private sector, the government sought to gain shares in cement, flour (which were previously owned 
by 2 of the elite families) and other local enterprises. They imposed restrictions on local business 
for imports of foods, drugs and timber. In response, local elites withdrew their capital from 
Jamaican banks as well as investment in local businesses. Private sector groups opposed these 
decisions by launching organisations such as the PSOJ and Jamaica Chamber of Commerce, which 
collaborated with the JLP to sway public opinion against the PNP. The withdrawal of the support of 
the local elite, the emigration of many capitalists and the economic downturn led to the loss by PNP 
of the election in 1980. PNP won 9 seats compared to 51 seats for the JLP (Edie, 1989). On the 
other hand, when the JLP gave primacy to elite interests and foreign investment, the local elites 
provided financial support. In 2007 election, when the JLP won, much of their support came from 
private donations (Edie, 2011). In turn, the JLP created the Generation 2000 (G2K), which brought 
together young corporate elites such as Daryl Vaz
 
to become the corporate leaders of the JLP and 95
continue to influence policy (Edie, 2011).  
 Daryl Vaz is the son of the former director of the Jamaica Manufacturers Association and former 95
Minister of Industry and Commerce. He is the founding president of the Jamaica Used Car Dealers 
Association and former Minister of Information and Technologies (2009-2012) (http://jis.gov.jm/
ministers/daryl- vaz/, accessed November 16, 2017). 
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Clientelism continued: International stakeholders and the state  
 A weakness of Stone and Gordon’s discussions is the lack of focus on the clientelistic 
relationships between the international stakeholders and the Jamaican government (Edie, 1997). 
They fail to deal with an essential element of the policymaking process; the influence of funding by 
international stakeholders on policy prescription in developing states like Jamaica. I highlight the 
shift towards the policymaking that caters to the interests of the developed states. I propose that 
these policies maintained interests of the local elite, while negatively affecting the state’s 
relationship with the majority classes due to pressure to implement programmes that attacked the 
role of dons as partners-in-governance. Moreover, these policies fail to consider the contextual 
issues, such as public distrust of the state, the lack of professional and financial resources and other 
context-specific issues. Political parties are not the only groups interested in the maintenance of the 
status quo and subjugation of the lower classes (Holzberg, 1980; Edie, 1984; 2011; Sives, 2002; 
Clarke, 2006). The need of the elite community to preserve wealth is an incentive to fund the 
patron-client system in place between the political parties and garrisons, as it keeps the lower 
classes from demanding more resources from the state (Edie, 1984; 1989; 2011; Sives, 2002).  
 There is a history of clientelistic relationships with IFIs and developed states  As I will 96
describe, there are clientelistic relationships between the state and the international stakeholders, 
where the former is the client and the latter is the patron. The need for the state to please the 
conflicting interests of the inner-city population, the local elites and these international 
stakeholders, diminishes the legitimacy of the state by reducing its ability to enforce the rule of law. 
The state’s financial dependence on international donors gave those donors illegitimate influence 
over justice policy choices.  
 Edie (1997; 2011) notes that Stone (1976;1977) fails to consider the external influences on 96
Jamaican society.
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Donor Countries  
 While the role of the state shifts between patron and client in its relationship with the 
economic elite, the role of the state does not shift with respect to the international donor community 
(Edie, 1984; Edie, 1989; Sives, 2002; Harriott et al, 2012). The literature on developing countries 
notes the tendency for them to comply with the policy preferences of developed states with whom 
they have a long-standing history (Biddle & Stephans, 1989; Sives, 2002; Weis, 2004; Edie, 2011; 
Daley, 2014; Graham, 2017). In return, these developing states receive preferential treatment and 
funding to implement these policies. By having influence over policies, dominant states develop 
long-term influence on developing states; protecting their interests by creating a consensus across 
jurisdictions and minimising potential defiance.  
 Historically, the policy choices of developed states have imposed, and later on indirectly 
shaped the policy prescription of an economically dependent Jamaican government (Edie, 1984; 
1989; Sives, 2002; Weis, 2004). The Jamaican government has on-going funding relationships with 
the US, Canada and the U.K (to a lesser extent) (Biddle & Stephans, 1989; Edie, 1989; 2011). 
These states are Jamaica’s most lucrative trading partners ; (ii) the sites of migration for most 97
Jamaicans who live outside of Jamaica and (iii) amongst the wealthiest nations in the world and 
provide the most significant aid and foreign investment to Jamaica (Edie, 1989; Dunn & Mondesire, 
2002).  
 During the 1950s and 60s, Seaga became one of the greatest allies of the US Under his 
administration, it adopted pro-U.S. position on relations with Cuba and Grenada by breaking off 
relations with the former and defending the U.S invasion into the latter (Edie, 1984; Libby, 1990).  
 In the 1960s and 70s, Jamaica imported more than 60% of what was consumed in the country, 97
including capital goods, food, manufacturing goods as well as raw materials (Biddle & Stephans, 
1989).
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 Also, Jamaica supported nuclear weapon reductions with verification and supported the U.S 
position on cold war issues (Libby, 1990; Sullivan, 2006). He was portrayed as a ‘Harvard-
educated’ businessman who had a commitment to democracy (Persaud, 2001). In response to 
Seaga’s choice of pro-U.S policies, the U.S committee on Jamaica extended resources to further 
foreign investment. Both political parties sought foreign investment in bauxite and tourism through 
import-substitution policies (Biddle & Stephans, 1989; Edie, 1989). The Reagan administration 
established the Caribbean Basin initiative, which allowed duty-free entry of Caribbean goods and 
promoted investment through tax incentives and removal of barriers to U.S investment (Biddle & 
Stephans, 1989). Most importantly, it increased aid from 14.6 million to 140.7 million in 1982  98
Under Seaga, the Jamaican government was able to receive extensions on their IMF agreements and 
received a raise in lending by 450% of the quota (the maximum allowed) under far more lenient 
conditions than Manley.  
 By developing these funding relationships with the donor countries, Jamaica was able to 
maintain the class structure; particularly with regard to the maintenance of the middle strata. Also, 
the influx of foreign investment prevented an uprising of the majority classes. In 1974, a similar 
survey found that elites rated Jamaican self-interest as lower than western nations (Persaud, 2001). 
As a result, the state benefitted from both donor countries’ and the local elite’s funding of the 
clientelistic relationships of the state and majority classes. While this helped to maintain the 
stability of the state, it certainly diminished the state’s capacity for self-rule.  
 Historically, there is evidence of semi-coercive policy transfer having taken place in 
Jamaica, particularly throughout the 80s. Any refusal by the Jamaican government to adhere to the 
interests of these donor countries has had grave consequences. Manley’s attempt to become 
 As will be discussed, Canada played a significant role in the most recent justice reform efforts 98
and the RJ policy. 
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independent of foreign investment resulted in severe backlash from the US Both the local 
(controlled by the elite) and U.S media began to paint Jamaica in a poor light (Persaud, 2001). The 
Gleaner, which held a conservative JLP view at the time, published editorials that undermined 
Manley’s government. Subsequently the PNP charged the newspaper with attempting to overthrow 
the government. The international newspapers such as the Miami Herald, Newsweek and the World 
Report wrote about the political violence in Jamaica and Manley’s ties to communism, Anti-
Americanism and dictatorship (Persaud, 2001) . 99
 Most relevant to this thesis is the long-standing relationship between Jamaica and Canada 
(which began in the 1950s) . Between 1981 and 1992, Canada gave the second highest level of 100
aid-funding to Jamaica (278 million US dollars) (Dunn & Mondesire, 2002). The main focus of this 
funding, which was given through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
 
was: 101
(i) poverty reduction, (ii) good governance, (iii) multilateral cooperation, (iv) private sector 
development ,(v) the environment, and (vi) gender equality. CIDA has field offices in Jamaica as a 
means of strengthening collaborative efforts as well as officers stationed in Kingston (Dunn & 
Mondesire, 2002). As part of its aim of reducing poverty, CIDA has contributed significantly to 
security in Jamaica (Baranyi & Dosman, 1991). In 1980 an agreement was made for Caribbean 
police personnel to receive training at the Canadian Police College in Ottawa.  
 The literature does not indicate a similar level of coercion in the relationship between Canada and 99
Jamaica. However, there is some concern regarding the sincerity of Canada’s stated goals to reduce 
poverty in developing states (Baranyi & Dosman, 1991; Cameron, 2007). 
 For instance, in 2001, 71% of Canadians claimed to be of Jamaican origin. In Toronto, they 100
make up (150,000) 3% of the population. Acosta (2005) notes that between, 1990 and 2002, 229 
and 940 US million dollars are sent back to Jamaica from Canada in remittances. 
 CIDA is a government agency that provides sustainable development assistance in developing 101
countries in order to reduce poverty (http://www.international.gc.ca/, accessed April 10, 2017). 
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 In exchange for this funding support, Jamaica has supported Canada on a number of 
regional initiatives, including the ratification of the Landmines convention, its foreign affairs 
interest in Cuba and Haiti as well as support for its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council (Dunn 
& Mondesire, 2002). Also, Jamaican imports from Canada are significant including seafood, paper, 
medicine and consumer products; notwithstanding high tariffs on their exports to Canada. However, 
as will be discussed, I propose that the current funding relationship between Canada and the 
Jamaican government is not coercive; instead the Jamaican government engages in ‘opportunistic’ 
policy transfer, where policy is adopted voluntarily from a jurisdiction in order to take advantage of 
funding opportunities from the donor.  
IFIs  
 In addition to funding from developed states, Jamaica and other Caribbean countries receive 
funding from multilateral financial institutions (IFIs), such as IDB, WB and IMF (Burnside & 
Dollar, 1977; Edie, 1984; Sives, 2002) . These organisations pool money from funds from 102
multiple countries in order to provide aid to recipient countries (Milner & Tingly, 2012). 
Historically, a clientelistic relationship exists between IFI’s and the Jamaican government. That is, 
these organisations typically provide loans under a set of conditions, such as imposition of interest 
rates and the implementation of policies and programmes that often limit their capacity for 
economic growth . This coercive policy transfer is seen in the case of the IMF and the agreements 103
 Although IFIs such as IDB contributed to the national RJ programme, their impact on the 102
direction of the policy was fairly limited. However as will be discussed, as an international 
organisation, their financial interests were given priority throughout the policymaking process
Fleck & Kilby (2005), after examining the geographic distribution of WB lending to 110 103
countries between 1968 and 2002, found that U.S interests were a significant influence on allocation 
of funding. These U.S interests were primarily related to geopolitics (particularly during the Cold 
War) and commercial interests (Fleck & Kilby, 2005). In Jamaica, the implementation of these 
SAPs was based on the neoliberal agenda of the US Dreher & Jensen (2003) note that countries that 
align themselves with U.S interests, face fewer conditions when entering into IMF agreements. This 
is highlighted by the leniency of the IMF to the Seaga administration.
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both Manley and Seaga entered into, which imposed a series of restrictions as well as the 
implementation of SAPs (Burnside & Dollar, 1977; Milner & Tingly, 2012).  
 The policy literature indicates that these imposed policies are often consistent with the 
interests of developed states, rather than the recipient country (Burnside & Dollar, 1977; Maizels & 
Nissanke, 1984; Fleck & Kilby, 2005). Under the leadership of Seaga, the JLP administration 
embraced this neo-liberal agenda that had been set by the IMF (Edie, 1989; Brown, 2013; Sives, 
2002; Edie, 1984). In doing so, it attempted to rebuild the relationships with North America and 
encourage the return of local and foreign investment. In return, Seaga was able to renegotiate the 
IMF agreement and was even granted leniency when it failed to meet the requirements at the first 
assessment of their agreement (Edie, 1989; Brown, 2013; Sives, 2002; Edie, 1984).  
 However, the IMF agreement was particularly detrimental to the economy and the welfare 
of the majority classes, which resulted in the Jamaican government continuing to borrow from these 
agencies . The first IMF agreement provided the Jamaican government with conditionalities for 104
their annual fiscal budget, including public sector wage freezes, increase in interest rates and taxes 
as well as devaluation in order to improve the export sector (Brown, 1981; Johnston & Montecino, 
2011; Johnston, 2015). This and other austerity measures led to the devaluation of the Jamaican 
dollar (from $1.78 to 1 US dollar to $5.50 to 1 US dollar) and an overall lower standard of living 
for Jamaicans. By 1983 the cost of living had increased by 18%. Paying these loans has consumed 
much of the Jamaican fiscal budget for several years. In 1991, Jamaica’s debt represented 194% of 
its total budget (Brown, 1981; Johnston & Montecino, 2011; Jaffe, 2012; Johnston, 2015).  
 Ultimately, compliance with the IMF appeased the local elites, but left the PNP government 
to deal with the disgruntled society lacking economic freedom. More than 77% of Jamaicans were 
 Since 1976, Jamaica has had continuous agreements in place with the IMF (Jaffe, 2012; Brown, 104
1981; Johnston & Montecino, 2011; Johnston, 2015).
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unable to access basic resources (Headley, 1996). In 2010, the debt represented 129% of the budget 
(Johnston & Montecino, 2011). Young men between the ages of 15 and 29 continue to suffer from 
unemployment and lack of access to legal pathways to rise in social status. Male participation in the 
labour force fell from 84% in 1985 to 74.6% in 1993 (Harriott, 1996; 2000). Between 1980 and 
1989, only 40,000 of the 450,000 individuals that comprised the 16 to 24 year old Jamaican 
population were able to attain some skill or education beyond elementary school (Headley, 1996). 
This meant that even when jobs were available, many were not capable of filling those positions. 
This overall neglect of the majority classes resulted in resentment against the minority classes in 
Jamaica, who continue to access state machinery for personal gain (Edie, 1984; 989; Sives, 2002; 
Brown, 2013).  
 However, the Caribbean policy literature indicates that since the 2000s, there is an 
availability of funding that is consistent with the needs of the Jamaican context and other 
developing states. Donors and IFIs that have been historically stringent and focused on economic 
benefit, expanded their scope to a wider range of issues (Dani & De Haan, 2008). For instance, 
donors such as the IMF and World Bank have become more amenable to social sector spending. 
More focus is given to financing public services, such as health and education as well as improved 
governance (Gough, 2008). Wynter, Hardee & Brown (2004) note the availability of adequate 
funding from international and local donors for adolescent reproductive health. In fact, they discuss 
the willingness of donors to respond to the Jamaican context and the need amongst adolescents for 
reproductive health services, rather than coercing the Jamaican government to focus on a particular 
issue. Within environmental policy, Scobie (2016) identifies donor funding as one of the driving 
forced behind policy choice in Caribbean States and the tendency of regional leaders to prioritise 
climate change in order to obtain funding. Thompson (2007) speaks to the ways in which Jamaica 
and other developing states strategically use international donor programmes to implement 
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information technology programme. Dani & De Haan (2008) note the shift in the approach of 
donors to policymaking across jurisdictions also. In the case of implementing social policies that 
address structural inequalities, they discuss a shift towards a more participatory approach in 
reducing poverty, as highlighted by increased empowerment  of poor communities, increased 
partnership between donors, states civil society and academic institutions as well as more relaxed 
funding conditions (Dani & De Haan, 2008). This shift in the approach to funding and relationships 
between donors and recipient states will be exemplified in the case of justice policy in the following 
chapter. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the political, economic and social landscape 
of Jamaica. In particular, I have focused on the state’s relationship with donors as a response to its 
clientelistic relationships with the majority classes and the local elite. The politics literature on 
Jamaica highlights the historical use of policymaking as a tool to appease both the masses, the local 
elite as well as the IFIs and country donors. However, I note the increasing trend of donors to 
encourage a much contextualised and relaxed approach to policymaking and lending. Chapter 4 will 
continue this discussion by highlighting the relationship between Canadian donors and  justice 
policy as an example of the shift in donor approaches to funding small developing states. As a 
result, Chapter 4, will point to the opportunity for change to take place within the political, 
economic and cultural context that I have described here in this chapter, particularly as it relates to 
justice reform and crime prevention.  
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  Chapter 4: A Historical Shift and its Effect on Justice Policy  
 In the last chapter, I discussed the historical context of Jamaica with regard to class, politics 
and policymaking. In this chapter, I focus on justice policymaking in Jamaica. In doing so, I 
propose that there has been a shift from coercive policy transfer to ‘opportunistic’ policy transfer 
where the Jamaican government adepts policies of developed states without coercion, in order to 
take advantage of an opportunity to secure funding relationships with donor countries and give the 
appearance of being responsive to crime. As will be discussed, the exercise in RJ policymaking 
undertaken by the Jamaican government is an example of opportunistic policy transfer, which I 
propose, leads to inappropriate transfer.  
Jamaican Justice Policy  
 As discussed, there is a history of developed states influencing Jamaican policy. With regard 
to justice policy, international stakeholders have contributed significantly to the funding of justice 
policymaking (Robotham, 2003). As a result, both donor countries and IFIs have coerced multiple 
Jamaican administrations to adopt policies that benefit their jurisdictions, rather than the Jamaican 
context. That is, the Jamaican government has often engaged in inappropriate semi-coercive policy 
transfer. For instance, Monahagn (2015) considers the impact of global governance meetings as a 
site for policy transfer of crime policy. He criticises the G8 meetings , which are viewed as an 105
opportunity for the US to place pressure on the Global South to implement policies favourable to 
their own interests (Monahagn, 2015). Also, financial institutions such as IDB and IMF, which are 
controlled by developed states, are more inclined to provide funding for projects that transplant 
policies from the developed to the developing world (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Spiller et al. 2003). 
 G8 is a political forum where heads of state from 8 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 105
Japan, Russia, the UK and the US meet to discuss a range of political issues such as terrorism and 
aid for developing countries. 
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This places pressure on developing nations to adopt external policies, regardless of their differences 
between them and recipient countries.  
 The need for financial support meant that the state acquiesced to semi-coercive policy 
transfer. As noted, crimes committed by dons, such as drug trafficking, gun crime and fraud had 
substantive impact on developed states including U.S, Canada, and the U.K since the 1970s. 
Between 1987 and 1988, The U.S reported that between 300 and 400 homicides could be attributed 
to Jamaican drug gangs (Headley, 1996). A vast number of deportees from the UK, USA and 
Canada associated with drug crime were from Jamaica; indicative of the expansive nature of the 
drug trade and its effect on crime in other jurisdictions. In 1993, 70% of all deportations from the 
UK were drug related and 9% were related to illegal gun possession (Harriott, 1996). At the end of 
1996, over 6000 persons had been deported for drug-related offences (Albuquerque & McElroy, 
2007).  
 As a consequence, the focus of donor states became that of addressing the crippling of dons’ 
power and gang crime in Jamaica. There was concern of backlash if Jamaica did not adhere to the 
extradition agreement for Dudus, one of the most powerful dons in Jamaica; its international 
reputation would be tarnished and its funding relationships would be compromised (Robotham, 
2003; Lewis, 2012). For instance, international HR organizations and governments have publicised 
the Jamaican justice system as weak and ineffective (Wolfe, 1993; Amnesty International, 2001; 
2003). In 2000, the U.S. State Department HR Report highlighted a number of justice related issues, 
including lack of accountability within law enforcement and correctional services, lack of access to 
justice and issues regarding gender-based violence, such as sexual harassment by the police and 
increasing reports of rape (U.S. Department of State, 2000). In 2010, the U.S. State department 
encouraged the adoption of severe legislation to criminalise participation in organised criminal 
gangs and requested that the Jamaican government demonstrate its willingness to address corruption 
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(Sullivan, 2010). In 2014, the Jamaican government passed a SOCA (2014) or ‘Anti-Gang Act’, 
which makes minimal distinction between types of gangs and criminalises a number of non-violent 
behaviours thought to be associated with gang involvement such as wearing tattoos and the use of 
graffiti and songs related to gang life. SOCA (2014) imposes a sentence of up to 20 years for 
persons who are convicted of these crimes (Leslie, 2010; Levy, 2012). Much of its emphasis is 
placed on punishing gang leadership, membership and assisting with gang ‘activities’ ranging from 
drug trafficking to exportation of scrap metal and forgery (GOJ, 2013). Under the 2014 SOCA, the 
Jamaican government has implemented a number of zero-tolerance responses to minor offences and 
grants discretion to law enforcement to punish public order offences such as loitering . Since the 106
extradition of Dudus, the U.S government has praised the cooperation of the Jamaican government 
with its Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and continues to support Jamaica’s efforts through the 
provision of training of law enforcement and financial resources (Leslie, 2010; Levy, 2012). The 
U.S. Marshals Service has a regional office in Jamaica that provides training and equipment to the 
Jamaica Fugitive Apprehension Team (JFAT) (Sullivan, 2010). In 2009, 15 drug traffickers were 
extradited to the US for prosecution (Sullivan, 2010).  
Consequences of Semi-Coercive Policy Transfer  
 Policy transfer is an attractive option for developing states, since its speeds up the slow and 
uncertain reform process (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Barrows, 2014). The trend of adopting policy 
from developed states is predicated on the notion that best practice in one jurisdiction can be 
applied to another. This is the idea that there is potential for developing a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model 
 Some effort has been made to prevent gang crime by the implementation of prevention 106
programmes for juvenile offenders and tackle underlying issues of poverty and unemployment for 
adults (Government of Jamaica, 2007). For instance, the Child Diversion programme, which is in its 
pilot stages, aims to divert juvenile offenders and at-risk youth from incarceration and the criminal 
justice system as a whole, in order to reduce the potential for their involvement with gangs (CSJP, 
2008; Government of Jamaica, 2013; MOJ, http://moj.gov.jm/programmes/child-justice, accessed 
October 17, 2016).
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that is effective in reducing crime regardless of differences in political, social, legal and economic 
context (Common, 1999; Spiller et al. 2003; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Schoburgh, 2007). 
International approaches are adopted readily within the Caribbean to counteract this perception and 
‘keep up’ with developed counterparts. In adopting these ‘best practice’ policies and approaches, the 
Jamaican state wishes to improve its credibility and maintain positive relationships with their 
funding donors (Spiller et al. 2003; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Schoburgh, 2007; Tennant & 
Clayton, 2010; Steinberg, 2011). However, the implementation of these policies has led to the 
failure of the Jamaican government to address crime effectively, since it has often adopted policies 
that address problems of the developed states without considering the impact on the Jamaican 
context.  
 Due to the limited focus on process, there is little discussion of the reasons that penal policy 
transfer has failed in Jamaica (Jones & Schoburgh, 2004). The JJSTRF (2009) states that the 
relationship between donors and justice reform has been largely unexplored. Many have made 
recommendations for future policy attempts to consider context, such as the lack of professional and 
financial resources and the nature of the political environment (Headley, 2001; Harriott, 2002). 
However, available evidence indicates that many adopted justice policies adopted are not suitable 
for the Jamaican context (Allen, 1997; Headley, 2002; Jones, 2003; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004). 
Jamaica has failed to incorporate key aspects of policies from the donor countries or  
consider the differences between it and donor states in relation to a range of issues, such as political 
contexts and access to resources.  
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 With the Anti-Gang Act
 
yet to take full effect, the literature raises concerns regarding the 107
potential effectiveness of this type of gang-suppression legislation (Bjerregard, 2003; Cheng, 2003; 
Hofwegen, 2009; Leslie, 2010). Despite its success in other countries, a 1998 study conducted by 
the Ministry of National Security (MNS) indicated that gang suppression legislation might not be an 
effective solution to the issue of crimes within a Jamaican context (Leslie, 2010). These policies 
have not had a significant effect on crime reduction in Jamaica . 108
 The continued inappropriate policy transfer has had a negative effect on the state’s 
relationship with the majority classes. The Jamaican government had to then choose between 
prioritising the interests of its international funders and local ‘partners-in-governance’ (Edie, 1984; 
Jaffe, 2012; Figueroa & Sives, 2012). By attending to the needs of the donor states to address 
organised crime, the state would violate its patron-client agreement with dons, who benefit from the 
state’s immunity and minimal interference, thereby diminishing public trust. For instance the state 
demonstrated hesitation about extradition because of its potential to expose the corrupt activities of 
politicians is compounded by the response of the garrisons. Without satiating them with improved 
access to state resources and justice, many garrison communities’ protest against these attempts to 
 This legislation makes minimal distinction between types of gangs and criminalises a number of 107
non-violent behaviours thought to be associated with gang involvement such as gang tattoos, the 
use of graffiti and songs related to gang life and imposes a sentence of up to 20 years for persons 
who are convicted of these crimes (Leslie, 2010; Levy, 2012). 
 In 2014, the 314 and 37 per 100,000 population were victims of serious crimes including murder, 108
rape, shooting, assault, larceny and (PIOJ, 2014). In particular, the 2014 Crime and Safety Report 
for Jamaica states that much of crime in Jamaica, such as murder and kidnapping, is still gang-
related (OSAC, 2014). Also, Jamaica had one of the lowest incarceration rates in the Caribbean at 
that time (122.5 per 100,000), indicating that there is a failure to hold offenders accountable 
(UNODC, 2013). In 2017, there was an increase in murders and shootings, much of which was 
attributed to gang crime. The 2018 Crime and Safety report found that 1616 murders took place in 
2017, which was the highest rate seen in 6 years and a 20% increase from the previous year (OSAC, 
2018). However, the police were only able to make arrests in 44% of homicide cases with a 29% 
conviction rate for the same crime.  
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remove dons. When the government was forced to arrest and extradite Dudus , residents of Tivoli 109
Gardens barricaded the entry points of Tivoli with weapons and their bodies. Despite the successful 
extradition of ‘Dudus’, the efforts of the police resulted in 73 civilians being killed .  110
 The removal of dons has weakened the relationship with the state, as it has not sought to 
reclaim the roles that the dons initially took over from the state, nor does it seek to hold political 
officials accountable in the same way. The 2006 National Governance survey (Powell, Bourne, & 
Waller, 2006) noted that most citizens thought of corruption as a normal part of Jamaican life. Many 
respondents indicate that it was ‘likely or ‘very likely’ for political officials and judges to be bribed. 
Bourne (2010) found that 82.4% of 1,338 respondents in Jamaica felt that the administration of 
justice and governance favoured the elite and interest groups.  
A Shift towards Opportunistic Policy Transfer  
 Despite the fact that many of the policies promoted by the US had negative effects on the 
state’s relationship with the majority classes, the Jamaican government continues to give primacy to 
the interests of those whom they have an opportunity to obtain funding from. For instance, the most 
recent Auditor General’s Report (2014) indicated that the search for justice reform programmes has 
largely been rooted in developed countries . The 2009 JJSTRF Policy Agenda Framework states 111
 In 1983, an extradition treaty was signed between Jamaica and the US, which facilitated the US 109
government to prosecute Jamaican nationals for narcotic related offences (Extradition Treaty with 
Jamaica, 1983, https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/traites/en_traites-ext-usa-jam.pdf, accessed 
April 28, 2015). 
 Women and children in particular, will use themselves as physical shields to protect the don 110
(Johnson & Soeters, 2008). One of the first reported attempts to remove a don took place at the 
height of the drug trade in 1998, when Donald ‘Zeeks’ Phipps was arrested for attempted murder 
and wounding with intent (Charles, 2002). When Zeeks was arrested, hundreds of residents from 
both PNP and JLP garrisons put their differences aside in support of the don. Residents from 
Matthews Lane and Tivoli (a JLP garrison) joined together in protest in the front of the Central 
Police station (Charles, 2002). 
 Trinidad was the only Caribbean or developing state named that was considered in the search for 111
effective rehabilitation programmes.
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that the Jamaican government gave priority to the recommendations of their international 
development partners, which were based in part, on the Millennium Development Goals
 
(Dalby, 112
2009). The report from the Joint Select Committee, which considered the Jamaican 2014 SOCA, 
affirmed the importance of the legislation being in line with that of international best practice, by 
referring to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and examples of legislation 
from the US, in states such as California.  
 I have discussed the fact that there has donors have relaxed certain parameters associated 
with funding and encouraged a contextualised and participatory approach to policymaking. 
However, despite this shift that expands the availability of funding and encourages collaboration 
across a wider range of stakeholders, this emphasis on international stakeholder interest continues, 
even without coercion from developed states on the Jamaican government to implement certain 
policies. I propose that the economic dependence on international stakeholders has become 
embedded into the political culture of Jamaica. Thus there is a type of self-imposed pressure to act 
opportunistically by adopting policies that increase the likelihood of taking advantage of funding 
opportunities. As noted, Jamaica has a long-standing relationship with Canada. Since the 1980s, 
CIDA has consistently provided funding for the expansion of existing crime reduction programmes 
that are run by the voluntary sector. They have given significant funding to DRF for the 
 The motivation for reform was prompted by the 2000 Millennium Summit (http://www.un.org/112
millenniumgoals/pdf/mdg2005progresschart.pdf, accessed October 16, 2016). This summit brought 
191 representatives from different countries to develop plans that encouraged partnership between 
developing and developed countries to ‘create an environment at the national and global levels 
alike- which is conducive to the development and elimination of poverty’ (Dalby, 2009). More 
specifically, these goals were: (i) the eradication of poverty (ii) access to primary education (iii) 
gender equality and the empowerment of women (iv) child mortality (v) mental health (vi) HIV/
AIDS (vii) environmental sustainability and (viii) Global partnership. 189 countries including 
Jamaica, committed to focusing on addressing these goals by 2015 (http://www.un.org/
millenniumgoals/pdf/mdg2005progresschart.pdf, accessed October 16, 2016).  
Page !167
development of the Social Conflict and Legal Reform Project , which ran from 2001 to 2004. In 113
addition, CIDA and other offshoot organisations such as the Canadian Caribbean Cooperation Fund 
(CCCF), have given significant funding to the Jamaican government programmes that focus on 
crime prevention through creating alternative pathways to the formal justice system, including 
CAN$20 million and CAN$500,000 to the most recent justice reform efforts respectively . Their 114
on-going efforts have enabled the implementation of a number of justice related programmes, 
including the capacity strengthening of the Police Public Complaints Department and the 
development of firearms policy in 1997
 
(Stone, Miller, Thornton & Trone, 2005).  115
 More recently, the Caribbean News noted that Jamaica is one of the CARICOM countries 
that benefitted from CAN$90 million dollar funding for the Judicial Reform and Institutional 
Strengthening Project (JURIST) in 2017 (https://wp.caribbeannewsnow.com/2017/12/26/jurist-
project-strengthens- justice-system-jamaica/, accessed July 2018). In particular, Jamaica had 
received up to Can $44.2 billion for the development of the Jamaican justice sector (http://
www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/16-years-of-Canadian-support- for-justice-system_85029, 
 The mandate of this project was to implement conflict resolution programmes throughout 113
Jamaican communities through training of teachers and mediators.
 In addition DFID and the UK Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) have sought to address 114
issues within law enforcement by donating 4.5 million pounds and 9.2 million pounds between 
2008-2011 and 2011-2015 respectively for training of law enforcement and increased accountability 
in the justice system respectively (http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country- Profiles/
Jamaica-Country-Profile, accessed August 30, 2017). Also, USAID has spearheaded the 
development of the Community Empowerment and Transformation Project (COMET), a project 
aimed at the dismantling of gangs through a series of initiatives including the strengthening of civil 
society and improvement of community policing programmes.
 The Firearms Act (2010) seeks to reduce the availability of illegal firearms through legislative 115
measures such as restriction of importation of firearms and ammunition and increased punishment 
for possession of firearms with intent to injure.
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accessed August 29, 2017). This includes the contribution of Can$ 19.2 million to modernise
 
the 116
system and Can$ 5.2 million for capacity building. In addition, the Canadian High Commission 
gave funding to training workshops for the incorporation of restorative circles in schools (Ferguson 
& Chevannes, 2018). This funding support has served to improve the situation of Jamaican women 
as well (Thame & Thakur, 2014; https://wp.caribbeannewsnow.com/2017/12/26/jurist-project-
strengthens- justice-system-jamaica/, accessed July 2018). As part of judicial reform efforts, a range 
of Canadian organisations, such as the Canada/Caribbean Gender Equality Programme (CCGEP) 
and the JURIST project lent efforts to reducing gender-based violence, which included the 
development of a national gender equality policy. 
 Within the regional literature on justice reform and donor states, there is no indication that 
Canada, as a donor, has imposed any pressure to adopt certain policies and practices. Much of the 
funding given to the Jamaican government from Canada has contributed to general improvement of 
the justice system, rather than advocating a particular approach. For instance, much of the funding 
for JUST programme went towards increasing strengthening capacity and removing barriers to 
reform (Dalby, 2009; http://www.moj.gov.jm/programmes/just-programme, accessed July 2018). 
Also, the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives has funded a number of projects with both CSOs and 
the state on crime prevention and state accountability (http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/
jamaica-jamaique/development- developpement/CFLI-FCIL-Projects_projets-2014-15.aspx?
lang=eng, accessed July 2018). While this funding body has 3 thematic priorities (such as conflict 
management, economic growth and climate action), there is no specific stipulation as to the 
approach that should be taken. In fact, many of the identified eligible costs cover general areas, 
such as administrative costs, publishing fees and website development (http://
 Modernisation of the justice system includes the computerisation of court documents, improved 116
case management, increased availability of information for victims throughout court process as well 
as increasing jury pools (Canadian Bar Association, 2007). 
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www.canadainternational.gc.ca/jamaica-jamaique/development- developpement/CFLI-
FCIL-2018-19.aspx?lang=eng, accessed July 2018).  
 In fact, Canadian donors have increasingly provided support that is responsive to the needs 
of the Jamaican community. For instance, the project director of the JURIST programme 
specifically stated that the aim of the JURIST project is to address the specific needs of the poorer 
communities, such as the development of context-specific guidelines for handling issues of gender 
equality for each CARICOM country (https://wp.caribbeannewsnow.com/2017/12/26/jurist-project-
strengthens- justice-system-jamaica/, accessed July 2018). Canadian agencies were responsible for 
many of the papers and consultancies cited in the JJSTRF Policy Framework (Dalby, 2009). Much 
of the report speaks to the need for increased research and prioritization of the Jamaican context, 
including the need to ‘computerise’ the office of the DPP, the issue of sustainability as well as the 
recruitment of professional resources to address the lack of available local crime data.  
 On the other hand, there is some evidence that the Jamaican government has been proactive 
in seeking assistance from the Canadian government by choosing policies that are in line with their 
political interests. For instance, JJSTRF states that the diaspora information available to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be proactively used to conduct ‘early outreach’ to diaspora in 
Canada and other countries to gauge their interest in participating in the justice reform framework 
(Dalby 2009). In 2004, the Jamaican government held a diaspora conference to encourage donations 
from Canada and other developed states, through the development of a website, the designation of 
‘Diaspora Day’ and the creation of a diaspora foundation (Dalby, 2009). During the development of 
local gender policy, it was found that the ideas of international organisations were incorporated into 
the policy, even though they were not part of the national consulting process (Thame & Thakur, 
2014).  
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 This shift towards opportunistic policy transfer is highlighted by the simultaneous 
implementation of policies and programmes with contrasting ideals. For instance, while the research 
indicates that there have been a number of justice reform efforts, including that of a national RJ 
policy, the Jamaican government has chosen to implement legislation that is antithetical to the 
context-specific approach being advocated by its donors. For instance, the 2009 SOA is legislation 
that calls for increased incarceration with less opportunity for reprieve for sex offenders. In 
particular, the adoption of the sex register
 
is an example of government neglect of differences 117
between Jamaica and donor states. While the use of sex registers has had some positive effect on 
first-time offenders (only with limited access and online), it could have detrimental effects on the 
prevalence of sex offenders in Jamaica due to the differences in availability of technology and 
professional resources (Letournou et al. 2010). For instance, in the absence of costly electronic 
tracking systems, sex registries cannot work unless sex offenders voluntarily update the relevant 
authorities of their whereabouts. Also, it might not be advantageous for the Jamaican government to 
implement a system that requires costly tracking equipment and the training of law enforcement that 
is already overburdened. During my interview with Minister Golding, (MOJ Offices, 18/11/14) he 
indicated that there were plans to implement electronic tagging; a tracking system for offenders that 
is popular in developed states. When asked how this would be financed he said it was suggested that 
offenders would pay for this technology themselves; meaning that only those that can afford to pay 
for the electronic tags would benefit from the opportunity to avoid incarceration, thereby 
compounding the disadvantages of poorer communities in terms of their access to justice. Also, in 
 A sex registry allows law enforcement to monitor the activities of sex offenders by maintaining 117
information on convicted sex offenders. Typically, this information includes offences committed, 
addresses of relatives and identifying physical characteristics. Another thing required of a registered 
sex offender is consistent reporting to the local police and notification of travel plans (Bonnar-Kidd, 
2010; Agan, 2011; Prescott, 2012; Carpenter & Beverlin, 2012; Worley & Worley, 2013). In 
addition, many sex registries give public access to this information (Levenson & Cotter, 2005; 
Letournou et al. 2010). 
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some states, community notification has led to vigilante attacks by enraged citizens on sex 
offenders and their family members (Thomas, 2004; Letournou et al. 2010). A sex register is likely 
to exacerbate the potential for vigilante attacks. There have already been reports of vigilante attacks 
against sex offenders and victims of sexual violence in Jamaica (Allen, 1997; Charles 2002).  
 Canada also funds policy on sex offences. For instance, under the JURIST programme, the 
Canadian government is currently funding the development of model sentencing guidelines to 
accompany the 2009 SOA (https://jis.gov.jm/response-sexual-assault-cases-pleases-high-
commissioner/, accessed August 2018). However, several interviewees affirmed the Auditor 
General’s 2014 report, which highlighted a failure to investigate individualised rehabilitation 
programmes for sex offenders. Some of my interviews, including those who have first hand 
experience working with offenders, such as Dr. Sewell (forensic psychiatrist, UWI office, 9/1/14) 
and Dr. Oo (Lead psychiatrist, Bellevue Hospital, 8/1/15) noted a lack of local research on sexual 
offending and rehabilitation for sex offenders specifically. Thus there is use of international donor 
money to develop policy on an issue that still embraces an international approach, in spite of efforts 
from the donor to embrace a contextualised approach.  
 All available evidence suggest the 2009 SOA as an example that opportunistic policy 
transfer is also likely to lead to inappropriate policy transfer. In May 2014, the sex register database 
was completed (https://jis.gov.jm/data-system-sex-offenders-registry-completed/, accessed July 
2018). However, in 2015, only 50 names had been added to the register (http://rjrnewsonline.com/
local/50-names-now-on-sex-offenders-registry, accessed July 2018). In 2013, 792 rapes were 
reported (OSAC, 2014). Although Jamaica has seen a decrease in the number of rapes in Jamaica, 
they do not correlate with timing of the implementation of the 2009 SOA or the sex registry.  
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Figure 4.1 Jamaica Rape Rates 2006-2015  
 
(Accessed: https://knoema.com/atlas/Jamaica/topics/Crime-Statistics/Assaults- Kidnapping-
Robbery-Sexual-Rape/Rape, July 2018)  
 As seen in Figure 4.1, there was an increase in reported rapes after the implementation of the 
2009 SOA until 2012. Although the rate of reported rapes has declined since then, the rate of 
decline was significantly less in 2014, indicating the null effect of the implementation of the sex 
register. In addition, there has been a slight increase in rapes between 2016 and 2017; from 470 to 
473 (OSAC, 2017; http://rjrnewsonline.com/local/more-than-470-women- raped-last-year, accessed 
July 2018). Also in 2016 and 2017, only 34 persons and 81 persons were convicted of sexual 
offences in St. Andrew respectively (http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20180218/
punishing-pervs- more-and-more-sexual-offenders-being-convicted, accessed July 2018)   118
 In this thesis, I propose that the national RJ policy stands as an example of inappropriate 
policy transfer that is opportunistic in nature, from Canada to Jamaica. As will emerge, the 
Jamaican government adopted policy from the Canadian province of Nova Scotia, without coercion 
 There were 1,005 reported sexual offences in 2016 and 940 in 2017 (http://jamaica-gleaner.com/118
article/lead-stories/20180218/punishing-pervs- more-and-more-sexual-offenders-being-convicted, 
accessed July 2018). 
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and in spite of encouragement from local expertise as well as Canadian consultants and funding 
representatives themselves, to develop a more contextual ‘Jamaican’ RJ. Instead the Jamaican 
government actively sought and prioritised Canadian involvement, as indicated by the limited 
geographical search for justice policy, the recruitment of Canadian staff to develop and implement 
policy and the exclusion of local research that sought to investigate local forms of community-
driven or restorative-oriented practices.  
The Lack of Collaborative Governance in Jamaica  
 The weight given to international interests in Jamaican justice policymaking is highlighted 
by the lack of collaborative governance in Jamaica. The literature notes that the Westminster model 
is rooted in the practice of government, rather than governance, which emphasises involvement of a 
range of stakeholders in the policymaking process (Sutton 1999; Ryan, 1999; Altink, 2015). There 
is limited discussion of collaborative governance within the literature on Jamaican democratic 
practices and government (Schoburgh, 2007; Bowen, 2009; Jones, 2010; Minto-Coy, 2011; 
Moloney, 2013). Moreover, much of this discussion is not focused on any individual policy arena 
and tends to exclude jurisdictions where collaboration is not popular (Minto-Coy, 2011; Moloney, 
2013). The available literature indicates that local stakeholders are often excluded from the 
policymaking process. I suggest that this lack of collaboration contributed significantly to the lack 
of a consensus in defining the concept of RJ and the approach to implementation in the 
policymaking process. Those who examine the policymaking process in Jamaica note that policy 
discussions begin among elites and outcomes are likely to be representative of the views of political 
representatives (Abrams, 2002; Headley, 2002; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Acosta, 2005; Harriott, 
2009; Ricketts, 2010; Jones 2010; Daley, 2014). The paternalistic ‘top-down approach of the 
Jamaican government does not lend itself to collaboration. As a result of their financial input, 
international stakeholders are involved actively in the development and implementation of 
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policymaking Also, it tends to exclude the public sector, which allows the policymaking process to 
become dominated by government officials and private sector (Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Ricketts, 
2010; Minto-Coy, 2011; Moloney, 2013; Daley, 2014). Historically, much of the government 
contracts are given to private sector organizations. That is, those who are most disconnected and 
unaffected by crime are typically responsible for finding solutions to it. For instance, The Major 
Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCACA) Strategy, 2015-2018 stated that 3 
international consultants formed part of the committee that developed strategies to address 
organised crime (MOCACA, 2015).  
 I noted that policy has become a political tool that parties use to win favour with Jamaican 
citizens as well as the international lending community. The competitiveness between the political 
parties and overall political corruption contributes to a lack of cooperation across and between 
stakeholder groups. When policymaking takes place in a competitive setting, there is less 
motivation to engage in collaboration (Exadaktylos & Zahariadis, 2012; Moloney, 2013). 
Essentially, the view of policy as a tool for political patronage overrides its value as a vehicle of 
change. I have discussed the benefits of a unified approach to any policymaking exercise in terms of 
its capacity to improve efficiency and effectiveness through consensus development, capacity 
building and cost-effectiveness. However, issues of political competitiveness can often drive 
administrations to focus on appearing to effect change, instead of utilising the perspectives of those 
on the ground.  
 The literature on policymaking and policy transfer provides a list of actors that are typically 
involved in policymaking, including actors including government officials, political parties, civil 
servants, pressure groups, policy experts and supra-national institutions (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 
Stone, 2001; Abrams, 2002; Acosta, 2005; Benson & Jordan, 2011; Cahn, 2013). The literature 
indicates how essential it is that stakeholders work collaboratively (Bowen, 2009; Innes & Booher, 
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2010; Exadaktylos & Zahariadis, 2012; Moloney 2013). There is particular emphasis within the 
literature on the value of involving non-state stakeholders in decision-making activities that affect 
the well-being of society (Bishop & Davis, 2002; Burstein, 2003; Schoburgh, 2007; Moloney, 
2013).  
Public Opinion  
 A key stakeholder group of the policymaking process, which is often overlooked, is the 
public. There is a wealth of literature on public opinion in political decision-making (Gramberger, 
2001; Burnstein, 2002; Bishop & Davis, 2002; Burstein, 2003; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Green, 
2006; Janse & Konijnendijk, 2007; O’Faircheallaigh, 2010; Glucker et al. 2013). As might be 
expected there is relatively little literature that is dedicated to public consultation within developing 
states . Much of the literature does however highlight the value of direct citizen input in 119
policymaking (Bishop & Davis, 2002; Burstein, 2003; Bishop & Davis, 2002; Irvin & Stansbury, 
2004; Van Camp & Lemonne, 2005; Zimring & Johnson, 2006; Jones, 2010; O’Faircheallaigh, 
2010; Glucker, et al. 2013). Public participation usually improves the problem-solving capacity of 
the state, which results in improved policy outcomes. The contribution of the public allows policy 
makers to become aware of practical concerns that will influence how they Use the policy to 
address the larger problem. Also, increased public participation is thought to increase public trust. 
The public can educate the state on its needs (Bishop & Davis, 2002; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; 
O’Faircheallaigh, 2010; Glucker et al. 2013). In turn, this involvement might bring about increased 
cooperation of the public with state-led decisions. In this way, public participation increases the 
transparency of state decision-making and can change the perspective of apathetic or disillusioned 
 In Burstein’s review of literature that discusses the impact of public opinion on public policy, he 119
found that most of the articles were based on policy in the US and Europe (Burstein, 2003). 0 
articles that provided information on developing countries (Burstein, 2003).  
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citizens who have little faith in the system (Gramburger, 2001; Bishop & Davis, 2002; Irvin & 
Stansbury, 2004; O’Faircheallaigh, 2010). Public participation in the policymaking process  
makes citizens more informed about the policymaking process and the issues being addressed 
(Gramburger, 2001; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; O’Faircheallaigh, 2010; Glucker et al. 2013) . While 120
the value of public opinion is clear, there is a lack of consensus on how that participation should be 
achieved and the level required (Arnstein, 1969; Johnstone, 2000; Bishop & Davis, 2002; Irvin & 
Stansbury, 2004; Green, 2006; Glucker et al. 2013; O’Faircheallaigh, 2010; Moloney, 2013) .   121
 When it comes to penal policy, I suggest that there is justification for some public 
involvement in penal policy development, particularly when implementing community driven 
approaches to crime. It is assumed that the pressure to respond to public opinion has resulted in the 
approach of deterrence that is predominant in both developed and developing nations (Johnstone, 
2000; Green, 2006; Zimring & Johnson, 2006; Maruna & King, 2013). Terry Thomas (2004) 
categorizes this chain of influence as “popular punitivism”. Popular punitivism is defined as, “the 
interplay in late modern society between the media, public opinion and politicians that generates a 
backdrop to the formulation and implementation of both criminal justice and penal policy 
(Monterosso, 2009). Despite literature that indicates the lack of impact of incarceration on 
There are some who voice concerns about whether public participation in policymaking is worth 120
the effort (Burstein, 2003; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Green, 2006). The process of engaging citizens 
on public policy issues can be quite time consuming and costly, especially if the rewards of the 
process turn out to be limited. In addition, public opinion might be dominated by interest groups 
and elites who are comfortable enough financially to volunteer the time required to participate 
(Burnstein, 2003; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). For instance, citizen-participation committees usually 
consist of members of a higher SES, including college graduates and participants who are paid to 
represent the interests of businesses (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). However these groups might also 
participate in order to represent the interests of minority groups.
In accordance with Arnstein’s ladder of participation, some academics argue that much of 121
government consultation with the public is tokenistic and recommend participation to take place on 
the higher level of this scale at all times (Bishop & Davis, 2002; O’Faircheallaigh, 2010). On the 
other hand, there are some who argue that the level of participation is dependent on the policy and 
the issue being addressed (Johnstone, 2000; Bishop & Davis, 2002; Green, 2006).  
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reoffending, there is a widespread assumption that prison is an effective deterrent
 
for offenders 122
(Mears & Bales, 2009; Bonta, 2010; Freiburger & Iannacchione, 2011; Cullen et al. 2011; Bushway 
& Owen, 2012; Budd & Desmond, 2013; Wermink et al. 2017) . 123
 As noted earlier, the societal call for increased punitive measures is an opportunity for 
politicians to seem responsive to the public. Where there is public mistrust, governments are more 
likely to implement harsher forms of punishment such as mandatory minimum sentences and the 
removal of parole options, which remove the discretion of punishment from judges (Zimring & 
Johnson, 2006; Green, 2006). In addition, it may be beneficial for the prospect of re-election for 
politicians to maintain the status quo. It is advantageous to act in accordance with the will of the 
people. If the will of the people is assumed to favour increased incarceration, then politicians are 
likely to embrace policies that underscore that belief (Zimring & Johnson, 2006; Green, 2006).
 124
Many participants of my research indicated the popularity of a punitive, deterrence-based approach 
to punishment . In particular, PS Carol Palmer (MOJ Offices, 10/01/15) and Justice McIntosh 125
(Puisne Judge, DPP offices, 11/28/14) indicated that RJ has been largely implemented for relatively 
minor crimes as a starting point because of the societal encouragement of severe punishment and 
 Deterrence is understood as the use of punishment that aims to reduce the incentive of 123
committing crime (Drago, Galbiati & Vertova, 2011; Brooks, 2012). 
 Having inherited much of its legislation from Britain, the overall approach to punishment in 124
Jamaica is rooted in deterrence (Harriott, 2009; UNDP, 2012; Ministry of National Security, 2014). 
Jamaica has the 104th highest incarceration rate in the world; incarcerating 174 people per 100,000 
of its population (Robottom, 2011; Walmsley, 2015). This is compounded further by the inhumane 
conditions seen in Jamaican correctional facilities, which will be discussed in the following 
chapters. 
 In this thesis, I propose that, during times of justice reform in jurisdictions that suffer from 125
public mistrust, public consultation is particularly important for the government in engendering a 
positive public reception of changes to the justice system, especially when they are inconsistent 
with the status quo. In particular, public awareness and seeking public opinion on RJ might have 
helped to develop a form of RJ that Jamaicans would have been more willing to participate in. 
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the popular misconception of RJ as a soft approach to crime . In addition, Wedderburn (FES 126
Director, FES Offices, Kgn, 10/10/14) and Professor Biholar from UWI Law School (NMLS, 
22/1/15) indicated that many Jamaicans still felt that the increased punishment for sex offenders 
under the 2009 SOA was not severe enough .  127
Civil Society  
 Another key stakeholder in justice policy is civil society. The literature highlights the benefit 
of collaborating with CSOs, particularly in societies where there is low public trust of the state and 
its justice institutions (Jones, 2003; Stone, 2004; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Plaatjies, 2008; Prince, 
2012; McFarlane & Canton, 2014; Macauley, 2013). Earlier in this thesis, I noted that the literature 
on governance argues that the involvement of civil society in governance can help to reduce the 
impact of contextual issues that hamper good governance in Jamaica, including competitiveness 
between political parties, political corruption and resource deprivation (Harriott, 1999; Headley 
2003; Sives, 2010; Moloney, 2013). Civil society has the ability to fight corruption and public 
mistrust of the state by pressuring the state to hold parties accountable, including illegal 
organisations that the public are dependent on (Charles, 2002). Sives (2010) cites the example of 
civil society in Italy acting as a deterrent to the criminal activity of the Mafia . Also, CSOs can 128
provide cost-effective ways of providing service delivery, which is important in jurisdictions that 
suffer from lack of resources (Sives, 2010). Finally, they can be a valuable resource in terms of 
mobilising issues within the society by acting as a liaison between the state and its citizens. Usually 
their membership consists of individuals from across social classes (Lewis, 2012). By engaging 
 However, I suggest later on, that the reason for the popularity of severe punishment is due to a 126
lack of information. Therefore, public consultation must include an element of unbiased public 
education.
 Later on in the thesis, I will highlight the value of consulting with victims due to their unique 127
perspective on justice, as opposed to the largely uninformed perspective of community members.
 Charles (2002) highlights the similarities between the dons and garrisons and the Mafia culture.128
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with civil society, the Jamaican government can ensure that the needs of the communities are 
identified correctly and encourage them to be met. Citizens may be more trusting of participating in 
programmes that are run by CSOs that they are familiar with, rather than the state.  
 The literature also provides an overview of the historically disadvantageous exclusion of 
civil society in policymaking in Jamaica (Bowen, 2009; Jones, 2010; Minto-Coy, 2011; Moloney, 
2013). Much of it argues that the Jamaican government has only involved civil society in a 
tokenistic manner (Harriott, 1999; Abrams, 2002; Headley, 2002; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; 
Ricketts, 2010; Jones 2010; Minto-Coy, 2011; Daley, 2014). Moloney (2013) identifies civil society 
involvement in governance in Jamaica as, at best, consultative. Within the context of justice, The 
Jamaican government has a history of using civil society as providers of justice-related public 
services, ranging from Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
 
to crime prevention community 129
projects (Witter, 2004; Epstein, 2006; Moloney, 2013) .  130
 Shapland (2011) notes a developing trend for states to create a new group of professionals 
instead of developing partnerships with organizations that are operating within the community 
already. Similarly, CSOs have rarely been incorporated into the development of justice programmes 
in Jamaica (Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; Daley, 2013). In the case of the development of anti-gang 
 ADR refers to a range of practices that use problem-solving techniques in order to resolve 129
disputes without resorting to litigation (Holbrook & Gray, 1995; Brown & Simanowitz, 1995). ADR 
involves direct communication between or amongst parties, where they participate in deciding how 
the issue should be resolved. There is usually a common thread amongst these practices; a neutral 
party facilitates the resolution of this issue, rather than determining punishment (Brown & 
Simanowitz, 1995; Knudsen & Balina, 2014). In Jamaica, ADR was introduced primarily to 
decrease the burden on the judiciary (Zacca, 1995; UNDP, 2012; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Blake, 
2013). Later on, I argue that DRF, PMI and other civil society groups should have been considered 
main stakeholders in the development of the national RJ policy.
 Since the 18
th 
century, civil society and volunteerism have played an important role in Jamaica. 130
Following slavery, missionaries were instrumental in the development of free villages, which were 
developed through the voluntary service of citizens (Witter, 2004; James, 2014).
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strategies, government documents, including the 2007 policy agenda from the MNS emphasised the 
development of partnerships with civil society for the service provision and delivery of training, 
advocacy and representation of public opinion (Dalby, 2009). However, instead of working with 
local CSOs, new organizations were created to deliver these services. The Community Assessment 
Security and Transformation Programmes (2009) indicated that the government formed many of the 
organizations to implement crime prevention programmes from scratch, such as the CSJP , PMI 131
and Community Security Initiative (CSI) (Government of Jamaica, 2009). In addition, international 
not-for-profit organizations such as UNICEF were involved heavily with the provision of training 
and general violence prevention efforts (Leslie, 2010). 
 This limited involvement is compounded by the appropriation of civil society by political 
parties. The literature on civil society in developing countries highlights the involvement of civil 
society in the struggle for political hegemony (Jones, 2010; Sives, 2010; Minto-Coy, 2011; 
Moloney, 2013). Post-independence, high level functioning CSOs were created by and became tied 
to political parties and crime organizations. Sometimes CSOs were forced to enter into agreements 
with governments or criminal groups in order to continue operating. Usually this agreement turned 
CSOs into vehicles of electoral gain; CSOs gained access to resources, but quelled any potential 
resistance or any form of independent action (Sives, 2010; Jones, 2010; Moloney, 2013). Instead of 
allowing civil society to be effective in the delivery of services and programmes, the Westminster 
model appropriated civil society as another political tool for political patronage. Thus CSOs became 
a way of soliciting votes.  
 CSJP is a crime and violence prevention programme that seeks to ‘enhance citizen security and 131
justice in Jamaica’, particularly in vulnerable communities, through implementation of programmes 
that strengthen crime management capacity, improve the delivery of justice services and prevent 
crime and violence. Examples of programmes are entrepreneurship training, provision of victim 
support, and community dispute resolution (http://www.mns.gov.jm/content/citizenship-security-
justice-programme, accessed March 7, 2017). 
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 The appropriation of CSOs by political parties meant that social services and their activities 
were state-controlled (Harriott, 2004; Jones, 2010; Sives, 2010; Moloney, 2013). For instance, the 
Jamaica Welfare, a civil society group that promotes self-governance and community development 
became a governmental body under the JLP administration (Moloney, 2013). In short, civil society 
was limited in their choices: be agreeable with the state in terms of policy prescription or refuse 
involvement in hopes that its political party will return to power or to be apolitical altogether . 132
None of these options provides any hopes of sustainability for CSOs. Ultimately the precarious 
position that they occupy has an impact on their ability to deliver services, and influence change 
(Sives, 2010; Jones, 2010; Minto-Coy, 2011; Moloney, 2013) .  133
 However, the community of CSOs have changed over time. Although it is difficult to 
provide statistics, there has been a proliferation of CSOs that work on justice-related issues (Bowen, 
2013; James, 2014; BTI, 2016). There are over 3,500 CSOs operating in Jamaica. The Council of 
Voluntary Social Services (CVSS) has identified 115 NGOs, while the Social Development 
Commission named 2,903 community-based organisations in 2012 . The literature notes that there 134
are 4 main areas of CSO involvement; social services, community building, local economic 
development and sustainable development (Bowen, 2013; James, 2014; BTI, 2016). In Jamaica, 
much of the work of CSOs for the justice sector focuses on social services and capacity building, 
 While there are CSOs that are not dependent on or in competition with the Jamaican government 132
for funding, these organizations, such as Jamaicans for Justice and J-FLAG are categorized as 
‘troublemakers’ since they are often critical of the government’s policies. As a result the 
government does not make any effort to collaborate with them. 
 In the case of the national RJ policy, I characterise the interaction between the state and civil 133
society as one of consultation and argue later that the failure to be collaborative contributed to the 
disconnect between the aims of the policy and its implementation. 
 Of this number, 2,283 were active and 451 were partially active (James, 2014). After cooperation 134
with the UN and Commonwealth foundations in the 1980s, there was an increase in the number of 
CSOs and their level of activity (James, 2014). In particular, the implementation of SAPs pushed 
the civil society community to minimise the economic losses to the majority classes and ensure that 
their rights were protected where possible.
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with a particular emphasis on advocacy and service delivery (James, 2014; BTI, 2016). For 
instance, Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ) is one of the most self-sustainable civil society organisations 
that have been successful in effecting change in Jamaica. Their mandates includes lobbying and 
advocating against human rights violations and delivery of related services, such as legal 
representation and human rights training for correctional officers (James 2014). In 2011 and 2013, 
JFJ trained 1000 and 750 recruits respectively (James, 2014). They are also responsible for 
successfully lobbying for a more efficient and justice jury selection process and the Commissions of 
Enquiry that investigated a number of justice issues, such as disturbances in the St. Catherine 
district prison (James, 2014).  
 Within my own research I interviewed 7 Jamaicans CSO representatives that were dedicated 
to resolving justice-related issues, including gender equality, and offender rights through service 
delivery, advocacy and research (See Table 2.0) . In particular, I interviewed the 3 members of 135
two organisations that spearhead CSO involvement the Jamaican justice sector. Formerly named the 
Mediation Council of Jamaica, the DRF was founded in 1994 . It is a private voluntary
 136 137
organization that provides a number of services, including public awareness and training in ADR 
techniques such as arbitration and mediation. As part of these efforts to educate the Jamaican 
 The CEO of Stand Up for Jamaica, Carla Gulotta (Standup Offices, Kgn, 20/1/15), affirmed their 135
involvement focused on project delivery and advocacy for legislative reform. She highlighted a 
number of projects, including rehabilitation in correctional facilities, human rights training for 
correctional officers and the facilitation of education and professional development in prisons. 
 I interviewed Damian Hutchinson, CEO of PMI (PMI Offices, Kgn, 26/2/15), Paul Hines, CEO 136
of DRF (DRF, Kgn, 7/11/14)  as well as Donna Parchment-Brown one of the founders of both PMI 
and DRF (MOJ Offices, Kgn, 03/02/15).
 I chose to highlight DRF and PMI in this thesis because they are two CSOs who work in 137
collaboration with the Jamaican government as part of the justice system. For instance, DRF 
receives some funding from the government (Dispute Resolution Foundation, http://
www.disputeresolutionfoundation.com/). Also, both organizations practice RJ and thus were 
particularly relevant to the development of a national RJ policy.  
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community, DRF has reform programmes that are targeted at youth and family. DRF has established 
18 ‘Peace Centres’ throughout Jamaica, where people can access ADR services (at a cost). In 1999, 
the courts recognised DRF as responsible for mediation services in minor civil and criminal 
disputes and the official consultant for determining appointments of mediators to the court (Fiadjoe, 
2004). Once a matter has been put before the court, judges have the discretion to refer cases to DRF 
for mediation. Once an agreement has been reached, a formal document is returned to the courts for 
approval. If an agreement cannot be made, then the case goes back to the courts.  
 The MNS founded the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) in 2002 (Government of 
Jamaica, 2009). It consists of 12 members from various sectors including religious, academic, 
political communities as well as other CSOs representatives . PMI is the only intervention 138
programme that uses ADR for gang violence (Leslie, 2010). It provides mediation, counselling and 
social development services in over 50 volatile communities that suffer from politically motivated 
acts of violence and gang warfare within the KMA and the wider parish of St. Andrew (Government 
of Jamaica, 2009) . As a result of their focus on volatile communities and gang violence, PMI is 139
more likely to mediate between larger groups, while DRF mediates between individuals. These two 
organisations are particularly relevant to the thesis due to their direct experience with restorative-
oriented practices . 140
 Donna Parchment-Brown was the director of both DRF and PMI until her move to the MOJ as 138
the head of the Justice Reform Implementation Unit (JRIU) at the MOJ.
 After significant success in Kingston, the programme was expanded to include the second city of 139
Jamaica, Montego Bay. 
 Later on, I will argue that their direct involvement was integral to the development and 140
implementation of a national RJ policy that considered the Jamaican context due to their history in 
spearheading the use of these practices in Jamaica. Ultimately I argue that their superficial 
involvement resulted in the creation of a context-insensitive policy that was implemented with 
minimal efficiency.  
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 There is also greater collaboration within the CSO community (James, 2014). The 
assessment of civil society in Jamaica 2014 report cites collaboration as one of the strengths of the 
CSO community (James, 2014). There is increased partnership seen within the CSO community as 
well as collaborations between civil society, state organisations and the private sector. For instance, 
three umbrella organisations were created to accommodate collaboration within the CSO 
community, including the Jamaica Coalition of Civil Society Organisations. Also, the report notes 
the collaboration between JFJ, IJCHR, the Jamaica Bar Association (JBA) and the Opposition (JLP) 
that led to the successful legal challenge of the constitutionality of plans to establish a Caribbean 
Court of Justice (CCJ) (James, 2014). The report notes that the increased collaboration across 
organisations has led to consensus, efficiency and cost-effectiveness (James, 2014). Also, PMI and 
DRF have a partnership, with Donna Parchment-Brown having been instrumental in founding and 
directing both organisations. Some of my interviewees affirmed increased level of collaboration. 
Carla Gulotta from Standup for Jamaica (Standup Offices, Kgn, 20/1/15), Donna Parchment-Brown 
(in her capacity as former CEO of PMI and DRF, MOJ Offices, Kgn, 3/2/15), Joan Wedderburn of 
FES (FES Offices, Kgn, 10/10/14)  and Hermoine Mckenzie from AWOJA (AWOJA Offices, Kgn, 
16/02/15) all spoke to the successful partnerships between CSOs. For instance, Wedderburn (FES 
Offices, Kgn, 10/10/14)  noted a number of partnerships, including leadership and equality training 
with the Caribbean Quality Development Centre, promotion of gender equality with the 51% 
Coalition and lobbying for gender equality alongside the Sistren theatre Collective. Gulotta, of 
Standup for Jamaica highlighted their partnership with JFJ and JFLAG on discrimination and police 
brutality. She (Standup for Jamaica, Kgn, 20/1/15)  stated,  
 “To co-ordinate with other NGOs, we don’t have any problems, we know each other very  
 well, we try to make a way. We have a coalition that meets quarterly to discuss, which   
 emergency to give priority to and who is doing what since there is not so many of us.”  
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 She (FES Offices, Kgn, 10/10/14)   went onto highlight the fact that this collaboration has 
led to increased efficiency by preventing duplication of work,  
 “If I don’t do it, someone will. If there is a problem with police extrajudicial killing, we pass 
 it on to JFJ, if there is a problem with an abused woman, we send them to Women Inc.it is  
 important that each one of us try to get somehow a little bit of specialised”.  
 This collaboration extends to financial support. While the research indicates that lack of 
professional and financial resources remains an issue for CSOs, significant strides have been made 
in developing relationships with donors. For instance, JFJ, the most financially stable CSO in 
Jamaica, has on-going funding relationships with DFID, the European Union, The German 
Embassy and CIDA (James, 2014). In fact, CIDA is responsible for spearheading increased funding 
of civil society. In the 1980s CIDA provided bilateral funding through the UN. In addition, the 
report noted that CSOs have found alternative pathways to funding, such as state funding, strategic 
partnership development with private sector organisations, fundraising events and sponsorship 
programmes (James, 2014) . A number of international NGOs, such as UNICEF have provided 141
funding to enable civil societies to carry out specific activities. My discussion with Carla Gulotta 
from Standup for Jamaica (Standup for. Jamaica office, 201/1/15) highlighted them receiving 
funding from a number of international NGOs to provide training to correctional staff and 
offenders. Rachel Morrison of UNDP (UNDP Offices, 21/1/14) stated that UNDP had provided 
funding to have CSOs deliver victim support to the victims of the Tivoli shoot-out in 2011 during 
the Dudus extradition.  
 However the level of collaboration is not explicitly discussed within the literature. There has 
been increased acknowledgement of the pivotal role that CSOs can play in creating good 
 The Assessment of Civil Society in Jamaica Report (James, 2014) noted that funding from 141
international donor organisations has been historically inconsistent. In my interview Hermoine 
McKenzie, head of AWOJA (AWOJA Offices, 16/2/15), noted lack of resources as one of the main 
obstacles.
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governance (Bowen, 2013). Many of the partnerships noted within the 2014 report are intermittent, 
dedicated to a single activity of advocacy or service delivery. The former Prime Minister, Bruce 
Golding published an article in the Jamaica Gleaner, describing the shift of CSO involvement from 
‘purely representational to participatory’ (http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/commentary/20150510/
civil- society%E2%80%99s-role-governance, accessed July 2018). According to Moloney’s 
Continuum of Collaboration, this statement indicates that the extent of the collaboration between 
organisations is limited to, at best, coordination.  
 In particular, there is little discussion of collaboration in terms of policy development 
(Bowen, 2013; James, 2014). The Assessment of Civil society in Jamaica (James 2014) states that 
there are 4 main approaches that CSOs use to influence policy in Jamaica: collaboration, 
complementary activities, confrontation and consciousness raising. Some level of involvement in 
policy change has been noted. For instance, JFJ is responsible for lobbying for implementation of 
the ‘Administrative Policy re Attendance at Post Mortem Examinations’ (James, 2014). The report 
noted a positive working relationship between GOJ and the Jamaican Youth Advocate Network 
(JYAN); they rated themselves highly in terms of being recognised by the state and cooperating 
with government organisations to effect change (James, 2014). Some organisations, such as IJCHR, 
have influential committee members, which bolster their potential to influence policy.  
 However, much of this collaboration is achieved through complementary activities and 
consciousness-raising. In Bowen’s discussion of the role of Caribbean CSOs in governance, she 
describes civil society involvement in policy development as ‘tangential’ (2013). She noted that 6 of 
23 organisations were involved with policy development, only 3 (13%) of those organisations 
provided evidence that their efforts genuinely influenced policy (Bowen, 2013). There is little done 
in order to ensure that the voice of civil society and their work with affected Jamaican communities 
informs policy development and implementation. For instance, Rachel Morrison the HIV co-
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ordinator of UNDP (UNDP Offices, 21/12/14) noted in our interview, that they have limited 
involvement in justice policy development, despite their on-going role in service delivery.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have discussed significant changes that have taken place within justice 
policymaking landscape of Jamaica. In particular I discuss the shift in relationship between the state 
and international donor stakeholders, where the Jamaican government has proactively sought to 
adopt policy as an opportunity to obtain funding from funders. In addition, I have noted that, as part 
of the need for collaborative governance to develop contextual and effective justice policy, there 
should be increased public consultation. Later on, I argue that one of the reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of public consultations for the national RJ policy was the failure to dispel public 
myths about the nature of crime in Jamaica. As a result, information garnered during public 
consultations could not be useful in the policymaking process because it did not come from a fully 
informed public. Similarly I propose that, despite increased involvement of civil society in the 
justice system, there is still need for more substantive involvement of CSOs in justice policy 
development. I highlight the improved level of collaboration amongst CSOs and with state 
organisations, but propose that this increased collaboration should be extended to their involvement 
in policy development.  
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   Chapter 5: Legal Pluralism and Human Rights  
 In previous chapters, I described the various relationships between the state and the majority 
classes, the local elite, donor countries IFIs and their effect on justice policy. I argued that 
contending with the various group interests has weakened the legitimacy of the justice system. The 
on-going association between both political parties and criminal gangs has created difficulties in 
crime prevention by limiting the types of crime that are addressed and resulted in public mistrust of 
the state. Its dependence on the local elite and multilateral financial institutions for financial 
stability has directed much of the policy prescription in Jamaica; serving the interests of the donor 
states, while having limited success in preventing crime in Jamaica. This historical coercion has led 
to an embedded culture of opportunistic policy transfer for developing states to adopt policies, 
which are consistent with the international trends on crime prevention, in order to take advantage of 
funding opportunities from developed states like the U.S and Canada without any coercion from 
them.  
 In this chapter, I introduce the concept of legal pluralism. Legal pluralism is defined as the 
existence of two or more legal systems within the same social field (Merry, 1988; Berman, 2009; 
ICHRP, 2009). Legal pluralism would argue that Jamaica is pluralistic; in that there are there are 
two informal systems that operate alongside the formal system; the ‘jungle justice’ system of the 
garrisons as well as the Maroon justice system that the independent Maroon communities of 
Jamaica adhere to. I will argue that the legal pluralistic perspective adds to my analysis of the 
inappropriate policy transfer that takes place for RJ in Jamaica. The recognition of de facto pluralist 
context would provide a better basis from which to implement a contextual approach to RJ and 
justice policy generally. Similar to RJ, these systems embrace community driven approaches to 
justice that reconcile issues within a Jamaican context. However, the Jamaican government can also 
learn from their failure to provide outcomes that are consistent with human rights standards. I make 
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the case for using HR as a standard to assess justice in a legally pluralistic jurisdiction. Finally I will 
analyse the systems and their relationship with each other against this standard.  
Legal Pluralism  
 Legal pluralism essentially refers to the existence of multiple legal systems within the same 
jurisdiction. This definition covers a range of instances, from co-existing legal systems within the 
same geographical space to overlapping legal systems within the global community (Berman, 2009; 
ICHRP, 2009). Within this discussion, I will focus on the legal pluralism as it relates to the 
relationship between state and non-state entities operating within the Jamaican jurisdiction.  
 In general, legal pluralism stands in contrast to the notion of ‘legal centralism’, which 
postulates that any given jurisdiction should have uniform laws for all persons, which are 
administered by state institutions solely (Merry, 1988; Woodman, 1998; Jackson, 2006) . 142
Emerging literature now focuses on the interaction between formal and informal systems and their 
capacity to influence each other (Merry, 1988; Woodman, 1998; Berman 2009; Jaffe, 2015). More 
specifically it suggests that formal systems and these normative orderings interact in a way that 
makes them both dependent on and separate from each other (Merry, 1988; Woodman, 1998; 
Berman, 2009). In order to capture the bi-directional nature of their interaction, Moore (1973) 
describes their interaction as part of a ‘semi-autonomous social field’, which is a concept used to 
encompass the various types of interaction within plural legal orders . The semi-autonomous 143
social field is a space that has the capacity for rule making and compliance of those rules, but can be 
affected by the norms and customs of the wider environment.  
 Early work on legal pluralism did not stray far from this centralist ideal, by assuming the 142
dominance of the formal system. 
 Plural legal orders are spaces where varying norms and law govern a specific issue within a 143
particular jusridiction (ICHRP, 2009).
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 In keeping with this concept, the literature acknowledges the variety of interactions between 
the state and non-state entities (Forsyth, 2007; Larcom, 2013) (See Figure 5.0).  
Figure 5.0 Typology of Relationships between the Formal and Informal systems  
 
Accessed Forsyth, 2007.  
 Often thought of as a continuum, the interaction ranges from complete negligence of 
informal systems by the state, formal endorsement or incorporation of the normative order to some 
middle ground of semi-autonomy of the normative order (Kotter, 2015; Tamanaha, 2007; Quane, 
2013). This range of interactions can be further categorised as strong and weak pluralism (Grenfell, 
2013; Merry, 1988; Tamanaha, 2007; Kotter, 2015; Jackson, 2006). Strong legal pluralism is the 
notion that not all law is administered by the state. There is no assumed superiority of systems and 
legal systems can exist without having any formal affiliation (Grenfell, 2013; Merry, 1988; 
Tamanaha, 2007; Kotter, 2015; Jackson, 2006). On the other hand, weak pluralism makes reference 
to the idea that law is only valid when it is recognised by the state in some way (Grenfell, 2013; 
Merry, 1988; Tamanaha, 2007; Kotter, 2015; Jackson, 2006). Within weak pluralism, there is some 
incorporation of non-state law by the state, although it is usually considered to be inferior to state 
law (Kotter, 2015; Jackson, 2006).  
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The Formal Jamaican Justice System  
 Like other post-colonial states, the Jamaican justice system is widely considered to be 
‘centralist’: a number of state institutions enforce established state law uniformly without 
acknowledging the capacity of any other legal system to govern the wider Jamaican public (Merry, 
1988; Woodman, 1998; Wojkowska, 2006). These institutions include the MOJ, the court system, 
police as well as the prison system. The administration of justice falls under the remit of the MOJ 
and the Court Management Services  (CMS) (Slowe & Solomon, 2014; MOJ, http://144
www.moj.gov.jm/, accessed, March 1, 2016). The MOJ has a range of justice related responsibilities 
that aim to encourage adherence to the law, protect the rights of citizens and promote awareness of 
citizen duties, including the improvement of the justice system.  
 Jamaica is a common law jurisdiction. Most British colonies maintained the much of the colonial 144
laws after becoming independent states. As in the British justice system and that of other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, the court structure is based on a hierarchical system of courts that 
have varying gradations of authority, which is highlighted in Chart 5.0 (Elias, 1955; UNDP, 2012; 
Slowe & Solomon, 2014; The Supreme Court of Jamaica, http://www.supremecourt.gov.jm/content/
legal-system, accessed March 1, 2016).  
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 Chart 5.0 Diagram of Court Structure Hierarchy in Jamaica 
 
Informal Systems  
 Legal pluralism is often understood to be a condition of the colonial experience (Merry, 
1988; Woodman, 1998; Zips, 1998; Tamanaha, 2007; Berman, 2009; Jaffe, 2015). Many multi-
cultural post-colonial jurisdictions have developed distinct legal systems in response to the 
imposition of colonial law (Tamanaha, 2007; ICHRP, 2009; Megret, 2013) . In many jurisdictions 145
local law was acceptable only if it was considered to be consistent with the principles of written 
 Early studies noted that it was common practice for imperialist nations to transfer their own legal 145
systems to colonies, which resulted in European law working alongside local law (Merry, 1988; 
Woodman, 1998; Tamanaha, 2007; Berman, 2009). In his discussion on colonial courts, Elias 
(1955) notes that most colonial systems had a ‘two-tier’ judicial system; a centralised British court 
system that applied systemised English law and an indigenous law system (likely to be void of 
formal legal structures and forego consistent application of pre-determined punishment) (Elias, 
1955; Merry, 1988). The formal British system became dominant and sought to restrict the use of 
local law (Elias, 1955; Merry, 1988; Woodman, 1998). 
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colonial law (Merry, 1988; Woodman, 1998; Berman, 2009). Despite its colonial background, there 
is limited literature on legal pluralism within the Caribbean (Jaffe, 2015). In the case of Jamaica, a 
pluralist analysis identifies at least two more justice systems; the Maroon Justice system and the 
Jungle justice system within the garrisons.  
 The development of the Maroon justice systems stands as an example of strong pluralism. 
Consistent with Model 5 (Figure 5.0) this system is formally recognised by the state for the 
administration of justice for a particular group within a defined area, where the process of forming 
rules and compliance to them stems from inherent patterns of social norms (Forsyth, 2007). The 
Maroon justice system is rooted in the cultural norms and social orderings of the Maroon 
community. As an independent system, this system has limited interaction with the state system, but 
does not conflict with its values.  
 The Maroon justice system was created by a group of enslaved Africans as part of their 
independence from the colonial state (Zips 1996; 1998; Besson,1999; Jaffe, 2015). In 1655, during 
the transition from Spanish rule to British colonialism, many enslaved Africans fled to the hills in 
Jamaica in fear of re-enslavement and the genocide of the Arawaks they had witnessed under 
Spanish rule (Zips 1996; 1998; Besson, 1999; Jaffe, 2015). This group of runaway Africans was 
referred to as the Maroons
 
(Jaffe, 2015). Until 1738, the Maroons engaged in a series of 146
rebellions against the British. Unable to penetrate the Maroon communities, the British conceded to 
a Peace treaty in 1739. This enabled the Maroons to live autonomously within the interior lands 
located between Trelawney Town and the cockpits of Jamaica, including Accompong town in the 
parish of St. Elizabeth (see Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.1 Map of Cockpit Country (Maroon Territory)  
 Maroon is a word that is derived from the Spanish word, ‘Cimarron’, which means runaway. 146
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(http://www.thesportsseer.com/2013/08/01/cammack-villlage-the-accompong- town-of-arkansas/, 
accessed March 8, 2016) 
  
 The Maroons became autonomous in 1962 upon Jamaica becoming independent  147
(Golding, 2019). It was agreed that the Maroons should maintain their own leadership and develop 
their own legal and political systems. In exchange for their freedom however, the Maroons agreed 
to act as part of the British military force (Jaffe, 2015). Maroons were given the liberty to manage 
 Subsequently, the Jamaican government has further acknowledged these rights under the UN 147
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), including the "right to maintain and 
strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions." It also states the 
"right for self-government in matters relating to local affairs," as well as "ways and means for 
financing autonomous functions”. (UN, 2007). Also, The International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries was 
adopted on 27 June 1989, entered into force on 5 September 1991). 
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their own conflicts. However, all conflicts that involved a British person were to be handled by the 
formal courts.  
 More recently, there has been an emergence of informal systems created by non-state 
governmental groups, such as criminal organisations, as seen with the jungle justice systems of the 
garrisons (Roseveare, 2013; Jaffe, 2015). Typically, these non-state legal orders are examples of 
weak pluralism. They are not formally recognised by the state and operate parallel with the formal 
justice system (Roseveara, 2013; Jaffe, 2015). Similar to other post-colonial states, Jamaica 
continues to suffer from weak state law that fails to provide effective avenues of justice, which has 
a particular effect on the rights of the majority classes, who are more affected my crime (Merry, 
1988; Tamanaha, 2007; Berman, 2009; Megret, 2013). In weak states, the government and public 
are less inclined to abide by formal law (Tamanaha, 2011). In response to this ineffective form of 
justice and subsequent mistrust of the system, Jamaica has seen the development of informal justice 
systems. These informal systems, often referred to as non-state legal orders, are popular amongst 
those who are unable to access justice through the formal system (ICHRP, 2009; Megret, 2013; 
Kotter, 2015).  
 The jungle justice system is considered to be a type of hybrid state that has emerged, in part, 
from the formal system and its failure to administer justice effectively. These ‘hybrid states’, share 
authority and legitimacy between the formal and informal, overlap in responsibilities and influence 
each other (Jaffe, 2015). Like many other developing states, an informal justice system has 
developed in response to the inadequacy of the state to address crime in Jamaica, particularly those 
unrelated to organized crime and political violence (Sives, 2002; Levy, 2012; Charles & Beckford, 
2012; Quane, 2013; Kotter, 2015).  
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 This failure to address crime by the formal justice system had a disproportionate effect on 
individuals living within inner-city communities in Kingston and rural communities across Jamaica. 
In response, an informal justice system, referred to as ‘jungle justice’ has developed within the 
garrisons. I have noted the economic downturn in Jamaica of the 1970s and the newfound wealth of 
dons, which enabled them to take on state-like functions, including justice (Charles 2002; Johnson 
& Soeters, 2008; Charles & Beckford 2012; Thomas, 2013; Blake 2013). Dons, who had become 
feared leaders within the garrisons, were natural candidates to lead the emergence of an informal 
justice system, referred to as ‘jungle justice’, to address the increasing domestic crime that was 
taking place within garrisons, which the state neglected (Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Jaffe, 2012; 
Charles & Beckford, 2012; Sives, 2012; Jaffe, 2015).  
 This relationship is consistent with formal independence between the two systems (Model 
2). Forsyth’s typology (2007) (Figure 5.0) denotes that there is no formal recognition given to the 
non-state system, but simply ignores its handling of disputes and in fact, unofficially supports the 
capacity of the non-state system to address crime. As will be discussed, the state and the jungle 
justice system interact often, as the state is often dependent on dons to reconcile crime within the 
garrisons.  
Human Rights  
 Human rights are defined as, ‘rights, not benefits, duties, privileges or some other perhaps 
related practice’ that individuals are entitled to due to their status as human beings or ‘deriving from 
the inherent dignity of the human person’ (Donnelly, 1982). The universal aim of HR is to provide 
protection for all individuals against the power of the state in order to ensure that people have the 
liberty to develop some of the capacities that they need to lead autonomous lives and participate in 
democratic politics.  
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 One might ask why HR law is accepted as an authority on justice and how the state treats its 
citizens in general. First, HR law seems to be respected by a majority of jurisdictions in spite of 
social, cultural and political differences (Franck, 2001; ICHRP, 2009; Bendana & Chopra, 2013). 
This transnational nature of international HR standards is signified by the widespread ratification of 
HR treaties. Regardless of their compliance, 167 countries have ratified the International Covenant 
of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which protects some of the most fundamental HR, such as 
the right to life and liberty (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2012) .  148
 HR standards provide justification for individuals to not violate each other’s rights. Within a 
HR framework, crime is viewed as a failure of individuals or officials to demonstrate equal respect 
for another by inflicting some harm (Griffin, 2008; Boonin, 2008). HR instruments are based on the 
principle that all individuals have a certain set of shared vulnerabilities and potential for 
development as humans (Donnelly, 1982; Brown & Wilkie, 2002; Alston et al, 2008). Human 
beings should respect each other in virtue of these shared characteristics. HR law sees proportionate 
punishment as a way of responding to the failure to demonstrate equal respect (Griffin, 2004; Smit 
& Ashworth, 2004; Griffin, 2008; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2009; Penal Reform International, 2010). 
Equal respect is not only an attitude between individuals; it is the attitude that should be embraced 
in the administration of justice, as long as it does not compromise the well being of the majority 
(Nussbaum, 1996; Griffin, 2008; Webster, 2010).  
 What kind of approach does HR law recommend in the administration of justice? The HR 
approach to punishment strikes a balance between protecting the offender, addressing the needs of 
the victim and protecting the wider community (Griffin, 2004; Smit & Ashworth, 2004; Griffin, 
2008; Perlin & Dlugacz, 2009; Penal Reform International, 2010). When a crime has been 
committed, the victim(s) seeks to address the violation against their dignity. HR acts as a guide to 
 Jamaica has ratified 21 UN treaties (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2012). 148
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ensuring that the victims’ needs are addressed. The UN’s Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power identifies a range of activities that should be offered to the victim 
including: (i) the provision of supportive services, (ii) the provision of recourse, (iii) restitution and, 
(iv) prompt access to justice by way of opportunities for redress through formal and informal 
procedures (United Nations, 1985). The Basic Principles highlights the importance of incorporating 
the victim into the justice process, as a way of ensuring that their needs can be addressed adequately 
(United Nations, 1985). Evidence across jurisdictions indicates that when these needs are addressed, 
victims are more satisfied with the justice process (Van Wormer, 2009; Cattaneo & Goodman, 2009; 
Ptacek, 2009; Julich, 2010).  
 HR protect the rights of offenders, by setting minimum standards of humane imprisonment, 
including measures for facilitating an offender’s return to society. Punishment should facilitate 
offenders’ recognition of the harmful behaviour as well as encourage a good relationship with the 
community. If offenders were not held accountable, the harm caused would remain unaddressed, 
demonstrating a lack of respect for the victim’s dignity as well as their own. Ultimately the 
identification of offenders as responsible agents that are equal to their peers would be neglected 
(Miethe & Lu, 2005). However, HR instruments recognize that the general treatment of offenders 
from arrest to release should result in some positive behavioural change. The Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners states that the overall aim of punishing offenders is their 
successful reintegration into the society after incarceration, and detail the way in which this should 
be done (United Nations, 1955). In addition, the Standard Minimum Rules proposes that by holding 
offenders accountable in a way that allows them to maintain a life as close to liberty as possible, 
they are less likely to reoffend. This reduces further risk to the public (United Nations, 1955). While 
offenders must be held responsible for the failure to demonstrate equal respect to others, they also 
must learn how to handle the responsibilities that accompany normal life. This may be achieved 
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through respecting the rights of offenders, particularly those that promote the individual 
responsibility (Penal Reform International, 2010; United Nations, 2006). Many jurisdictions that 
adopt this approach to holding offenders accountable have been successful in crime prevention 
(Uggen, 2000; Walker & Clark, 2007; Uggen & Staff, 2001; Svankvist & Nylen, 2009).  
 The HR framework recognises a role for the wider community in the administration of 
justice (Maletzky & Steinhauser, 2002; Twenge et al. 2007; Jacobson, Phillips & Edgar, 2010; 
Grimwood & Bermann, 2012). It acknowledges the interconnectedness of humanity by indicating 
that all have a responsibility to address harm. Principle 4 (b) in the Principles of Justice for Victims 
of Crime and Abuse of Power calls upon states to,  
 ‘promote community efforts and public participation in crime prevention. Both the Basic   
 Principles of Justice for Victims and the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal  
 Aid in Criminal Justice call upon the community to provide various forms of assistance to  
 victims including material, psychological and medical support’ (United Nations, 1985;   
 2012).  
 Community involvement serves as a way of bringing awareness to the community regarding 
the underlying factors that contribute to crime as well. Their interaction with offenders through 
reintegration programmes, for instance, should help to dispel stereotypes and uninformed feelings 
of vengeance against offenders (Braithwaite, 2002; Murphy 2003; Harriott, 2009). In turn, if an 
offender realises that his community will support him, an appreciation for respecting the rights of 
others in order to retain respect for their own rights should develop (Ward et al. 2007).  
 Most justice systems and HR standards share the overall aim of preventing crime and 
acknowledging harm by holding the wrongdoer accountable (McGregor, 2001; Griffin, 2008; Penal 
Reform International, 2010). What the HR approach might prove useful for is helping to establish 
guidelines as to how harm should be addressed, how the wrongdoer will be reintegrated into the 
community successfully and how the community might be involved through both formal and 
informal systems. Within formal systems, HR may help to limit the potential for oppressive state 
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structures to impose inhumane punishment, neglect victims’ needs and exclude the community. As 
for informal systems, HR instruments could provide the necessary guidelines for implementing 
check and balances that ensure that practices are enforceable, do not impose inhumane punishment 
and limit susceptibility to bias and corruption.  
Human Rights and Legal Pluralism  
 There is limited academic discussion of HR and pluralism (Provost & Sheppard, 2013). 
However, there is increasing acknowledgement of legal pluralism by HR can be seen (Tamanaha, 
2007; ICHRP, 2009; Quane, 2013). Since 2002, the UN has formally acknowledged the role of 
informal systems in improving access to justice (Grenfell, 2013). Some HR instruments such as the 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, as well as the 
ICCPR have acknowledged informal procedures as a valid pathway to justice (Dexter & 
Ntahombaye, 2005; Wojkowska, 2006; Danish Institute of HR, 2012). The 2007 Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
calls for the respect the right of these groups to self-government 149
and maintenance of their judicial systems (United Nations, 2007; ICHRP, 2009; Quane, 2013). 
Also, regional documents such as the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 
emphasize the value of traditional courts to the administration of justice (ICHRP, 2009).  
 HR has developed a view of legal pluralism that embraces the benefits of informal justice as 
an additional pathway to justice, as long as fundamental HR are not violated (Tamanaha, 2007; 
ICHRP, 2009; Picq, 2012 Bendana & Chopra, 2013; Quane, 2013). This approach to legal pluralism 
is both encouraging and limiting (ICHRP, 2009; Quane, 2013; Provost & Sheppard, 2013). HR 
values informal systems and their ability to increase access to effective justice, particularly in 
jurisdictions where the formal system has limited resources and weak state law. However, they limit 
 This is a non-binding standard (ICHRP, 2009). 149
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the operations of informal systems as well, where there is potential for violation of fundamental HR 
of individuals (ICHRP, 2009; Picq, 2012; Grenfell, 2013; Quane, 2013; Bendana & Chopra, 2013).  
 I propose that the literature on HR and pluralism advocates a type of weak pluralism 
(Tamanaha, 2007; ICHRP, 2009; Quane, 2012; Megret, 2013; Grenfell, 2013). More specifically, it 
encourages the recognition of informal systems as long as those systems do not interfere with the 
wider public interest. The state should recognise informal systems in their ability to uphold the rule 
of law by allowing groups to be responsible for the administration of justice. Ideally, informal 
systems should not oppose the state and value the support that states can provide in terms of 
enforcement and monitoring and supervision (Tamanaha, 2007; ICHRP, 2009; Quane, 2012; 
Megret, 2013; Grenfell, 2013).  
 In keeping with this approach, the literature indicates that informal systems should be (i) 
voluntary: (ii) driven by the community, (iii) consistent with HR, and (iv) under the supervision of 
the state (ICHRP, 2009; Chopra & Isser, 2012; Grenfell, 2013; Megret, 2013; Quane, 2013). There 
are concerns from legal pluralists that the imposition of external legal systems neglects cultural 
difference and group rights that do not conform with those of the state (ICHRP, 2009; Provost & 
Sheppard, 2013; Quane, 2013). This can be seen in the case of colonialism and the incorporation of 
British common law in post-colonial states, which did not consider the cultural and social context of 
an independent Jamaica. Also, states may use informal systems to reinforce their own laws (Chopra 
& Isser, 2012; Picq, 2012). Therefore, instead of making informal systems subject to state law, 
which might reinforce prejudiced social and cultural norms that affect both systems, international 
HR must be the measure against which these informal practices are benchmarked.  
 Normative orders are valued because of their contextual, flexible nature and cultural 
familiarity (Buscaglia & Stephan, 2005; Wojkowska, 2006; Quane, 2012; Megret, 2013; Grenfell, 
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2013; Kotter, 2015). In order to maintain these benefits, their practices must continue to be shaped 
primarily by the people who use them. If communities are no longer the source of law practiced 
within these informal systems, the notion of and benefits attached to legal pluralism are invalidated. 
These systems should be recognised and work in conjunction with the state, rather than working in 
opposition of it. In this chapter I have suggested that a HR perspective on legal pluralism allows for 
both informal and formal systems to work together towards a shared goal of public protection and 
equal access to justice.  
 Having established HR standards as a normative framework to assess justice systems, I will 
now assess the range of systems outlined in the previous chapter. Similar to other developing states, 
the Jamaican justice system is ineffective in its ability to uphold the rule of law, including access to 
justice, providing equality before the law, due process and accountability (Wojkowska, 2006; 
Tamanaha, 2007; Chopra & Isser, 2012; Picq, 2012; Bendana & Chopra, 2013). Identifying the 
issues that plague the formal system will shed light on the underlying issues that should be 
addressed. More specifically, by working with gang leaders and Maroons the Jamaican government 
would have worked towards developing a ‘domesticated’ national RJ policy that considers the 
political, social and economic context of the jurisdiction. Dons would have provided insight as to 
the interests of Jamaican citizens who typically fail to gain access to the formal justice system. Also, 
the visible support of trusted leaders within the community might have had a positive effect on the 
perception of RJ as a state run programme, given the level of public mistrust for the state.  
Human Rights Assessment of Jamaican Formal System  
Access to Justice  
 One of the most fundamental expectations of a formal justice system is prompt access 
(Galanter, 1981; Buscaglia & Stephan, 2005; Wojkowska, 2006). As discussed a number of HR 
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standards demand prompt and affordable legal representation and access to courts (United Nations, 
1966). However, there are a number of practical issues that contribute to the consistent 
inaccessibility of the formal justice system in Jamaica, such as the increasing case backlog, its 
physical inaccessibility as well as associated expenses (Buscaglia & Stephan, 2005; Wojkowska, 
2006; Norwegian Council, 2009; UNDP, 2012). The Jamaican government has identified lack of 
access as one of the main issues facing the justice system (ESSJ, 2012; Moncrieffe, 2014; James, 
2014). In 2012, 1213 cases were carried forward. In addition to the 341 new cases, only 20.7% of 
cases were settled (Moncrieffe, 2014). In 2013, the Public Defender’s office close 10% of the total 
complaints filed (312) and had 282 cases pending with an estimated 1,000 new cases to be handled 
in 2014 (Harriott & Jones, 2016). A number of factors contribute to this severe backlog, including a 
lack of professional and financial resources, poor investigation and limited modernisation of the 
courts (Rowat, Malik & Dakolias, 1996; UNDP, 2012; Moncrieffe, 2014). In the case of sexual 
offences, several delays were due to the high cost of processing rape kits
 
In 2013, there were 921 150
rape kits that were waiting to be analysed (Jamaica Gleaner, http://jamaica- gleaner.com/power/
49601, accessed March, 25, 2016). Some of my interviews with members of the judiciary confirmed 
this issue. During my interview with the Senior Puisne
 
Judge , Justice Marva McIntosh (DPP 151
 The cost of analysis per rape kit is between 200 and 250 US dollars (Jamaica, Gleaner, http://150
jamaica-gleaner.com/power/49601, accessed March 25, 2016).
 This is a term from English common Law that refers to any judge that is not a chief judge.151
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Offices, Kgn, 28/11/14), she noted that some of the biggest contributors to backlog were the lack of 
professional and financial resources and the failure of police to ensure the safety of witnesses .  152
Bias and Corruption  
 Those who have the financial means and time to access the Jamaican justice system might 
still face issues of bias and corruption. The lack of impartiality and illegal conduct of legal 
authorities is in direct contravention of international standards embedded in the ICCPR, the 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and the Abuse of Power and the 
Basic Principles on the Independent Initiative (CSI) (Government of Jamaica, 2009). In addition, 
international not-for-profit organizations such as UNICEF were involved heavily with the provision 
of training and general violence prevention efforts (Leslie, 2010). Article 14 of the ICCPR seeks to 
ensure the equality of all persons who should go before an impartial judicial system (United 
Nations, 1966). In addition, The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials expressly 
prohibits the police from engaging in any corrupt
 
activities (United Nations, 1979).  153
 Issues of corruption affect the ability of citizens to access effective justice in Jamaica. While 
the Jamaican judiciary has a reputation of honesty and professionalism, there is evidence of 
corruption within law enforcement (Levy & Spiller, 1994; Golding 2012, UNDP, 2012). 
Unfortunately the JCF has become an extension of the political system, which delegitimises the 
 Many Jamaicans cannot afford to access the justice system, as legal representation can be 152
expensive. While legal aid is available through the Kingston Legal Aid Clinic (KLAC), it is too 
understaffed to meet the needs of the Jamaican population. Also, legal aid in Jamaica is not free. In 
fact KLAC is dependent almost exclusively on client fees for the sustainability of the organization 
(MOJ, http://www.moj.gov.jm/legal-aid-clinic, accessed May 25, 2016). In 2012, legal aid 
representation accounted for 2163 persons only (Moncrieffe, 2014). This limited capacity results in 
limited use of the legal aid system.
 According to this Code of Conduct, corruption is defined as ‘any commission or omission of an 153
act in the performance of or in connection with one’s duties, in response to gifts, promises or 
incentives demanded or accepted, or the wrongful receipt of these once the act has been committed 
or omitted (United Nations, 1979).
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formal legal system further. There are 3 predominant policing styles that law enforcement agencies 
embrace typically (Zhao, 2005; Hawdon, 2007; Harriott, 2007) . In Jamaica, the watchman style 154
of the JCF places emphasis on creating social order, rather than crime reduction (Harriott, 1997; 
2007; Headley, 2002; Jamaica Constabulary Force, https://www.jcf.gov.jm/about-us/history, 
accessed September 20, 2017). In emphasising the maintenance of order, there is a large amount of 
discretion granted to individual officers. Usually, this results in officers being willing to violate laws 
if they believe that it will maintain order and reduce resistance from citizens. I will now describe 
some of the predominant characteristics of the JCF, which include: (i) loyalty to power, (ii) work 
avoidance, and (iii) indiscriminate use of violence (Harriott, 1997; 2000; 2007).  
 Consistent with the watchman policing style, the JCF values maintenance of social order 
over the protection of citizens’ rights. JCF demonstrates a focus on maintaining political order, 
where primacy is given to preservation of power of the state (Harriott, 1997; 2000; 2007; Headley, 
2002; Robotham, 2003). As a result, controlling the public and maintaining order within 
communities have become secondary functions. This emphasis on state protection is highlighted by 
the relevant Jamaican legislation on law enforcement, which uses legislation to maintain an 
authoritarian approach to governance by limiting citizen political involvement . There is evidence 155
to suggest that JCF officers respond to dons’ orders as well (Harriott, 1997; Headley, 2002; 
 The legalistic approach emphasises upholding the principles of law and protocols that follow. 154
The actions of officers are based on the idea that laws should be applied universally without taking 
into consideration the varying situations across communities and groups (Hawdon, 2007; Harriott, 
2007). As a result, individual officers exercise discretion rarely; almost everything is done ‘by the 
book’. On the other hand, the service style of policing focuses on protecting its citizens. It demands 
that law enforcement treats all citizens’ requests equally. As a result, their strategies are designed to 
build a sense of trust within the society by gaining an understanding of the social norms within the 
various communities. Unlike legalistic, service policing focuses on problem solving. Agencies that 
embrace this policing style are willing to incorporate non-traditional approaches such as community 
policing and alternatives to incarceration in order to gain resolution (Harriott, 2007; Hawdon, 
2007). 
 For instance, the 1857 Riot Act imposes a sentence of life imprisonment for any group of 12 155
persons or more that seek to disturb the peace, thereby limiting the capacity for political protest.
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Robotham, 2003). Members of the JCF have been implicated in the drug trade through their ties 
with corrupt politicians and gangs alike in exchange for promotions or other personal benefits 
(Harriott, 1997; 2002; Headley, 2002; Acosta, 2005; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Jaffe, 2013) . 156
 As a result, the literature notes a failure of the JCF to carry out their work efficiently, 
including decreased mobilisation, active discouragement of citizens to make reports and 
mistreatment of those that do, as well as the complete neglect of certain crimes altogether (Amnesty 
International, 2006; Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Gaskins, 2008; Charles & Beckford, 2012). Crimes 
such as rape and murder are not properly addressed (Charles & Beckford, 2002; Headley, 2002; 
Amnesty International, 2006; Harriott, 2007; Sives, 2012). Data from the Economic and Social 
Survey of Jamaica stated that between 1999 and 2008, the JCF, cleared half of the cases of carnal 
abuse and rape only. In 2008, 49% of the police investigations were closed without conviction 
(Blake, 2013) . In 2011 there were 23 convictions of rape versus 41 acquittals in rural circuit 157
courts in Jamaica (The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, 2014). However, within that 
year there were 2,671 reported cases of rape (Jamaica Observer, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/
columns/When-rape-becomes- common_12667494, accessed March 25, 2016). This demonstrates 
 In 2011, 137 officers were denied reenlistment because of allegations of corruption (UNDP, 156
2012). Some of my interviews reiterated the corrupt nature of the police force. The 2012 JNCVS 
report indicated that 57.3% of participants felt that police corruption was a significant problem in 
Jamaica. In addition, 56% of those Jamaicans felt that corrupt individuals were not likely to be 
punished for their behaviour, indicating the perceived lack of accountability for corrupt behaviour 
(Bourne, 2010). In her interview, Nancy Anderson (attorney, NMLS, 1/12/2014) recounted 
instances of police officers creating false witness statements to achieve a conviction in court. Judith 
Wedderburn (Director, FES offices, Kgn, 10/10/2014) also highlighted the failure of police officers 
to adequately investigate allegations of sexual violence. She noted that there is a lack of due 
diligence in cases, where officers will encourage the complainant to drop the case or not show up 
for a court hearing.
 Anecdotal evidence indicated that women are at risk of further harm from the police by way of 157
sexual victimisation. There was unresolved investigation into a case where a woman who, upon 
reporting her victimisation to the police was then raped by 3 police officers at the station. 
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limited effort and efficiency, as much of law enforcement is carried out by a small number of 
officers.  
 When crime is addressed, it is often by excessive use of force, which puts Jamaicans at risk. 
Watchman style policing achieves control by targeting and subjecting marginalised populations to 
aggressive techniques indiscriminately (Harriott, 2007; Hawdon, 2007). It is assumed that the 
watchman style of policing will induce law-abiding, conforming behaviour in inner-city 
communities that are assumed to be inherently lawless (Harriott, 2007). Instead, the discretion 
granted to law enforcement results in little respect for legal protocol and the needs of citizens 
(Harriott, 2007; Hawdon, 2007). Law enforcement agencies are able to ignore the principles of law 
and citizens’ rights, resorting to military-like tactics that lend themselves to aggression and control. 
In keeping with the watchman style, the JCF has a long-standing history of indiscriminate use of 
aggressive, violent tactics, justified as a necessary response to increasing levels of violence .  158
Lack of Contextual Legislation  
 Another contributing factor to ineffective justice that is common within developing 
countries is the failure of state legislation to reflect the realities and cultures of the individuals who 
seek redress. Much of the literature on the development of legislation in developing countries 
 There have been consistent reports of the police involvement in vigilante killings (Allen, 1997; 158
Harriott, 1997; Charles, 2002; Headley, 2002; Harriott, 2003; Fearon & Latin, 2006). In 2001 the 
police admitted their role in at least 135 extra-judicial killings (Headley, 2002). In 2012, only 19 of 
the 267 officers that were charged with civilian abuses were convicted (Moncrieffe, 2014). There 
have been a number of Commissions of Inquiry held in order to investigate the behaviour of the 
JCF and their use of excessive force. However they only serve to underscore the lack of 
accountability, as they usually find no fault with the use of force by the police or any other state-led 
action (Headley, 2002; Amnesty International, 2003; Jones, 2010). For instance, in 2001, 28 people 
died and 60 injured in an operation led by Reneto Adams, a police commissioner with the aim of 
seizing illegal weapons in Tivoli Gardens (JLP stronghold). The forensic report and testimony from 
members of the JCF that testified during the subsequent Commission of Enquiry indicated that the 
police were shooting randomly with no specific targets, nor was there any intelligence that pointed 
to specific individuals being in possession of weapons (Amnesty International, 2000). However, the 
commission found that no one was responsible for the 28 persons who died at the hands of the JCF. 
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highlights the common use of a ‘top-down’ approach in law-making, which does not protect citizens 
from the context-specific risks faced (Buscaglia & Stephan, 2005; Rachlinski, 2006; Tully, 2007). 
The top-down approach creates general principles that are often abstract in nature and applies them 
through a centralised authority for individual cases (Rachlinski, 2006). This is contrast to the 
bottom-up approach of HR standards, where individual situations contribute to the development of 
general principles (Rachlinski, 2006).  
 The failure of legislation to address the realities of Jamaicans is demonstrated through the 
2009 SOA. According to the literature on sexual violence within the region, gender bias is one of 
the main issues that criminal justice system in Jamaica and other Caribbean islands face (Foglesong 
& Stone, 2007; Darby, 2009; United Nations Development Programme, 2012; Greenberg & 
Agozino, 2012; James, 2014). As mentioned, women are entitled to treatment before the law that is 
equal to men. However stereotypes surrounding sexual violence have a significant effect on the 
handling of sexual offences by the justice system.  
 First, most of the legislation is gender specific. While it is true that females are the main 
victims of sexual violence and males are typically the perpetrators, this does not obliterate the fact 
that there are other forms of rape that go beyond the male-female pattern (Rumney, 2008). The 
definition of rape as non-consensual heterosexual intercourse leaves female victims victimised by 
same sex offenders without recourse and male victims without the same level of protection, since 
non-consensual anal and oral penetration carry a lesser penalty. This definition carries the parochial, 
sexist values of the past despite evidence indicating the prevalence of male victimisation (http://
www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/more-men-than-women-killed-in- domestic-violence-montague- 
reveals_108693?profile=1338&template=MobileArticle, accessed, September 29, 2017). Currently, 
the marital rape law in the 2009 SOA states that a man can be accused of raping his wife only under 
circumstances relating to the male having an STD or the marriage being in the process of 
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dissolution, thereby limiting the access to justice for women who are being victimised by their 
spouses.  
Inhumane Treatment of Prisoners  
 In Chapter 3, I mentioned the severe punishment of offenders. In addition to lengthy 
incarceration, they are subject to inhumane treatment that violates a range of HR. These issues 
violate a range of HR principles, as stated within the ICCPR and the Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners. While incarceration may not be inherently harsh, Jamaica’s legislation is 
severe in that it imposes lengthy sentencing periods without distinction in terms of severity of harm 
(Green, 1976; Lange & Dawson, 2009; Newton, 2011; Paton, 2004; Dalby, 2011; Newton, 2011; 
Dalby 2014) . 159
 These lengthy periods of incarceration are compounded by poor physical conditions and 
lack of access to psychological and medical treatment (Morris, 2008; Robottom; 2011; Taylor, 
Chauhan, Fondacaro, 2012; Roach- Spence; Greenberg & Agozino, 2012; Rodríguez-Díaz & 
Andrinopoulos, 2012). There have been consistent reports of inhumane living conditions for 
prisoners in Jamaica, including a lack of medical treatment and unwarranted physical violence 
despite their commitment to international standards (Country Report on HR Practices, 2001; 
Amnesty International, 2006; UNDP, 2012; Robottom, 2011). In 2007, it was reported that all 12 
prisons in Jamaica were beyond 100% of their capacity (UNDP, 2012; Roach-Spencer, 2012) . 160
 For instance, the 2009 SOA states that life imprisonment is a possible punishment for a range of 159
sexual offences, including rape, grievous sexual assault and incest without consideration for the 
disparity in harm caused. Also, the 2009 SOA embraces the use of lengthy mandatory minimum 
sentencing, which is legislation that binds courts to impose a minimum period of incarceration for 
the punishment of crimes, thereby limiting the discretion of the judiciary and making punishment 
certain (Tonry, 2005). Section 6 (1) (a) of the 2009 SOA imposes a minimum mandatory sentence of 
15 years for rape when tried in Circuit Court. 
 In 2011, the Tower Street Correctional Facility was housing twice its official capacity 160
(Robottom, 2011). Tower Street has a capacity of 900, but generally houses 1663 inmates.
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Often overcrowding in prisons and poor conditions leads to health issues, psychological issues and 
death (Drago, Galbiati & Vertova, 2011). The treatment of offenders is not only out of line with HR, 
but it is also ineffective in reducing crime and protecting the community .There are limited efforts 161
to reform the offender. (UNDP, 2012; Moncrieffe, 2014; James, 2014). Many of the principles 
within the Minimum Standard Rules recommend the use of rehabilitation, which states that 
rehabilitation should be individualised, accessible consistently to all inmates in order to prepare him 
for reintegration into society (United Nations, 1955) .  162
Dissatisfaction with the Justice System  
 These factors hamper the administration of justice within the Jamaican justice system and 
result in a failure to convict individuals altogether. This leads to a lack of justice for the victims and 
protection for the wider public. Ultimately these issues tend to diminish public trust in the formal 
justice system and the rule of law generally (Tamanaha, 2001; Wojkowska, 2006; Norwegian 
Council, 2009; UNDP, 2012). Evidence indicates that public opinion of the justice system has 
continued to decline (Sives, 2002; JNCVS, 2012; UNDP, 2012). The 2012 JNCVS report indicated 
 The literature that examines correlations between prison conditions and recidivism indicates that 161
these harsh conditions and mistreatment increase the likelihood for reoffending (Chen & Shapiro, 
2007; Drago, Galbiati & Vertova, 2011; Grimwood and Berman, 2012). Although there is limited 
research on the effect of incarceration and prison conditions in Jamaica, one might infer its 
ineffectiveness in reforming prisoners from the consistently high reoffending rates. The DCS 
reported consistently high reoffending rates across prisoners during the 1990s, ranging from 25% to 
48% (Taylor, Chauhan & Fondacaro, 2012). In particular, in 1993 there was a spike of 54% in 
offender recidivism (Taylor, Chauhan & Fondacaro, 2012). 
 Admittedly, Jamaica has attempted to introduce some form of rehabilitation in prisons (Jones, 162
2007; UNDP, 2012; James, 2014). Most recently, the MNS received sponsorship from a civil 
society organization to implement a ‘Chess in Prison’ Programme. Like other Caribbean countries, 
lack of capacity and the tendency to maintain the traditional approach to being ‘tough on crime’, 
means that there is limited and generalised use of these approaches. While the reports from this 
programme were positive, only 16 inmates were able to access the programme for 4 weeks (http://
www.loopjamaica.com/content/tower-street-inmates-benefit-chess-prison-programme, accessed 
April 1, 2016). In addition, the 2014 Auditor General’s report indicated an absence of rehabilitation 
programmes for sex offenders altogether. 
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that only 15.5% of Jamaicans think that the courts are doing a good job. Only 17% think that the 
justice system provides a fair trial for victims. In addition, only 12.8% of Jamaicans think that 
corrections are doing a good job of reforming offenders.  
Assessment of Informal Systems  
 I will now use HR standards to assess informal justice systems in Jamaica. These systems 
have a number of benefits that are consistent with similar systems in other jurisdictions, particularly 
those that suffer from weak state law and public mistrust of the state, including accessibility to 
justice, contextual assessment of disputes and cultural familiarity (Wojkowska, 2006; ICHRP, 2009 
Chopra & Isser, 2012; Picq, 2012; Bendana & Chopra, 2013; Megret, 2013).  
Strengths of the Jungle Justice System  
 As noted by Forsyth’s typology, each of the systems has advantages based on their 
relationship with the state. Despite the fact that this system is marred by a number of issues (which I 
will discuss later on), many garrison constituents find jungle justice to be a swift, accessible form of 
justice (Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Blake, 2012; Jaffe, 2012; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Scott, 
2014). Jungle justice permits garrison constituents to access justice within their own communities 
(Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Blake, 2012). The dons and defence crews, 
who administer justice, are accessible to community members, since they live in the same 
geographical space. It is reported that justice can be attained within a few hours or days after the 
crime has been committed within the garrisons (Charles & Beckford, 2012). Since individuals are 
well known to each other, information about the crime can be collected quickly and background 
information about the people involved considered by the don.  
 Also, the jungle justice system operates within the same cultural boundaries as the formal 
Jamaican justice system, which demonstrates the potential for informal and formal justice systems 
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to work in conjunction with each other. ‘Jungle justice’, bears some resemblance to the formal 
justice system (Johnson 2006; Galvin, 2011; Blake, 2012; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Jaffe, 2015). 
When a dispute takes place, the complainant (a garrison community member) will make a report to 
the don, who acts as a judge in these informal proceedings. The don is responsible for determining 
guilt and dispensing punishment accordingly. Similar to police efforts, once a complaint is made, 
the don will coordinate an investigation, which might include speaking to the victim, the wrongdoer 
and other potential witnesses to the crime (Blake, 2012). Anecdotal evidence indicates that a 
hearing takes place within a space that acts as a makeshift courtroom, where the don sometimes 
employs a jury, which is comprised of higher-ranked gang members .  163
 As in the state-operated formal justice system, a severe approach is taken to punishment that 
is meant to deter offenders from committing crimes in the future. It is the fear of severe punishment 
or loss of financial assistance that deter persons from committing crimes that are not sanctioned by 
the don (Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Jaffe, 2012; 2015; Sives, 2012; Blake, 2013). While participation 
in drug trafficking might be allowed, the don bans any crime that is not sanctioned by him. These 
crimes include rape and other forms of violence against women, theft, assault, and arson (Johnson 
& Soeters, 2008; Jaffe, 2012; 2015; Sives, 2012; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Blake, 2013). Although 
it is not applied to any specific crime necessarily, there is certainly evidence that incarceration is a 
form of punishment that is used within jungle justice (Leslie, 2010; Galvin, 2011; Jaffe, 2012; 2015; 
Sives, 2012; Blake, 2013) . Also, there is some evidence that dons embrace the use of mediation 164
 However the don may take on the role of both judge and jury (Blake, 2012). 163
 There is no set code of practice that allocates a certain punishment to a specific crime, giving the 164
don complete discretion in dispensing punishment. Fowl coops, where chickens are reared and 
housed, act as a type of prison for offenders within the garrison. Persons awaiting conviction, or 
detainees, may be placed in these ‘cells’ as well. Dependent on the severity of the crime, offenders 
may be denied food or water for specific intervals (Galvin, 2011). Other forms of punishment 
include non-fatal shootings, beatings and the death penalty (Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Jaffe, 2012; 
2015; Sives, 2012; Blake, 2013). 
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and financial restitution for less serious crimes such as an inability to repay personal loans (Charles 
& Beckford, 2012).  
 As a result of the close links between the state and the jungle justice system, dons assist in 
the administration of justice (Forsyth, 2007). In states with weak legal institutions, it is common for 
informal systems to become the more dominant form of justice (Merry, 1988; ICHRP, 2009; 
Berman, 2009). In Jamaica, the JCF and political parties are dependent on the ability of the don to 
control violence within the garrisons (Allen, 1993; Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Charles & Beckford, 
2010; Jaffe, 2013). The JCF sub-contract matters of law enforcement to dons. Often, the police 
would be aware of a situation and go directly to the don to resolve the situation rather than 
investigating it themselves. In 1999, when the police were unable to quell the rioting that took place 
in response to a surge in gas prices, the police requested for the gang leaders from various inner-city 
communities to come together to stop the violence (Johnson, 2005; Jaffe, 2015). In 2002, after a 
series of violent incidents, government called upon dons to ensure peace within the garrisons. Two 
opposing dons, Zeeks and Justin O’Gilvie declared peace and ensured that there were no further 
disturbances to the downtown area for the rest of the year. It is stated that under Dudus’ rule of 
Tivoli, there was a zero murder rate (Jaffe, 2012; Nikken, 2017). This effective collaboration 
indicates the potential benefits of both systems learning from each other. Inviting members of the 
informal justice system to have input the development of a national RJ programme that is intended 
to service the same communities might have proven beneficial.  
Strengths of the Maroon Justice System  
 There is limited academic discussion of the informal justice system of the Maroons, since 
much of what is known about the Maroons generally is based on oral history (Zips 1996; 1998; 
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Besson, 1999; Jaffe, 2015) . The Maroon justice system handles all types of crimes, ranging from 165
the use of indecent language to land ownership disputes. Community councils respond to crime in a 
way that is similar to traditional forms of state justice; there is an investigation, statement made by 
both offender and victim and the wider Maroon community (Zips 1996; 1998; Besson, 1999). The 
court sessions are presided over by 5 members of the Council including the Auditor General, the 
Commissioner of Police and the Chief himself. When there is a complaint, it is brought before the 
Chief, who will hold a session in Maroon Court. Typically, Maroon court is held at the Main 
Council house, which is a large circular structure that accommodates the participation of the wider 
Maroon community. These hearings are usually public in order to accommodate the voices of 
persons who have information on the dispute and indicate how it might have an effect on the wider 
Maroon community (Zips 1996; 1998; Besson, 1999). The Chief and other elders then make a 
decision. Punishments range from financial restitution to community service. However there is no 
set code of punishment in place within the Maroon justice system. Also, corporal and capital 
punishment are not used as punishment within the Maroon justice system.  
 Similar to the jungle justice system, the Maroon justice system, as will be discussed, suffers 
from a number of problems. However, there are a number of identifiable strengths to this system 
that might prove useful in developing a contextual justice programme in Jamaica. We know that the 
Maroon justice system is easily accessible. All Maroons can go to the Chief and the council of 
elders directly to make a claim against someone Disputes are decided within the boundaries of 
Maroon state. As the leader of the Maroons, the Chief is responsible for the administration of 
justice. Anecdotal evidence indicates that he is always available to mediate disputes. Once someone 
comes forth with an issue, advice can be given immediately or a hearing can be arranged on demand 
(Zips, 1997; Zips, 1998; Friedman, 2016). In addition, there is no financial cost expected of 
 Due to the relative lack of crime, Zips (1996) was unable to experience a Maroon court process 165
first-hand. 
Page !215
individuals for the administration of justice (Zips, 1998). This means that justice can be swift and 
inexpensive within the Maroon justice system.  
 In addition, the presence of the Maroon system increases access to justice. More specifically, 
the formal recognition of the Maroon system as independent by the state improves access to justice. 
Maroons are legally allowed to use both the Maroon justice system as well as the formal justice 
system. This gives the Maroon community choice in terms of the approach they wish to embrace.  
 This may be beneficial depending on the type of crime being addressed. For instance, the 
formal court system, acts as a court of appeal for all Maroon trials, particularly for murder and other 
violent disputes. This, again increases access to justice, since, as will be discussed shortly, is 
beneficial given the lack of enforcement capacity seen in the Maroon justice system generally.  
 Maroons are likely to feel more comfortable with the justice system as it is rooted in the 
same norms and values that dictate their daily existence. The Maroons define their own norms and 
procedures, which allows the flexibility needed to service the community in accordance with their 
needs (Forsyth, 2007). Generally there is more primacy given to communal ownership, self-
sustainability and direct input from the community and those most affected by the crime (Dundas, 
2007) . Usually, this is achieved by the imposition of some consensual settlement of conflict in the 166
interest of maintaining the Maroon tradition of communal land ownership or through reference to 
the boundaries set by Maroon authorities. The lack of a set code for punishment in the Maroon 
justice system allows flexibility in determining punishment.  
 The decisions that arise from Maroon Court are based on what Zips (1991) refers to as 166
communicative rationality. This non-punitive form of rationality dictates that decisions should be 
based on social justification.
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 The strength of the Maroon justice system is its foundation in contextual justice . 167
Respected elders are responsible for carrying out justice based on a complete knowledge of the 
persons involved, rather than just the facts of the case. Also, the process is participatory; public 
hearings permit individuals to comment throughout the proceedings. As discussed, the inclusive and 
flexible nature of a justice forum is likely to increase the compliance with the outcome, especially if 
the outcome is geared towards the satisfaction of all persons involved and the wider Maroon 
community. On the other hand, the system does have some power constraints built into the process. 
Because the Chief consults with the council of elders decisions are not being made unilaterally. The 
Council must authorise all decisions made, particularly as it relates to land disputes (Zips, 1996; 
1998; Friedman, 2016 Accessed April 1, 2016). In fact, the Maroons’ justice system is a reflection 
of the effort to retain their cultural emphasis on community and land ownership .  168
 This accessible, tailored approach to justice allows for a more effective response to crime 
and increased satisfaction of those who engage with these systems (Buscaglia & Stephan, 2005; 
Wojkowska, 2006; Mehmood & Chaudry, 2015). Across jurisdictions, increased popularity of 
informal justice systems has led to increased satisfaction of those seeking justice as well as reduced 
court burden and overcrowding in prisons (Erlanger, Chambliss & Melli, 1987; Stern, 2001; 
Buscaglia & Stephan, 2005; Wojkowska, 2006; Mehmood & Chaudry, 2015). The relative success 
 Contextual justice is understood as any dispute resolution process that considers the historical 167
context of all parties and the relationships between them (Buckley, 2012; Robinson, 2006). It is a 
pluralistic approach that embraces different principles dependent on the contextual factors at play in 
the situation being addressed (Buckley, 2012). This is in contrast to the Universalist approach to 
justice that embraces the same principles regardless of context. 
 Kromanti draws on the shared experience of enslaved people in the Caribbean; it incorporates a 168
multitude of African norms as well as European approaches to structure and organization (Zips 
1996; 1998; Besson, 2011; http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Course_Pages/
legal_systems_very _different_12/Papers_12/MAROONS%20James.htm. Accessed April 1, 
2016Kromanti emphasizes the communal approach to sharing land and the cultural emphasis on 
maintaining social harmony (Zips, 1998; http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Course_Pages/
legal_systems_very _different_12/Papers_12/MAROONS%20James.htm. Accessed April 1, 2016). 
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of informal systems in Jamaica might be indication of the potential for the formal incorporation of 
informal justice to have a similar effect of reducing court backlog and other practical issues facing 
the Jamaican justice system.  
 I propose that the Jamaican government should have considered these systems in their 
development and implementation of a national justice programme, given the obvious effect on the 
administration of justice. This is consistent with literature that indicates the failure of justice reform 
projects that fail to consider informal systems (Tamanaha, 2007; Chopra & Isser, 2013; Quane, 
2013). Having originated in Jamaica, these informal systems can inform the creation of a context-
specific justice programme that is intended to serve the Jamaican people. The consideration of 
Jamaican informal systems is essential since their benefits respond directly to the lack of access and 
context seen within the formal justice system.  
Failures of the Informal System  
 Informal justice systems provide an alternative route to justice for those who are unable to 
attain it through the formal justice system. Unfortunately, there are aspects of these systems that are 
not consistent with the HR approach to punishment. I shall now discuss these issues, which include 
gender bias and corruption, inhumane treatment of participants as well as lack of or excessive use of 
enforcement. I propose that it is essential that, in developing an effective approach to justice in 
Jamaica, for the failures of its informal justice systems, which violate HR standards, must be 
reconciled to prevent the creation of a system that replicates these problems.  
Jungle Justice System  
 In the case of the jungle justice systems, a number of issues arise from the interaction 
between the two systems. The jungle justice system seeks to limit state involvement in a number of 
ways, which limits access to justice for its residents. When the police are searching for a criminal, 
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the don will ‘protect’ him from the police (Blake, 2012). Instead of handing the wrongdoer over to 
the authorities, the wrongdoer is given a ‘road sentence’, which allows the wrongdoer to leave the 
community until the investigation of the crime is complete or until the person has served the 
equivalent of the expected sentence (Blake, 2012). This form of punishment is done to prevent 
intrusion from the state in general. Also, garrison residents are actively banned from accessing state 
justice. The don works to ensure that his leadership and administration of justice is not hampered by 
the state. As a result, dons expect complete loyalty from the community. I have discussed the fierce 
defence of dons who are under threat from the police and the state . In the garrisons, there is an 169
understood ‘code of silence’ within garrisons where one is forbidden from reporting crimes to the 
police, the state or the media or becoming involved with the formal justice system altogether 
(Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Sives, 2012; Blake, 2012). An individual can 
become an ‘informer’ by participating in the justice system; whether it is reporting for jury duty, 
being a witness in formal court proceedings or pressing charges. In fact it is perceived as one of the 
worst crimes within garrisons, which is often punished by execution. This ‘informer culture’ ensures 
that complete allegiance is held to the don . By limiting the interaction of community members 170
with the state and forcing constituents to have unwavering loyalty to dons, jungle justice limits the 
agency of individuals to choose how they access justice.  
 There is some concern that legal pluralism can violate the rights of some groups in order to 
enable the freedom for other groups to have their own legal practices (Forsyth, 2007; Chopra & 
 Many citizens within the garrisons are pleased that dons dispense punishment for a range of 169
crimes that are neglected otherwise (Charles & Beckford, 2012; Johnson & Soeters, 2008). In a 
study by Jaffe (2012) about the privatization of security within garrisons, 36% of respondents 
believed that a strong don meant decreased crime for a garrison. 
 Later on in the thesis, I argue that this ‘informer culture’ is an example of the many cultural 170
nuances that should have been considered in the development of a context-specific national justice 
policy. In particular, it is important to consider how this informer culture would impact the ability to 
participate in a state-sanctioned system that seeks to address crime and how the incorporation of 
key figures from this system might have minimised this impact. 
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Isser, 2009; ICHRP, 2009; Picq, 2012; Mehmood & Chaudry, 2015). Informal systems often define 
an offence in keeping with the goals of the group or the overarching culture. These cultural norms 
sometimes carry their own discriminatory stereotypes, particularly towards women (Picq, 2012; 
Chopra & Isser, 2012). In addition, the men who dominate many of these informal justice systems 
typically do not place emphasis on the rights of women. Without female representation, informal 
systems uphold gender stereotypes that ignore and minimise the needs of women . In Jamaica, the 171
jungle justice system within garrisons is subject to bias. Dons are not subject to their own rules. 
This unwavering loyalty and limiting recourse has a particular effect on women’s rights. Many dons 
have been known to take advantage of young women within garrisons (Amnesty International, 
2006; Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Blake 2013). Sometimes mothers who 
have received a favour from the don are ordered to send their daughters to the dons to be victimised 
sexually (Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Blake, 2013). Dons can commit these crimes because of the 
expected loyalty from the community members as a result of their economic dependence on the 
don. This renders the protection of women through jungle justice negligible.  
 The political allegiances of dons to one of the political parties create a bias in the 
administration of jungle justice. Within garrisons then, being associated with a rival political party 
is an offence that has consequences. Dons will engage in violence with political rival communities 
to ensure political victory for their party without a crime being committed. During election periods, 
just being associated with a rival political party can result in excommunication of one’s entire 
family (Charles & Beckford, 2012; Blake, 2013). Also, the lack of mechanisms for controlling 
abuses of power has a direct effect on the HR of garrison residents. Within garrisons, it is 
 Many informal systems, particularly those that are created in opposition to the state, require the 171
unconditional loyalty of its members, meaning that they can only access justice through the 
informal system (Franck, 2001; Wojkowska, 2006; Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Megret, 2013). 
Because many women access informal justice systems out of a lack of alternatives, they may feel 
pressured to accept the outcome of informal systems. 
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understood that certain illegal activities are allowed as they enable financial survival. Harriott 
(1997; 2002; 2003; 2009), Stone (1978; 1980) and Headley (2003) discuss the increasing tolerance 
of Jamaican citizens for organized crime as characteristic of the sub-culture of violence. They 
contend that there is an increasing normalisation and legitimization of violence within garrisons 
because of the dependency on crime for economic survival. As a result, community members justify 
and participate in their own exploitation for the greater good of the community and lack of recourse. 
Storeowners provide goods to dons and the gangs in exchange for protection (Jaffe, 2012; Sives, 
2012). This is not considered extortion but a fair trade for freedom from theft or violence. Also, I 
have noted the use of severe punishment in the garrisons. This approach to punishment undermines 
the dignity of offenders, as underscored by the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, the UDHR and ICCPR and CAT. In addition, there are no supervisory bodies to ensure 
that dons are making the right decision or that offenders are treated fairly.  
Maroon Justice System  
 Like informal systems, the Maroon justice system has drawbacks regarding enforcement and 
lack of consensus between the informal and formal systems. There is no set code of punishment in 
place within the Maroon justice system, which might limit its capacity to address a wide range of 
crimes. In addition, as part of their non-punitive approach to crime, Maroons do not use 
incarceration, which would protect the community from violent offenders (Zips 1996; 1998; 
Besson, 1999). The right to impose capital punishment was taken away from the Maroons during 
colonial times, which worked to undercut their authority. In these cases, it might prove beneficial to 
defer to the state system through some collaborative efforts. However, Bilby (2006) notes that 
Maroons are increasingly taking their disputes to the formal justice system in Jamaica. While some 
judges do refer cases back to the authority of Maroon leaders, others accept the case, which also 
undermines the authority of the elders in the informal justice system. Without consensus of 
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approach across systems, the formal justice system will consistently undermine the authority of the 
informal system.  
 Forsyth (2007) proposes that an advantage of informal systems is based on the respect of 
elders and their capacity to enforce rules through community disapproval. This is not the case for 
the Maroons, who suffer from a lack of enforcement capabilities. The Maroons in Accompong do 
not have a police force to ensure that agreements are upheld (Zips, 1996; Zips, 1997; Baldwin-
Jones, 2011; Friedman, 2016, accessed March 20, 2016).  
 Initially, this does not create a major issue since Maroons seemed to respect the leaders that 
had been appointed to restore social order . Over time, many of the leaders have passed away or 172
become too old to be considered sound. This consistent loss of the elders led to concerns about the 
impartiality of the Maroon Council of elders. In addition, there has been an infiltration of Western 
values and norms, which have disrupted the traditions of Maroon community members. As Western 
values began to dominate the Maroon community many persons began to question the efficacy of 
spiritual advisors responsible for the administration of justice . The de-legitimization of leaders 173
meant that they were less capable of controlling the behaviour of the wider community. The council 
was no longer included in the justice process and the local traditions rooted in community, social 
harmony and discipline became antiquated ideals. This independence has weakened the 
 Anecdotal evidence indicates that Accompong did not have any major issues of course prior to 172
the 1970s due to the respect that citizens had for their leaders (Zips, 1996, p296).
 The introduction of Christianity to the Maroon community in the 1930s compounded the 173
growing concerns regarding the elders (Zips, 1996; Zips, 1997; Baldwin-Jones, 2011; Friedman, 
2016 accessed March 20, 2016). During the leadership of Chief Cawley, he convinced the Maroon 
community that the council of elders was being manipulated by obeah for personal gain and that 
there should be a shift towards Christianity. After Chief Cawley burned down one of the spiritual 
huts without consequence from the First Time People, the doubts of Maroons were confirmed and 
obeah was outlawed (Zips, 1996; Zips, 1997; Baldwin-Jones, 2011; Friedman, 2016 accessed 
March 20, 2016). The council of elders was told to serve a Christian God.
Page !222
administration of justice, as the Maroon system has not been given the enforcement capacity of the 
state, thereby highlighting the potential benefit of the support of informal systems by the state.  
 Thus, access to both systems can cause conflict because of their opposing guiding 
principles. Increasingly, Maroons are taking their cases to the formal Jamaican courts. The norm of 
communal land ownership is not considered and formal courts apply principles associated with 
individual land rights to their issues (Zips, 1996; Zips, 1997; Baldwin-Jones, 2011; Friedman, 2016 
accessed March 20, 2016). In addition, as a system plagued by its own issues regarding access, it is 
of no real addition benefit to the Maroons. Just like other Jamaicans, maroons who have made 
claims regarding land issues in the formal courts are waiting for their cases to be heard (Zips, 1996; 
1998). This problem highlights the need to consider cultural context. While access to both systems 
is important, it is essential that the formal justice system give deference to the cultural norms of 
Maroons, in order to avoid subverting its justice system.  
Conclusion 
  Pluralism has the potential to foster dialogue in order to improve the overall approach to 
justice within any jurisdictions (Merry, 1988, Berman, 2009; Chopra & Isser, 2012; Quane, 2013). 
Constructive dialogue and collaboration between the state and actors of the informal systems might 
increase the potential for success of the implementation of an approach to justice. Members of the 
garrisons, particularly the defence crews mentioned in the Chapter 3, might have been useful allies 
in the development of a national justice programme. Their input and the visibility of their 
collaboration with the government might have helped to produce a more effective form of justice 
that would be received well by the inner-city communities. In addition, the Maroon justice system 
would have been a useful guide to implementing a culturally familiar and community driven justice 
approach that has been used by an indigenous group of Jamaicans.  
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 I have assessed the formal and informal systems that operate in Jamaica within a normative 
HR framework. I have proposed that, in order to develop an effective approach to justice in Jamaica 
that supports the formal justice system, it is important to consider these indigenous systems. In 
particular, jungle justice and the maroon justice systems demonstrate that informal systems that are 
accessible, inclusive and contextual in nature are received positively. In addition, it is essential that 
any approach to justice being implemented must work in conjunction with the formal system to 
prevent the issues of bias, corruption and inhumane treatment experienced by users of both systems. 
The jungle justice and maroon justice systems demonstrate the problems that can arise when 
informal systems work against the formal system, whether it be increased violation of rights or lack 
of accountability for offenders due to lack of enforcement.  
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  Chapter 6: Exploring RJ as an approach to crime in Jamaica  
 In the previous chapter, I established that a HR perspective on legal pluralism is an ideal 
guide for informal and formal legal systems to co-exist. More specifically, both systems should 
ground their practices to HR principles. In addition, this perspective proposes that informal systems 
should be community-driven, whilst receiving support from the state in the form of supervision and 
financial support. This approach overlaps significantly with the proposed collaborative governance 
approach.  
 The HR perspective on legal pluralism provides clear guidelines and objectives regarding 
the administration of justice through instruments such as the UDHR, ICCPR, CEDAW and Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. These documents state that both formal and 
informal systems should understand punishment as the protection of the wider public by holding to 
the wrongdoer to account in a way that returns the wrongdoer to society as a law-abiding citizen. In 
addition, it outlines key considerations for the administration of justice such as maintaining the 
dignity of all involved as well as increased involvement of the victim and community. The HR 
perspective provides guidance on developing a complementary, symbiotic relationship between 
formal and informal systems. The formal system should spearhead the administration of justice and 
act as a supervisory support for informal systems. Informal systems support the administration of 
justice by using culturally embedded norms and community involvement to resolve crime. This 
increased interaction and transparency between the two systems towards a shared goal of public 
protection is likely to result in increased access and overall efficiency of justice, thereby increasing 
public trust of the entire justice system.  
 I propose that RJ is an informal system that fits the HR perspective on legal pluralism. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, RJ seeks to uphold the human dignity of all participants by: (i) holding the 
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wrongdoer to account in a way that is humane and increases his capacity to be a law-abiding citizen 
(ii) considering the needs of the victim, and (iii) recognising the shared responsibility of crime 
prevention by increased community involvement (Braithwaite, 2002; Liebmann, 2010; Zehr, 2015). 
In this way, it is also collaborative as it encourages the direct involvement and considers the 
perspectives of all stakeholders in how the crime should be addressed. As a community-driven 
process, RJ is an adaptable process that is often shaped by the social, political and cultural context 
of the community, making it fit-for-purpose.  
 As noted earlier, I focus on the idea of RJ as a malleable approach to restoring agreement 
between persons or bounded communities. As highlighted by the discussion on informal justice 
systems in the previous chapters, I identify RJ as an informal justice approach, consistent with 
many informal justice systems, works to reconcile disputes within communities, independently of 
the justice system. However, I suggest that RJ might be best practiced with the support of the state, 
which can facilitate professional and financial resources as well as continue improvement via 
regular evaluation of practices. In addition, working alongside the state expands the reach of RJ to 
that of addressing crime once it has entered the justice process.  
 Using my own research has well as evidence from similar developing states, I describe an 
ideal form of Jamaican RJ; one that works alongside the formal justice system and inspires a shift 
in the way justice is administered in Jamaica as a whole. Jamaican RJ would seek to improve the 
justice system, in part, by responding to the intricacies of the Jamaican context including: (1) the 
lack of public trust in the formal system as compared with that of dons, (ii) the jungle justice system 
and its culture of informerphobia, as well as (iii) issues of professional and financial resource 
scarcity (iv) other culturally embedded practices such as the Maroon justice system and (v) political 
competitiveness between parties. I will then go on to contrast this ideal form of RJ with how RJ was 
actually developed and implemented by the Jamaican government.  
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Does RJ work?  
 Proponents of RJ characterise restorative practices as flexible processes, which can and 
should be adapted to the cultural context in which it is being implemented (Braithwaite, 2002; 
Liebmann, 2010; Zehr, 2015). RJ offers a range of benefits to the society such as increased 
satisfaction and safety of the public. Also, literature affirms that RJ can often have beneficial 
byproducts, including forgiveness, reconciliation and decreased recidivism (Braithwaite, 2002; 
Zehr, 2015) .  174
Retributive aspects of RJ  
 RJ is often viewed as the opposite of retribution (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Daly, 2002; 
Duff, 2003; Wenzel et al, 2008). Many proponents of the restorative approach consider it to be 
antithetical to a retributivist agenda (Holtermann, 2009; Strelan, Feather & McKee, 2011; Brooks, 
2012; Niriella, 2013; Wenzel, Okimoto & Cameron, 2012; Daly, 2013). The position taken in this 
thesis, however, is that RJ can be a demanding penal regime and is consistent with moderate 
retributivism.  
 RJ is concerned with responding to harm in a way that is proportionate to the offence 
(Barton, 2000; Braithwaite, 2003; Duff, 2003; Wenzel et al. 2008). This is not necessarily 
inconsistent with retribution. Retributive justice is understood as an approach to justice that 
advocates the ‘unilateral imposition of punishment’ (Wenzel et al. 2008). According to retributive 
justice literature, this punishment must be proportionate to the crime, after considering harm and 
culpability (Ashworth, 2002; Morris, 2002; Von Hirsch, 2003). It is a common misconception that 
 For instance, RJ can reduce reoffending through holding the offender accountable for his 174
behaviour in a way that seeks to address certain risk factors such as alcohol and drug rehabilitation, 
anger management and community support, rather than imposing blanket curtailment of rights that 
are disconnected from the offending behaviour altogether. However these are not set objectives of 
RJ processes.
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the state must impose harsh punishment, via lengthy periods of unpleasant incarceration out of 
some vindictive attempt to get back at the wrongdoer (Barton, 2000; Braithwaite, 2003; Duff, 
2003). This line of thought misses the point that a penal regime can be demanding without being 
inhumane. While retributive justice requires the imposition of punishment that is proportionate to 
the offence (desert), it does not necessarily require long incarceration or the mistreatment of the 
wrongdoer (Barton, 2000; Braithwaite, 2003; Duff, 2003; Wenzel et al. 2008). On this point, 
retributive and RJ can be in agreement.  
 In order to communicate public condemnation of an offence to the wrongdoer and the wider 
public, there must be some burden that the wrongdoer shoulders as a result of committing an 
offence. Restorative responses fulfil these requirements by identifying the harm of the offence and 
developing a response that is tailored to repairing it (Barton, 2000; Duff, 2003; Wenzel et al. 2008). 
In this way, the restorative approach responds to the proportionality requirement of retributivism 
even better than formal justice system, which imposes pre-determined periods of incarceration and 
other conditions without significant consideration of circumstances surrounding the crime, the 
wishes of the victim and community or the best pathway reform of the wrongdoer (Llewellyn & 
Howse, 1997; Achilles & Zehr, 2000; Ashworth, 2002).  
 RJ also simulates in an interesting way the retributivist idea that it should be hard or difficult 
to undergo punishment (Zehr, 2015; Duff, 2003; Wenzel et al. 2008; Brooks, 2012). Impersonal 
retribution via incarceration can be undergone passively, and does not require active and public 
work from the wrongdoer to make amends or change his behaviour. It allows the wrongdoer to 
avoid discharging the duty to manage, learn and grow from their conflicts (Wenzel et al. 2008). 
Depending on the regime of the formal system, a wrongdoer can be incarcerated and returned to 
society without any change to his offending behaviour . In the traditional formal system, persons 175
 In the previous chapter, I discussed the lack of correlation between incarceration and recidivism. 175
Page !228
who enter a guilty plea are given some form of reward for acknowledging their guilt, usually in the 
form of a reduced sentence. As a result many who are guilty of an offence are not necessarily 
incarcerated. On the other hand, RJ ensures accountability: the outcome of RJ practices always has 
an agreed action for the wrongdoer to undertake.  
 The 2009 UK National Commission on RJ discussed research on restorative practices that 
indicated that offenders found the process of facing their victim to be much more difficult and 
emotional than the traditional court process, which allows for passive acknowledgement of guilt. 
Choi & Severson (2009) look at responses to making or receiving apologies within a RJ setting. 
Qualitative data indicates that offenders found that preparing an apology statement was the one of 
the most difficult parts of the process (Choi & Severson, 2009). Also, at the outset of restorative 
proceedings, a wrongdoer must agree to abide by whatever outcome the restorative group decides 
collectively (Sapir, 2007; Van Ness, 2005). This may include activities that are more taxing than 
incarceration or incarceration itself. Agreements from RJ may include strict probation terms or 
participation in treatment programmes. In this way, participation in RJ will not allow the wrongdoer 
to avoid punishment  
 Restorative practices have a number of safeguards in place to ensure that offenders do not 
abuse the process. Proeve & Tudor (2010) discuss the problem of insincerity in restorative practices. 
While they agree sincerity is not guaranteed, they identify a number of ways that an insincere 
wrongdoer can be identified and the manipulation of the restorative process exposed (Proeve & 
Tudor, 2010). For instance, RJ can introduce expert community members who may be useful in 
identifying sincerity. In particular, Proeve & Tudor (2010) suggest the use of clinical psychologists 
and psychiatrists who have relevant training (Proeve & Tudor, 2010). Another method of identifying 
sincerity may be the use of polygraph testing. There is evidence to suggest that there is some benefit 
to using polygraph tests. For instance Grubin et. Al (2006) looked at the use of polygraph testing in 
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sex wrongdoer treatment programmes post-sentencing . There were 176 sex offenders in 176
treatment programmes in Atlanta, Georgia (3 of whom were women) with varied criminal 
backgrounds that took part in the study. These individuals were asked to report on their experiences 
with the polygraph. 85% of participants said that the polygraph was accurate (Grubin et al. 2006). 
Only 9 offenders admitted to making false disclosures. In addition, 56% of offenders said that the 
polygraph was beneficial to avoiding risk behaviours (Grubin et al. 2006). It is important to note 
that polygraphs were used post-admission of guilt. This is similar to how they would be used in 
restorative practices since offenders must admit guilt prior to participation. In this way, the 
polygraph is not used to determine guilt. Rather, polygraphs are used an additional measure to 
ensure that offenders are sincere throughout the restorative process . While it may be hard to 177
know for certain whether someone else is sincere, the preparation of individuals to identify common 
visible characteristics as well as the use of other avenues such as expert participants and polygraph 
testing may minimise the risk of individuals exploiting RJ.  
 There is no evidence that indicates that RJ has a negative impact on recidivism (Braithwaite, 
2002; National Commission on RJ, 2008).  On the other hand, there is a wealth of evidence that 
 The use of polygraph testing is controversial (American Psychological Association, 2004; 176
Lykken, 1991). Many researchers question its accuracy, Alternatively, because people respond to the 
pressure that the test puts them under, results may indicate guilt falsely.
 Although there is no literature indicating use of polygraph in restorative settings, they have been 177
used in a number of other arenas to determine whether or not an offender is telling the truth. For 
instance, the Iowa Department of Correctional Services conducts polygraph examinations on sex 
offenders in treatment programmes. In this way authorities can establish the level of accountability 
they take for the crime and the level of compliance with treatment requirements (Iowa Board for the 
Treatment of Sex offenders, 2008). In 2011, Hertfordshire police began using polygraphs for sex 
offenders in court (BBC, 2011). 
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demonstrates a positive effect on crime reduction . The UK Justice Research Consortium looked 178
at three RJ conferencing programmes in 2001. Of 374 cases, the Consortium found a 27% drop in 
re-offending in comparison with traditional court proceedings (RJ Council, 2011). A meta-analysis 
of 22 individual Canadian RJ programmes dating from 1985 to 2005 was carried out. It looked at 
studies that focused on offenders who participated in RJ programmes and examined recidivism, 
victim/wrongdoer satisfaction, and restitution compliance (Latimer et al. 2005). Latimer et al. 
(2005) found that restorative practices had a positive influence on reoffending rates. Latimer et al.
2005) looked at the influence of RJ on restitution compliance of offenders. Overall results indicated 
that young male offenders who participated in restorative programmes had higher compliance rates 
than those offenders who had prior arrangements (Latimer et al. 2005). 8 studies looked at 
restitution compliance specifically. The overall effect size was +0.33, indicating that those who 
participated in restorative programmes had higher compliance rates (Latimer et al. 2005). In 
addition, the overall effect size of the 32 tests that examined recidivism was +0.7 (Latimer et al. 
2005). This means that offenders were significantly less likely to reoffend after RJ compared with 
traditional court proceedings (Latimer et al. 2005). Another study by the New Zealand MOJ (2011) 
looked at offenders who went through court-referred restorative programmes from 2008 to 2009. 
The study looked at recidivism rates for 12-24 months after offenders had been through restorative 
proceedings. In addition, researchers compared the recidivism rates with those of offenders who had 
gone through the traditional court system over a 3-year period. In total, the study looked at 10,369 
offenders (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2011). In 2008, of 251 offenders, restorative practice 
offenders reoffended less than other offenders by 28%. In 2009, of 468 offenders, restorative 
 Generally, the literature indicates that there are a few indicators of when RJ will be most 178
effective in reducing recidivism. For instance, recidivism is far lower in juvenile offenders who 
meet with their victims and comply with conference agreements (United, Nations, 2006). Also, 
research indicates that RJ works best when offender and victims are known to each other and 
reduces crime more effectively for more serious crimes than minor crimes (Strang & Sherman, 
2007; National Commission on RJ, 2008). 
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practice offenders reoffended less than other offenders by 23% (New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 
2010). In addition, only 13 out of 468 offenders (2.8%) who received a RJ conference in 2009 were 
convicted and imprisoned for offences committed within 12 months of the conference and only 
4.7% conference offenders committed an offense that resulted in more than a 12 month sentence 
(New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 2010).  
Benefits of RJ  
 Having discussed the capacity to reduce recidivism in offenders, I will now highlight the 
literature on victim satisfaction and community involvement.  
 The literature highlights that RJ provides a sense of satisfaction and validation to victims, 
particularly when compared with their dissatisfaction of the formal justice system (Shapland, 2007; 
Daly 2015; Johnson et al. 2015; Braithwaite, 2016; Ptacek, 2010). The UK Home Office carried out 
an assessment of 3 RJ programmes in the UK. All 425 victims were interviewed about the 
restorative experience (Shapland et al. 2007). These London-based programmes worked in 
conjunction with the criminal system (Shapland et al. 2007). CONNECT was such a programme 
that ran from 2001 to 2003. CONNECT offered a variety of restorative processes to parties who 
wished to participate in RJ. JRC was the second programme that offered restorative conferencing 
from 2001 to 2004 (Shapland et al, 2007). REMEDI was a programme run in Sheffield that ran 
from 2001 to 2003. Within this programme, a range of offenders was offered varied restorative 
programmes, although most engaged in some form of mediation (Shapland et al, 2007). Finally two 
random control groups (RCT) from Northumbria who went through the court system were 
interviewed. Conferencing was offered to offenders who had committed burglary or some sort of 
street crime (such as robbery). All except the control groups went on to participate in conferencing. 
All of the offenders in RCT had pleaded guilty to their crimes and were awaiting sentencing 
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(Shapland et al, 2007). Qualitative data collected from victims after the restorative conference 
demonstrated that 45% of victims believed in the sincerity of their offenders (Shapland et al, 2007). 
This was not related to whether the wrongdoer and the victim knew each other prior to the crime. In 
other words, this assumption of sincerity was not related significantly to any prior information the 
victim may have had about the wrongdoer’s character (Shapland et al, 2007). In the JRC 
programmes, 91% of the victims said that they accepted the apology of their wrongdoer (Shapland 
et al, 2007). In addition, victims accepted apologies for a range of crimes, including more serious 
ones such as burglary and robbery (Shapland et al, 2007). Data from Sherman and Strang’s 
Canberra experiments showed that only 12% of victims disagreed with using RJ as an  
alternative to the criminal justice system (Braithwaite, 2002). In addition, only 9% of victims left 
restorative proceedings wanting to hurt their offenders (Braithwaite, 2007).  
 In addition, emerging literature on RJ and sexual violence indicates the potential for it to 
reduce reoffending (Stewart, Sapers & Wilton, 2013; Koss, 2014; Kingi, 2014) . Skelton & Batley 179
(2006) examined 63 conferences and 72 VOM cases that handled sexual violence between 2004-5. 
Interviews with staff indicated that all participants were satisfied. Koss looked at the RESTORE 
(Responsibility and Equity for Sexual Transgressions Offering a Restorative Experience) project . 180
In 2010, Julich et al (2010) conducted a review of the RESTORE project. They conducted 
interviews with RESTORE facilitators and staff, as well as victims and offenders that had 
 In particular, positive effects are seen when the following is in place; individualised screening 179
and assessment of offenders use of experts (as suggested earlier by Proeve & Tudor), flexibility of 
time and responsiveness, a skilled facilitator, specialised treatment of offenders and physical and 
emotional safety of those involved (Daly, 2006; Julich et al, 2010; Koss, 2014 Bolitho, 2015). Post-
prison programmes such as COSA have a strong evidence base (Skelton & Batley, 2006; Koss, 
2008; Julich, 2010). 
  The RESTORE Project aimed to use restorative practices for 1
st 
time rape offenders with no 180
previous records (Koss et al, 2004). Offenders who entered a guilty plea for misdemeanour sex 
crimes and were willing to enter the program were given a court order to do so. The victim of the 
offence also had to enter the program voluntarily (Koss et al, 2004). 
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undergone the process. In total 4 cases were made available to researchers . Qualitative evidence 181
received indicated that individuals felt that the programme was beneficial. Through the interviews, 
participants indicated that RJ allowed them to have closure, since they were given an opportunity to 
face their wrongdoer and tell their story (Julich et al, 2010). For those who did not wish to face their 
wrongdoer, RJ may still have been beneficial, since victims were allowed to use representation 
(Hudson, 1999) . Participants of the RESTORE project also stated that they felt that the process 182
was fair and objective (Julich et al, 2010). Regardless of the format, victims may benefit from the 
switch between the power role of the wrongdoer and victim. While the sex crime may have left the 
victim feeling powerless, restorative conferencing can allow the victim to feel empowered. Unlike 
the criminal system, which is concerned with arriving at a conviction, restorative processes seek to 
put an end to the abuse . This begins with a wrongdoer admitting his guilt (Van Wormer, 2009). 183
Victims do not feel like they have to defend their accusation, since the guilt of the wrongdoer is no 
longer in question.  
 This yielded 18 participants (Julich et al, 2010). However, only 6 face-to face interviews were 181
conducted (Julich et al, 2010). Due to the limited number of participants, researchers did not 
comment on the overall effectiveness.
 Women’s groups and other organizations that have a vested interest in responding to sexual 182
violence will be able to provide insight into the victim’s testimonial.
 Curtis-Fawley & Daly (2005) conducted a study examining the use of RJ to address gendered 183
violence in Australia. They conducted interviews with: representatives from victim advocacy 
groups, Australian indigenous and non-indigenous women that were working in policy and 
government. In addition, archival research was conducted on 400 sexual assault cases handled by 
court and RJ. Finally they conducted a critical analysis of 15 sexual assault and domestic violence 
conferences (Curtis-Fawley, 2005). Many of the victim advocates interviewed saw RJ as a way or 
restoring balance to the victims. In particular, advocates indicated that victims get a sense of 
satisfaction by seeing the wrongdoer admit his actions and be held accountable (Curtis-Fawley, 
2005). They also acknowledged the benefit gained by making offenders address their actions 
(Curtis-Fawley & Daly, 2005). Similarly in South Africa, Dissel & Ngubeni (as cited in Renzetti, 
Follingstad & Coker, 2017) examined the effects of conferencing on DV cases. Of the 21 women 
who participated, most women felt safe during the process and that they were provided with a space 
to speak freely and honestly. In addition, all of the women reported positive changes in their 
abuser’s behaviour and a complete absence of physical abuse since the conference (18 months later) 
(Renzetti, Follingstad & Coker, 2017). 
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 It is in the best interest of the public that offenders return to the community as law-abiding 
citizens . It is clear that the community also benefits from this reduced recidivism and increased 184
safety within their communities. However, their direct involvement with resolving crime can also 
improve community cohesion. According to the thinking behind RJ, the wrongdoer, victim and 
micro-community immediately affected have a responsibility to work towards restoration of a norm 
that existed before the crime. (Mantle, Fox and Dhami, 2005). Marshall (1999) states that 
community involvement encourages individuals to take an active role in restoring its society and 
preventing further crime. In particular, RJ works towards creating a community that supports the 
rehabilitation of both victims and offenders to prevent crime further. Throughout RJ practices, 
community members are present, in part, to provide support to both offenders and victims. 
Restorative practice can provide the community with a better understanding of crime, since they are 
able to hear the views of both the victim and wrongdoer. The UN Handbook on RJ notes that 
restorative practices such as peace commissions and victim wrongdoer mediation programmes can 
bring unity to the community by rebuilding the various broken relationships as a result of the crime, 
i.e., the relationship between the wrongdoer and his community (United Nations, 2006). Research 
indicates that volunteering has the capacity to build stronger social networks (Schmid, 2001; 
Gabbay & Guenther, 2005). Similarly Beck (2012) notes the positive effects that restorative 
practices can have on the community; namely increased community cohesion and engagement as 
well as community repair.  
Will RJ work in Jamaica?  
 Kurki (2003) noted that community benefits of RJ are under-examined. However, there are some 184
studies that discuss this area. Sampson (1997) found that increased community interaction, sharing 
of norms and willingness to act on enforcing those norms is positively correlated with lower crime 
rates. In Vermont, over 78% of persons who participated in restorative boards recognised an 
increased sense of community cohesion (Karp & Clear, 2002). 
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 RJ is an adaptable approach to justice; it can be moulded to meet the needs and context of 
any particular jurisdiction (Llewellyn, 1997; Llewellyn & Graham, 2008; Dundas, 2008; Zehr, 
2015). There are a number of benefits to introducing RJ alongside a formal justice system. 
However, it is important to consider whether or not RJ is even suitable for a Jamaican context. As 
seen in other countries with similar issues, I propose that RJ can reconcile many of the previously 
mentioned issues faced by the Jamaican justice system, including lack of public trust, overcrowding 
and case backlog. In addition, consideration of the cultural, political and social context of Jamaican 
communities, give direct guidance as to how RJ should be practiced in Jamaica  
 One of the main justifications for implementing RJ in Jamaica is the need to improve the 
public trust of the justice system (MOJ, 2012). The National RJ policy identifies public trust as one 
of its primary policy goals and speaks to the lack of public trust as a result of the formal justice 
system to provide sufficient access to justice (MOJ, 2012). Increased satisfaction with RJ as a 
national programme, would help to improve the perception of the justice system as a whole. A 
recent report on the trust and confidence in criminal justice systems by Race on the Agenda (ROTA) 
noted that the use of RJ improved the perception of the justice system in South Africa (Rota, 2011). 
Similarly 80% of survivors and 90% of offenders that participated in the Gacca restorative courts in 
Rwanda indicated a developed trust in the justice system (National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission, 2010). Thailand is a state that suffers from public mistrust of the justice system 
(Kittiyarak, 2004; Ramesh & Fritzen, 2009). Borinboonthana & Sangbuangamium, (2013) 
examined the use of restorative conferences and its effect on satisfaction rates and reoffending rates 
for offences including theft, fraud and assault. Of 11,962 cases, 92% of victims said that they were 
satisfied with the process and the outcome respectively (Borinboonthana & Sangbuangamium, 
2013). 97.5% of offenders expressed satisfaction with the process and outcome as well. 95.7%  
of offenders felt that the conference held them accountable. In my own research, Damian 
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Hutchinson, head of PMI (PMI offices, 26/2/15), recounted a number of instances where utilising 
restorative-oriented practices contributed to the building of trust within hard-to-reach communities 
that suffered from gang violence. In particular he recounted a matter of reprisal violence between 
two gangs. He stated that by working with the gangs and the community, he was able to disrupt the 
violence that had occurred between a gang member and the family of the deceased. He added that 
RJ was essential to addressing these kinds of disputes due to its capacity to address the long-
standing collective hurt and mistrust that remains after an offence has taken place and neglected by 
the formal justice system.  
 In order to build trust within the communities, RJ has to demonstrate that it can remedy 
practical issues that plague the formal justice system, such as case backlog and overcrowding. I 
have discussed these issues in previous chapters. Both Justice McIntosh (Puisne judge,  DPP 
Offices , Kgn, 28/11/14) and Lisa Palmer-Hamilton (DPP, DPP Offices, Kgn, 25/02/15) noted in 
their interviews that (sexual) offences take up a lot of the court’s time because of delays in getting 
victims and law enforcement to show up for court. In addition, victim-survivors from my focus 
group stated that they were less inclined to go to court following their victimization because their 
cases were consistently being put off; sometimes for more than a year. The literature highlights the 
potential of RJ to reduce the number of persons incarcerated through diversion from the courts and 
reduced recidivism even for developing states.  
 Braithwaite (2006) argues that RJ is an attractive option for developing countries because of 
its long-term cost-effectiveness, particularly if it is implemented as the first port of entry into the 
justice system. As discussed, Jamaica suffers from a lack of financial resources. As Brooks (2015) 
notes, these programmes and shorter prison sentences would be more cost-effective than long-term 
prison sentences with limited rehabilitation. Reports indicate that the implementation of RJ has led 
to substantial reduction of overcrowding, backlog and related costs in Nigeria, North Ireland, and 
Page !237
South Africa (Elechi, 1999; McGratton, 2010; Hargovan, 2012; Marshall, 1999; Furman, 2012; 
Strang et al, 2013; Sherman et al, 2014). Some of my interviewees such as Dorothy Lightbourne 
(Law Offices, Kgn, 20/02/15), as Attorney General and Barrett, the NTA of the national RJ 
programme (Skype, 10/01/15) highlighted the desire to reduce case backlog and overcrowding. 
Lightbourne (former politician, Law Offices, Kgn, 20/02/15) discussed a number of efforts to 
address this, including the partnership with DRF to handle mediation as well as the child diversion 
programme. Both interviewees affirmed that introducing RJ was an additional effort to reduce 
backlog. In Jamaica RJ could successfully divert juvenile and adult cases from the courts, once 
offenders have acknowledged harm caused, particularly for minor crimes and community disputes 
that can be referred to RJ at the pre-charge stage. Reducing overcrowding would help to improve 
prison conditions, for which Jamaica is consistently chastised by HR organisations . Having the 185
capacity to reduce case backlog and overcrowding cost-effectively makes RJ an attractive approach 
for Jamaica, where addressing these issues is likely to bring about increased public trust in the 
justice system as a whole.  
Collaborative Approach  
 If RJ would be effective in Jamaica, how should it be implemented? I propose that RJ 
should be developed in a collaborative manner so that it can respond to stakeholder-specific needs. 
Consistent with the literature, I have mentioned that the literature identifies RJ as a collaborative 
process (Llewelyn, 1997; Morris, 2002; Braithwaite, 2002; Earle, Crawford & Newburn, 2002; 
Bissessar, 2002; Lemley & Russell, 2002; Zehr, 2005; Hamlin & Hokamura, 2014; Silva, 2015). As 
 Conditions such as overcrowding can be a hard form of treatment for an offender that affects the 185
welfare of prisoners and their capacity to access adequate healthcare and other basic necessities. 
The Universal Periodic Review has noted the problem of overcrowding in Jamaican prisons. In the 
most recent report from the Death Penalty Project in 2011, Robottom (2011) noted that 
overcrowding in prisons was so bad that hammocks had to be used in order to ensure that prisoners 
had a space to lie down at the same time. 
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a practice it involves the collective input of all stakeholders in determining how an offence is 
handled (Lemley & Russell, 2002; Hamlin & Hokamura, 2014). In addition, RJ requires the 
collaborative efforts of agencies to ensure that the RJ agreement is carried; ranging from CSOs and 
their role in victim/wrongdoer support, the use of counsellors and the supervision of the agreement 
by community members/ independent bodies. In India, social activists, retired judges and legal 
counsel as well as community elders contribute to the delivery of restorative practices, which are 
legally recognised to resolve a range of disputes (Latha & Thilagaraj, 2013). If RJ is a collaborative 
process, the design and implementation of it should also be collaborative. There is some literature to 
support that RJ programme development should reflect the process itself (Lemley, 2001; 
Braithwaite, 2002; Silva, 2015). By including key stakeholders, a fit-for-purpose version of RJ 
would be created, where its implementation would seek to address the Jamaican context, the needs 
of its communities and encourage participation through cultural familiarity . Collaboration 186
between the state and stakeholders’ to design a RJ programme should make stakeholders take 
ownership of RJ, thereby increasing use of the programme to resolve disputes. In my interviews 
with the Canadian consultants, Professor Llewellyn (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) and Barrett 
(consultant, Skype, 10/01/15), they emphasised the idea of ownership. Whilst dismissing the one-
size-fits-all approach to developing RJ, Llewellyn (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) stated,  
 “And then they wind up disrupting the kinds of coalition building and the kinds of   
 supportive relationships that you need to build and develop ownership over this kind of   
 approach in institutions”  
 Both she and Barrett (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15)  also noted that they initially declined the 
offer to lead the RJ policymaking process because they understood that it “if they didn’t develop 
their own national policy it wouldn’t work within the context” (Llewellyn interview, (consultant, 
Skype, 10/01/15). Barrett (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) went further to say that her decision to 
 As the research will demonstrate, the development and implementation of RJ was not 186
collaborative, which led to the inappropriate policy transfer of RJ policy. 
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leave the programme was largely in the hope that it would become a ‘Jamaican initiative run by 
Jamaicans”. Damian Hutchinson (head of PMI, PMI offices, 26/2/15) stated that the community-
driven, RJ-oriented approach embraced by PMI allowed communities to take ownership of the 
violence that was taking place in their communities as well as the need to address it. He noted that 
despite acting as facilitators, it was important that PMI allowed community members and the gangs 
to lead their own negotiations, so that everyone could be satisfied with the outcome. Giving 
stakeholders this sense of ownership also alleviates the contextual issue of informerphobia. 
Community members were less likely to feel that they were corroborating with the state, because 
they were in control of the process and outcome.  
 There are a number of groups that the state can collaborate with in order to develop a 
Jamaican version of RJ. I will now discuss how the collaboration with civil society and other non-
state stakeholders can contribute to a more effective RJ programme.  
Civil Society  
 The literature indicates the value of civil society in service delivery (Jones, 2010; Moloney, 
2013; Macaulay, 2013). In chapter 1, I note that many states use non-governmental organisations to 
deliver RJ programmes or to provide additional support to RJ programmes for offenders and victims 
at various stages of the criminal justice process. In Paraguay, a French NGO, Terres des Hommes, is 
responsible for delivery of training and awareness programmes (Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Twenty-sixth session Vienna, 2017). Collaborating with civil society is fitting 
for the Jamaican context, which has an increasingly strong civil society community that works on 
justice related issues. The state might have incorporated many of these organisations, such as Stand 
up for Jamaica and UNDP, into the delivery of restorative-oriented services, including post-RJ 
counselling, volunteer recruitment, offender reintegration and victim support. In the following 
Page !240
chapters, I focus on the failed collaboration between the Jamaican government, DRF and PMI. In 
this way, developing partnerships with local CSOs is a way of responding to the issue of financial 
and professional scarcity. It would reduce costs by allowing the national RJ programme to access 
existing infrastructure, trained facilitators and volunteers as well as a range of funding opportunities 
to help sustain the RJ programme.  
 Also, organisations such as PMI and DRF are trusted by the public and are welcomed into 
violent communities to resolve disputes. The Assessment of Community Security and 
Transformation Programmes in Jamaica highlighted the success of PMI in Jamaican communities. It 
recommended that PMI take on a leadership role in brokering peace in volatile communities and 
providing dons with alternative law-abiding lifestyles (Government of Jamaica, 2009). Citizens are 
more likely to trust the national RJ programme by seeing the state work alongside trusted CSOs. 
However, as will emerge, despite intentions of collaborating with these organisations, the neglect of 
political context, and in particular the competitiveness between political parties led to a breakdown 
in collaboration with civil society.  
 I have noted that there is a long-standing history of RJ in Jamaica, largely through the use 
community-driven processes by the DRF and PMI. Collaboration with organisations would enable 
the Jamaican government to tap into a pre-existing Jamaican RJ culture that was operating 
harmoniously alongside the Jamaican government. This is likely to strengthen the national 
programme by learning from the successes and failures of these organisations and utilising 
infrastructure and other tangible resources that the Jamaican community is already familiar with. In 
the following chapters I will highlight the failure of the Jamaican government to engage with these 
organisations in an effective manner.  
Other non-state Actors  
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 I have noted that there are two community-driven informal systems that are operating with 
some success in Jamaica already. I have discussed Forsyth’s typology and the benefits derived from 
informal systems interacting with the state, including financial support, supervision and expanding 
pathways to justice. I propose that consultation with leaders of these systems in Jamaica, that is, 
dons and Maroon community leaders, would be beneficial to developing a Jamaican version of RJ 
that responds to the needs of the Jamaican community and is culturally relevant.  
 Working with non-state criminal actors in ‘weak’ states is discussed within the literature 
(Blake, 2013; The Stanley Foundation, 2015; Idler & Forest, 2015). For instance, the Venezuelan 
state engaged in what is referred to as ‘complementary governance’, where the state formed 
strategic alliances with non-state violent actors to share intelligence in 2011 and respond 
collectively to on-going justice issues. This partnership is based on the shared desire to reduce 
violence (though for different reasons). In particular, it notes the positive impact of collaborating 
with non-state criminal actors in justice policy development in terms of its capacity to improve the 
understanding of motives and justifications of criminal behaviour within a jurisdiction. Idler & 
Forest (2015) indicate that collaborating with these actors has policy implications, as it provides a 
better understanding of the complex relationships between these non-state actors and the 
communities they operate in. By involving these individuals and groups in the restorative process 
and having them gain a better understanding of crime, potential offenders may be less inclined to 
commit crime, which reduces the cost of crime prevention as well (Lilles, as cited in Morris & 
Maxwell, 2003).  
 By working with dons and gang members, there is an opportunity to provide them with a 
better sense of the need for human rights, thereby reducing the need for the jungle justice system 
altogether (The Stanley Foundation, 2015). I have discussed the efforts of the Jamaican government 
to remove dons from the garrisons. The Jamaica National Crime Victimisation Survey (JNCVS) 
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reports a decline in the presence of corner crews, criminal gangs and area dons between 2013 and 
2016 (Dalby 2009). Also, 42.7% of respondents still believed that area dons did positive things for 
their community (as compared with the 24.5% who believed them to be a negative influence). In 
Jamaica, there has been some discussion of incorporating violent non-state criminal actors. Levy 
(2012) discussed the potential of defence crews and former dons becoming part of the justice 
reform process. His research indicates that many of these individuals have a genuine wish to help 
dismantle the system that they previously supported. As respected leaders, this collaboration can 
provide the state with information about the needs of the communities they once served and 
increase the legitimacy of the state. The JJSTRF provided an overview of policy recommendations 
based on local research. One of the recommendations was the utilisation of reformed gang members 
in the fight against crime (Dalby, 2009). If the Jamaican government were to embrace the advice of 
international consultants, Levy (2012) and other local research (JJSTRF), engaging with former 
criminal leaders in designing a programme that their communities would want to participate it, one 
might see increased reception of the programme and a shift in public trust of the government. If 
former dons give some endorsement to state programmes in spite of the culture of informerphobia, 
garrison constituents might be more willing to follow suit . More recently the Jamaican 187
government decided to incorporate more than 30 dons as stakeholders into the process of renovating 
downtown Kingston, which is intended to improve the economic status of Jamaica (Cross, 2017).  
 There are many partnerships between the state and informal traditional systems across 
jurisdictions (Wojkowska, 2006; Idler & Forest, 2015; Goff et. al., 2016). In Nigeria, there is a 
 For instance, there is some collaboration with favela leaders in Brazil. As in the garrison system, 187
the favelas have their own informal dispute resolution system, which is operated by criminal 
community leaders who are involved heavily in drug trafficking. In 2006, the Unidade de Policia 
Pacificadora was created to regain state control of the favelas. This project consulted directly with 
members of the favelas in order to find resolutions to drug-related crimes (https://
www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case- study/asserting-state-presence-in-rio-de-janeiro/, accessed 
August 2013). 
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historical trend of the federal state consulting with traditional authorities to improve their 
relationship with communities and resolve minor disputes (Idler & Forest, 2015). In Tanzania, local 
neighbourhood watches collaborate with the state, through their supervision of police efforts, 
prosecution and courts (Wojkowska, 2006). Both Dundas (2007) and Llewellyn (2002; 2007) 
discussed the potential value of consulting with dons in their papers on RJ, which were 
commissioned by the Jamaican government. Llewellyn & Graham (2007) note the loyalty to dons 
within inner-city communities and states the dons’ relevance to the reception of RJ as they are 
responsible for setting the ‘moral tone’ of the community. Llewellyn & Graham (2007) also affirm 
that this type of partnership has been successful in Jamaica before. Dundas (2007) states that dons 
might be encouraged to participate in RJ as a way of accessing a positive type of ‘power and 
legitimacy’.  
 If RJ were to be collaborative and consider the perspectives of stakeholders and be sensitive 
to local needs, what would this Jamaican version of RJ look like in practice? During my interview 
with Michael Gordon (RJ facilitator and UWI lecturer, civil society Office, Kgn 27/11/14), he stated 
that it was too early to tell what a Jamaican form of RJ would look like. However, in exploring the 
views of Jamaicans on RJ and understanding the social, political and cultural context, there is some 
indication as to the types of things RJ might seek to incorporate in practice. I continue to draw on 
the long-standing history of informal community-driven justice systems in Jamaica in order to make 
RJ feel culturally familiar to Jamaicans.  
 I propose that some of the aspects of the Maroon culture, which are part of Jamaica’s 
historical and cultural fabric, might have been incorporated into national RJ practices, thereby 
increasing the positive reception of RJ by Jamaicans. Dundas (2007) notes that the Maroon justice 
system as one that is consistent with the traditional values of Jamaican culture. In my interview with 
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Llewellyn (consultant, Skype, 10/02/15), she discussed these values as consistent with Jamaican 
culture,  
 “ You have a place where people feel deeply connected to seeing that justice is done is their  
 business. It’s deeply embedded in the consciousness of the community. Its not something   
 that people don’t care about.”  
 Its emphasis on community, concern about justice and its roots in African rituals and 
symbols is reflected within garrison communities and Jamaican popular culture. For instance, the 
Abeng
 
is an important symbol in the Maroon community and, a familiar one to Jamaicans. In 188
embracing Jamaican context, the RJ programme could have used the Abeng as their ‘talking piece’ 
which is an object used to dictate whose turn it is to talk during restorative proceedings. Also, the 
RJ programme could have created a council of elders from the community
 
to the group of elders 189
in the Maroon justice system that would consistently report on the needs of the community or 
provide insight on the public reception of the programme. They might be tasked with bringing forth 
practical concerns from the public that were highlighted in my questionnaire and focus groups, such 
as childcare and the impact of participation on employment and work collectively to reconcile them. 
Alternatively they could also become responsible for the monitoring of RJ agreements and 
providing support to an offender. This would replicate the community support of the Maroon 
community in resolving crime.  
 Furthermore, the circular set up of the Maroon court could have been mirrored in the RJ 
process. My interview with Hines (DRF director, DRF Offices, Kgn, 07/11/14) indicated that, 
despite the fact that there has been a focus on conferences, DRF facilitators have found that using 
 An abeng is an animal horn or musical instrument originating from Ghana. The abeng is an 188
important part of Maroon culture; it was often used as a means of communication between 
Maroons. Now it is a popular symbolic figure often used at ceremonial occasions within Maroon 
communities and across Jamaica. 
 Some of these elders might include former dons as well as church leaders.189
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circles has better outcomes and utilise that format. PS Carol Palmer (MOJ Offices, 10/1/15) and 
Roydon Hall, interim director of RJ programme (RJU Unit, Kgn, 28/11/14)  noted informal success 
of using circles. This could have been extended to the infrastructure of the RJ centres that were 
built. Therefore a Jamaican version of RJ would embrace a range of RJ approaches, including the 
use of circles and be aesthetically representative of Jamaican culture.  
 Also, if we consider the need to reduce crime, case backlog and overcrowding, it follows 
that RJ should be offered at all stages of the justice system. Some of the pioneering RJ jurisdictions, 
such as New Zealand, Canada and Australia work in conjunction with the state and its formal justice 
system (Morris & Maxwell, 1998; Gavrieldies, 2007; Barnes, 2013). In South Africa, criminal 
prosecutors are able to request a pre-trial diversion to RJ for both child and adult offenders 
(Skelton, 2013). In addition, family group conferences and VOM are listed as sentence options 
(Skelton, 2013). In Guatemala, VOM is recognised as a form of ADR by the courts. As discussed, 
allowing RJ at the pre-charge and pre-sentence phased has a positive effect on all of the 
aforementioned needs. In addition offering RJ at the post-sentence phase contributes to the reduced 
likelihood of recidivism of offenders.  
 Regardless of the model of interaction between state and RJ, it is essential that both the state 
and RJ programme have similar objectives. I have discussed the deterrence-based, wrongdoer-
focused approach to punishment of the formal justice system in Jamaica. This approach, which is 
inconsistent with a ‘restorative’ and human rights understanding of punishment, is compounded by 
the various failures discussed in the previous chapters, such as court backlog, lack of resources and 
inhumane sentencing and prison conditions. Llewellyn (1997) and others propose that, when 
implementing RJ, it is done in a way that ensures a shift in the culture of justice within the state 
(Zehr, 2015). In particular, she notes that RJ cannot simply be an ‘add-on’ to the formal system. 
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Instead, the two systems should adjust to meet similar goals and understandings of accountability 
and restoration (Llewellyn, 1997). During my interview she noted (consultant,  Skype, 10/02/15),  
 “I have some concerns and continue to have concerns if it (RJ) becomes a practice or a tool  
 just used by the justice system of by certain actors in the system without any reflection or  
 any fundamental questioning about how to think differently about how the justice system   
 works”.  
 She went on to state that if we are implementing RJ, we need to consider how damaging the 
current system is to the work of RJ and how legislation and correctional facilities should change in 
order to contribute to holding offenders accountable in a way that encourages their return to society 
as law-abiding citizens . In countries that practice RJ in conjunction with the state, a shift can be 190
seen in the formal justice systems. Many of these systems focus on returning offenders to the 
society through access to counselling, education, skill development and maintaining their civic 
responsibilities. In Africa, where RJ has also been implemented as part of larger justice reform 
efforts, there is also increased use of alternative sentencing. The African Prisons Project in South 
Africa has a number of projects that deal with a wrongdoer’s reintegration to the community 
(African Prisons Project, 2012). The projects range from helping offenders finish educational 
programmes, training prisoners to become paralegals and provision of facilities for citizens’ advice 
bureaus and legal resource centres (African Prisons Project, 2012). In Jamaica, the national RJ 
policy was being developed as part of a larger effort at justice reform. However, as I will discuss in 
the following chapters, it did not embrace the transformative spirit of RJ, highlighted by the 
simultaneous implementation of harsh legislation, its almost exclusive focus on infrastructural 
reform of the justice system and the failure to research rehabilitative-centred approaches to handling 
more serious crimes such as sexual offences.  
 In the following chapters, the research indicates that RJ was actually being implemented as part 190
of a larger justice reform effort. However, much of this effort was focused developing 
infrastructure, rather than creating a shift in the approach to justice.  
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Best Practice.  
 Despite the fact that RJ is a malleable process, there are certain approaches that have been 
seen as successful across certain and, in some cases, all jurisdictions. First, I propose that Jamaica 
would have benefitted from initial implementation of RJ for juvenile offenders. As noted earlier, a 
vast number of developed and developing states implement RJ programmes for juvenile offenders 
initially. This is particularly relevant to the Jamaican context, as restorative-oriented practices are 
already being used in schools. Rev. Dundas (2008), a former member of DRF and RJ facilitator 
provided a timeline of RJ in Jamaica. Within that timeline he noted the development of restorative-
oriented programmes in Jamaican schools, such as Peace and Love in Schools (PALS) (1994), 
which continues to be successful currently. Implementing RJ for juvenile offenders would have 
strengthened the on-going restorative-oriented approach already taking place for young people, 
where it is seen as most effective across jurisdictions.  
 In addition to offering various forms of RJ at all ages, a Jamaican approach to RJ would 
seek to offer RJ at all stages of the criminal justice process. I have discussed the failure of the 
formal justice system to address sexual offences due to the expense of rape kit analysis. Many of the 
interviews that I conducted confirmed that there was a problem of backlog. In my interview with 
Lisa Palmer-Hamilton (Public Attorney, DPP Offices,Kgn, 25/2/15) , she noted that within 3 months 
a total of 89 sexual offence cases were yet to be heard in court. Other members of the legal 
fraternity such as Attorney-at-law Dr Barnett, Q.C (Office, Kgn, 11/12/14) and Justice McIntosh, 
Puisne Judge (DPP Offices, 28/11/14), highlighted a number of reasons for the failure to address 
sexual offences, including lack of resources, absence of victims and witnesses as well as poor 
evidence collection and documentation by the police force. Proponents of RJ suggest that 
addressing these gaps in the formal system regarding access to justice might result in an improved 
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perception of the justice system by citizens (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; Sherman, 2001; 
Braithwaite, 2003; Shapland, 2003; Braithwaite, 2007; Wallace, Wylie & Gordon, 2013).  
 Offering RJ at all stages of the justice process, particularly at the pre- charge, post-charge 
and pre-sentencing stage would address a number of issues such as overcrowding and case backlog 
in Jamaica. The application of RJ to a wide range of crimes, such as sexual offences would also 
further reconcile the issues of backlog and the overall failure of the Jamaican justice system to 
address a number of serious crimes. Certainly, many cases will still go through the court system. 
However, RJ punishes offenders who acknowledge their guilt, which will alleviate some of the 
burden on correctional facilities.  
 One might argue that certain crimes, including sexual offences require some period of 
incarceration as a means of ensuring public safety. In addition, there may be some hesitation for a 
state that embraces a more traditionally retributive approach to crime to utilise RJ for more serious 
crimes. Within my research, there was some indication of this hesitation. For instance, Justice 
McIntosh (Puisne Judge, DPP offices 28/11/14), head of FES Judith Wedderburn (FES offices, 
10/10/14), PS Carol Palmer (MOJ Offices, 10/1/15), and former Attorney General, Dorothy 
Lightbourne (legal offices, 20/2/15) all indicated that RJ should initially address a limited number 
of offences in order to demonstrate its effectiveness to the public before broadening its application 
to a wider range of crimes. Similarly, my community focus groups shared concerns of safety when 
discussing the use of RJ for sex crimes. However, this concern might easily be resolved by offering 
RJ for more serious crimes at post-incarceration stage only. Offenders who acknowledge guilt might 
then be able to be sentenced through sentencing circles and access rehabilitation programmes, such 
as Circles of Support and Accountability, as part of the restorative agreement. In addition, Mr Hines 
(DRF director, DRF Offices, 7/11/14) noted the successful use of RJ for sexual offences by DRF 
without incarceration.  
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 Given the failure of the formal justice system to address sexual offences, RJ might be a way 
of addressing offenders who acknowledge their harmful actions by providing support to them once 
they have served their time. Sex crime victims require moral justice (Koss et al, 2004). According to 
victims themselves, this can usually only be achieved when they feel that their input is valued and 
they are kept aware of the on-going process of deciding punishment. Responses suited to their 
emotional needs are also valued (Koss, 2004; Daly 2011; Edwards & Sharpe, 2004). Curtis-Fawley 
& Daly (2005) examined the use of RJ to address gendered violence in Australia. They conducted 
interviews with: representatives from victim advocacy groups, Australian indigenous and non-
indigenous women that were working in policy and government. In addition, they conducted 
archival research on 400 sexual assault cases handled by court and RJ.  
 In my focus group with female victim-survivors, I found that most women values an 
opportunity to find out why the wrongdoer did it, particularly where the wrongdoer and the victim 
knew each other. The victim can articulate what her needs are and have them accounted for in the 
restorative agreement. By being offered at post-charge and pre-sentencing stage of trials, victim-
survivors of crimes that the state has failed to address can gain a sense of validation from 
participating in the justice process, which is likely to improve their overall perception of it.  
 Generally, there is some evidence that RJ might be positively received into the Jamaican 
justice system. Taylor, Chauhan and Fondacaro (2012) looked at the perception of different 
approaches to crime in 107 university students in Jamaica. They gave participants scenarios where 
crime was addressed by incarceration only a mix of incarceration and RJ or RJ only. Researchers 
found that a mix of RJ and incarceration was most popular option for several crimes including rape 
and murder (Taylor, Chauhan & Fondacaro, 2012). Also, female victim-survivors from my focus 
group stated that they were unwilling participants of the court system because they felt that they 
were put on trial instead of the wrongdoer. Consistent with the literature on victim satisfaction in 
Page !250
RJ, many of the participants stated an interest in participating in RJ to address their victimisation. 
Results from the questionnaire indicated that more than half (148 of 202) of respondents would 
participate in a RJ process. In addition, it is important to note the long-standing success of DRF in 
Jamaica, who utilise RJ practices such as circles and conferences to handle both community 
disputes and court-ordered ADR.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have described an ideal form of RJ for the Jamaican context. I suggest that 
the understanding of RJ should be drawn from the work of Llewellyn (1997) and Zehr (2015), 
consistent with a human rights understanding of punishment. In order to achieve this, I propose that 
it be developed and implemented collaboratively with the state and other key stakeholders, 
particularly those who deliver restorative-oriented practices or participate in the operation of 
informal systems already. Collectively they should seek to transform the way in which justice in 
handled, given the need to improve public trust and the lack of professional and financial resources. 
In addition I propose that the national RJ programme should combine some best practice 
approaches, such as initial focus on juvenile offences, post-reintegration programmes such as 
COSA, with local practices from the informal justice systems operating in Jamaica already, such as 
the use of circles and elder councils.  
 In the following chapters, I will discuss the development and implementation of the national 
RJ policy by the Jamaican government between 2001 and 2015. As will emerge, the process was not 
collaborative as it limited the participation of or excluded key stakeholders altogether, such as the 
public, justice-focused CSOs and those persons who lead other informal community-driven 
informal systems within Jamaica already. As a result of this failed collaboration and a subsequent 
focus on donor interests, I argue that the Jamaican government had opportunistic motivations that 
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resulted in the inappropriate adoption of a RJ programme from a jurisdiction with little resemblance 
to the Jamaican context and was compounded by was divisive political tactics.  
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    Chapter 7: RJ in Jamaica  
 In earlier chapters of this thesis, I have discussed information on the political, legal, social 
and economic context of the Jamaican society. I have argued that this context should be considered 
in developing justice reform policy. I have proposed that RJ, as a community-driven approach to 
crime that is bound by principles consistent with a HR approach to punishment, can be adapted to 
meet the needs of its jurisdiction, as long as it works under the supervision of the state. Before 
examining the policy itself, I will provide a chronology of RJ in Jamaica, from the initial 
introduction with RJ to its formal adoption by the Jamaican government by way of a national policy 
(See Appendix Five). This will be followed by the analysis of the research data.  
History of RJ in Jamaica  
 The development and implementation of the national RJ policy took place as part of justice 
reform agenda set in 2001 (which I will describe shortly). However, RJ has a prehistory in Jamaica 
that existed previously through the work of academics and CSOs. Academics have recommended 
the exploration of RJ in Jamaica (Headley, 2002; Harriott, 2008; Llewellyn & Graham, 2008; 
Dundas, 2008; Williams, 2009; Taylor Chauhan & Fondacaro, 2012). Professor Bernard Headley 
writes about RJ as a viable approach to resolving crime in Jamaica. In ‘A Spade is still a Spade: 
Essays on Crime and the Politics of Jamaica’, he suggests that restorative principles are essential to 
repairing the trust between the state and the Jamaican citizen as they can bring about increased 
accountability of the state and collaboration between community and state in crime prevention 
(Headley, 2002) .  191
 Many of his recommendations for community approaches to crime prevention were met with 191
much hesitation from political officials, who remained loyal to the zero-tolerance approach. In 
particular, he relays a conversation that he had with Superintendent Adams, where he stated that 
Jamaica citizens were too uneducated to understand the concept of community policing and that 
they would manipulate the process to ‘pick off’ policemen (Headley, 2002). 
Page !253
 DRF is the leading organization in ADR in Jamaica. The DRF website lists restorative 
practices as one of its services (http://drfja.org/drf/, accessed January 24, 2017). While interviewing 
its founding members, Donna Parchment-Brown (MOJ Offices, 30/2/15)
 
and Paul Hines (DRF 
Offices, 07/11/15), I discovered that, in the late 1990s, they coordinated study tours to attend 
international conferences and training sessions given by Professor Howard Zehr at the Eastern 
Mennonite University (EMU) in the US One of Professor Zehr’s students, Barbara Toews 
(consultant, Skype,  06/11/14), confirmed that she went to Jamaica twice to provide training to DRF 
members, law enforcement and members of MOJ (under a PNP administration). Also, she stated 
that the DRF coordinated a summer study tour to EMU.  
 Donna Parchment-Brown ([JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15) indicated that under her 
directorship of DRF, her recommendation to incorporate restorative practices into the justice system 
was not received positively. Rev. Leon Dundas (consultant, Cafe, Leicester, 20/4/15), who worked 
closely with DRF and MOJ, indicated that he was also unsuccessful in persuading the PNP-led 
government to implement RJ in prisons as part of a peace-making initiative in 2000. This failure to 
consider the advice of local RJ practitioners and academics is indicative of the lack of collaborative 
governance throughout the policymaking process and the dismissal of local context for the preferred 
acceptance of the donor states. The Jamaican government would later consider RJ as part of its 
justice reform efforts in the following year, which included the development of a national RJ policy.  
RJ National Policy  
 According to Harriott, (2009), an integrated model should aim to transform communities 
that have high rates of violence by implementing social justice programmes that encourage 
development in addition to increasing state accountability and transparency. In 2001, the Jamaican 
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government stated justice sector reform as a priority . This reform signalled a shift towards the use 192
of social justice methods. Efforts were outlined to improve the efficiency of the justice system 
including modernisation, increased access to justice, legislative reform and development of inter-
sectoral partnership, community involvement and offender rehabilitation (Jamaican Task Force, 
2009). In 2002, PMI offered mediation, counselling and social development services (such as 
homework assistance and parenting advice). In 2006, the Community Security Initiative (CSI) was 
implemented (Government of Jamaica, 2009). This programme provided general public services 
and restorative-oriented programmes .  193
 According to the National RJ Policy (MOJ, 2012), the decision to introduce RJ came within 
the same year that justice reform was prioritised. Specifically, the 2001 West Commission of 
Inquiry, which sought to address a shoot-out between the police and Tivoli residents, introduced 
expert testimony from Professor Jennifer Llewellyn from Dalhousie University in Canada in 
February 2002 . She testified that RJ had the potential to address the prevalence of violent crime 194
and rebuild public trust of the state. After this recommendation was made, a report of the National 
Committee on Crime and Violence spoke in favour of the capacity of RJ to address crimes 
committed by first time offenders and improve access to justice. During our interview, Professor 
Llewellyn (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) indicated that, in 2002, upon request from MOJ, she 
published a research paper based on her Commission of Enquiry testimony. In this paper, she 
emphasised the potential application of RJ to youth crime, adult offences and inter-group conflict. 
 The main goals of the intended reform included strengthening the rule of law, crime reduction 192
and improving public trust (Dalby, 2009).
 However, many of these programmes that have been implemented have not been assessed in 193
terms of their effectiveness (Buckley, 2006). 
 This was confirmed through interviews with the 2012-2016 Minister of Justice, Mark Golding,  194
(MOJ offices, 11/18/14) current Permanent Secretary (PS) Carol Palmer ( MOJ Offices, 10/1/15), 
former Director of RJU (2014-2016), Roydon Hall (RJU offices, Kgn, 28/11/14) and Donna 
Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15). 
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In addition, Llewellyn (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) said it was essential to consider context-
specific factors that might delay or reduce the uptake of RJ and its successful implementation, such 
as the mistrust of the police, the role of dons, resources, proportionality of restorative outcomes and 
public safety. Llewellyn (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) recommended that, in order to address these 
contextual issues, Jamaican citizens should be the driving force of any RJ programme. This would 
increase the likelihood that their needs and circumstances would be considered; providing incentive 
to see a programme that they were involved in creating, succeed.  
 Still in 2002, a national election was held, after which P. J.  Patterson and the PNP continued 
to lead the government. My interview with Professor Llewellyn (consultant, Skype, 10/02/15) 
revealed that, during this election, the PNP had made a promise to incorporate JPs into the RJ 
programme to garner political support. The National RJ policy states that RJ facilitators were 
chosen from a roster of pre-selected groups of individuals, including JPs. The CSJP Phase 3 Loan 
Proposal and the Overview of the Jamaican Justice System Reform by the JJSRTF (CSJP, 2014; 
Buckley, 2006) both state the government’s intention to expand the role of JPs through the RJ 
programme.  
 This choice to include JPs was in response to a few issues. Donna Parchment-Brown (JRIU 
Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15) noted in her interview that there are over 6000 JPs in Jamaica. 
Normally their responsibilities are limited to administrative activities, such as attestation of 
documents and serving in Petty sessions or Children’s court. However, only 15-20% of JPs carry 
out the latter responsibility (JJSRTF, 2007). Expanding their role through the RJ programme was 
thought to alleviate some of the burden on the lower courts and the resident magistrates. This would 
increase access to justice with limited cost to the state, since JPs are not remunerated for their 
services
 
(JJSRTF, 2007). In addition, involving JPs in the RJ programme might have addressed 195
 Travel and lunch expenses are covered for the JPs (JJSRTF, 2007).195
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their need for greater respect from the legal fraternity. The Justice Reform report stated that JPs felt 
that they were not shown respect by lawyers and police officers (JJSRTF, 2007). The state might 
have attempted to appease JPs by increasing their remit to that of ADR. As intimated by Professor 
Llewellyn (consultant,  Skype, 10/02/15), the PNP might have appealed to the JPs need for greater 
respect to gain their political support. The JLP also agreed to this inclusion within their policy 
manifestos (CaPri, 2007).  
 Acting on these recommendations, the Cabinet of Jamaica mandated MOJ to lead the 
development of a RJ policy in 2004. RJ fell under the remit of the CSJP , which had already 196
secured grants and loans from the IDB and DFID (MOJ, 2012). CSJP is a crime and violence 
prevention programme that seeks to ‘enhance citizen security and justice in Jamaica’, particularly in 
vulnerable communities, through implementation of programmes that strengthen crime management 
capacity, improve the delivery of justice services and prevent crime and violence. Examples of 
programmes are entrepreneurship training, provision of victim support, and community dispute 
resolution (MOJ, 2012).  
 The main funders of CSJP were the IDB, DFID
 
and the Canadian Department for Foreign 197
Affairs, Trade and Development. DFID required that their funding be used to address: (1) 
community mobilisation and governance, (2) Socio-Economic Opportunities, (3) Community 
Violence Prevention Services, and (4) Social Marketing and Public Information Campaigns (http://
www.csjp.gov.jm/, accessed April 10, 2017). This funding sought to improve the justice system 
 CSJP has 3 phases, which received various amounts of funding; Phase 1 ran from 2002-2009, 196
Phase 2, from 2009-2015 and Phase 3, from 2015-2019.
 DFID has a history of working with developing countries in the implementation of citizen and 197
security programmes as a means of addressing issues of police corruption and the IMF reform 
programme. The business case proposal for Phase 3 of the CSJP programme states that the use of 
citizen and security programmes is part of the approach employed in the UK, that targets people at 
risk of becoming involved with crime (DFID, 2014). 
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through such measures as developing an automated jury selection system and computerising the 
DPP office. DFID and the GOJ have a long-standing relationship, as DFID has funded many of the 
justice and security efforts by the Jamaican government (DFID, 2014). They are engaged in the 
implementation of citizen and security programmes throughout the Caribbean, as a means of 
supporting efforts at economic reform, as mandated by the WB and IMF (DFID, 2014). The 
business case proposal for Phase 3 of the CSJP programme states that the use of citizen and security 
programmes is part of the approach that targets people at risk of becoming involved with crime 
(DFID, 2014). Also, DFID viewed the CSJP programme as consistent with combatting gender-
based violence (CSJP, 2011).  
 On the other hand, IDB provided a loan
 
for the CSJP programme. These funds came with 198
general objectives: (1) Community Action and (2) Institutional Strengthening of the MNS (MNS). 
The CSJP Phase 3 loan proposal states its on-going role in lending to small and vulnerable 
countries. The CSJP Phase 2 Completion Report states that the inclusion of the Trafficking in 
Persons (TIP) programme in reform efforts aided the continued financial support of US bi-lateral 
funding, indicating that they also had interests in reducing issues that acutely affect women in 
Jamaica.  
 According to CSJP evaluation reports, the National RJ policy and the JVPPSD report, the RJ 
programme was mainly funded by the CIDA
 
and Department of Foreign Affairs and 199
 IDB charged a 5% fee of the total amount given to cover their overheads (IDB, 2015. This fee 198
amounts to US$ 1,755,145 approximately (CSJP, 2015).
 CIDA is an agency that provides sustainable development assistance in developing countries in 199
order to reduce poverty (http://www.international.gc.ca/, accessed April 10, 2017).
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Development (DFATD) (CSJP, 2011; MOJ, 2012) .  These organizations have provided on-going 200
support for the Jamaican justice reform efforts, including the provision of 17.8 million to the JUST 
programme and 20 million and the provision of technical support to CSJP Phase 1 and the RJ 
programme (http://jis.gov.jm/canada-commits-supporting- justice-reforms/, accessed March 7, 
2017; http://moj.gov.jm/news/launch-just- programme, accessed March 7, 2017) . The Canadian-201
Caribbean Cooperation Fund committed CAN$500,000 Canadian to the RJ programme (http://
jis.gov.jm/canadian-funding-boosts-restorative-justice-programme/, accessed April 13, 2017). The 
2008-2009 MOJ Report stated that this funding went towards development of a RJ policy 
framework, the creation of training modules, training of RJ facilitators, building public awareness 
and hosting an international RJ conference.  
 The RJ programme received additional funding from various organizations such as the 
UNDP . Also, the RJ programme received some of their funds from the IDB loan for CSJP (http://202
www.csjp.gov.jm/about/components, accessed April 10, 2017). This funding went towards the 
delivery of training, development of the policy framework and building of RJ centres. Also, DFID 
provided some funding to strengthen the RJ programme during CSJP Phase 2. 12 million of the 
CSJP Phase 3 budget went towards increasing the range of RJ programme by focusing on an 
evaluation of services.  
 These organizations were supporting the Jamaican state financially in other justice reform 200
initiatives already such as CSJP, PMI, and JVPPSD, Justice Undertakings for Social Transformation 
(JUST) and Citizen Security Initiative (CSI). 
 CSJP Phase 1 completion report indicated that some of the funds for CSJP were allocated to 201
addressing the damage caused by Hurricane Ivan in 2004 (CSJP, 2009). The re-allocation of funds 
might indicate the non-prescriptive nature of funding requirements. 
 These funds did not go to the development of the programme itself. Rather they allowed the RJ 202
programme to be useful in other areas. Rachel Morrison (HIV programme officer, UNDP offices, 
21/12/14) indicated that UNDP gave financial support to the RJ unit to support victims from the 
2001 shoot-out in Tivoli. 
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 Some of the funders played an active role in the programme. The loan proposals for CSJP 
stated that IDB monitored the grants that were given to the Jamaican government for CSJP and the 
RJ programme. The National RJ policy stated that UNDP gave practical assistance in establishing 
the RJ unit. Also, many funder representatives from DFATD and IDB joined a range of other 
stakeholders on the steering committee, which served to inform policy and the CSJP programme in 
general (IDB, 2015). This committee incorporated stakeholders; from academics to practitioners, 
clergy, law enforcement and political officials. According to Dr. McCalpin, a committee member 
and professor (telephone, 3/3/15), the aim of the committee was to draft a policy document, and 
also to establish the value of RJ for Jamaican judicial system .  203
 The first major activity in the policymaking process was the hiring of consultants. The 2008 
Annual MOJ Report indicates that, in 2003, funding enabled the hiring of staff and acquisition of 
facilitator trainers. Interviews with Professor Llewellyn (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) and her 
former PhD student, Audrey Barrett, (who later became the NTA for the Jamaican programme, 
Skype, 10/1/15) confirmed that Llewellyn was asked to become the lead consultant for the RJ 
programme. However, she declined. Due to her emphasis on domesticating the policy, she felt that 
someone local, who had a better understanding of the Jamaican context, would be better for the 
position. In her interview she stated,  
 “In the conversations before the process, I had said that what I thought was really important, 
 was that we would not write a policy for them, but that we would come, do interviews,   
 learning and host some conversations amongst the parties on the ground. See what capacities 
 there were. Certainly, help them understand what RJ policy would entail, where the   
 strengths might be and how the policy is developed; but that if they didn’t develop their own 
 national policy, it wouldn’t work within the context”.  
 The mandate of the committee overlaps with the role of Carey, who was also mandated to 203
develop the policy. There is no indication of any collaboration between the committee, Barrett and 
Carey. 
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 In 2005 and 2006, the PNP-headed government collaborated with DRF on a number of RJ 
initiatives. These efforts included an official launch of the RJ programme, study tours to Canada, 
public consultations, preparing RFPs for hiring, as well as a series of PR activities, including the 
creation of billboards and newspaper articles about MOJ efforts to introduce RJ. (http://
www.cabinet.gov.jm/current_initiatives/jamaican_justice_system_refor m_project accessed January 
25, 2017). Donna Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15), Audrey Barrett 
(consultant, Skype 10/1/15) and the director of PMI, Damian Hutchinson (PMI Offices, Kgn, 
26/2/15), made mention of study tours during their interviews. Barrett (Skype, 10/1/15) confirmed 
that DRF (headed by Donna Parchment-Brown at the time) coordinated the study tours that were 
made to Canada. Both Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15) and Hutchinson (PMI 
Director, PMI Offices, Kgn, 26/2/15) indicated that the Canadian study tour exposed them to 
various restorative practices and gave first-hand experience on how RJ was practiced in Canada. 
Parchment-Brown (politician, MOJ Offices, Kgn, 26/2/15) stated that the Jamaican government 
financed this study tour, which allowed representatives from DRF, PMI and a number of 
government officials to attend. Interviewees who participated in the study tours, such as Damian 
Hutchinson (head of PMI, PMI offices, 26/2/15), Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 
30/2/15) and Palmer (MOJ Offices, 10/1/15) all had positive reviews of the study tour and saw the 
potential of using RJ within a Jamaican context. Also, she noted that PS Palmer and others from this 
administration attended the Summer Training Institute at the IIRP in Bethlehem Pennsylvania, 
where Palmer would later become a board member. IIRP provides training for facilitators and 
implements restorative practices in schools.  
 Between 2005 and 2007, a number of changes took place within the internal leadership 
within the parties and the national leadership of the Jamaican government. In 2005, Edward Seaga, 
former head of the JLP and Prime Minister (1974-1980 & 1989-2005) stepped down as leader of the 
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party and internal elections appointed Bruce Golding as the JLP leader (Sullivan, 2010; Edie, 2011). 
In 2006, P.J Patterson, PNP Prime Minister stepped down (Sullivan, 2010; Edie, 2011). Another 
internal election saw Portia Simpson-Miller become the leader of PNP and Prime Minister. 
However, in 2007 a national election was held, which resulted in a win for the JLP and a change in 
national leadership from Simpson-Miller to Golding (Sullivan, 2010; Edie, 2011).  
 These developments resulted in a number of changes in key positions within MOJ. After JLP 
won in 2007, PS Carol Palmer left the Ministry in 2009. A JLP representative, Robert Rainford, 
replaced her. In addition, attorney-at-law, Dorothy Lightbourne (JLP) (2007-2011) became the 
Minister of Justice and Attorney General (http://moj.gov.jm/past-ministers, accessed January 25, 
2017).  
 The JLP continued to develop the RJ project despite the fact that RJ is not consistent with 
the stated conservative ideology of the JLP. Despite this, the MOJ 2008-2009 Final Report 
identified the RJ programme as a priority for the JLP administration. It highlighted the RJ-related 
activities that had been completed, such as the exposure of 2000 persons to RJ and the hosting of an 
RJ conference. In addition, they stated plans to develop similar community justice initiatives such 
as the empowerment of emerging community leaders as a means of improving police-community 
relations (CaPri, 2007). However, this development of RJ is juxtaposed with the development of the 
2009 SOA, which, as I discussed, inadequately defines sex offences and responds with blanket, long 
periods of incarceration without rehabilitation or individualised accountability.  
 Between 2007 and 2008 a number of important RJ activities took place. DRF was 
commissioned to carry out 23 public consultations and sensitisation and trained facilitators for the 
RJ programme. The public consultations were expected to gauge public opinion on RJ from a range 
of individuals such as children in schools, CSOs and law-enforcement agencies. The Appendix of 
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the national RJ policy includes a report on the public consultations conducted in 2008, which 
confirms the format for public consultations as Talking Circles. In addition they administered 
questionnaires to 923 of the participants from the consultations, to bolster their data.  
 During my interviews, I sought to find out what these consultations consisted of. All 
interviewees who coordinated or participated indicated that conversations took place in groups of 
about 50 persons in a circle . Other aspects of their responses varied, indicating a lack of 204
consistency across consultations. Both Dorothy Lightbourne (politician, offices, Kgn, 20/2/15) and 
PS Carol Palmer (MOJ Offices, 10/1/15) described the consultations as a ‘mixture of everything’, 
including video demonstrations and discussions regarding RJ in other jurisdictions. On the other 
hand, Donna Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15) highlighted the use of power 
points and role-play as significant to the consultations. She stated that the group discussions focused 
on flagging issues that the public found problematic within the justice system that RJ could 
potentially address.  
 The consultations indicated a lack of awareness of RJ. Of the 2,086 public consultation 
participants, 52.9% indicated that they did not know about RJ before participating (MOJ, 2012). 
When asked how one might become involved with RJ in Jamaica, the answers varied from ‘being a 
good role model’ to ‘youth groups with restorative principles’, indicating a limited understanding of 
RJ that focused on RJ as a moral approach to ‘healing the nation’, rather as a set of practices to 
address crime.  
 There were a number of issues with the public consultations. Audrey Barrett (consultant, 
Skype, 10/1/15), who was hired as the NTA in 2010, indicated a great level of disappointment with 
the way the public consultations were conducted. She described them as a ‘complete fail’, stating 
 None of the interviewees indicated the use of a questionnaire, despite the fact that it is referred to 204
in the national policy. 
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that they were one of the aspects of the policymaking process that she would have redone. For 
instance, none of the questions posed sought to identify how Jamaicans wanted RJ to look like. 
After watching a 10-minute video on RJ, 4 main questions were asked: (1) what does justice mean 
to you? (ii) When someone is killed, raped or burglarised, what should be done and who should be 
involved? (iii) When a child is involved in trouble at school, who should be involved? (iv) How can 
you be involved in RJ? (MOJ, 2012). These questions did not ask how Jamaicans wanted RJ to be 
implemented in Jamaica. None of the reported responses – with the exception of finding out who 
might be involved-- indicated how RJ should be adapted to meet Jamaican context, with the 
exception of determining who might be involved. When asked who should be involved when 
burglary, murder or rape has taken place, respondents mentioned family, victim, community 
members, the police and trained mediators. However, there was no information garnered as to what 
RJ might look like in practice.  
 Also, the consultations did not include the RJ stakeholder groups, that is victims and 
offenders. The consultation report in the Policy indicates that the majority of the participants had 
limited interaction with the justice system. Of the 923 questionnaire respondents, 96.9% had never 
been found guilty of an offence and 70.7% did not know anyone who had been found guilty. Of all 
respondents only 21% had ever been victim to a crime. Therefore the views of victims and 
offenders were not represented .  205
 While the consultations provided information on RJ, they did not educate participants on the 
various ways in which these crimes are normally punished or indicate underlying causes of 
crime . This meant that participants were answering questions from an uninformed perspective. 206
 George (activist, Standup offices, Kgn, 20/1/15), from Standup Jamaica indicated that many of 205
the offenders he worked with were interested in participating in RJ. Their input would have been 
useful in the development of the policy.
 As mentioned previously, many offenders are victims of poverty, abuse and other issues that 206
contribute to their offending behaviour. 
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For instance, many of my interviewees were misinformed about sex offences. Justice McIntosh 
(DPP Offices, Kgn, 28/11/14) indicated that sometimes women were complicit in their victimization 
because they led men on and said ‘no’, but meant ‘yes’. She also described offenders as predators 
who were unlikely to be rehabilitated. Minister Golding (MOJ Offices, Kgn, 18/11/14) admitted 
limited awareness of the various approaches to punishing sex offenders across jurisdictions, 
including the use of sex registers, which he spearheaded the implementation of, in Jamaica. Also he 
assumed that marital rape and homosexual incest did not take place in Jamaica . The fact that 207
these interviewees were involved with the development of the policy, consultations and sensitisation 
demonstrates that their efforts did not provide any information on offences to dispel these myths. 
Ultimately these misinformed ideas would not only have affected public opinion, but the ways in 
which stakeholders presented information on offenders .  208
 In 2007, PS Palmer (MOJ Offices, Kgn, 10/1/15) (prior to her temporary departure from 
government in 2009) became a member of the executive board of IIRP, who subsequently won the 
contract to train RJ facilitators. 2 more research papers were published that offered 
recommendations from consultants in 2007 . Llewellyn and her colleague, Danny Graham 209
published a strategic framework for RJ in Jamaica; focusing on its implementation. It reiterated the 
 This is despite indication that marital rape and incest are particularly problematic forms of 207
sexual offences across the Caribbean (Bourne et al, 2015). For instance, between 2007 and 2011, 
there were 584 cases of incest reported, relative to the 548 cases of rape to the Office of Children’s 
Registry in Jamaica (OCR, 2012).
 As will be discussed, my focus groups provided some indication on the different approaches to 208
punishment and factual information about offenders generally and sexual offences in particular in 
order to garner an informed opinion.
 In 2007, some funding issues arose, which delayed the programme. The MOJ 2008 Annual 209
Report states that MOJ requested a time extension to achieve the deliverables and submit the 
necessary documents to CSJP and funders. Confirmed by my observations at the 2015 International 
RJ Conference, the former Director of the RJ unit, Roydon Hall (RJU offices, 28/11/14) stated that 
the first director underspent and misused the funding. Also, the CSJP Phase 1 completion report and 
Rachel Morrison (UNDP HIV Programme manager, UNDP Offices, 21/12/14) indicated that some 
funding was reallocated to address the damage caused by Hurricane Dean (Lamas et al, 2009).  
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potential for RJ to be beneficial and in keeping with informal justice systems and its respected 
leaders. Her emphasis on innately ‘restorative’ factors was confirmed in her interview. She stated 
that Jamaica’s inner-city communities lend themselves to RJ because of the tendency for 
‘everybody to be in everybody else’s business’ and the need to ensure that justice is done as ‘deeply 
embedded into the consciousness of the communities’. She intimated that considering the public 
mistrust of the state, partnering with dons and their gangs might improve the reception of the 
programme. Also, she emphasised collaboration with communities, civil society and churches, 
international agencies and academics. Finally, the paper provided a draft version of the national 
policy; of which a substantial portion has been incorporated verbatim into the executive summary of 
the National RJ policy.  
 The second paper by Rev. Dundas proposed that informal justice systems such as the jungle 
justice system and Maroon community justice were indications of the potential for RJ, as other 
effective community-based approaches to justice. He stated that jungle justice seen within the 
garrisons could be a ‘nascent expression of an outcry for RJ’ , where the public turned to their 210
communities for justice instead of the state, sometimes at great personal cost (Dundas, 2007). As a 
result, the role of dons should be incorporated into garnering support for the RJ programme because 
of the power they have over the communities. He noted that this type of collaboration has achieved 
success for CSOs that work to empower the communities (Dundas, 2007).  
 While PS Palmer (MOJ Offices, Kgn, 10/1/15) indicated that the PNP administration was 
opposed to working with the dons, the JLP considered the recommendations to explore local forms 
of community justice. Both Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15) and Lightbourne 
 Dundas exemplifies how the punishments dispensed by the don might have a positive impact. A 210
curfew imposed by the don, prevents someone being killed or arrested by the police. He discusses 
transforming this punishment into a way of ensuring that offenders are productive outside of work 
hours, as part of their restorative agreement (Dundas, 2007). 
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(former politician, Legal Offices, 20/2/15) discussed their plans to examine the local Maroon 
practice in Accompong Town. Lightbourne (former politician, legal offices, 20/2/15) had planned to 
communicate with the Maroon community through Donna Parchment-Brown . Lightbourne 211
(former politician, legal offices, 20/2/15) stated that she had signed documents that affirmed the 
exploration into the Maroon justice system and their consultation for the policymaking process. 
Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15) affirmed that Lightbourne had attempted to 
coordinate these efforts. Also the JVPPSD report stated that some preliminary reports were created 
on RJ and gender issues and recommends further investigation into using RJ for gender-based 
offences (Morgan, Leslie & Duncan, 2011). 
 
In her interview, Barrett (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) 
stated that during her time as NTA, she recommended that research to see the impact that RJ might 
have on addressing sexual offences, given the ‘pervasiveness’ of sexual violence and the failure to 
address it through the formal court system. However there is no evidence to demonstrate that any 
further research was conducted.  
 The potential for collaboration, as seen between Parchment-Brown (PNP) and MOJ 
Lightbourne (JLP) was hampered by political competitiveness between parties. While Lightbourne ( 
former politician, legal offices, 20/2/15) stated that both herself and Parchment-Brown shared a 
passion for seeing the RJ programme to fruition, their position within opposing parties meant that 
they were unable to carry out these plans because of difficulties experienced in attempting to work 
other PNP colleagues, particularly in light of the shift in power from PNP to JLP at the time. She 
indicated that there was a fight for ownership over the RJ policy, where the PNP sought to claim 
 Donna Parchment-Brown acted as the legal representative for the Maroons for cases addressed 211
through the formal justice system. 
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ownership, despite the fact that both administrations had worked on its development . In her 212
interview, she stated that there was a purposeful delay in the publishing of the policy, so that PNP 
could take responsibility for the RJ programme.  
 Also, she noted a lack of organisational capacity in the JLP. Lightbourne (former political 
official, legal offices, 20/2/15) indicated that, despite a vested interest in RJ, the PNP had better 
relationships and connections with local and international organizations that would help to develop 
the programme. For instance, consultants Llewellyn (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) and Barrett 
(consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) indicated that IIRP gained this contract due to their relationship with 
the PNP and PS Palmer specifically. The CaPri report (2007) notes that the PNP placed a greater 
emphasis on collaborating with international agencies than the JLP. Lightbourne (former political 
official, legal offices, 20/2/15) stated that this failure of the JLP to build connections with the 
international funding agencies affected the flow of funding during their administration. If the two 
parties had collaborated, they might have benefitted from each other’s strengths; the JLP efforts 
might have resulted in a more contextualised policy, while the PNP’s d relationships with key 
stakeholders would have reconciled the issue of limited resources, and the need for increased 
overall organisation.  
 In 2009, IIRP began their training programme for facilitators. According to the CSJP Phase 
2 report and the 2009 MOJ Annual Report, IIRP trained 59 facilitators, the majority of whom were 
 The struggle for policy ownership is seen in the case of the 2009 SOA as well. The 2009 SOA 212
was passed under a JLP administration. During my interview with Dorothy Lightbourne, former 
Minister of Justice and National Security and Former Attorney-General, claimed ownership of the 
2009 SOA. As soon as the PNP returned to power in 2011, the Minister of Justice, Hon. Mark 
Golding called for an early review of the legislation, claiming that it suffered from a number of 
issues that needed to be addressed urgently. During out interview, when I asked him about 
consideration of other approaches to punishing sex offenders, such as chemical castration and 
rehabilitation, he stated that JLP was in power at the time and was unsure of how much analysis 
went into the development of the legislation. 
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JPs (MOJ, 2009; CSJP, 2011). However, Barrett (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) indicated that DRF 
did follow-up sessions after the initial training from IIRP.  
 As discussed, RJ is a malleable approach to justice that considers the social, political and 
economic context of the jurisdiction in which it is being practiced (Zehr, 2000; Llewellyn & Howse, 
1997; Liebmann, 2010; Wright, 2000). My interviews with Llewellyn (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) 
and Barrett (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15), and my own observations of IIRP Director, Ted Wachtel 
at the 2015 International RJ Conference, highlighted the distinction between the understanding of 
RJ held by IIRP and other stakeholders such as Professor Llewellyn and DRF. Consultants of the 
policymaking process and those who provided ad hoc training including Llewellyn (consultant, 
Skype, 10/1/15), Barrett (consultant, Skype, 10/1/15) and Barbara Toews,
  
(consultant, skype, 213
6/11/14), who conducted DRF training in the early 2000s) described their philosophy on RJ as a 
community-driven process, which adapts to the social, political and economic context.  
 On the other hand, IIRP takes a one-size-fits all approach to RJ. IIRP defines RJ as a 
specific practice with a set of defined protocols. It embraces the social discipline window (See 
Figure 7.1 below). The social discipline window is a model, which focuses on RJ as a leadership 
model for academic leaders and institutions, which are not necessarily applicable to the justice 
system (http://www.iirp.edu/what-we-do/what-is-restorative-practices/defining- restorative, 
accessed April 13, 2017). It views RJ practices as a part of a continuum.  
Chart 7.0 IIRP RJ Continuums  
 Professor Zehr from EMU provided training to DRF. Barbara Toews, a student of Zehr (Skype, 213
6/11/14), stated that their approach to training DRF was an inclusive one that focused on allowing 
participants to develop their own version of RJ, based on their context-specific needs. In particular, 
she stated that once the basics had been imparted, she would allow the discussion to be dominated 
by the participants, who would determine what they thought RJ should look like.  
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 (http://www.iirp.edu/what-we-do/what-is-restorative-practices/defining- restorative, accessed April 
13, 2017).  
 Throughout the continuum, they propose that using a set of scripted questions can be 
effective, regardless of context. On the informal end of the spectrum, IIRP identifies a series of 
affective statements to resolve conflict as well as scripted questions to be used for formal RJ 
conferences (http://www.iirp.edu/who-we-are/about-the-iirp/about-us, accessed April 13, 2017). 
Wachtel reiterated this idea at the international conference; RJ could be applied in any context with 
the use of these scripted questions. He proposed that these questions, such as “Why did you do it?” 
and “How does that make you feel?” could be used verbatim to resolve any type of conflict 
regardless of situation, time or place.  
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Figure 7.1 Social Discipline Windows  
    
(http://www.iirp.edu/what-we-do/what-is-restorative-practices/defining- restorative, accessed April 
13, 2017) .  214
 In her interview, Professor Llewellyn (consultant, skype, 10/2/15)  noted that IIRP is an 
organization that believes that RJ can be applied in the same way regardless of context. She went on 
to say that they market and sell RJ as if it were a product, which is antithetical to her philosophy of 
RJ.  
  As a theory, the social discipline window framework (as seen in Figure 7.1) focuses on 214
maintaining discipline in social norms and behavioural boundaries (Weitekamp & Kerner, 2002; 
Wachtel, 2013). It proposes that social interaction can be managed by focusing on the interplay of 
continuums of ‘control’ and ‘support’
.
 Although the social window framework argues for an 
inclusive approach to conflict resolution, these continuums posit RJ as opposite to punitive 
approaches to justice (Weitekamp & Kerner, 2002, p112; Wachtel, 2013). On one end of the 
spectrum, the approach that provides least support and control is considered punitive, while more 
control and support leads to a more restorative outcome (Wachtel, 1999). This is inconsistent with 
the Llewellyn’s understanding of RJ as retributive. 
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 In addition to hiring IIRP, Ruth Carey, the former head of the RJ unit, was hired as a projects 
specialist by MOJ under the JLP administration. She was mandated to write the RJ policy, along 
with other policies. In 2009, the RJ programme was yet to hire a lead consultant. Both Professor 
Llewellyn (consultant, skype, 10/2/15) and Audrey Barrett (Consultant, skype, 10/1/15) stated that 
MOJ asked Professor Llewellyn to reconsider taking the role. MOJ indicated that they had been 
unable to find someone local who fulfilled the job description. However, she declined for personal 
reasons and recommended that MOJ hired Audrey Barrett, who accepted the role and began her 
work in 2010.  
 In 2010, Barrett arrived in Jamaica to begin her role as NTA of the RJ programme. In her 
interview, Barrett (consultant, skype, 10/1/15) indicated that she was given no specific mandate, but 
went on to initiate activities pertaining to the development of the 1
st 
four RJ centres
 
and training 215
modules, the coordination of training sessions by herself and IIRP, PR activities, overall 
organization of the programme and its volunteers and most importantly, development of the policy. 
Upon her recommendation, MOJ hired Carey as the new director of the RJ unit in 2011. She also 
stated that indicated that immersing Carey within the RJ unit would help her to write the policy, 
which they worked on together to complete.  
 As discussed, PNP had a strong partnership with DRF. It was intended that DRF would 
provide substantial support to the RJ programme. According to RJ director, Mr Hall (RJU offices, 
28/11/14) and JRIU Lead, Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15), there was a MOU 
between the PNP administration and DRF that would allow the RJ programme to use DRF peace 
centres located throughout the island as sites for RJ conferences. Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, 
MOJ Offices, 30/2/15) indicated that after MOJ was given the responsibility of developing the 
 All centres were built in one of 11 pilot communities, which were chosen based on the high rates 215
of crime.
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policy, there was a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with DRF to lead the development and 
implementation of the RJ policy. However, as an ally of PNP, JLP failed to capitalise on this 
resource. Individuals with a strong affiliation to the PNP have led DRF, including Donna 
Parchment-Brown. Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15) notes that, upon the 
departure of Carol Palmer, there was no effort by the incoming JLP PS Rainford to maintain this 
agreement. Professor Llewellyn (consultant, skype, 10/2/15) noted a fight for ownership between 
the JLP administration and DRF, as DRF expected to lead the development and implementation of 
RJ, while the government would be relegated to the role of providing financial support.  
 Barrett (consultant, skype 10/1/15) confirmed this by noting instances where attempts to 
collaborate with DRF were met with much hostility, 
 “There was always this underlying sense of rivalry.. I found whenever I engaged with DRF,  
it was either DRFs way of no way. I remember once specifically where I asked for    
clarification because there was a side conversation that was going on between someone from  
DRF and another person from that meeting. I asked if they could share the discussion. And   
the response from DRF was ‘don’t worry, just give it to us and we will do it.”  
 As a result of the political competitiveness, the stated role of DRF in the National RJ Policy 
was limited to aiding the state in developing best practice standards for RJ in Jamaica (MOJ, 2012).  
Between 2010 and 2011, a number of financial issues arose again that affected the completion 
timeline of the programme. The JVJPPSD report confirmed that the RJ programme was delayed 
because of issues with receiving the allocated funding from UNDP. The report states that these 
delays in 2010 were caused by a failure of some of the partners to fulfil the funding requirements of 
UNDP. The state and CSOs had some difficulty attaining funding due to their limited financial 
administrative capacity. Also, Barrett (consultant, skype, 10/1/15) noted that many of the state-
allocated funds were reallocated due to IMF negotiations and the 2011 Commission of Enquiry 
investigating Dudus’ extradition.  
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 Again, there were changes in political power. Following Dudus’ extradition, former Prime 
Minister Golding and Lightbourne were questioned with regard to a number of activities during the 
extradition. Lightbourne was accused of exhibiting bias towards Dudus during the handling of the 
extradition request. In addition she was accused of giving false testimony during the enquiry. 
Lightbourne was removed from her position as Minister of Justice and Attorney General . JLP MP 216
Delroy Chuck took over the role of Minister of Justice. Prime Minister Golding denied claims of the 
Jamaican government contracting an international law firm, Manatt, Phleps and Phillips to prevent 
the extradition of Dudus. Instead he suggested that this engagement with the law firm was carried 
out on behalf of the JLP. Despite his denial of these claims, he resigned and conceded to Andrew 
Holness, the current Prime Minister.  
 RJ director, Carey completed the formulation of the policy and was sent to Parliament to 
review. In her interview, Barrett (skype, 10/1/15) indicated that, as National Tech Advisor, her 
perspective and her familiarity with the Nova Scotia RJ policy influenced the Jamaican policy. With 
Carey not being well versed in RJ at the time, the failed consultations and limited search for RJ 
models, the policy bore much resemblance to the Nova Scotia model.  
 The National RJ Policy (MOJ, 2012) identifies its goals as ‘(i) creating a culture of peace 
through developing values of mutual respect (ii) empowering communities by allowing them to 
respond to crime (iii) reducing case backlog by diverting cases from the formal justice system (iv) 
increasing public confidence in the justice system (v) reducing recidivism by addressing the 
underlying causes of criminal behaviour and (vi) eliminating the reprisal culture of Jamaica by de-
escalating community disputes’. Also, it provides a series of outlines including the protocols for 
participation, a governance structure, identification of key stakeholders, the legislative framework, 
 Also, the role of MOJ and Attorney General were split into separate roles.216
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monitoring and evaluation activities, description of the training model for facilitators, as well as 
when RJ conferences should be used within the justice process.  
 The policy outlines the circumstances in which RJ will be used in Jamaica and for what 
crimes (See Chart 8.1).  
Chart 8.1 MOJ RJ Referral Process  
 
 The policy document gives a list of the types of crime that restorative conferences can be 
used for. For pre-trial matters the list of offences include: (i) Unlawful wounding, (ii) Assaults, (iii) 
Property theft, (iv) Community noise, and (v) Property damage. For post-conviction cases all 
offences are included except: (i) Murder, (ii) Treason, (iii) Offences under section 3 of Malicious 
Injuries to property act, (iv) Firearm offences, (v) All offences under the offence against the person 
act (all related to murder), (vi) All offences under the dangerous drugs act (vii) All offences under 
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the child care and protection act, (viii) Terrorism, (ix) Perverting the course of justice, (x) Sexual 
offences, and (xi) All offences under the first schedule of the praedial larceny act.  
 Much of the policy is based on that of RJ in Nova Scotia, a provincial jurisdiction in 
Canada, where Llewellyn and Barrett are based. The Jamaican RJ policy identifies the Nova Scotia 
policy as one of the strongest models in the world (MOJ, 2012). I compared the national RJ policy 
published in Jamaica with the Nova Scotia policy. The structure and content of both documents are 
remarkably similar. The wording of the Eligibility Criteria checklist is verbatim to the Nova Scotia 
policy with the exception of the named agencies responsible for carrying out the assessment for 
eligibility (MOJ, 2012). Chapter 6 of the policy uses the same wording for discussing the range of 
RJ agreements, including supervision agreements (MOJ, 2012). Other sections of the policy mimic 
the Nova Scotia section explicitly, including the post-charge referral process, post-sentence referral 
and post-finding guilt referral process. Administrative techniques were transferred from the Nova 
Scotia policy; sections that copy the Nova Scotia policy refer to administrative procedures, such as 
the requirements for referral and how the agreements will be monitored;  
 The 2012 election saw the return of PNP to power. Following this shift, a number of 
personnel changes took place. Mark Golding (2012-2016) became the MOJ and PS Carol Palmer 
returned. The National RJ policy was published by the new PNP administration in 2012. However, 
Lightbourne (former politician, legal offices, 20/2/15)  stated that the Cabinet had approved the 
policy in 2011, corresponding to her suggestion of an intentional delay of its publication so that the 
PNP could take ownership of the programme. Finally, Parchment-Brown left her role at DRF to 
head the JRIU in 2016.  
 In 2012, 7 additional RJ centres were built and sensitisation sessions continued. In 2014, 
Carey’s contract ended. However instead of renewing her contract, Roydon Hall (RJ director,JRU 
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Offices, 28/11/14) indicated she left the RJ unit to start her own RJ consulting firm during our 
interview. I confirmed this through the website for the Centre for Social Transformation itself: 
http://cstconsulting.org/ (accessed June 2018). Her departure was reportedly due to a failure to work 
alongside PNP counterparts. Professor Llewellyn (consultant, skype, 10/2/15) and Barrett 
(consultant, skype, 10/1/15)  both discussed the unfriendly working relationships between the 
administration and supporters of the opposition party. Minister Golding (MOJ offices, 11/18/14) 
stated that PS Palmer (PNP) and the RJ director Carey (hired under JLP administration) had 
difficulties getting along. Barrett (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) confirmed that, as a political entity, 
MOJ was a difficult space for Carey to work in effectively. Upon telling Barrett that Carey declined 
my interview, she (consultant, skype, 10/1/15)  states,  
 “Ruth went through a lot at MOJ. Being a political entity, it had a lot of politics going on in  
 it. I think it was then at the level of the PS that things would often go wrong”.  
 Upon Carey’s departure, Roydon Hall was given the role of interim RJ unit director. In the 
same year the RJ programme began to run RJ conferences on the basis of community referrals only 
at community centres.  
 In 2014, the national RJ programme began running conferences at the community dispute 
level. Although I did not observe a complete conference, my observations and my interviews gave 
me an understanding of what the conference process in Jamaica looks like currently. In particular, I 
visited 2 of the RJ centres; the Spanish Town Restorative Centre and the Tower Hill restorative 
centre in Olympic Gardens respectively. Both sites had issues that affected the capacity for persons 
to participate in RJ. For instance the Spanish Town Restorative Centre had no signage to indicate to 
direct persons towards the building. Upon my arrival there was no clear direction to the entrance, 
nor was anyone at the premises to provide any assistance. I was given an overview of the case itself, 
asked a number of questions ranging from my overall disposition on that day, my awareness of RJ 
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to my initial thoughts on how the case should be handled. I was given detailed information about 
the process that would take place, if it went forward to the conference stage. I was informed that on 
the day community members would be called into a room with the facilitator, while the offender 
and victim were kept in separate rooms. The facilitator would welcome us and provide us with 
instructions, such as the use of the talking piece (which was a tennis ball) and the need for 
confidentiality. The offender and victim would be brought in separately and introduced. The 
facilitator would then coordinate an opening apology and statement by the offender, which would 
be followed by a victim statement. The facilitator would then ask for input from all parties on the 
case and ways in which it could be resolved. Once all terms for the offender were agreed upon, the 
facilitator would then leave the room to write up the restorative agreement. During this time, 
participants were asked to fill out an exit survey. The facilitator would then return and ask offender 
and witnesses to sign the restorative agreement.  
 By 2015, PS Palmer (MOJ Offices, 10/1/15) and Donna Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, 
MOJ Offices, 30/2/15) indicated that approximately 80 cases had been conducted and 20 were 
complete. Implementation activities continued through to 2016, when, as the Policy states, over 
5000 Jamaicans in the pilot communities identified were exposed to RJ. Over 40 more facilitators 
were trained. In 2015, the CSJP Phase 3 began. This phase gave significantly more attention to the 
RJ programme. Both the IDB and DFID CSJP Phase 3 loan proposals discuss plans to expand the 
RJ programme to allow eligible cases to get to a point of resolution within the pilot communities 
(DFID, 2014; IDB, 2014). 
 Official reports state that only 46 cases have been conducted. However, my interviews 
revealed that practices are not being carried out as stated within the policy. PS Palmer (MOJ 
Offices, 10/1/15) and RJU Acting Director, Roydon Hall (RJU Offices, 28/11/14) stated that RJ has 
been used informally to address more serious crimes such as rape, despite the fact that the policy 
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excludes them. Mr. Hall (RJ director, RJ Unit, 28/11/14)indicated that monitoring and analysis 
procedures might be flawed because of the failure to consider poor literacy rates within pilot 
communities. At the end of a restorative conference, participants are given a survey in order to 
determine their satisfaction level. Mr. Hall (RJ director, RJ Unite, 28/11/14) stated that there had 
been difficulty attaining accurate information since many participants were unable to read the 
questionnaire and instead, picked answers randomly. Thus measuring the success of the programme 
is inaccurate. Confidentiality is intended to be of utmost importance in any restorative process. 
However, during my visit to Tower Hill RJ Centre, I arrived to discover that my pre-meeting was to 
take place outside of the centre, due to the fact that a church event was occupying the premises, 
negating any sense of anonymity for those involved, including the facilitators. Other persons from 
the community were loitering outside the gate of the property, within earshot of the permeating, 
which might affect the confidentiality of the participants. Also, DRF continues to utilise restorative 
practices that are not approved by the national policy for crimes that are officially excluded from 
the list of eligible offences.  
 My observations indicated that there was limited emphasis on ensuring the success of the RJ 
programme. A series of PR activities took place during 2015. However these sessions did little to 
develop public awareness of RJ. Barrett (consultant, skype, 10/1/15) noted that both administrations 
carried out a lot of PR activities, as a way of showing the public that they were taking action. I 
attended the International RJ Conference and a RJ Library Exhibition that were held as part of 
International RJ week. Throughout all observations, there was consistent mention of expanding RJ 
to schools . However, there was no discussion of the success of the pilot on the justice system. 217
The demonstrated lack of due diligence is consistent throughout my observations. The International 
 Many of the plenary discussions focused on implementing RJ in schools. The keynote speaker, 217
Wachtel acknowledged that his expertise was the implementation of RJ in schools and indicated that 
he had not visited to see the progression of RJ in ten years.
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Conference had a series of plenary sessions as well as two main sessions, where Wachtel was the 
keynote speaker. Generally, the discussion was limited to the idea of RJ as a way of creating 
‘healing’, but there was no discussion of what RJ looked like in practice or how it would achieve 
this healing in Jamaica. Wachtel was asked to speak on RJ and HR. As an expert on RJ in schools, 
Wachtel stated openly that this was something he knew nothing about or had given any thought to. 
Art submissions from primary students throughout the country focused on the ‘spirit’ of RJ and its 
ability to heal the communities, rather than educating people about RJ within Jamaica. At the 
conference, many of the panellists had limited previous interaction with the RJ programme and 
demonstrated little awareness of RJ and the status of the programme in Jamaica. Dr. Gerstenburg, 
the Senior HR Advisor for the UN, who was part of a panel discussion at the conference, 
acknowledged that she had little awareness of RJ. In fact, only 3 of the 8 speakers were described as 
being involved with the RJ movement in the conference brochure.  
 I attended another event: a library exhibition that was intended to launch RJ week, which 
sought to spread awareness throughout the younger Jamaica community. Students between the ages 
of 5 and 12 years attended this exhibition. However, the presentations made at the exhibition were 
not appropriate for the age range of the audience and nor did they refer specifically to RJ. The 
speeches from various members of parliament did not define RJ or discuss how it is used. Minister 
of Education (JLP), Ronald Thwaites’ speech consisted of anecdotal stories of crimes, including 
gruesome details (someone’s head being bashed in by their lover), which could have frightened the 
children present. During the exhibition children were questioned about RJ. The documentation 
provided was not created to serve its audience. At the library exhibition, some of the information 
describing RJ was pulled directly from the official statement of the policy without consideration 
that the audience consisted largely of children. There were no questions regarding access to RJ 
Page !280
services in Jamaica, details of the actual process or even how teachers and students in school might 
use it.  
 Also, the observations confirmed that the hiring of IIRP was ill advised. At the conference 
there was a VIP sensitisation session, where Wachtel made himself available to answer questions 
from a group of VIPs, which consisted of members of the judiciary, government, law enforcement, 
members of DRF and Canadian funders. However he was unable answer a number of fundamental 
questions about RJ, including questions regarding assessment criteria for effectiveness and how RJ 
would be practiced within a justice system. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have provided a detailed account of RJ in Jamaica with particular emphasis 
on the development and implementation of the policy. Since I completed my research in 2015, the 
RJ programme has continued. A 2016 election saw the return of JLP to power . A new RJ director 218
was hired. In 2016 the policy was enacted into legislation as the Law Reform (Restorative Justice) 
Act (2016).  The most recent newspaper publications indicate that there have been over 200 RJ 
conferences, of which 189 have yielded agreements. There has also been some discussion of 
expanding RJ to schools. However, there is some indication that there continues to be a lack of 
collaboration in terms of implementation. For instance, DRF have publicised plans to introduce 
gender-based violence training, while the Law Reform Act does not permit RJ to be applied to any 
offences listed under the Sexual Offences Act (2009) (https://jis.gov.jm/peace-and-justice-centres-
to-offer-gender-based-violence-training/, accessed January, 2019). 
 The following chapter will focus on the application of the Dolowitz & Marsh framework to 
this account of the policymaking process, which will highlight further the voluntary motivation for 
 Carol Palmer has retained her position as Permanent Secretary. 218
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policy transfer and the inappropriateness of its adoption from Nova Scotia, despite the lack of 
coercion from international stakeholders.  
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  Chapter 8: Examining the Transfer of RJ Policy in Jamaica  
 In this chapter, I examine the efforts of the Jamaican government to create a national RJ 
policy. Despite being prompted by the agenda of developed states, namely Canada, a national RJ 
policy had the potential to reduce crime in Jamaica and subsequently improve public trust of the 
state. In this chapter, I will explain how this policymaking process became a failed opportunity for 
the Jamaican government. The Dolowitz & Marsh framework will help to explain how 
inappropriate policy transfer took place. Stemming from the opportunistic motivation for policy 
transfer and political competitiveness between political parties and their affiliated organisations, the 
Jamaican government failed to consider sufficiently the political, social and cultural differences 
between itself and the donor jurisdiction throughout the development and implementation of the 
national RJ policy, such as public mistrust of the state, lack of financial and professional resources 
and the presence of other local informal justice systems already operating in Jamaica. This failure to 
give sufficient weight to context is further demonstrated by the lack of collaborative governance.  
Dolowitz & Marsh Policy Framework  
 Having given a narrative of RJ in Jamaica, I will now apply the Dolowitz and Marsh policy 
transfer framework to highlight a number of themes that are evident within the research. In 
particular, I establish that policy transfer took place; mainly from Nova Scotia and Philadelphia to 
Jamaica. However, the research demonstrates that the lack of collaborative governance throughout 
the policymaking process meant a failure to consider these contextual issues mentioned above. 
Thus, I argue that the national RJ policy stands as an example of inappropriate policy transfer; 
where there was a failure of the policymakers and other stakeholders to create a policy that 
considers the various economic, social, and political differences between Jamaica and the donor 
countries. The inappropriate use of policy transfer resulted in discrepancies between policy and 
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practice and poor implementation as a whole. The limited uptake and ill-considered implementation 
of RJ in Jamaica stands as a failed opportunity to implement an approach to crime that had the 
potential to address the Jamaican context without being under duress from international donors and 
precedent for its success.  
 I will now respond to the various questions as set out by the Dolowitz and Marsh Policy 
transfer Framework, which will highlight further how the research supports this position. I have 
established collaborative governance as a key process of policymaking. By making the 
policymaking inclusive, one considers the perspectives of all involved and how best to address them 
through a cohesive policy. Collaborative governance is an effective way of addressing potential 
pitfalls such as lack of professional or financial resources and public mistrust of the state. In the 
case of the national RJ policy, I argue that the failure to be collaborative contributed to the 
disconnect between the aims and implementation of the policy as well as the limited uptake of the 
RJ programme. Neither administration embraced their stated intentions of collaborative governance 
to policymaking The Jamaican government collaborated with the donors, allowing them to 
influence key decisions, shape the policy and maintained consistent communication throughout the 
policymaking process. However, they often ignored the advice of international consultants who 
advocated for contextualisation, as it was not consistent with their motivation to give the 
appearance of implementing ‘First World’ programmes. Also the state  
excluded key stakeholders from decision-making processes and limited their involvement in the 
programme. I characterize the nature of the interaction between the state and civil society as one of 
cooperation, as their role was limited to service provision for specific tasks and their engagement 
was short- term and informal. In addition, the public was engaged in a tokenistic manner, as they 
were only informed and did not influence policy development. The state did not engage with other 
non-state stakeholders at all. As stated earlier, this failure to collaborate resulted in a lack of 
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consensus on the understanding of RJ and a disjointed approach to developing a policy that did not 
consider Jamaican context.  
Who was involved?  
 Political officials from both administrations were involved directly in the policymaking 
process. Since there were changes to national leadership between 2001 and 2015, both the JLP and 
PNP influenced the national RJ policy. I have discussed the antagonistic relationship between 
political parties has affected the capacity for a unified approach to policymaking and collaboration. 
Dr McCalpin (telephone, 3/3/15), who sat on the RJ committee and Barrett, the NTA (Skype, 
10/1/15), both confirmed that the differences in the policymaking approaches of political parties 
resulted in a lack of continuity throughout the policymaking process. Barrett (consultant, Skype, 
10/1/15) and Professor Llewellyn (consultant, Skype, 10/2/15) stated that they observed JLP 
utilising a bottom-up, but disorganised approach to develop the RJ policy to create a contextualised 
policy. On the other hand, the PNP approach was top-down and structured, which aimed to develop 
a policy that was consistent with international practices. According to my interviews with Minister 
Golding (MOJ Offices, 11/18/14) and Parchment-Brown (JRIU Director, MOJ Offices, 3/2/15), PS 
Palmer spearheaded the MOJ’s role in getting tasks accomplished and ran a tight ship in terms of 
supervising employees. However, Barrett (consultant, Skype, 10/1/15) indicated that the JLP 
Minister Rainford and the Permanent Secretary, who replaced PS Palmer during her absence, were 
far more laid-back in their approach. Former Minister Lightbourne (JLP) (legal offices, 20/2/15)  
also highlighted the failure of the JLP PS, stating, “He was a disaster, am so sorry, and he didn’t 
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have a clue what he was doing and he messed up the whole thing” .
 
Former director Roydon Hall 219
(RJU Offices, 28/11/14) indicated that prior to the return of PNP to administration and Carey being 
hired, the RJ director under the JLP administration failed to spend the funding given, indicating a 
certain level of apathy towards implementation. This is consistent with the variation in motivation 
between the two parties. McCalpin (consultant, telephone, 3/3/15) stated that different 
administrations embraced RJ for different reasons. While the PNP focused on more practical uses of 
RJ, such as reducing backlog and recidivism, JLP viewed RJ as a way of re-envisioning justice 
towards a more community driven, contextualised approach to justice. This was highlighted during 
my interviews with PNP and JLP representatives. During my interview with Minister Golding (MOJ 
Offices, 11/18/2014) (PNP), he emphasised the capacity of RJ to divert cases from the formal 
justice system and quell violence in volatile communities. When I asked about the contextualisation 
of the policy, he noted that policymakers, ‘were quite firm about not departing too much from the 
established principles as to how it’s to work’. On the other hand, former MOJ Dorothy Lightbourne 
(legal offices, 20/2/15), (JLP) highlighted the JLPs focus on listening to the public through 
consultation and the public interest in becoming more invested in attaining justice. She states,  
 “we went to the public and found that they wanted justice and that the system as it stood was 
 not giving them justice; that they did not have any input as to how the system worked..they  
 are apathetic because they think it isn’t working for them, but when we listened to them,   
 they would tell us what they would like to see. I don’t know how much of it was taken on  
 board, but they had a lot to say”  
 I suggest that the fight for ownership and funding hampered the capacity for collaborative 
governance. I have discussed the fight for ownership of the RJ policy between political parties. As a 
 Also, the multiple leadership changes at the level of national leadership, especially at the MP 219
level also affected the capacity for collaboration. National Technical Advisor, Barrett (consultant, 
Skype, 10/01/15) indicated that during her time as a consultant, she served under 3 different MPs. 
Both Barrett and former RJ director, Hall  (RJU Offices, 28/11/14) stated that these changes at the 
MP level affected the rollout of the programme as they constantly had to update new MPs on the 
status of the RJ programme and subject to any recommendations made by them. 
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result, both parties failed to benefit from each other’s strengths and address their own weaknesses. 
For instance, the focus of the PNP was on operational success rather than contextualisation. The 
top-down approach of the PNP meant increased productivity with a focus of rolling out the 
programme quickly in a way that did not disrupt the function of the current justice system. Based on 
interviews and the timeline of events in conjunction with the reign of political parties the PNP 
administration was responsible for a number of operational achievements, including the tentative 
partnership with DRF, the attainment of funding, the coordination of study tours to Canada as well 
as the building of 7 RJ centres.  
 Initial JLP plans to investigate local forms of community justice and other contextual issues 
were discontinued by the PNP administration (2012-2016). In fact, they actively pushed against 
consideration of context. For instance, their close association with IIRP and their non-contextual 
application of RJ fits in with the top-down approach of the PNP, which also fails to incorporate the 
voice of stakeholders (which I will discuss shortly). There was neglect of the advice regarding the 
value of contextualisation by both Llewellyn and Barrett. PS Palmer (PNP) (MOJ Offices, 10/1/15) 
stated the refusal to collaborate with dons. Also, Lightbourne (former politician, legal offices, 
20/2/15) spoke about the fight within the MOJ under PNP administration about the joint efforts of 
Parchment-Brown (JRIU) and Lightbourne to take the Maroons on board as official consultants for 
the RJ policy.  
 The RJ national policy might have been more effective in considering the Jamaican reality if 
it had partnered with the JLP and their bottom-up and contextualised approach. The JLP 
administration was responsible for initial investigation into the Maroon justice system and the 
hiring of Barrett, who proposed a more contextualised approach to developing RJ. As the policy 
was completed during a JLP administration, the RJ programme has some elements that consider the 
Jamaican context, including the facilitator-training module (which was developed by Barrett, who 
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placed much emphasis on contextualisation). As presented in the National Policy, the module has 
elements that consider how RJ should work within a Jamaican context, such as the section on 
‘Orientation to the National Programme in Jamaica’.  
 However, the JLP administration was not proactive about the RJ programme. Barrett 
(consultant, Skype, 10/1/15) noted that the approach of JLP MOJ PS Rainford and the JLP as a 
whole was ‘not overly aggressive’ , ‘laid back’ and disorganised,  
 “What I found, upon my arrival, is that is wasn’t overly organized and wasn’t clear what the  
 position was...as the national technical advisor, on one had, had a whole lot of freedom,   
 because the government didn’t have a clear vision, they just wanted it implemented”. 
 Also, the JLP suffered from a number of internal issues, which affected their organisational 
capacity and availability of strong leadership. Lightbourne (former politician, legal offices, 20/2/15) 
noted that her own party (JLP) suffered from not engaging in partnership with the PNP, as they had 
better contacts and better relationships with funders. She spoke about the PNP being granted 
extensions, the JLP were delayed in receiving money from funders. NTA, Barrett (consultant, 
skype, 10/1/15) affirmed that the shift from PNP to JLP resulted in a loss of the strong partnership 
developed between the international funders and the PNP.  
 While parties did not collaborate with each other, they collaborated with the international 
stakeholders. They had consistent communication, were involved in decision making, exchanged 
resources and an overlapping of boundaries between state and funders. The policy itself states that 
primacy was given to the developing partnerships with international stakeholders and ensuring that 
local RJ protocol would be consistent with international standards (MOJ, 2012). McCalpin 
(consultant, telephone, 3/3/15)  affirmed that, when sitting on the committee, that the Canadian 
funders had influence on the policy through their financial and professional contributions. As a 
funder, IDB played an active in policymaking by choosing monitoring the contributions of all 
funders. Also, UNDP coordinated efforts of victim support under the RJ programme and gave 
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practical assistance in developing the RJ unit. As a donor country, Canada was also directly 
involved. Both administrations supported the hiring of consultants from Canada, despite the fact 
that both consultants initially declined the offer, recommending that local persons should be 
hired
216
. The steering committee had representatives from the IFIs as well. During my observation 
at the international RJ conference, I noted that a majority of those that were VIP invitees were 
international funders. At these sessions, they were able to answer questions about the status of the 
RJ programme in Jamaica that local stakeholders were unable to.  
 While there was emphasis given to donors, the state’s relationship with the international 
consultants specifically, was that of coordination. They were asked to provide services and complete 
a range of tasks, which affected the outcome of policy transfer. As discussed, consultants were hired 
to guide the development of RJ programme through training, research papers and strategic planning 
(MOJ, 2012; MOJ 2009). As the NTA to the RJ programme, Barrett (consultant, skype, 10/1/15) 
lists a series of activities that she coordinated on behalf of the state, including the development of 
training modules and development of the policy. As a result, consultants have had some influence 
by being able to control the way in which they carried out these activities. Barrett (consultant, 
Skype, 10/01/15) acknowledges that her influence resulted in much of the policy resembling that of 
the Nova Scotia policy particularly and her influence in hiring Carey to write the policy.  
 However there is no indication that consultants were included in key decision making 
activities. The consultants were never asked to meet or work together for the sake of building a 
single consensus. None of the consultants were on the steering committee. Also, many of their 
recommendations were ignored, such as the incorporation of the dons into the RJ programme, the 
potential value of partnership with the Church and the prospective use of RJ for sexual offences in 
Jamaica. Also, Llewellyn’s recommendations to hire a local consultant were ignored, as they asked 
Page !289
her to be a consultant twice. IIRP’s role was limited to service provision as well, such as facilitator 
training and PR activities. At the international conference, Wachtel confirmed this by stating that he 
had not visited in ten years and was relatively unaware of the status of the RJ programme. The 
limited role of consultants and the lack of collaboration between them resulted in a lack of 
consensus of stakeholders throughout the RJ programme. For instance, Barrett, IIRP and DRF, 
which have varied understandings of RJ, trained multiple cohorts of practitioners. Training from 
IIRP would have focused on implementing a one-size-fits-all best practice, while Barrett and DRF 
emphasised an approach that considered each case individually and local context. The fact that IIRP, 
Barrett and DRF trained RJ facilitators means that RJ facilitators will have varied understandings of 
RJ and its purpose for Jamaica. Naturally the inconsistency training would be reflected in the 
delivery of RJ conferences and, subsequently the satisfaction levels of participants.  
 The state also limited its interaction with the public to that of informing them about the RJ 
programme. However, this effort was not carried out efficiently. Interviews and the policy itself 
highlighted the failure of state to collaborate with the public. McCalpin (consultant, telephone, 
3/3/15) noted that one of the main failures of the policy was that it did not domesticate best 
practices by incorporating public opinion. He noted that, despite it being a mandate of the steering 
committee, there was never any discussion of how RJ should be implemented to consider local 
context , such as proximity between victims and offenders within communities or the popularity 220
of reprisal crime as part of the informerphobia culture. These issues within politically affiliated 
communities were important considerations for the RJ programme, as persons might not be willing 
to participate in RJ if not protected from possible vigilante attacks. In this way, the failure to 
incorporate the public might have affected the uptake of the programme. The policy includes a copy 
of the consultation process, which focused on providing information about RJ, rather than garnering 
  This committee was the only form of participation for academics and CSOs.220
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public opinion on the kinds of context-specific issues that the RJ programme should have 
considered. As part of the consultation, questionnaires were handed out to participants. However, 
the questionnaires assumed that citizens had a solid understanding of the justice system. It did not 
provide factual information on the nature of offending or the justice system.  
 As discussed, the consultations did not include groups who were likely to participate in RJ, 
such as victims and offenders. The consultations with different potential stakeholders demonstrate 
the varied considerations and recommendations that might have been garnered. For instance, my 
female-victim survivor focus group highlighted the interest of victims of sexual violence to 
participate in RJ and some of the considerations that would need to be reconciled. Most of the 
women said they would utilise RJ, but offered a number of criteria that would make them feel 
comfortable, including the presence of a psychologist, physical space between themselves and the 
wrongdoer, as well as anonymity of identity and location of the RJ conference. Having this 
information might have encouraged collaboration with civil society and other non-state 
stakeholders. For instance, by partnering with DRF, the Jamaican government would have had 
access to their peace centres, which were already trusted public spaces. This would have negated 
the need for building or occupying spaces that were identified for the state RJ programme 
specifically.  
 Former RJ director, Hall (RJU Offices, 28/11/14) indicated that the presence of 
psychologists had not been considered by MOJ. However, collaborating with CSOs and 
universities, such as NCU might have allowed cost-effective access to counsellors that were 
familiar with ADR. In addition, despite the fact that the victim-survivor group highlighted the value 
of researchers to observe conferences, so that the programme could consistently be improved upon, 
PS Palmer (MOJ Offices, 10/1/15) and Hall (RJU Director, RJU Offices, 28/11/14)both confirmed 
that this was not allowed under the RJ policy.  
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 On the other hand, the community focus group emphasised the consideration of current 
legislation and implications for the misuse of RJ for revenge. Persons suggested that the RJ 
programme should consider the availability of legal counsel to ensure that RJ did not violate the 
rights of offenders or are too lenient on them. Also, they asked questions based on practicality such 
as how participation might affect job security and childcare. Had the Jamaican government asked 
these questions, they might have considered collaboration with the NMLS, where law students 
might have provided legal advice in return for course credit. Also, partnerships could have been 
developed with schools and corporate organisations (such as Digicel Foundation) that provide 
childcare to assist participants where needed.  
 Similar to the Jamaican government, I used questionnaires to confirm the local 
understanding of and response to RJ . The responses to the questionnaires distributed by the 221
government highlighted a hesitation to apply RJ for more serious crimes and confirmed the 
popularity of the harsh punishment, such as beatings and incarceration. However my questionnaires 
focused on informing the public with factual information and identifying the reasons for hesitation 
to participate and the kinds of measures that might encourage it. Many persons identified fear as the 
main reason for non-participation, confirming the need for a Jamaican restorative process to address 
the issue of informerphobia. The participation-encouraging measures were similar to those of the 
focus groups, including arranging for a psychologist, law enforcement, legal counsel and the 
anonymity of participants.  
 I have noted briefly the missed opportunities for the state to collaborate with civil society. 
Where there was interaction, the involvement of civil society was limited to that of cooperation. 
 The Jamaican government did not maximize this approach, despite its capacity to garner a large 221
number of responses with limited expenditure. They collected 923 responses from within the same 
group of participants from the Talking Circles.  
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Their interaction was task-oriented and intermittent. For instance, PS Palmer (MOJ Offices, 
10/1/15) noted that organisations such as HEART
 
and UNDP as instrumental in providing 222
support to the RJ programme. The national RJ policy includes a general note that identifies CSOs as 
an important stakeholder within the implementation process in terms of service delivery and making 
a connection with the public (MOJ, 2012). However, no specific CSOs were identified as having a 
specific role. DRF was limited tot that of facilitator training and conducting public consultations, 
alongside Barrett and IIRP. McCalpin (consultant, telephone, 3/3/15) notes the presence of civil 
society representatives from DRF and PMI on the steering committee. McCalpin (consultant, 
telephone, 3/3/15) noted that his own organization, Truth and Action Justice Group, carried out 
sensitisation sessions surrounding reconciliation and healing. However McCalpin’s group was not 
identified as a stakeholder in the policy.  
 The political competitiveness also affected the limited relationship with civil society. The 
departure of (PNP) PS Palmer under the JLP administration resulted in a failure to maintain a 
partnership with DRF. In this policymaking process, DRF maintained its allegiance to PNP, which 
hampered the capacity of the JLP administration to develop the RJ programme, as evidenced by the 
difficulty that Barrett faced working with DRF under a JLP administration and their failure to 
maintain MOUs regarding its partnership. Former RJ director Hall (RJU Offices, 28/11/14) stated 
that PS Palmer’s replacement, (JLP) PS Rainford did not adhere to the MOU that was in place to 
use DRF centres for RJ services, which would have been a cost-effective and familiar space for 
participants to experience RJ, there by improving the uptake of the programme. If the PNP and JLP 
 The Human Employment and Resource Training Trust (HEART) is a training and resource 222
development organisation that provides technical and vocational education across Jamaica (https://
www1.heart-nta.org/About1, accessed September 2018).  
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had collaborated, the JLP would not have suffered from this loss of network . Admittedly a lack of 223
professional and financial resources might have hampered the collaboration between state and 
CSOs. However, the proliferation of self-reliant organisations such as DRF, JFJ and Standup for 
Jamaica, meant that, as discussed, CSOs were already providing services that might have been 
incorporated into a contextual RJ programme, such as counselling, training and rehabilitation.  
 However, the JVPPSD report (2008) states that CSJP not only failed to partner with local 
NGOs for the consistent delivery of services, but also engaged minimally with other state-run 
agencies with similar mandates, such as PMI (GOJ, 2012). For instance, despite its long-standing 
use of RJ in Jamaica, DRF is not named as a referral agency for the national RJ programme. During 
my interviews with Hines (DRF Director, DRF Offices, 7/11/14) and Hutchinson (PMI Director, 
PMI Offices, 26/2/15) , they demonstrated little awareness of the status of the national RJ 
programme, stating that most of the information was filtered through Parchment-Brown, as a former 
director of both organisations. Also, Minister Golding (MOJ Offices, 11/18/14) acknowledged a 
failure to partner with DRF effectively, citing a lack of capacity as justification. However, as 
discussed the Jamaican government had already contracted them to handle all mediation on behalf 
of the formal justice system, whilst running their own independent ADR services across the country. 
All other CSO representatives that I interviewed said that they were not asked to participate in the 
policymaking process.  
 Minister Golding (MOJ Offices, 18/11/14) intimated that one of the reasons that DRF was not 223
given the responsibility of developing the RJ programme was a lack of capacity. Similarly, the civil 
society leaders whom I interviewed such as director of AWOJA, Hermoine McKenzie (AWOJA 
Offices, 16/2/15), the coordinator of Stand-up for Jamaica, Carla Gulotta (Standup for Jamaica 
offices, 20/1/15) and Director of the FES, Judith Wedderburn (FES Offices, 10/10/14) indicated that 
one of the main issues that civil society suffers from is a lack of professional and financial 
resources. Thus the dependence on the IFIs for funding prevented the creation of partnerships with 
civil society.
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 Finally, there was no engagement with non-state criminal stakeholders at all. As stated 
earlier, Canadian, local consultants and the public suggested an examination into informal justice 
systems in Jamaica and more specifically, the incorporation of dons as consistent with the 
contextual approach of RJ. Despite this, PS Palmer (MOJ Offices, 10/1/15) indicated the state’s 
opposition to incorporating these suggestions. In addition, plans to consult with Maroons regarding 
their justice system were discontinued by the PNP government. Instead they developed partnerships 
with international organisations such as UNDP, CSJP and IIRP to carry out service provision. 
Consistent with the literature and RJ programme research papers, the incorporation of dons would 
have allowed the state to understand why the public trusted the jungle justice system. Having dons, 
who are trusted by garrison constituents, co-sign the RJ programme might have encouraged 
increased participation from its citizens. This would be an important step in improving the 
administration of justice in Jamaica. If the efforts of the JLP to investigate the maroon justice 
system had been actualised, the state would have benefitted from the insight into an informal justice 
system, similar to RJ that was also consistent with the Jamaican culture.  
What is the motivation for policy transfer?  
 As discussed, stakeholders have varied and multiple motivations for engaging in policy 
transfer. I will now discuss these various motivations of the aforementioned stakeholders. In 
keeping with the Dolowitz and Marsh Policy Transfer Framework Continuum (Figure 1.2), I 
suggest that political officials engaged in opportunistic transfer for the national RJ policy, as they 
are motivated without coercion by a desire to attain funding from donors in order to claim party-
political ownership of the policy and give the appearance of addressing crime in Jamaica. This is a 
departure from the history of semi-coercive policy transfer seen in Jamaican policymaking.  
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 The decision to reform the justice system in Jamaica was prompted by international 
disapproval of the justice sector and in particular its inadequate response to crime that affects 
developed states such as the transnational drug trade (Levy, 2009; Harriott, 2009; Dalby, 2009; 
Golding, 2012; Barrows, 2014; Silva, 2015). Also, the Jamaican government sought to respond to 
the shift in global governance towards developing best practice standards such as community justice 
and gender equality (Fruhling, Tulchin & Golding, 2003; Stone, 2004; Jones & Schoburgh, 2004; 
Dalby, 2009; Levy, 2009; Monahagn, 2015) .  224
 The Jamaican government was keen to maintain existing partnerships with countries and 
financial institutions by aligning their justice reform efforts in a way that is consistent with their 
interests. As a practice, RJ is in keeping with international trends in justice reform and the stated 
mandates of the donor countries funders as evidenced by the recommendation of RJ made by 
Llewellyn at the 2001 Commission of Enquiry. The research demonstrates the opportunistic nature 
of policy transfer. As stated by Parchment-Brown, as the CEO of DRF (MOJ Offices, 3/2/15) , her 
suggestion to the Jamaican government to introduce a national RJ programme was not well 
received. It was not until the Canadian expert witnesses suggested RJ as a potential avenue to 
reduce crime that the Jamaican government considered its adoption. Following this suggestion, the 
Jamaican government limited their study tours to Canada and the United States in an effort to secure 
funding from them. Also, the policy mentions Canada as a pioneering force in using RJ effectively 
11 times, more than any other jurisdiction mentioned. As stated, the government sought Canadian 
 Monahagn (2015) discusses the impact of global governance meetings as a site for policy 224
transfer of justice policy. He discusses the G8 meetings, which are a tool for the Global North to 
place pressure on the South to implement policies that are in line with their own interests 
(Monahagn, 2015). In the case of Jamaica, the motivation for reform was prompted by the 2000 
Millennium Summit, which encouraged partnership between developing and developed countries to 
‘create an environment at national and global levels alike- which is conducive to the development 
and elimination of poverty’ (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/mdg2005progresschart.pdf, 
accessed October 16, 2016).  
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consultants, despite their advice to hire someone local and kept Canadian funders involved 
throughout the policymaking process. I noted the awareness of the RJ programme demonstrated by 
Canadian representatives at the PR activities I attended. Also, two individuals represented CIDA on 
the steering committee. Lightbourne (former politician, legal offices, 20/2/15) stated that PS Palmer 
would also go to great lengths to have an international component at RJ events. Professor Llewellyn 
(consultant, skype, 10/2/15) also discussed the fact that IIRP put PS Palmer on their board, in order 
to bolster their chances of becoming the official trainers for the national RJ programme.  
 The opportunistic nature of the policy transfer is highlighted further by the lack of sincere 
motivation of both political parties to maintain RJ as a priority. Lightbourne (former politician, legal 
offices/ 20/2/15) stated that, during her time at MOJ, she certainly felt that while the government 
was focused on reducing backlog, the communities were seeking an overall shift in the 
administration of justice. During our discussions, both Barrett (consultant, skype, 10/1/15) and 
Lightbourne (former politician, legal offices, 20/2/15) noted that during their time at MOJ, a lot of 
money was spent on PR. She stated that the government was eager to let the public know that they 
were attacking crime. However, neither of the parties indicated the prioritization of RJ in their 
official documentation. The CaPri report (2007), which provides an analysis of the various aspects 
of the political parties’ manifestos prior to the 2007 election, states that the PNP’s manifesto was 
vague in its discussion on justice. RJ was mentioned briefly in PNP 2007 Manifesto (4 times), as 
part of efforts to increase community justice programmes (PNP, 2007, CaPri, 2007; ECLAC, 2008). 
While they mention the issues that need to be addressed, such as backlog, they do not state RJ as a 
response to these issues definitively (CaPri, 2007).  
 The JLP does mention RJ more than the JLP. The JLP manifesto discusses responses to 
backlog in greater detail, including increasing the powers of JPs through ADR (CaPri, 2007). 
However, subsequent JLP documents, such as the 2010 Jamaica Security Report only mentions RJ 
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once. Also, the 2008-2009 MOJ Final Report noted that, under the JLP administration, many 
activities under the RJ programme including increasing the number of referred mediation cases to 
DRF , planning of the International RJ conference and completion of the policy were not 225
completed. This signals the superficial interest that both parties had in RJ, juxtaposed with the 
choices made to please international stakeholders. The insincere motivation is consistent with the 
literature on policymaking in Jamaica where political parties will embrace a policy, but neglect it 
once the financial backing is given (Harriott 2009; Tennant & Clayton, 2010; Daley, 2013). During 
my interview with Barrett (consultant, skype, 10/1/15) , she stated,  
 “I kind of chuckled when you said that the legislation was forthcoming, because they used to 
 put PSAs about the policy and how it was forthcoming and it took years and years”. This   
 statement highlights the lack of priority given to moving the policy process forward by the  
 Jamaican government”.  
 Moreover, there is no indication that the donors exerted any pressure to adopt RJ. In fact, the 
Canadian stakeholders emphasised the need to develop a contextual version of RJ for Jamaica. As 
noted earlier, both Barrett (consultant, skype, 10/1/15) and Llewellyn (consultant, skype, 10/2/15) , 
as international consultants to the RJ programme were adamant that Jamaicans owned RJ. Also, 
Minister Golding (MOJ Offices, 18/11/14) noted that it was, under IDB requirements that a local 
person was hired to run the Granville RJ centre .  226
 As discussed, much of the funding that was used towards the RJ programme came from 
funding for general justice reform efforts. As Barrett (consultant, skype, 10/1/15) stated, ‘where 
there was a need, the funding would follow’. I noted earlier that the Commission of Enquiry and 
provision of victim support from the Tivoli incursion usurped some of the funds intended for the RJ 
 In 2007, 967 cases were referred to DRF for mediation, while 74 cases were referred in 2008 225
(MOJ, 2009). 
 Despite this hiring requirement and the even more specific request that the person hired by from 226
Granville, the Jamaican government hired someone local from outside the community. As a result 
the community rejected this person and they had to be relocated to another centre. This highlights 
the value of public opinion and collaboration. 
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programme. In their interviews, Donna Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15) and 
Rev Dundas (consultant, Leicester cafe, 20/4/15) stated that much of the funding that RJ received 
came through money from other programmes such as CSJP. This indicates the relatively lax 
restrictions placed on the Jamaican government by funders in terms of how the money was spent. 
Despite the lack of coercion, the Jamaican government was persistent in applying a ‘best practice, 
one-size fits all’ version of RJ in Jamaica. The hiring of IIRP is consistent with this agenda. The fact 
that the Jamaican government utilised an organisation that advocates ‘universal application of RJ 
without consideration of context’, against the advice of consultants highlights their intent to be seen 
favourably within an international context, as opposed to effecting change within the Jamaican 
community.  
Where is the policy transferred from?  
 In the case of the national RJ policy, the state engaged in exogenous transfer. The research 
demonstrates that Jamaica went to great lengths to adopt the use of RJ from Canada. They avoided 
the more cost-effective context-specific examination of local forms of community justice such as 
jungle justice and the Maroon justice system in developing the national RJ policy. In addition to the 
study tours and the hiring of Canadian consultants, much of the funding of the RJ programme came 
from Canadian agencies, such as CIDA and the CCF. As will be discussed in the following section, 
much of the policy has been taken from the RJ policy of Nova Scotia. However the implementation 
of RJ is consistent with the approach offered by IIRP, as reflected in the training of facilitators. As 
discussed previously, the Jamaican government refused to engage in endogenous transfer by 
avoiding consultation with non-state stakeholders such as the dons and the Maroons. Dundas 
(consultant, Leicester cafe, 20/4/15) states,  
 “Nobody is documenting the 100 case studies that says this is what restorative conferences  
 have looked like in Jamaica for the past 100 years, or a video study of the Maroons. Until  
Page !299
 that happens, we will be negotiating with external agencies to fund models, which are   
 translations of American or British or Canadian RJ, rather than through the indigenisation of 
 how RJ works. And unless we really begin to indigenize RJ or acknowledge it as a deep   
 community process, we will just be doing techniques until the cows come home”.  
What was transferred?  
 The Jamaican government engaged in both hard and soft forms of policy transfer to develop 
the national RJ policy. There was hard transfer of tangible elements, as the policy copies parts of the 
Nova Scotia counterpart in terms of structure, content and administrative techniques.  
 Softer forms of transfer took place also. I have discussed the incorporation of two opposing 
ideologies on RJ by the Jamaican government; the one-size-fits all approach of IIRP and the 
context-specific approach advocated by the consultants. Some of the literature on RJ speaks to the 
importance of having an agreed understanding of RJ and its standards (Llewellyn & Howse, 1997; 
Braithwaite, 2001; Ashworth, 2002).  
 As Llewellyn stated in her interview (consultant, skype, 10/2/15) , it is essential for a 
jurisdiction to understand why it is engaging in RJ, as opposed to just thinking of it as another way 
of imposing punishment:  
 “For me, it depends on why parties are agreeing to it. If parties are agreeing to it because we 
 assume that justice hasn’t really been done; unless there is some punishment meted out. One 
 of the dangers of using these as practices to get to the same end point is that if you don’t   
 actually change your thinking about justice is that the idea of justice is that we need to be  
 able to meet the needs of the parties and establish better relationships for the future”.  
 Collaborative governance could have remedied this lack of consensus. Earlier I noted that 
the opposing nature of these ideologies resulted in a lack of consensus amongst stakeholders. 
However it also resulted in a variation in the implementation of RJ practices. The failure to 
streamline the efforts of DRF, the consultants and IIRP meant that different types of RJ were being 
practiced without the support of the state and outside of policy boundaries. I have mentioned the 
referral process of the national programme in Chapter 7 (Chart 8.1). However, the RJ process of 
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DRF is different in that it utilises a wider range of RJ processes, dependent on the type of crime 
being addressed. For instance, Hines (DRF director, DRF Offices, 07/11/14) indicated that DRF 
uses restorative circles at their own discretion. Also DRF uses RJ for a wider range of crimes 
including gang violence and sexual violence. This restricted use of RJ practices might affect the 
uptake of the programme and its success in resolving community disputes, since culturally, the 
Jamaican context lends itself to the use of circles and meets the demand of resolving a wider range 
of crimes  
Chart 8.0 DRJ RJ Referral Process  
 
 Also, Northern Caribbean University (NCU), founded in 1907, participates in delivering 
restorative service through their Community Counselling and RJ Centre (CCRJC), in a way that is 
inconsistent with the national policy (http://www.ncu.edu.jm/, accessed on January 24, 2017). They 
use a RJ conferences and circles for a wide range of issues, namely gender-based violence. Also, 
they only provide RJ services at the pre-charge stage. (See Chart 8.1) In his interview, acting RJ 
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director, Hall,(RJU Offices, 28/11/14) affirmed this by noting that their approach to RJ was very 
different to that of MOJ, including their application of RJ to DV.  
Chart 8.2 CCRJC Referral Process  
 
 When I asked Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15) if there was any 
concern regarding these distinctions, she indicated that it did not matter, as long as these other 
practices could be differentiated as being something other than RJ . As long as RJ could be 227
claimed by the state, there was no concern for how these other programmes might affect the state’s 
programme, particularly since the public trusts DRF and PMI. However, as discussed, the presence 
of these programmes, which operate independently of the state by organisations that are more 
 My interviews indicated that upon leaving MOJ, Ruth Carey began to offer her own RJ services, 227
which do not function as part of the state RJ programme. 
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trusted by the state are likely to have an effect on the uptake of the programme and the 
understanding of RJ generally.  
What is the degree of transfer?  
 The literature on policy transfer indicates that a lack of political will is more likely to result 
in direct copying of policy. In the case of the Jamaican national RJ policy, a hybridisation/synthesis 
of elements from more than one jurisdiction took place. The practices and the policy in Jamaica are 
not exact copies of the practices and policies in Nova Scotia or Pennsylvania. However the 
similarities and changes made to the policy highlight the neglect of contextualisation and the 
opportunistic motivation to adopt international approaches, even in spite of advice from 
international consultants to do the opposite.  
 As discussed, some direct copying of the Nova Scotia policy took place. This had an impact 
on the reach of the RJ programme in Jamaica. For instance, both policies do not utilise RJ for sexual 
offences. Barrett (consultant, Skype, 10/01/15) noted that there was a current moratorium on the use 
of RJ for these crimes. However, she had recommended further research on its potential to address 
them in Jamaica, given the backlog of sexual violence cases. As discussed, this research was not 
done.  
 However, there are some differences between the Jamaican policy and its Nova Scotia 
counterpart. One such difference is that the Jamaican policy focuses on the punishment of adults 
only, whereas the Nova Scotia policy places particular emphasis on juvenile offences . This initial 228
focus on adult offences is inconsistent with best practice regarding implementation of RJ across 
 At the RJ International Conference, PS Palmer (MOJ Offices, 10/1/15) stated that the next phase 228
of the RJ programme would be implementation in schools despite the fact that it has not yet been 
implemented into the justice system formally. 
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jurisdictions, where RJ is first applied to juvenile offences, where it is proven to have the most 
success .  229
 In addition, the Nova Scotia policy allows a range of agencies to be responsible for 
monitoring RJ agreements and other aspects of implementation. In Jamaica, the policy states that 
the RJ centre will undertake monitoring of agreements. The 2009 Community Security and 
Transformation Assessment Report states that CSJP failed to partner with local NGOs for the 
consistent delivery of services and had limited collaboration with other state-run agencies (GOJ, 
2012). This distinction fails to take into account the lack of professional and financial resources 
available to run the programme in Jamaica. If the Jamaican government took the similar approach 
of collaborating with CSOs that are familiar with RJ already to implement and monitor RJ 
agreements, the initial results of the programme might have been more successful. Persons that 
were already familiar with DRF and PMI would have greater incentive to use the RJ programme. 
Also the courts could have piggybacked off the pre-existing agreement with DRF to conduct ADR 
for the courts by simply including RJ conferences in their mandate.  
What factors constrain or enable policy transfer?  
 The policy transfer literature states that there are factors that either constrain or enable 
policy transfer. Hard forms of transfer tend to be plagued by constraining cognitive issues, such as 
public opinion as well as more tangible, environmental issues such as lack of resources (Benson & 
Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Stone, 2004). In Jamaica, I suggest the constraining factors 
are social, cultural and economic in nature, ranging from practical issues such as literacy, to wider 
problems such as the nature of crime and public mistrust of the state.  
 Instead, Jamaica has developed a child diversion programme that works separately from the RJ 229
programme.
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 Some of the more practical aspects of how RJ is being practiced hamper the efficiency of the 
process directly. I have discussed the failure to consider contextual issues such as literacy and its 
effect on the monitoring and evaluation of the RJ programme. This failure makes it difficult for 
MOJ to improve upon the initial implementation and satisfy the monitoring requirements of funders 
and thus maintain financial sustainability. Collaboration with civil society and more effective public 
consultations might have identified this issue prior to implementation.  
 Also, the state has not considered the differences in economic context between Nova Scotia 
and Jamaica. As part of a developed country that had a long-standing history of using RJ, Nova 
Scotia had access to funding, state support, a functioning justice system and a wealth of agencies to 
assist with implementation (Nova Scotia Justice, 2007, https://novascotia.ca/just/rj/documents/
Restorative%20Justice%20Protoco l%20Eng%20Web.pdf, accessed February 17, 2017). In 
Jamaica, economic instability has a direct effect on the sustainability of the RJ programme, which  
is run by way of external funding. During my interview with Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ 
Offices, 30/2/15), she noted that sustainability was her only concern about the RJ programme. 
Without charging for restorative services, there was no plan for how the programme would continue 
after the funding ends in 2019. As a result, the future of the programme is in jeopardy. Had there 
been a collaborative  
approach to governance, cost-effective measures might have been implemented such as service 
provision through civil society, the church academics and a range of professionals (including 
healthcare) to the RJ programme.  
 While RJ has the capacity to resolve a range of offences, its application was limited by the 
failure to consider the hesitation of political parties to address political violence and 
informerphobia. Damian Hutchinson of PMI (PMI Offices, 26/2/15) and Judith Wedderburn from 
FES (FES Offices, 10/10/14) discussed the difficulty of using RJ to address politically fuelled crime 
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because of the informerphobia culture. Hutchinson (PMI Director, PMI Offices, 26/2/15) stated that 
PMI embraces RJ principles of healing and restoration, but finds it difficult to utilise the practices 
because restorative conferences do not lend themselves to resolving issues between political gangs, 
because gang culture is such that persons are not inclined to be accountable or divulge the names of 
persons who are. Similarly, participants in both of my focus groups discussed their fear of 
implicating community gang leaders or an associate through participating in RJ. During my 
observations, the Tower Hill RJ centre was clearly identified as a RJ centre, which might deter 
persons from entering, from fear of being labelled as an ‘informer’. Also, I noted earlier that other 
persons were using the centre itself, which affected any possibility for anonymity. As a state-run 
entity, the RJ programme has suffered from informerphobia. During Barrett’s interview (consultant, 
Skype, 20/1/15), she recounted a story where a family member of a CSJP worker was killed because 
he was perceived as an informer. She stated that this perception of CSJP and the choice to partner 
with them affected the ‘politics’ surrounding the implementation of the RJ programme. In 2015, a 
RJ facilitator (also a JP) was killed as well (http://jamaica- gleaner.com/article/news/20151118/
justice-minister-condemns-killing- restorative-justice-facilitator, accessed February 4, 2017).  
 The perception of trusted individuals such as dons, supporting the initiative might have 
allowed for increased public confidence of the RJ programme. However, I have discussed PS 
Palmer and the refusal of the Jamaican government to work with dons, against the advice of 
international consultants. Also, the 2009 Community Security and Transformation Assessment 
Report states that CSJP neglected to make attempts to improve police-community relations, which 
would have been an important step in improving public trust.  
 I have discussed the failure of the Jamaican government to consider public opinion. Public 
attitudes of justice constrain the types of policy that can be transferred. In Jamaica, the predominant 
approach to justice is categorised by severe and blanket punishment. PS Palmer (MOJ Offices, 
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10/1/15) and Justice McIntosh (DPP Offices, 28/11/14)  stated that that public consensus indicated 
that RJ, as a soft approach to crime, should only be applied to minor community disputes. CEO of 
FES, Wedderburn (FES Offices, 10/10/14) as well as PS Palmer (MOJ Offices, 10/1/15) and Puisne 
Judge Justice McIntosh (DPP ,Offices, 28/11/14) echoed similar sentiments, stating that some CSOs 
felt that RJ would be inappropriate for more serious crimes such as sexual violence. Indeed the 
national consultations indicated that people were not comfortable with the use of RJ for more severe 
crimes. While the majority (77.9%) of respondents felt that persons should always have the 
opportunity to explain their actions, 57.2% felt that the community was not better than the 
government in resolving crime. 52.9% felt that community leaders would be best suited to resolve 
family disputes.  
 However there is some research to indicate that the public is open to RJ for serious crimes. 
In particular evidence indicates that persons are open to RJ in conjunction for sexual violence at the 
post-sentence phase. I have discussed the work of Taylor, Chauhan & Fondacaro (2012), which 
indicates that people are open to a mixture of restoration and retribution. In my own questionnaire I 
asked how participants thought sexual offences should be punished. 109 of 202 participants felt that 
RJ should not be used for more serious sexual offences (as identified in Chapter 5). However, when 
asked how individual crimes should be punished, many persons opted for a mixture of incarceration 
and rehabilitation or rehabilitation only. Participants felt that rape (61%) and (54%) grievous sexual 
abuse was best addressed through a mixture of rehabilitation and incarceration. Also over 40% of 
respondents opted for rehabilitation only in the case of incest and marital rape. Rev. Dundas 
(consultant, cafe leicester, 20/4/15) highlighted the success of restorative-oriented programmes that 
he ran during his post as Chaplain for the correctional facilities. During my interview with George 
from Standup Jamaica (director, Standup for Jamaica offices, 20/1/15), he stated that many 
incarcerated offenders (including sex offenders) were eager to participate in RJ. If the Jamaican 
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government had sought to use public opinion to determine how RJ should look in Jamaica, 
policymakers might have considered RJ to be applied to a wider range of crimes at various stages 
throughout the justice process, thereby increasing access to justice.  
What was the Impact on Policy Transfer?  
 The national RJ policy in Jamaica stands as an example of inappropriate policy transfer. The 
lack of collaborative governance, lack of political and the opportunistic motivation for policy 
transfer led to a neglect of political, economic and social context that would have created a national 
RJ policy that addressed the needs of Jamaicans. This inappropriate policy transfer led to the poor 
implementation efforts discussed, such as the varied approach to practice within and across 
administrations, poor infrastructure, lack of sustainability, the neglect of practical restraints such as 
poverty, safety and literacy within the practice itself, discrepancy between policy and practice and 
poor monitoring of the programme. Also, there have been limited results. Inconsistent reports on 
how many conferences have been conducted demonstrate the poor implementation While 
Parchment-Brown (JRIU Lead, MOJ Offices, 30/2/15) reported that over 80 cases had been 
conducted, the official report indicates that only 46 cases have been undertaken. This is particularly 
low considering the relatively large populations of the identified pilot communities (See Appendix 
Seven).  
 The fact that none of these cases have been completed speaks to the efficiency of the 
programme as well, particularly since these cases take place at the community dispute level, where 
they are unburdened by the lack of involvement of the court system and its backlog. Also, there is 
limited awareness of the programme. The 2009 Community Security and Transformation 
Assessment Report, an assessment of CSJP found that only 44% of persons living in CSJP 
communities were aware of their presence (GOJ, 2009).  
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         Conclusion  
 This thesis examines the development and implementation of the national RJ policy in 
Jamaica. In particular I sought to identify what the policymaking process as well as the factors that 
influenced that process and determine how these factors affect the capacity of RJ. Other justice 
policies implemented in Jamaica have failed to prevent crime within a Jamaican context, but 
appease international interests and Jamaica’s need for financial support. Jamaica is a post-colonial 
society that has a history of government using policy as a political tool to gain favour and funding 
from developed states and the wider international community. However, in the case of justice policy 
there has been a hesitation to implement effective policy as a result of the government’s own 
involvement in crime. Jamaica has become a pluralist society, where there are multiple informal 
justice systems that operate alongside the state, in response to its failure to provide effective justice 
to its citizens.  
 In this thesis I suggest that, unlike other justice policies implemented in Jamaica, RJ policy 
has the potential to provide an effective approach to justice within a local context, while being 
consistent with best practice as dictated by the international community. RJ is a HR respecting 
approach to crime that seeks to address the harm caused to the victim and the community by 
holding the wrongdoer accountable in a way and placing emphasis on the healing of all affected by 
the crime to ensure that they are better off than before the crime took place.  
 RJ has the capacity to respond to a number of justice related issues in Jamaica. First, it 
provides an avenue to justice in response to the current lack of effective justice available to 
Jamaicans, particularly those from the majority classes, due to discussed issues of backlog and 
ineffective legislation. Second, it is a system that is rooted in respect for HR. This is in contrast to 
Jamaican justice systems that violate the rights of both wrongdoer and victim. Where punishment is 
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imposed by the formal system, it often violates the rights of the wrongdoer by imposing severe 
punishment that is unrelated to the crime, thereby limiting his capacity for reform and putting the 
public at greater risk of his reoffending. Third, as an adaptable approach to justice it has 
demonstrated effectiveness in a range of jurisdictions, for a number of crimes. This effectiveness of 
RJ could inspire public confidence in the justice system as a whole addressing crime, thereby 
reducing the need for informal systems that offer victims justice, but in a way that violates the rights 
of the wrongdoer, and often ties the victim to conditions of reciprocity. However I suggest that RJ 
can only be effective when it is implemented as a community driven approach with the state playing 
a supportive role. In addition, I emphasise the importance of collaborative governance in 
policymaking so that the policy itself can reflect the needs of the society in which it is being 
implemented.  
 Consistent with the Dolowitz and Marsh framework literature I note that it is important that 
policymakers do the following in order to be successful in policy transfer: (i) accommodates the 
involvement of a wide range of stakeholders, (ii) have a genuine un-coerced desire to reconcile an 
issue problem, (iii) identify what needs to be transferred in order to address the issue within the 
local jurisdiction, (iv) engage in a broad search to find the solution to the problem being addressed, 
with a particular view to examine jurisdictions with similar problems and context, (v) adapt policy 
to suit the context of the local jurisdiction, (vi) consider contextual, demand and programmatic 
constraints throughout the transfer process, (vii) be informed about the donor and recipient 
countries as well as the policy being transferred.  
 However the Jamaican government engaged in opportunistic policy transfer. That is, the 
state implemented RJ with the desire to maintain funding relationships with Canada and be 
consistent with international best practice, as opposed to reducing crime, despite encouragement 
from donors to contextualise policy. This insincere motivation resulted in an emphasis on 
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collaboration with international stakeholders, while limiting the involvement of other stakeholders 
who had a vested interest in developing effective justice or could provide insight to the Jamaican 
context. Also, the state failed to consider a wide range of similar jurisdictions from which to borrow 
policy, but instead borrowed from the province of Nova Scotia of Canada; a leading country in 
implementing RJ. Thus, the Jamaican government engaged in inappropriate policy transfer, where 
they failed to sufficiently inform themselves as to the social, cultural and economic differences 
between Nova Scotia and its own jurisdictions as well as the various constraints of adopting policy 
from a developed to a developing context including public mistrust of the state, lack of resources 
and the presence of informal justice systems that operate alongside the state.  
 I attribute this failure to consider context sufficiently to a lack of collaborative governance. 
In borrowing from the literature on collaborative governance, I suggest that collaborative 
governance is a key process of policymaking. That is, in order to develop effective policy, it is 
essential that: (i) a range of stakeholders are engaged in key decision making processes, particularly 
non-state actors, (ii) there is consensus amongst all decision makers regarding the aims and their 
roles in achieving those aims, (iii) a presence of strong administrative capacity and leadership and, 
(iv) on-going, clear communication. In Jamaica the failure of both political parties to collaborate 
with each other demonstrated a lack of strong leadership and administrative capacity by the state, 
which was hampered further by the jungle justice system. By failing to collaborate with each other, 
there was a lack of consistency and consensus in the approach to developing the RJ programme. 
Ultimately the lack of motivation to implement effective justice policy and competitiveness for 
ownership of the policy as a means of gaining favour with international funders, limited the 
capacity for collaboration with civil society and excluded other stakeholders such as dons and the 
public; all of whom would have helped to address the context-specific issues to contend with in 
Jamaica. In this way collaborative governance contributed to inappropriate policy transfer. As a 
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result the RJ programme has demonstrated limited efficiency and has been received poorly, as 
evidenced by the limited uptake.  
 I have noted that this thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature and practical 
application of justice policy transfer. In particular, I note the contributions to the discussion of penal 
policy transfer in Jamaica and other developing countries that have to contend with certain issues 
that are absent within a developed context. By embracing a case study approach that utilises the 
Dolowitz & Marsh framework, this thesis also highlights an example of the mistakes that can be 
made in policy transfer and offers suggestions as to how they might be avoided. In particular, I have 
added to the framework itself by introducing the concept of opportunistic policy transfer and its 
potential to lead to inappropriate policy transfer. I have indicated that opportunistic policy transfer 
is poorly motivated for effecting change through policy and thus, is usually accompanied by limited 
search for policy that meets the needs of the political, economic and social context of the recipient 
jurisdiction. In addition, there is no coercion, direct or implied from the donor country. As a result, 
opportunistic policy transfer is most likely to lead to inappropriate policy transfer.  
 This discussion is particularly important for other countries that might learn from an 
examination of this justice policymaking exercise. Some of these lessons include the need for 
developing states to: (i) collaborate with a range of stakeholders, particularly those non-state 
stakeholders who are most affected by or involved with crime and can contribute to the 
development of a programme that meets the realities of the local context, (ii) investigate local forms 
of justice and justice systems that operate successfully in similar jurisdictions, (iii) focus on finding 
sustainable approaches to implementation, (iv) emphasise the value of monitoring and evaluation 
efforts as a means of identifying and reconciling problems that affect policy effectiveness, (v) 
ensure all stakeholders share a consensus on the aims of the policy as well as their roles in 
achieving those aims. This consensus should be rooted in factual information about the recipient 
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jurisdiction, such as the underlying causes of crime and local factors that prevent the administration 
of justice.  
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    Appendix One: Collaboration  
Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation  
 
Moloney’s Continuum of Collaboration  
Informing —>. Consultation —-> Placation —> Cooperation —> Coordination —> Collaboration  
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            Appendix Two: Methodology Tools 
Interview Request Sample  
         Leanne Levers    
         University of Warwick,   
         Coventry CV4 7AL,    
         United Kingdom 
November 3, 2014      
Permanent Secretary,            
Ministry of Justice,            
South NCB Head Tower,             
2 Oxford Road,            
Kingston 5, Jamaica  
Attention: Mrs. Carol Palmer, Permanent Secretary   
      Dear Permanent Secretary:  
My name is Leanne Levers I am a PhD Candidate at the University of Warwick in England. 
Currently, I am conducting research for my thesis in Jamaica, which focuses on the use of 
restorative practices in Jamaica.  
As part of my research, I am conducting interviews with various persons who have participated in 
the development of RJ in Jamaica. I am hoping that you would participate in this research as an 
interviewee. At your convenience, I would be most appreciative of the opportunity to speak with 
you about your role as Permanent Secretary and your involvement in RJ  
I sincerely hope that you will consider my request. I may be contacted at 406- 9194 or email me at: 
L.A.Levers@warwick.ac.uk.  
Sincerely,  
 
Leanne Levers  
PhD Candidate, University of Warwick  
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Online Questionnaire  
RJ and Sexual Violence  
Before you answer the questions, please watch this video. This video has two parts. The first section 
aims to provide you with factual information about sex offenders/sexual offences. The second 
section is a dramatization of a restorative conference that is handling a sexual assault. In this 
questionnaire, we will ask your opinions about how we define sexual offences and how sexual 
offences should be handled. In addition, we will be asking about your knowledge and opinions 
about a certain type of RJ and its potential use for certain crimes. Please answer all questions to the 
best of your ability. Thank you for participating in this research.  
Before you answer the questions, please watch this video:  
 
1. What is your gender?  
• Male 
• Female 
2. What is your age?  
• 18- 24 
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•  25-34 
• 35-44 
• 45 and over 
3. Employment Status 
• Self-Employed 
• Employed 
• Homemaker 
• Retired 
• Unable to work  
• Student  
• Military  
4. Have you ever been arrested or incarcerated?  
• Arrested  
• Incarcerated 
None of the Above  
 
5. What does the word ‘justice’ mean to you?  
6. How would you rate the following crimes in terms of severity (1 Least Severe-5 Most 
severe)?  
•  Marital Rape – non consensual intercourse with a spouse 
• Incest – sexual relationship between family members 
• Grievous Sexual Assault –oral/anal intercourse with object other than a penis 
• Rape –Vaginal Penetration with a penis 
• Child Sexual Abuse –Any sexual contact with a child performed by an adult  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7. What kind of punishment should sex offenders receive?  
• Marital Rape  
• Death Penalty 
• Rehabilitation 
• Chemical Castration 
• Life Imprisonment 
• Incarceration and Rehabilitation 
• Incest 
• Death Penalty 
• Rehabilitation 
• Chemical Castration 
• Life imprisonment 
• Incarceration and Rehabilitation 
• Rape 
•  Death Penalty  
•  Rehabilitation 
• Chemical Castration 
• Life imprisonment 
• Incarceration and Rehabilitation 
• Grievous Sexual Assault 
• Death Penalty 
• Rehabilitation  
• Chemical Castration 
• Life imprisonment 
• Incarceration and Rehabilitation  
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• Child Sexual Abuse 
• Death Penalty 
• Rehabilitation 
• Chemical Castration 
• Life Imprisonment 
• Incarceration and Rehabilitation 
8. Do you think sex offenders should be allowed to return to the community after being 
punished?     
• Yes  
• No  
9. Before watching the video were you are of RJ?  
• Yes  
• No 
10. Have you ever participated in a restorative process? If yes, which?  
A. Sentencing Circle 
B.   Restorative Conference  
C. Family Conference  
D. Peacemaking Circle  
E. None  
11. Would you opt to participate in restorative process?   
A.  Offender 
B. Victim 
C. Community Member 
D. I would not participate  
12. Do you think RJ, as shown in the video would help victims get closure?  
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• Yes  
• No  
13. What reasons would victims have for not participating in restorative justice? 
• Fear  
• Expense 
• Time 
• Non interested 
• Anger 
• Other ____________  
14. Do you believe that any types of sex offenders can give genuine apology?  
• Marital Rapists 
• Rapists 
• Incest 
• Child Molester 
• Grievous Sexual Assault  
15. Do you think that the type of RJ shown in the video could be used to punish less serious 
sexual offences? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Maybe  
16. Do you think the type of RJ shown in the video could be used to punish more serious sexual 
offences?  
    
• Yes 
•  No 
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• Maybe  
17. Do you think Jamaicans would participate as community members? 
• Yes  
• No 
• Maybe 
18. What are the reasons that Jamaican community members would possibly refuse to participate in 
RJ, as shown in the video?  
• Fear 
• Expense 
•  Time 
• Not Interested  
• Other  
19. If you were to participate in the type of conference shown in the video what measures 
would you want in place? _________________________________________________  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   Appendix Three: Document Analysis  
List of Documents  
• 2008-2009 Final MOJ Annual Report  
•  2009 CSJP Quality and Risk Review: Results and Procedures  
Report  
•  2010 Amnesty International Jamaica Submission to the UN  
Universal Periodic Review  
•  2012-2013 Jamaica National Crime Victimization Survey Final  
Report (Ministry of National Security, 2013)  
•  2013 Economic and Social Survey (Planning Institute of  
Jamaica, 2014)  
•  2013 UK Home Office Report on Jamaica  
•  2014 Auditor General’s Department Performance Audit Report  
of the Management of department of Correctional Services’ Rehabilitation Activities and 
Reintegration of Offenders into Society  
•  2014 CSJP Project Profile  
•  3 research papers prepared by international consultants for the RJ programme  
•  Assessment of Community Security and Transformation Programmes in Jamaica (GOJ, 
2009)  
• Assessment of the Civil Society in Jamaica (James, 2014)  
•  Code of Consultation of Practice for the Public Sector (GOJ,  
2005)  
•  DFID Business Case for Citizen Security and Justice Programme  
Phase 3 (2014)  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•  Final Evaluation Report: Jamaica Violence Prevention, Peace  
and Sustainable Development Programme (UNDP, 2011)  
•  Final Jamaica Justice System Reform Policy Agenda (Darby,  
2009)  
•  IADB CSJP Programme III Loan Proposal and Nonreimbursable  
Technical Cooperation (2014)  
•  Jamaica Request for an Extended Arrangement under the  
Extended Fund Facility (IMF, 2013)  
•  JLP and PNP Manifestos 2007-2011  
•  National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy  
(NCPCSS) (Ministry of National Security, 2010)  
•  National RJ policy of Jamaica (Government of Jamaica, 2012)  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   Appendix Four: Garrison Information  
List of Garrisons and their Political Affiliation  
List of Kingston Garrisons Political Affiliation
Cassia Park JLP
Trench Town PNP
Cockburn Pen PNP & JLP
Waterhouse PNP
Riverton City PNP
Payneland JLP
McKoy Lane PNP
Tivoli Gardens JLP
Brownsland JLP
Rose Town PNP
Denham Town JLP
Wilton Gardens JLP
Olympic Gardens JLP
Dunkirk JLP
August Town JLP
Nannyville PNP
Rae Town PNP
Arnett Gardens PNP
Hannah Town PNP
Vineyard Town PNP
Allman Town PNP
McGregor Gully PNP
Mountain View JLP
Backbush JLP
Papine PNP
Jaques Road JLP
Rockfort PNP
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Jarrett Lane PNP
Tel Aviv PNP
Bull Bay PNP & JLP
Political AffiliationList of Kingston Garrisons
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    Appendix Five: Timelines  
Timeline of Milestone Events regarding RJ in Jamaica  
1976: 
• Introduction of pre-trial process for family disputes (discontinued)  
1980: 
• IMF agreements focused on economic development 
1990-4**:  
• DRF Founded (1994) 
• Peace and Love in Schools (PALS) receives mediation training from the Peace Education 
Foundation 
• Dispute Resolution Foundation (DRF) receives training in mediation and dispute resolution from 
Capital Law School 
• Court referrals to DRF 
• Establishment of Drug Courts1 
•  Use of Commission of Enquiries (highly politicized)  
1995  
• Introduction of Night Courts to reduce court backlog; resolve minor matters (discontinued in 
practice due to safety issues in downtown)  
1998 
• Mediation units in Police force (never established formally) Police officers receive mediation 
training from DRF.  
1999-2000  
• DRF Conducted VORP training and advanced communication skills with Professor Howard Zehr  
•  DRF attends Eastern Mennonite University for training in RJ 
• DRF attempts to introduce RJ to government. 
• DRF conduct RJ sensitization for correctional centres in Kingston o Development of Batterer’s 
Programme (discontinued) 
• Temporary release programmes for inmates (not used widely)  
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2001  
• West Kingston shootout between Renalto Adams and Tivoli Gardens garrison (27-30 civilians 
killed, 2 police officers wounded)  
•  Separation of Ministry of National Security and Justice into 2 separate entities   
•  West Kingston Commission of Enquiry receives recommendation from Jennifer Llewellyn to 
consider incorporation of RJ into system.  
•  Citizen Security Justice Programme (CSJP) founded (Government Agency; Phase 1 intended to 
develop nation strategy, capacity building within ministries, improve justice system)  
2002  
• CSJP 1 funding granted (20.6 million- IMF budget, World Bank, IADB; provided RJ funding for 
Asst with policy, PR materials and delivery of Crime survey)  
•  Development of RJ programme in Prison through Harvard students (discontinued)  
• Peace Management Initiative (PMI) founded (parastatal)  
• PNP won general election. 3rd consecutive win 
• Policy Framework Research Paper by Llewellyn 
• Victim Support Unit founded (Government Agency)  
2003  
•  Social Conflict and Legal Reform Project founded 
•  UNDP funds position of consultant for RJ initiative.  
2004 
• Hurricane Ivan (relocation of some CSJP funds) 
2005 
•  People’s National Party coordinates RJ Study tour (main attendees, DRF, PMI & Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ)  
•  Training of Justices of the Peace as mediators by DRF 
•  Justice Reform Act passed 
• RJ Consultations conducted by DRF (not mentioned in policy documents)  
2006  
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• Government decision started coordinating RJ through MOJ to respond to 2002 recommendations 
of the inquiry  
•  Llewellyn asked to come on board as a consultant to write the policy. She recommends using a 
local person who would understand the Jamaican context Llewellyn and associates asked to 
come on board as consultants  
•  Citizen Security Initiative founded (government agency). Members trained by DRF  
•  Justice Task form Formed 
•  Portia Simpson-Miller becomes head of PNP and Prime Minister due to resignation of Prime 
Minister P.J Patterson  
2006-2010**  
• RJ agenda surrounding Public Relations, Building Awareness via Conferences, radio adverts, 
sensitization sessions  
•  Bid for training won by IIRP 
• Permanent Secretary becomes member of IIRP board 
• Request by Ministry of Justice to extend payment of CSJP funding to due to failure to complete 
objective  
2007  
•  Justice System Task Force: Reform Framework Agenda produced. Proposes RJ as an philosophy 
to underpin reform of the justice system   
•  RJ Paper produced by Rev. Leon Dundas (Head of Chaplaincy Unit, Member of DRF)  
•  Dispute Resolution Foundation continues Consultations and Sensitizations for RJ around the 
country  
•  Justice Undertakings for Social Transformation founded (government agency under Ministry of 
Justice; 18.5CA million, CIDA, exp. 2016)  
•  Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) wins national election after 18 year reign of PNP; Bruce Golding 
become Prime Minister  
•  Dorothy Lightbourne become head of Ministry of Justice and Attorney General  
• Joint Select Committee formed for reform of 2003 Sexual Offences Act o Hurricane Dean 
(redirections of funds)  
2008  
• Strategic Framework developed for Policy development by Llewellyn & Graham  
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•  Jamaica Violence Peace and Sustainable Development Programme founded (government 
programme) 
•  Consultations conducted by DRF  
2009 
•  Ruth Carey hired as ‘Project Specialist’ under Ministry of Justice o Permanent Secretary of 
Ministry of Justice Carol Palmer resigns 
• Rainford (JLP) replaces Carol Palmer as Permanent Secretary 
• First Assessment of Justice Reform Projects by CIDA/UNDP  
•  CSJP Phase 2 begins (IDB, UK government; DFID funded increased emphasis on RJ related 
objectives; IDB funding received; RJ programme framework, case management system, national 
policy, training/sensitization; RJ centres) 
•  IIRP conducts training of 59 RJ facilitators (mostly Justices of the Peace)  
2010  
• Extradition of donman Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke 
• Audrey Barrett (student of Llewellyn) is hired as National Technical Advisor (no description/
mandate given for position)  
• JVSPD ended 
• First RJ centres built (4) 
• Further training from IIRP  
•  Child Diversion Programme developed (considered to be driven by RJ principles)  
2011  
• West Kingston Commission of Enquiry following extradition (ongoing)  
• Lightbourne implicated in Dudus case; asked to resign and ousted from the party by Prime 
Minister Golding 
• Delroy Chuck becomes Minister of Justice 
• Ruth Carey become head of RJ Unit; writes and completes national RJ policy with Audrey 
Barrett 
• Bruce Golding resigns as Prime Minister due to being implicated in Dudus case 
• Andre Holness becomes JLP leader and Prime Minister 
• Some training delivered to MOJ facilitators by Audrey Barrett o Continued training by IIRP 
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2012  
• JLP loses election and Portia Simpson-Miller becomes Prime Minister under PNP   
•  More RJ centres built 
• Continued trained by IIRP 
• Carol Palmer returns to position of Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Justice 
• Publication of National RJ Policy o Sensitization of RJ continued  
2013  
• Estimated sensitization of 5000 citizens in 10 pilot communities by CSJP  
•  Child Diversion Initiative implemented (slated to end in 2016)  
•  40 RJ Facilitators trained with child rights and responsibility skills 
• Development of National Child Diversion Policy (not yet completed) o 6 Consultations held for 
Child Diversion Policy 
• Donna Parchment Brown (former head of DRF & PMI, Custos of St Andrew) becomes head of 
Justice Reform Implementation Unit for JUST programme (MOJ project)  
2014  
• RJ conferences begin to be held within pilot communities (80 conducted, 20 completed)  
•  Ruth Carey contract as head of RJU ends; she starts an independent RJ consultancy firm  
•  Roydon Hall (Olympic Gardens RJ centre manager) becomes acting director of RJU  
•  Announcement that RJ policy is being tabled for legislation (not done) o Hiring process for new 
RJU director begins  
•  Tender for training plan for Ministry of Justice under the JUST Programme  
2015  
• CSJP Phase 3 begins (Exp 2019) (55 million; IDB, DFID, DFATD; 12 million dedicated to RJ 
development; increasing range of RJ programmes, evaluation of RJ programmes; at end of CSJP 
2- 46 cases conducted)  
•  Ministry of National Security forms a new working group to work on crime fighting policies 
(http://rjrnewsonline.com/local/working-group- established-to-formulate-crime-fighting-policies)   
•  Opposition Leader uses buggery law to win votes; putting it to referendum (http://
www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Holness--JLP-Gov- t-will-put-buggery-law-to-
referendum_19235602) 
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•  New RJU director hired (4th director since programme started)  
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    Appendix Six: Photographs  
Pictures of Tower Hill RJ centre in Jamaica Signage for Tower Hill RJ Centre  
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Wall of RJ Community Centre  
 
RJ centre functions as a local community centre  
Pre-meeting taking place outside of the RJ centre  
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    Appendix Seven: Populations  
Population of RJ Pilot Communities 
Pilot Community Population (estimated)
Granville
Effort Ville
Homestead 5,756
Tower Hill
Canaan Heights 3,816
March Pen 3,827
Ellerslie
Montego Bay 110,115
Russia
Trench Town
August Town
6,122 
 
5,958 
 
 
4435
3,876 
 
11,926 
 
 
                             4,723
 
6,956
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